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Abstract
Historically capital cities in less developed countries such as Sierra Leone and 
Afghanistan have served as sites o f deliberate attempts to bring about change 
in both local and national political systems. Ranging from modernist agendas 
to contemporary donor-driven ‘reconstruction’ efforts, strategies to build 
effective state structures, including local governance institutions, have been at 
the core o f such politics.
Drawing on a multidisciplinary methodology that combines historical analysis 
with micro- and meso-level field research, the thesis explores the dynamics o f 
agency and structure in an investigation o f the function o f capital cities as 
political arenas. It reviews key strands o f urban political theory for their 
applicability to developing country contexts and situations o f state fragility. 
The thesis finds existing approaches to be insufficiently suited to explaining 
political processes operating in and on war-affected capital cities. Current 
theoretical treatments present cities as distinct or contained political spaces, 
which in these contexts they are not. They also fail to account for radical 
changes in the polities in which they are embedded and underestimate the 
degree o f coercion exercised towards local stakeholders by supra-local actors, 
highlighting the need for a revised interpretative framework.
The study juxtaposes policies and programmes targeted at urban and national 
level institutional change with urban political trajectories in war-affected 
Freetown and Kabul. The thesis examines how external resources and lines o f 
control create political axes that intersect and transcend urban spaces. The 
research finds that these axes work to the detriment o f local political 
deliberation and explains why institutional reforms aimed at strengthening 
local political agency have given rise to the opposite outcome. The research 
thus illustrates the importance o f political economy factors related to 
international intervention and shows how these have served to influence the 
nature o f capital city politics in least developed countries.
Empirically the study establishes why the two capital cities function as 
linchpins o f international assistance yet fail to benefit from local political 
empowerment and equitable urban recovery. It is concluded that local politics 
in these two cities are overdetermined by national and international interests 
and agendas. Theoretically the thesis offers the concept o f ‘tri-axial urban 
governance,’ which combines historically informed political economy analysis 
with an explicitly spatial framework for analysing politics in and on war- 
affected cities. This reconfigured conceptual scaffolding exposes power 
relations operative in city politics in fragile states and explains their impact on 
dynamics o f structure and agency.
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Foreword
Phil B o r g e s ,  v v v v w .p l
On 22 March 2006, Jacques Barrot, the European Commissioner of 
Transport, issued a list of 92 airlines banned from landing at European 
airports. A number o f carriers immediately sprang to my eye: these airlines 
are not only transporting passengers; they are also carriers of emotional 
souvenirs from my fieldwork in Afghanistan and Sierra Leone. While the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) appeared to be the front-runner of 
impossible companies, I was not really astonished to also find Ariana Afghan 
Airlines in this illustrious collection. Having flown with them only once— I 
had to leave Kabul in a hurry due to the rapidly worsening security situation 
in late spring of 2005— I remember vividly the loose seats and swinging 
overhead bins. However, I was slighdy more befuddled that Phoenix Aviation 
of Kyrgyzstan was featured there as well. They were the main contractor for 
the United Nations Humanitarian A ir  Services (UNHAS), operating several 
flights per week from Dubai to Kabul, and my airline of choice for three of 
my four visits to the country. I can also claim to have flown KamAir once, 
the warlord-owned carrier whose only jet plane crashed eleven miles from 
Kabul in a snowstorm in early February 2005— one day prior to my 
scheduled departure— causing 107 deaths. It remains a mystery why they did 
not make it onto Monsieur Barrot’s list. To my satisfaction— and pushing 
the shares in aviation insecurity between my two case study countries back 
into balance— I found Paramount Airlines on the roster, an airline operating 
four Russian MI-8 helicopters built in the late 1970s, which connect 
Freetown proper with Lungi Airport, Sierra Leone’s international hub, 
through hourly eight-minute flights. In spite of the brevity of these 
commutes they can be memorable journeys, such as when the chopper that I 
was travelling in was shattered by a heavy twitch after taking off from the 
sandblasted helipad in Freetown-Aberdeen. Hence it did not come as a total 
surprise when in June 2007 one of their helicopters crashed, killing 19 
passengers including Togo’s Sports Minister. For my part though, I have 
been lucky enough to always land safely, and looking back at my travels I 
feel a deep sense of gratitude for the glimpses into urban life and politics in 
Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, which in crucial aspects are so markedly 
different from my experience of European and North American cities.
x
Chapter 1: Rationale, hypotheses, structure
Why a study on urban politics in fragile states?
Politics and urban life are strongly intertwined social phenomena, in history 
as much as in the present. It has been in cities where the concept o f the 
“citizen” was forged and where debates on deliberation, legitimacy, and 
democracy have been taking place since the time o f Greek city states 
(Blockmans 2003). But David Harvey (2003: 939) has also remarked, 
“calmness and civility in urban history are the exception not the rule.” This 
comment echoes the doctrine o f St. Augustine (410), who more than a 
millennium and a half previously noted that although “the earthly dty [...] 
has its good in this world, [...], this city is often divided against itself by 
litigations, wars, quarrels, and such victories as are either life-destroying or 
short-lived.”1 Analysing the specific processes through which different cities 
shape and are shaped by conflicts, the range o f social and political patterns 
that emerge, and “whether outcomes are creative or destructive,” according 
to Harvey (ibid.) “the only interesting question,” is key to understanding the 
dynamic relationship between cities and conflict.
Contemporary theories aiming at structuring and explaining politics in cities 
thus touch upon vital issues o f society, including the preservation o f peace. 
These theories have so far been developed and applied predominandy to 
urban politics in the so-called ‘developed,’ industrialised countries to explain 
city-level politics in urban spaces that have, to some degree at least, 
undergone a capitalist transformation. Conversely, almost no theorising and 
testing has focused on less developed countries, and certainly not on those 
states whose polity is structurally fragile and operationally weak due to being 
challenged— often violendy— by actors either within these countries (cf. 
Caselli and Coleman 2006) or beyond national boundaries, such as terrorist 
networks (cf. Milliken and Krause 2002). This is surprising in light o f the 
logic introduced above, namely that it was urban spaces that constituted the
1 Cf. Martin (1972) for a discussion of St. Augustine’s philosophy of the heavenly and the 
earthly city.
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first fora— political arenas— in which debates on the factors generating 
peaceful co-existence and prosperity, both locally and at what is now known 
as the ‘national’ or even global levels. The fact that little is known on 
whether existing theories o f urban politics apply to settings marked by 
violent conflict and rampant poverty constitutes a theoretical gap in need of 
being filled.
Herein, while in fact implicit in the theories o f political change theorists have 
pointed out that the “three-tiered agenda o f linking agency, space, and 
structure [...] is rarely explicitly taken up” (Tajbakhsh 2001: 22) in 
theoretical texts on urban political economy. This is despite one o f the 
central lessons learned from the debate on urban autonomy during the 1980s 
being that power relations that play out in the city do not always originate in 
the city (cf. Beauregard 1984, Mollenkopf 1989). From this insight the 
journey to questioning the applicability o f urban theory to post-war urban 
settings is a short one. At the same time, the call for a holistic yet 
heterogeneous urban theory that is applicable to all cities in all countries has 
recently been uttered by theorists insisting on placing “different kinds of 
cities within the same field o f urban theory without suggesting that all cities 
are alike.” (Robinson 2006: 63, cf. Scott and Storper 2003). Capital cities in 
least developed countries just emerging from large-scale violence are 
tempting places to analyse in light of such claims. If such cities could be 
integrated meaningfully— that is, if they didn’t require an ‘extra set of 
theory’— into existing theoretical constructs, this would suggest that other 
conflict cities could potentially be incorporated as well.
This study rests on an assumption that urban institutions and policies cannot 
be modified or changed effectively unless urban politics are understood. 
This proposition draws inspiration from the observation that writing about 
urban politics is not primarily concerned about the place o f politics, but 
about the “politics o f place” (Bums et al. 1994: 7-8, cf. Smith and Katz 
1993), i.e., the analysis of inter-spatial processes o f institutional change and 
policymaking. Brenner (2001: 599, cf. Sellers 2005: 441, Kaltenbrunner 2006: 
15, Kufeld 2004: 17, Harriss 2002: 494) calls this the ‘singular and plural 
politics o f scale,’ and it is the plural notion, the one that cuts across polity
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layers, that is central to this present study. An analytical framework is 
therefore needed that accounts for both changes and continuities in political 
choice and structural contexts over time and within a given place, but also at 
different levels o f politico-economic interaction (cf. Stone 1987: 4-5).
Similar to the embeddedness o f markets in specific social and political 
relations, so can the space for local political agency be expected to vary from 
place to place — as much as specific roles o f central governments and 
international actors in “shaping and delimiting that space” (Bums et al. 1994: 
11, cf. Karstedt 2004, Tetzlaff 2003: 343). Grindle (2005: 2,14) explains,
“Acting within particular contexts, those who lead change initiatives often try to 
undermine the power o f  existing interests and to alter the biases o f  institutions. 
Whether they are successful or not depends in part on their strategies, but also on  
the context within which they seek to promote change. [...] The politics o f  policy 
change reflect a dynamic interaction o f  interests, institutions, and agency in a 
particular (andsometimes changing') context that unfolds over time, [emphasis added]”
The resulting challenge, then, is to explain rigidity, rupture and 
reconfiguration o f urban institutions vis-a-vis highly dynamic environments. 
Recalling Immergut’s (1992, cf. Dunlavy 1994) contention that those 
designing the institutional framework are usually not the ones who design 
policies that take effect within it, Brian Uzzi (1997) has pointed to the 
“paradox o f embeddedness” where agency for change is possible, but 
structural change is usually difficult, which in turn limits the scope for 
agency. However, while this rings true in late-industrialising (historically) and 
industrialised countries (from a contemporary viewpoint), one may challenge 
this sequence o f “agents shaping institutions shaping agency” in the case of 
post-war developing countries, proposing instead a higher degree of 
immediateness resulting in a higher degree o f discretion for policy-making and 
institutional change potentially to the benefit o f both local and international 
actors. Moreover, while this investigation could mistakenly lead to an 
assumption o f “fluid institutions” where every structure is in flux over time 
(Thelen 1999: 397), the empirical observations discussed in this study revoke 
this by showing that some institutions such as ethno-political faultlines 
across rural-urban ‘divides’ have remained rigid despite the dynamic past.
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When it is thus posited that systemic factors such as power, incentives and 
institutions are conditioning the scope o f agency over time, I am touching 
almost inevitably on an important body o f sociological literature on 
‘structuration’ whose central propositions are attributed mainly to Anthony 
Giddens. Henceforth this study also creates an opportunity to re-examine 
the allegedly self-constraining nature o f Giddens’ theory o f structuration, 
which posits that it is rendered in an idling circle o f structure-conditioning- 
agency-conditioning-structure caused by “a conceptual trap [of] residual 
sociologism” (Soja 1989: 141, 156). In a dynamic environment such as post­
war, least developed countries, isn’t it legitimate to suggest a greater 
likelihood for an ‘empirical escape’ from this trap? The termination o f large- 
scale violent conflicts may trigger a window of opportunity for what I 
propose to label ‘accelerated structuration’ — institutional structures are 
altered rapidly and deeply through the cross-spatial interaction o f urban, 
national and international actors.
We should note at this point that the idea that cross-border cooperation can 
accelerate the change o f structures that embed such interaction is one that 
Giddens discusses in his “Runaway World” (1999: 51), yet he does so 
without raising the case o f least developed (and pre-capitalist) countries or 
those arising from large-scale violence and experiencing targeted 
intervention. In Giddens’ view, structures ‘run away’ without armed conflict, 
but due to collective action increasing the intensity o f global flows o f goods 
and services. In the view purported in this study, structures are being altered 
within spaces that are not well-integrated parts o f these global networks and 
through processes that are not necessarily collective — ‘accelerated 
structuration’ happens at the spatial margins o f post-industrialist capitalism.
We also have to note that the term itself has not been invented here. Neil 
Brenner (2001: 697) must be credited for introducing the notion of 
‘accelerated restructuring’ in his discussion o f systemic capitalist crises. 
Brenner (ibid.) uses the concept to argue that “scalar configurations are not 
infinitely malleable, even during phases o f intensified, accelerated restructuring 
[emphasis added].” But much like Giddens, he looks at capitalist and post­
industrial societal systems and, what is more, provides no immediate
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empirical discussion o f his contention. This is where this study delves in — it 
aims at clarifying what exactly is going on during such potential “phases of  
intensified, accelerated restructuring” (Brenner 2001), and it tests this in a 
research setting characterised by substantial supranational involvement 
typical o f (but not necessarily limited to) spaces o f recently ended large-scale 
violence and institutional multiplicity, the latter pardy an effect o f unfinished 
projects o f creating nations within a capitalist structure o f production. 
Crucially then, this enquiry also addresses the accusation brought forward 
against Giddens o f “dip [ping] into empirical analysis at will and without 
commitment to any but his own framework o f interpretation” (Soja 1989: 
155). Rather than trying to ‘make structuration work’, the empirical data used 
here help assess the applicability o f Giddens’ analytical framework.
How close, then, does this investigation come to delivering an analysis 
commensurate with an extension o f urban Marxism (cf. Giddens 1984: 366)? 
While certainly engaging with urban neo-Marxist literature, the enquiry 
maintains a respectful distance. Soja (1989: 32) notes that Marx himself 
regarded geography an “unnecessary complication” to the determinist nature 
of capitalism, a conviction that has served to fuel the “annihilation o f space 
by time”, as Soja puts it (ibid., 33). This ‘despatialisation’ propagated by 
orthodox Marxism was eventually reverted through what is now labelled the 
‘spatial turn’ — a revived interest in the relations o f space, knowledge, and 
power (Soja 2002, Harvey 2000, 1989). Agreeing with these critics, the 
present enquiry seeks to transcend this competitive view o f time and space. 
Space assumes a central role in this analysis in that it broaches empirical 
phenomena such as migration, production and politics, tagging them as 
central to the understanding o f political processes surrounding the city as a 
policy objective and occupying the city as the political arena. History matters 
too, and gready so, yet we shall see that precisely the post-war context 
including international intervention and externally driven institutional 
(re) construction has the capacity to tip the balance towards space, not time.
This said, an uncritical reliance on the currendy prominent post-modernist 
school o f urban political theory to prey on the latter’s remarkable success in 
reconstituting discursively a “location for spatiality” (Lefebvre 1991: 119) in
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the analysis o f global and local political economies and their 
interconnections, would be equally misleading. The undeniable existence o f  
politico-economic structures o f extraction and exploitation in the developing 
world must not cover up the differences in nature and relative weight o f  
their constituting factors when compared to conceptually similar 
configurations in now-industrialised countries. If space matters for analysing 
the latter, it might do so differently in different politico-economic contexts.
Despite the attractiveness o f the intellectual thought experiment, filling this 
theoretical gap and addressing the resulting analytical agenda are not 
considered ends in themselves. In a recent contribution to the literature on 
peacebuilding in fragile societies, Scott Bollens (2006: 67) has proposed that 
“[t]he city is important in peacebuilding because it is in the streets and 
neighborhoods o f urban agglomerations that there is the negotiation over, 
and clarification of, abstract concepts such as democracy, fairness, and 
tolerance.” Therefore, explaining urban politics in cities in fragile states also 
serves a very practical purpose in that a better understanding o f such politics 
may help make cities places conducive to peacebuilding, not only locally, but 
potentially yielding additional positive effects on other parts o f the country 
as well, or even on the country as a whole.
The spatial level o f peacebuilding is thus regarded as an important factor 
determining the effectiveness o f peacebuilding (cf. Herrero 2005, Darby and 
MacGinty 2003, Abdullah 2002, Abrahamsen 2001, Low 1996, Lederach 
1995). Yet a “black hole” (Stanley 2003: 11-12, cf. Gleditsch 2004: 148-150) 
has purportedly been identified
“in the peacemaking literature when it comes to cities and to the urban scale [even 
though] substantive arguments about what is required for conflict resolution, about 
the dynamics o f  conflict transformation, about the praxis o f  peace making, all 
actually link very clearly to the urban scale, and cry out for agency at the urban 
level.”
In sum, even though peacebuilding is purportedly a bottom-up process, “in 
practice, the reverse is frequently the case.” (MacLean 1998: 35)
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To be fait, despite the gaps and ‘black holes’ identified, scholarly interest in 
the issue o f local politics and conflict is not entirely new. Research exploring 
the relationship between space and politics in fragile polities has gained 
momentum in the past decade, both in political geography and in peace and 
conflict studies (cf. Long 2001: 223-231), thus also responding to Bourdieu’s 
(1992: 33) call for integrating theory and practice in social enquiry.
This study builds on these different perspectives by proceeding in tandem, 
theoretically and empirically. The analysis examines the extent to which 
existing theoretical approaches to urban politics are applicable to fragile 
statehood and then, on this basis, reconfigures a framework for urban 
analysis that can accommodate the reality in two cities in such fragile 
environments, and possibly also other cities in similar settings as well.
The two cities that this study looks at in depth are Freetown and Kabul, the 
capital cities o f Sierra Leone and Afghanistan. These two countries have 
notably been labelled ‘failed states’ in the recently evolving liberal- 
interventionist literature on the subject, which aims at categorising countries 
on a continuum from collapse to weakness (Rotberg 2004: 11). Arguably an 
alarmingly reductionist ontology, this concept and classification have 
subsequently served to inform statements such that the intervention of 
external military forces helped Sierra Leone recover “sufficiently to be 
considered failed rather than collapsed,” and to then argue that it was the 
national “election in 2002 [that] capped the process o f recovery back to mere 
failure,” (ibid., 12) a process that should be supported through “jump- 
starting battered economies, re-introducing the rule o f law, and rejuvenating 
civil society” (ibid., 33). This task sounds straightforward. But it isn’t. Fragile 
states (some o f which the aforementioned camp has labelled ‘failed’) may 
not be effective in creating livelihoods and delivering services to their 
citizens and often also exclude their citizens from decision-making 
procedures. Their monopoly o f violence may be challenged by actors or 
groups with subversive, progressive and even legitimate agendas. But all o f  
these aforementioned processes that render such countries in a dynamic 
state o f fragility do not imply that such countries are political greenfields, 
institutional vacuums, or structural voids. On the contrary, when
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international forces (military as well as ‘humanitarian’ and those committed 
to ‘development’) set their feet on these allegedly ‘failed’ territories, what 
they find— if they allow themselves to listen and see— is a plethora o f actors, 
institutions, and structures. These may not be effective; they may even stand 
in fierce competition with one another, but they are the fragments that when 
taken together constitute the political, economic, and social reality that is 
supposed to be saved from ‘failure’ and strengthened to be rendered less 
fragile. Asking what happens to the incentive structures of different actors 
embedded in the political economy o f such places when foreign resources, 
plans, and personnel suddenly come flooding in therefore is a promising 
approach. What kind o f institutional and organisational frictions occur as a 
result o f these interactions? And what are the benefits and costs to the 
different stakeholders in the recipient country, both at the city level and 
nationally?
The investigation presented in this thesis shows that throughout history, 
resources external to the city and the resulting political leverage have mattered 
greatly in such settings (cf. Mitchell 1988). It thus concurs with recent 
studies such as Hohe’s (2005: 68-70) fascinating analysis of transitionary 
administration in East Timor that development policy that is aimed at 
“breaking through traditional systems o f power and former corruptive top- 
down decision-making processes” (ibid.) cause more harm than they create 
tangible improvements for those subject to them. Hohe (ibid.) concludes, 
“[sjocial engineering seems very tempting in a post conflict scenario, yet 
without full knowledge o f local dynamics, attempted empowerment o f new 
leaders will fail as local realities are stronger.” This example from a young 
country that has— for a number of years at least— been considered a 
successful exercise in democratic state-building suggests once again that the 
core problem is not a lack o f formal institutions or technical capacity, but 
rather the tension between external visions of, and measures toward, the 
implementation o f depoliticised urban development plans on one hand, and 
the reality o f cross-level urban politics on the other (cf. Bastian and 
Luckham 2003: 314-318).
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With intensifying international interconnectedness now termed 
‘globalisation’2 and ‘regional integration’ and the simultaneous softening o f 
national boundaries, local-national interaction concerning the distribution 
and use o f resources increasingly renders supra-national organisation and 
institutions, in particular in Europe but also in the Americas and parts o f  
Asia. The analytical category that has evolved to capture these cross-level 
interactions is ‘multi-level governance.’ Urban actors and structures are 
central part o f these governance networks (e.g., Bache and Flinders 2006, 
Welch and Kennedy-Pipe 2006, Scharpf 1997). With reference to European 
cities, Keil (2006: 335) explains the prominence o f the concept with the 
“spatial concentration o f multi-dimensional problems in parts o f urban 
areas,” which he considers a “known but unanswered question in 
international urban research.” Yet Olowu (2003: 515) stresses that the 
concept o f multi-level governance, if applied to the analysis o f developing 
country polities, commonly stops at the national level — precisely because o f  
the relatively lesser degree o f regional integration observed.
Conversely, the present study reveals that processes o f urban ‘recovery’ in 
post-intervention Sierra Leone and Afghanistan constitute telling examples 
of how international assistance to war-ridden cities can backfire because 
specific forms o f multi-level governance are not paid attention to. The 
research reveals that, even though the two countries were not officially ‘at 
war’ at the time o f writing,3 both continued to experience tugs o f war 
between entrenched interests and institutional multiplicity at several levels o f  
polity that were weaving the urban level into a multi-layered structure. The 
analyses o f different players and their political agency provided in this 
investigation not only demonstrate that these cities are highly politicised 
arenas; they also show that cooperation, collusion, and coercion around 
issues impacting on urban life in Freetown and Kabul connect actors and
2 Based of his critical analysis o f trans-national flows, Wade (1996) finds 
‘internationalisation’ a more appropriate term as ‘global’ implies an inclusion of all, and a 
general withering away of national units.
3 On September 15, 2006 amid mounting casualties among NATO forces fighting the 
Taleban in Afghanistan’s south, the US news channel CNN changed its theme for reports 
from the country to “The Unfinished War”. As CHAPTER SIX shows, this changing 
interpretation o f the security situation came with a significant delay considering the 
thousands o f Afghans— both government troops and insurgency forces— that died since the 
official ending o f the coalition-led regime change in late 2001.
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interests at different levels o f polity. What is more, international intervention 
and resulting projects o f nation state-creation and ‘local empowerment’ have 
produced ambivalent outcomes by buffering the relative power o f non-urban 
actors and coalitions at the expense o f ‘policy space’ for the cities (cf. Cavill 
et al. 2004: 170).
The crossover o f political space in such cities is suggested to be labelled “tri- 
axial urban governance,” a concept that resonates with Brenner’s (2000: 367) 
submission that “the urban scale is not a pre-given or fixed platform for 
social relations, but a socially constituted, politically contested and 
historically variable dimension o f social relations.” In essence, ‘urban bodies 
politic’ (Schneider and Susser 2003: 317) like Freetown and Kabul have been 
governed neither exclusively locally nor jointly by local and national entities, 
but in fact through dynamic processes o f governance that have been 
depending on three axes o f political deliberation. First, an axis that denotes 
the political relationship between formal and informal urban institutions; 
second, another axis that links urban agency to agency at the national level, 
and third, an axis that renders vital urban functions being governed 
‘remotely,’ through collusion between national and supra-national interests 
and organisations.
The study also finds that the last axis— connecting national and international 
agencies— is the most powerful; it has the greatest leverage with respect to 
the formulation o f policies geared toward alterations o f existing institutions 
within the urban realm. Extending a theoretical notion that has been fielded 
by Tajbakhsh (2001), the study proposes the additional concept of  
‘overdetermination’ to describe the structural foundation on which these 
processes o f partly remote-controlled urban governance can evolve. Seen 
against this theoretical background, the “radical reimagination o f scalar 
relationships” (Purcell 2002: 105) in favour o f local autonomy that has been 
hailed as a by-product o f globalisation therefore is— in post-war fragile states 
at least— the reimagination o f democratic countries, but not cities.
Based on the empirical investigation o f post-intervention politics in 
Freetown and Kabul and in conjunction with the comparative exploration of
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their historical trajectories as capital cities, the study also shows that at least 
three assumptions commonly made about reconstructing post-war cities in 
fragile states may require substantial revision. First, the dividing line between 
vulnerable and protected, poor and rich, and voiceless and powerful cannot 
be drawn neady between urban and rural spaces as it equally runs within 
cities. Second, an apolitical and market-driven vision of, and resulting 
strategies to, recovery in a weak institutional environment are not the best, 
but in fact the worst approaches to post-intervention and post-war urban 
planning as they carry the potential to strengthen exclusive structures and 
patterns o f the urban political economy while simultaneously empowering 
anti-government forces. Finally, imposing urban development strategies 
without accommodating— rather than depoliticising— local politics and also 
committing to the necessary patience for local institutional adjustment will 
not only be ineffective; it may also increase human insecurity, thus rendering 
such cities even more difficult to plan and govern.
To illustrate this last point, the declared national and international objective 
in post-intervention Sierra Leone was decentralisation, namely the 
devolution o f resources; this strategy had been taken up right after the 
cessation o f fighting in what was clearly the attempted continuation o f a pre­
war international donor agenda. Yet pushing it through proved extremely 
challenging. Political agendas and priorities o f different actors at the 
different levels o f polity were at loggerheads. Instead, decentralisation as a 
donor-supported key strategy for effective peacebuilding in Sierra Leone was 
in practice reformulated by national entities into ‘deconcentration’ to counter 
what was perceived as both politically and economically dangerous urban 
growth. This ultimately played into the national government’s hands as it 
weakened the opposition party in power in the capital city, clearly the most 
decisive constituency. At the same time, the neglect o f urban development 
reinvigorated already existing triggers o f conflict in the urban realm, 
including restricted public access to local policymaking and the urban land 
market, high rates o f youth unemployment, and poor urban services.
The ‘overdetermination’ also conditioned the neglect o f workable urban 
development strategies and thus hampered the formation and use of
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productive local capital. Capital accumulation in both countries did to some 
extent involve urban economies, but it nonetheless remained largely outside 
the legitimate political realm, a pattern that can be explained with informal 
institutional frameworks that had either survived modernisation attempts in 
the past or were outcomes o f both pre- and post-war polities. These 
institutions are found to have reinforced rather than helped overcome 
economic inequities. While some efforts were made to encourage urban 
investment in both cities, conflicts arising from institutional diversity and 
resulting political competition had a highly restrictive effect. At the same 
time, attempts both at and beyond the city level to depoliticise the discourse 
and substance o f city-related policies and to reframe them in a ‘capacity 
building language’ were remarkable.
In spite o f these arguments however, the critique o f intervention presented 
in this study is not informed by a general attitude against ‘humanitarian’ 
interventions. That violence might ultimately be the only effective 
countermeasure to violence is an insight that even most peace researchers 
admit. At the same time, effective violent intervention to put an end to a 
vicious circle depends on the quality o f coordination and understanding of 
the local conditions in order to transform the dynamics o f violence into a 
potential dynamics o f reconciliation and peace (cf. Waldmann 2004). This 
study is designed to hopefully contribute to making such interventions more 
responsive to the people in the receiving countries who are supposed to 
benefit from them.
One afternoon in Freetown— I was sitting in an Internet cafe housed by a 
dented cargo container on the roadside— I witnessed hundreds o f young 
men running down the main street, chanting slogans and throwing stones at 
random targets. I turned around and asked a local web surfer sitting next to 
me whether this was a riot. He answered, “No, this is just soccer!” (Image 1 
in annex 3). A couple o f days later, an interviewee who at the time was 
working in a very senior position in the national bureaucracy (NPB-F2)4 
commented on this incident as follows: “When the young men marched
4 The data coding system used in this study is explained in detail in the final section of  
CHAPTER THREE.
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down the street, this was a rehearsal o f how the rebels descended into town. 
[...] These are the same problems as well: poverty, disease, and violence.”
Such short tales from the micro-level are complemented by macro-level 
evidence. For instance, even though the United Kingdom’s commitment to 
ending the war in Sierra Leone has been lauded widely, analysts have also 
pointed to a lack of a multi-functional political approach that would have 
done justice to the multi-dimensional nature o f the conflict (Woodhouse and 
Ramsbotham 2005: 105, cf. Fombad 2004, PRIDE 2002: 24-25). Similar 
critiques have been uttered recently in the context o f peacebuilding in 
Afghanistan. Commenting on US-led reconstruction efforts in the country in 
front o f the U.S. Congress’ International Relations Committee, development 
consultant Amit Pandya (2006) could argue unchallenged,
“Even where there have been assistance initiatives that have posted records o f  
success, such as improvements in the legal and judicial infrastructure and 
institutional capacity— through, for example, courthouse construction, technical 
assistance to ministries and legal education— the reality remains that the majority o f  
Afghans outside the cities, and many in the cities, remain untouched by them.”
It follows then that if we take such critiques and accounts seriously, the 
analysis o f cross-level urban politics in post-intervention cities in fragile 
states developed in the course o f the following chapters ought to serve not 
only to reconceptionalise a specific body o f theory, but also to dissect and 
improve the practice o f urban policymaking and implementation in post­
intervention settings in order to address those ‘same problems’ more 
effectively, to the benefit o f those who otherwise suffer most.
Research questions and hypotheses
This investigation is guided by three research questions. The first question 
pertains to the applicability o f  urban theory to post-war urban settings in 
least developed countries and also aims at capturing conceptually the reality 
of post-intervention city politics. The second and third research questions 
are empirical in nature and trigger three working hypotheses.
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In order to evaluate the solidity o f potential theoretical foundations for this 
enquiry, I first ask:
1. Which existing theories o f urban politics are suitable to 
explain political processes and their intended and unintended 
outcomes in impoverished post-war intervention cities?
In response, I discuss these theories and assess their applicability. Against 
this background, I then ask:
2. Can the politico-economic leverage o f capital city-based 
actors over urban institutions and policies be linked 
empirically to (a) the emergence o f the nation-state and (b) 
the most recent armed conflicts in the two countries?
To clarify this hypothesis, I analyse the relative autonomy o f urban 
governance in Freetown and Kabul over the course o f the past two centuries 
vis-a-vis the rise o f the two nation-states and the impact o f intermittent supra­
national influences. I thus seek to clarify when ‘periods o f politico-economic 
restructuring’ have occurred, and how they have impacted on urban politics 
and development. In line with the assumption discussed above o f tight 
interaction between urban, national, and international levels after the most 
recent wars in both countries, I put forward the following first hypothesis:
A. The political leverage o f capital city-based actors has been 
correlated positively with the historical emergence o f the 
nation-state project, but as an effect o f war, urban pro­
development politics are overshadowed and paralysed by 
national recovery agendas and supranational strategies to 
(re) create the nation-state. The initial correlation has been 
reverted.
Arguing that the relationship between urban and national agendas is 
impacted— i.e., resulting in institutional and structural changes or shift— by 
international ‘forces’ not only prior and during armed conflict but especially
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so afterwards in periods o f internationally assisted ‘recovery,’ I elucidate the 
channels and means o f influence of such forces on city politics. Hence 
whereas the first ‘spatial turn’ (Soja 2002) was an epistemological manoeuvre 
triggered by a critical review of the physical manifestations o f capitalism, this 
study asks whether there exists a rationale for pondering a ‘second spatial 
turn,’ this time ontological, in response to the assumed reconfiguration o f  
urban polities through supranational actors and resources.
In this context I need to clarify both temporal and spatial aspects o f this 
hypothesised process. This leads to my third research question:
3. To what extent, at which pace, and between which levels 
does international intervention in post-war countries affect 
structure and content o f city politics and development?
To address this third question the second hypothesis o f this study posits:
B. The political leverage o f local actors and institutions in post­
war, post intervention cities is limited sufficiently through 
interorganisational competition with other institutions at 
other levels o f polity that agency by coalitions with sufficient 
financial means gains enough leverage to alter local 
institutions and policies in a process o f ‘accelerated 
structuration.’
Through a theoretical discussion and the empirical investigation o f the two 
cities, this study will investigate whether, and if so under which conditions, 
this accelerated process occurs, and also explore the relationships between it 
and the changes in autonomy (or disempowerment) o f local actors and 
institutions in the two cities as a result o f external politico-economic ‘aid.’
Finally, the investigation sheds light on the spatial component o f urban 
political restructuring because it seeks clarification o f the levels between 
which agency and structuration are taking place. Arguably, in the context o f  
‘peacebuilding’ cum ‘nation-building’ missions, the ‘propinquity’ (cf. CHAPTER
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TWO) o f large cities makes them prime loci o f either initiating or 
unintendedly causing shifts that are, following hypothesis (A), to the detriment 
of urban policies and governance. Not only common sense, but also the 
review o f theoretical approaches to urban politics in CHAPTER TWO below 
then suggests the following spatial interaction:
C. Urban policies and politics in the two cities are determined 
mainly by the interaction o f international and local actors.
This constitutes the third hypothesis that this investigation tests.
Structural outline
Cities are embedded in countries and regions, policies in institutions and 
structures, and intervention in fragile states in discourses and agendas. In 
order to appreciate the role o f local political agency in and on cities in fragile 
states over time, CHAPTER TWO explains concepts central to this 
investigation and offers a critical examination o f urban theories, illustrating 
their strengths as well as their shortcomings regarding their applicability to 
post-war intervention settings in least developed countries. This analysis 
culminates in the final section o f this chapter, which develops the rationale 
for extending existing strands o f urban theory in light of the missing 
coverage discovered. Following the empirical analysis in CHAPTERS FOUR to 
SEX, this analysis is revisited in CHAPTER SEVEN.
In CHAPTER THREE, I outline how the research agenda guiding this enquiry 
can be translated into a comparative methodology. The chapter thus lays out 
the investigative path travelled in this thesis, which combines deductive with 
inductive reasoning in order to arrive at a revised theory o f urban politics 
that can serve as a conceptual framework5 for analysing political processes in 
and on post-intervention cities in fragile states. The objective o f this study is 
not to create a “theory of everything” (cf. Mahoney and Ruschemeyer 2003),
5 Judge et al. (1995: 3) define ‘conceptual frameworks’ as providing “a language and frame 
of reference through which reality can be examined and [which] lead theorists to ask 
questions that might not otherwise occur.”
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a ‘one-size-fits-alT in that it would explain all processes o f politics in all cities 
in all settings o f challenged and ineffective statehood. At the same time 
however, this investigation rests on the conviction that patterns do exist, and 
that some o f these processes bear enough similarity to be captured in a 
reconfigured interpretative framework.
CHAPTER FOUR juxtaposes the trajectories o f the two cities central to this 
investigation from urban places to national “command posts” (Low 1996: 
393) to illustrate the respective changes in structure and agency as they 
pertain to the politics on urban and national development in both countries. 
It thus demonstrates that it is this “overdetermination” that carries one 
important clue to understanding contemporary urban governance in 
Freetown and Kabul. The historical narrative begins with an overview o f the 
founding o f Freetown and compares this period with the rocky rise o f Kabul 
as the centre o f Afghanistan until 1880. It then turns back to Sierra Leone to 
describe the turbulent period between the annexation of the hinterland and 
the politics o f immediate post-independence roughly seventy years later, 
paying particular attention to the influences on non-native political and 
economic forces as well as urban challenges in both governance and 
management that arose. This period will be paralleled with the fate o f Kabul 
as the place o f increasing social diversification and the container in which 
rapid societal progress was conceived and from where it was pushed ‘into 
the provinces’ under Abdul Rahman Khan and his successors, especially his 
grandson Amanullah, and later Zahir Shah.
The third juxtaposition provided by CHAPTER FOUR focuses on the political 
relationships o f the two nation states with international aid institutions. In 
Sierra Leone, this covers mainly the one-party state under President Siaka 
Stevens until the outbreak of rebel violence in 1991, mirrored against the 
increased debt entanglement during the second half o f Shah’s reign up until 
1973 and the following six years o f fierce political competition that ended 
with the Russian invasion on Christmas Day 1979. In the fourth and final 
direct comparison the fates of both cities in the ensuing armed conflicts are 
juxtaposed, highlighting important parallels with respect to the functional 
dynamics o f both cities as centres o f political agenda setting and military
17
command posts (and hence targets), but also differences in terms o f the 
degrees and characteristics o f their resilience, occupation, and physical 
destruction.
The most primary data-rich segments o f this study, CHAPTERS FIVE and SIX 
then discuss the politics operating in and on the two cities after the cessation 
o f large scale fighting and put them in context with commentaries from the 
urban policy and governance perspective. The primary data to address the 
three research questions and assess the validity o f the working hypotheses 
are derived chiefly from qualitative research techniques employed during 
four fieldwork periods between June 2004 and May 2005.
The combined data from these three chapters provide the basis for a 
synthesis o f theoretical considerations with empirical findings, which is 
presented in CHAPTER SEVEN. Drawing on aspects o f the politico-economic 
histories o f Freetown and Kabul as well as the contemporary spatial politics 
of agency and structure in both cities, differences and similarities are carved 
out, and important observations are tested through counterfactual reasoning. 
Step by step the answers to the three research questions emerge, and the 
evidence amassed throughout the foregoing chapters leads to nuanced 
assessments o f the working hypotheses. The final section o f CHAPTER SEVEN 
pulls these insights together and develops a revised research question to 
guide future enquiries into city politics in post-war intervention settings. To 
conclude, CHAPTER EIGHT revisits the advances made by this study but also 
addresses its limitations. This leads to targeted suggestions on how to adjust 
current policies o f urban management in Freetown and Kabul, as well as 
concrete recommendations for further research.
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Chapter 2: Literature review
Local autonomy and the spaces of urban politics
Complementing seminal writings by Henri Lefebvre (1991) and David 
Harvey (e.g., 2000: 210-211 and 1978: 102, cf. Slater 1978: 43), it is Edward 
Soja’s (1968, 1989, 2000) work on post-modern geographies which can be 
credited with ‘respatialising’ urban narratives and thus providing a theoretical 
foundation for the ‘spatial turn’ that informed the resurrection o f political 
urban studies (Schlogel 2003: 68). Reiterating Jessop’s (1997a: 63-64) 
proposition to map asymmetries between local actors from different sectors 
of urban society with regard to their political proximity or distance from 
specific modes o f economic growth, Jonas (1997: 228) has argued that the 
main question regarding urban polity today, in contrast with Dahl’s (1961) 
notion, “is not so much one o f ‘who governs cities?’ as one o f ‘at what 
spatial scale?”’ Brenner (2000: 395) points out that inter-spatiality in urban 
governance first became an issue during the late 1980s as scales “were no 
longer equated with unitary social functions but were viewed increasingly as 
material crystallisations o f multiple overlapping political-economic 
processes,” a development that later culminated in the literature on 
supranational and subnational governance (cf. Jessop 1997b; Keil 2006 and 
Olowu 2003 in CHAPTER ONE). I argue that this multi-spatial modification 
over time is both an empirical and a theoretical endeavour, not only in 
industrialized cities but also in urban centres in developing countries. Indeed, 
images o f cities that characterise them as political arenas in themselves but 
also as products of overarching spatial politics abound in developed and 
developing contexts alike, as Cornwall (2004: 77) points out:
“Talk o f  ‘arenas’ conveys spaces where voices and ideas jostle for attention while 
‘political space’ is not only something taken up, assumed or filled, but something 
that can be created, opened, reshaped. Less frequently heard, yet critically 
important, are other spatial terms that speak about and to issues o f  representation 
and power: ‘positioned’, ‘situated’, and ‘dislocated’, ‘displaced’.”
Hence cities are not ‘subjects’ (for a contrary position see Mazzonelli 1993: 
293), but a “particular manifestation, and form an essential component, o f  
wider political, economic, social and cultural networks and relations [which
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warrant] urban analysis in the context o f the principal external and internal 
forces and processes which underpin a city’s evolution or its role at a 
particular point in time” (Simon 1992: 5). Stone (1987: 8)— in his study o f  
Atlanta city politics— similarly points out that contents o f local or national 
political agendas and agency do not derive from predetermined roles o f local 
or national government (“cities don’t make development decisions; people 
do”) but are results o f competing interests, including the distribution o f  
benefits and costs at different levels (cf. Goldsmith 1995: 228-230).
In line with this observation, Wolman and Goldsmith (1992: 45) have 
proposed a definition o f local autonomy as “the ability o f local governments 
to have an independent impact on the well-being o f their citizens [emphasis 
added]” and distinguish between aggregate well-being (efficiency) and the 
distribution o f well-being among community members (equity) in the sense 
of a ‘local gini coefficient’. Following Page and Goldsmith (1992, cf. Gurr 
and King 1987: 57-58), the evaluation o f the specific position o f local 
government institutions will be conducted by assessing the functions, access^  
and the discretion o f local authorities vis-a-vis the central state (cf. CHAPTERS 
FOUR TO SEVEN). Functions denote the tasks to be dealt with at the local level, 
including production, service provision, equity, and security; access measures 
the nature (formal-institutionalised versus informal/personal) and the 
intensity (frequency and privilege) o f contacts between local and central 
government actors (a potentially important linking pin for local politicians 
with national aspirations); finally, discretion refers to the liberty in decision­
making with respect to the technical and financial options for local delivery. 
In practice, however, such interaction is not straightforward; “paradoxically 
those systems in which local government does more might suffer limitations 
of local discretion. Where local government has extensive functional 
responsibilities, its actions become more important to the centre, and are 
therefore more likely to be the target o f central influence.” (Page and 
Goldsmith 1992: 10, cf. Mann 1984)
To begin with, the study o f urban politics differs from other areas o f enquiry 
in political science in two important dimensions, namely propinquity, i.e., the 
spatial proximity o f political and social actors, both to one another and to
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decision-making processes, and numerosity, i.e., there are more localities 
than states, and hence more arenas to nurture ‘modernisation’ or change 
(John 2006, cf. Amin and Thrift 2002: 31-50). At the same time, 
understanding the place o f politics as well as the politics o f place (Bums et 
al. 1994) in the context o f this analysis requires a closer look at the types of 
political agency that take place in cities, the structures in which they are 
embedded, and the degree o f autonomy resulting from different institutional 
and structural constellations. Crucial given the perspective o f this study, such 
enquiry also necessitates the contextualisation o f urban policies and politics 
in settings o f widespread poverty, vulnerability and political fragility.
Given the existence o f an elite in almost any societal structure, it seems fair 
to expect these elites to ‘run’ such a structure and ‘elite theory’ to thus wield 
substantial explanatory power (Eyerman et al. 1991: 31, Schneider and Teske 
1992: 738)?6 Alternatively however, theories taking a pluralist view by 
building on Dahl’s (1961) work “Who Governs?” suggest that a multitude of 
actors can all exert significant influence on the policy-making process. In 
essence, pluralism suggests a multitude o f political actors in the urban arena 
based on short lived coalitions that cluster around particular policy issues 
(Mollenkopf 1989: 120). In its extreme form, ‘hyper-pluralism’ may even lead 
to stalemate where different factions block one another, making decision­
making processes ineffective and paralysing urban politics (cf. Yates 1977).
Occasionally, contemporary comments on post-war reconstruction do 
indeed buy into the blaming and shaming o f urban elites as the “central 
actors o f manipulation” of the political economy o f conflict (Nolting 2005: 
7, author’s translation), but both theoretical and empirical problems come to 
the fore when trying to apply the aforementioned analytical approaches to 
post-war cities. With the important limitation that some are heavily invested 
in the war economy, economic elites such as the Lebanese and Fulah trading 
networks in Freetown and the urbanised warlords cum economic interests in 
Kabul have a certain interest in keeping the peace to safeguard purchasing
6 Hobley (2004: 18), in her study of voicelessness at the local level in Bangladesh, 
distinguishes three groups o f local elites: patron-client elites that exert direct leverage over 
others, neutral elites who co-exist with other groups, and pro-poor elites, whom she calls 
“pro-poor proxies”.
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power, but comparably little interest in pushing urban development as long 
as local labour supply is abundant, the majority o f high yield retail products 
is being imported, and financial capital remains internationally mobile. In 
fact, the almost monopolistic control o f local markets through collusion and 
retail cartels in Freetown could well turn out to be a constraining factor to 
post-war local economic development. Conversely, political elites in both 
countries and at both the local and the national level have indeed bought 
into the peace and development agenda, but the foci on re-integrative 
agricultural development in Freetown and alternative rural livelihoods 
outside Kabul provide litde incentive to cluster around and push towards 
policies to facilitate the emergence o f sustainable urban incomes through 
production.
However, pluralism appears equally problematic as it is confronted with a 
reality o f economic, social and political exclusion from policymaking; most 
definitely so in the respective countryside and only marginally less severe in 
both capital cities. Stone (1987: 12-15) argues similarly that in the debate on 
structural determinism versus political autonomy, barriers to public 
participation and external constraints on coalition building have been 
recognised by both schools o f thought, demonstrating that the “inward- 
looking” pluralist view had been superseded by a more “outward-looking” 
(yet still locally centred) analytical framework. Elite theory, on the other 
hand, tries to explain the formation o f power structures at the local level by 
local ownership o f productive assets dominating local politics, media and 
educational institutions (cf. the ‘entrepreneurial activism’ hypothesis by 
Logan and Molotch 1987: 52) and emphasises detrimental effects on less 
organised residents. It fails to focus on ‘positional characteristics’ o f  non­
capitalist groups and their members’ relationships with supraurban patterns 
of production and administration (cf. Harding 1995: 39-45).
Economic structures and their spatial expression thus matter greatly in 
explaining urban politics, irrespective o f whether actors are concentrated and 
powerful or infinitesimally heterogeneous. Therefore the concept o f  
‘structure’ needs to be considered as power-loaded, with Mollenkopf (1989: 
129, cf. Foucault 1990: 93) even warning against the “trivialisation o f the
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political” in the urban realm. Similarly, Moe (2005) posits that power 
embedded in institutional arrangements must not be dealt with implicitly, but 
instead be made a determining factor. Power is not being reconfigured in the 
course o f every new transaction, but is preserved through the institutional 
landscape (cf. Greif and Laitin 2004: 639). This ‘self-preservation,’ as Moe 
(ibid., 229) points out, “accounts for the survival o f political institutions. 
Usually, they are stable because o f the agenda power o f current supporters, 
not because the original agreement lives on.” Both o f these institutionalist 
strands are thus geared towards explaining stability, yet they vary in their 
assessment o f political forces. In the following, we shall see how 
interpretations ranging from orthodox Marxism to regulatory gradualism lie 
at the heart o f an epistemology o f structure and agency across political space.
Early urban Marxists suggested that the conceptual framework for analysing 
cities could be the general class structure o f a society, a social order in which 
urban interactions then occur as a subset o f social relations. One o f the best 
known in-depth studies with this perspective has been conducted by 
Cockbum (1977) who describes local processes o f urban management in 
Lambeth (England) as a function o f class relations, thus rendering a single 
neighbourhood a ‘local state’ in that it mimics the class struggles based on 
opposing interests that also occur more generally in society, making “its 
parts work fundamentally as one” (ibid., 47; emphasis in the original). Linkages 
between central government and urban management reinforce this 
parallelism o f local and national arenas designed to serve the interest o f  
capital accumulation (cf. Harvey 2000: 192). Emphasising the centrality o f  
the mode o f production and the deriving composition o f the local 
workforce, Cockbum (1977: 41-46) points out,
“There is no ready-made theory of local government. It is necessary to piece together a 
number o f  concepts about the state as a whole and draw conclusions from them for 
local government. [...] The state nationally has its headquarters in London but it 
comprises nationwide and permanent institutions. [...] It is widely believed that 
local government is in some way constitutionally independent o f  central 
government. [...] This is not the case. They are, and under capitalism have always 
been, subject to central government. [...] Thus local authorities, including local 
health, water and transport authorities as well as local education, housing and 
planning authorities, are aspects o f  the national state and share its work, [emphasis 
added]”
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CasteUs (1977: 439) had made the same point, but after several years o f  
empirical research however, he (1983: 291) presented a more moderate 
position, arguing that “although class relationships and class struggle are 
fundamental in understanding urban conflict, they are not, by any means, the 
only primary source o f urban social change. The autonomous role o f the 
state, the gender relationships, the ethnic and national movements and 
movements that define themselves as citizen, are among other alternative 
sources o f urban social change.” This exemplifies are general trend within 
Urban Marxism to migrate away theoretically from orthodox Marxist 
determinism, positing instead a degree o f higher autonomy from dominant 
capitalist interests, a higher degree o f fragmentation o f state institutions and, 
consequentially, a higher degree o f discretion at the local level. Neo-Marxist 
theories in particular base their modifications on such constellation and 
suggest that some leeway for political actors at the local level derives from 
complex networks of local alliances and coalitions (Pickvance 1995: 254).
A similar shift can be observed regarding the loci, or localisation, o f class 
struggles in developing countries. Focusing on causes o f crises potentially 
leading to structural bifurcation points, Lipton’s (1977: 13) contention o f an 
“urban bias” was that
“the m ost important class conflict in the poor countries o f  the world today is not 
between labour and capital. Nor is it between foreign and national interest. It is 
between the rural classes and the urban classes. The rural sector contains m ost o f  
the poverty, and m ost o f  the low-cost sources o f  potential advance; but the urban 
sector contains m ost o f  the articulateness, organisation and power. So the urban 
classes have been able to ‘win’ m ost o f  the rounds o f  the struggle with the 
countryside; but in doing so they have made the development process needlessly 
slow and unfair.”
Lipton thus criticised the concept o f developing rural areas indirecdy 
through strengthening urban centres, which by default produced winners—  
such as government (fiscal incomes), urban consumers (subsidised prices) 
and industry (cheaper production factors)— at the expense o f private and 
public investment in agriculture, which fuelled rural exodus rather than 
curbing it and also catalysed a rural perception o f neglect coupled with 
cultural overwhelm (cf. UNESCAP 2001: 110, Herold 2004: 313). However, 
Lipton’s critique has travelled a long distance since 1977, with David A.
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Smith (1996: 149) twenty years later formulating its most recent perspective 
by arguing that “The basic conflict really is not between rural and urban 
classes; rather, it pits the urban-based elite (in alliance with international 
capital) against both urban and rural masses. [...] Misery and hardship [...] 
actually benefit some people. They also may actually be functional for 
surplus extraction under the conditions o f dependent capitalism.” This view 
is supported empirically by Brockerhoff and Brennan (1998) who criticise 
Lipton’s notion o f cities as “islands o f privilege” (Harrison 1982: 145) by 
pointing to inter-dty comparisons between large and medium-sized urban 
centres, with the former increasingly experiencing deteriorating or relatively 
unfavourable living conditions, due in part to what the United Nations 
termed an “anti-urban bias” o f official development aid that has coincided 
with a widespread underestimation o f the vigour o f urban growth 
particularly in Asia (UN ECOSOC 2006: 3, cf. Marcus and Asmorowati 
2006), but also increasing violence against residents in the form of urban 
insurgency and city-centred terrorism.
The second and more recent strand o f Urban Marxism leaves the orthodox 
interpretation behind. It focuses instead on explaining the rigidity o f the 
capitalist system of production in spite of the inherent contradictions and 
conflicts that, following Marxist logic, must ultimately lead to their demise. 
In his study o f the ‘City’, the commercial and financial district o f London 
(England), Ingham (1984) points out that an endogenous style o f theorising 
is inadequate, thus rejecting determinist analyses that try to explain the 
adaptation o f city based institutions to environmental changes as a function 
of capitalist polity (cf. Cockbum 1977). Ingham argues that alternative 
explanations need to be sought through a study o f city-based coalitions that 
acknowledges the scope o f agency and the potential for alternative 
development, as opposed to interpreting it as a temporary deviation from a 
predefined path. Ingham therefore focuses on the interplay between 
politico-economic dynamics at different levels, regulatory modes, and 
organisational responses that are both following and shaping the former 
over time, and his enquiry can therefore be considered one o f the earliest 
works o f Regulation Theory (RT). RT has to be regarded as the 
methodological response to the proposition o f  cities acting as ‘local states’,
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positing instead that municipalities are “the very medium through which 
regulatory practices are interpreted and ultimately delivered” (Goodwin et al. 
1993: 67). Rather than analysing individual or group action as in the case o f  
elite theory and pluralism, RT focuses on changes in environments and 
resulting changes in local institutions to accommodate external shifts (Judge 
et al. 1995: 10; Feldman 1997: 47-49). It thus acknowledges the 
embeddedness o f locality in larger contexts but emancipates itself from 
requiring deliberate coalitions, positing instead that the mode o f regulation 
changes with modifications to the regime o f accumulation. “Norms and 
codes are not set up for the purpose o f sustaining a regime o f accumulation, but 
they can sometimes interact to produce that effect.” (Painter 1995: 278, 
emphasis in the original)
However, through its focus on continuity, RT emphasises long time spans 
and therefore appears less suited to explain sudden changes that occur in 
governance in spite o f the alleged desire for stability, because it does not pay 
sufficient attention to the specific practices at the local level and the 
emerging conflicts that they produce. Instead, it focuses on decade-long 
political negotiations preserving capitalist structures in order to explain 
economic growth, which sits uncomfortably with large-scale reconfiguration 
of political networks in war-ridden developing countries in general, and in 
ffagmentally capitalised societies in particular (cf. Steinmetz 1994). We thus 
see that RT can be criticised on the grounds o f  two defining features. First, it 
does not offer insights into disruption. Goodwin and Painter (1997: 20) 
argue, “Very rarely, if ever, does regulation cease altogether (civil war 
accompanied by the complete collapse o f state institutions is perhaps an 
example).” Yet this is exactly the case in many o f the ‘crisis states’ and 
embatded cities that have been undergoing frequent eruptions o f physical 
violence and institutional collapse. Second, the specificities o f local agency, 
which might be causally linked to these disruptions, are not granted 
explanatory power. One o f the most instructive critiques in this context has 
been formulated by Jonas (1997) who suggests that in order to examine the 
relationship and relative weight o f structure and strategic action, one would 
need to focus on “spatial settings [...] in a period o f crisis or restructuring, 
(ibid., 207)” Jonas urges that an “important component o f the investigation
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would be to actuate and contextualise the regulationist concept mode o f  
social regulation in a way that draws out the relationships between local 
capacities and strategies, and the wider structures o f accumulation and 
regulation into which local actors and interests are inserted (ibid., emphasis 
added).” This, then, is where my assumption of distinctiveness regarding the state 
o f capitalist (under)development and structural dynamics in least developed 
post-war countries— and resulting supra-local resource discretion and 
policymaking— dovetails with the critique o f neo-Marxist thought.
The contested promise of urban distinctiveness
My scepticism o f universal comparability o f  urban settings is thus bome out 
of a critique o f First World structuralism. However, before we turn to some 
recent and indeed centrally related theoretical contributions to urban political 
analysis, it is important to understand how structuralism came under attack 
from yet another universalist comer and how this debate informed the rise 
of a literature that emphasizes the value o f context and distinctive politics.
In 1981, Paul Peterson made a straightforward suggestion: that the scope o f 
urban policies was limited to developmental means. What is more, this was 
meant to be an observation, not a prescription. Peterson argued that policies 
to “strengthen the local economy, enhance the local tax base, and generate 
additional resources that can be used for the community’s welfare” (ibid., 41) 
were the only ones that could reasonably be expected from urban 
governments. Social costs would be incurred, but as a result o f these policies, 
the community would gain new employment opportunities, and increased 
demand for locally provided services, higher land values, and higher local 
government revenues. On the contrary, redistributive policies helping “the 
needy and unfortunate” would be “pernicious” (ibid., 43) because they 
would drain scarce resources from local governments whose main concern, 
driven by the ‘benefits received principle’ as opposed to the national ‘ability 
to pay principle’, was to strengthen the local economy. Economic motives 
are indeed the drivers o f Peterson’s theory: he argued that redistributive 
policies required a high fiscal capacity but were politically unjustifiable,
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whereas developmental policies would be more cost-effective and respond 
to a high public demand, explaining that “insofar as the presence o f the poor 
weakens a local fiscal base, one must expect to find instead an inverse 
relationship between poverty and redistributive expenditures.” (ibid., 50) Put 
simply, the poorer the city, the more essential the concentration on 
developmental policies. This, then, incorporated the main cause o f local-and 
national conflict: “Where the national policies are developmental, local and 
national goals will overlap and the policy will be executed with a good deal 
o f cooperation [...]. But where the central government is pursuing a more 
redistributive objective, its goals are likely to conflict with those o f local 
governments. The national interest in equity will conflict with the local 
interest and efficiency developing its local economy.” (ibid., 82, cf. Saunders 
1986) We can see how this contention makes sense within Peterson’s 
rational framework, but it appears less obvious in post-war cases in which 
both national and local politicians, confronted with resource scarcity, are 
either forging or being forced into a developmental coalition with external 
‘development’ agencies. This does not necessarily mean that such agencies 
always pursue clear-cut development goals as opposed to working towards 
equity— the most recent World Development Report o f the World Bank 
(2005a) claims combining both to a cohesive strategy— , but it demonstrates 
that Peterson’s emphasis on ‘choice’ in urban politics is questionable in a 
post-war context.
Furthermore, in rational choice theory, choice also matters for the demand 
side o f public service provision. The special situation o f higher fluidity and 
mobility o f a large part o f the population encountered in post-war cities due 
to internal displacement could, at least theoretically, carry the possibility of 
residents exercising their sovereignty by voting with their feet. However, the 
level o f service provision is often directly linked with the price o f land and 
property, with the effect that many spatial options within the city are, realties 
unattainable due to financial constraints. Opting for ‘exit’, in Hirschman’s 
(1970) terminology, by going back into peri-urban or rural areas would 
clearly not ameliorate the service situation. Moreover, following Wolman 
and Goldsmith’s (1992: 17) analysis o f supply and demand sides, public 
choice theory begins from the erroneous assumption that urban public
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services exist in abundance— that there is an oversupply o f provision. But in 
the case o f least developed countries and their large cities, the expectation of  
consumers simply following their cost benefit calculations without having to 
worry about budgetary constraints is clearly misplaced. A critique o f public 
choice theory can therefore safely focus on taking up the latter’s own 
assumptions before even addressing more normative aspects such as its 
negligence o f equity and other ethical considerations.7
A Western-centred but supposedly more levelled approach to economic 
drivers o f urban politics and policies is ‘World Cityism’, which emerged in 
the mid-1980s. It emphasises networks and flows and constituted a 
theoretical response to the global economic contraction experienced in 1973 
and 1974 (cf. Soja 2000: 96-97). Among those who first saw cities as nodes 
of a global system were Timberlake (1985) and Hill (1984). Looking back ten 
years later, Smith and Timberlake (1995: 81) explain the root o f this theory 
with cities then considered in a new light, “somewhat separately from 
nations because, although their interrelations are often mediated by nation­
states, they are in direct and frequent contact with one another through the 
various city-to-city flows.” Cities were thus seen as potentialities for the 
inclusion o f countries into the international political economy (Potter 1990: 
3). At the same time, cities in the developing world would compete with 
those in developed countries to improve or at least maintain their position in 
this global system. They have to engage in “a punitive game o f catch-up” 
(Robinson 2006: 6); according to other authors, this ‘Darwinist’ structure 
also helps explain the rise in informal sector employment in the Third World 
(Jenkins and Wilkinson 2002: 33-45, cf. Hall and Winlow 2003: 142). Fast- 
growing cities in unstable regions suffer from a particular disadvantage. Since 
they have limited prospects to be chosen as hubs for economic flows, they 
are at risk o f eventually becoming structurally irrelevant, which adds 
‘structural violence’ (Galtung 1985: 145) as another powerful shaper of
7 The conceptual reduction of residents to consumers of public services also risks 
depoliticising their role in local polity. This is both an objective and a normative concern. 
Objectively, the discourse o f consumerism focuses public attention and indeed the direction 
o f institutional development on consumptive rather then participatory arguments (cf. 
Lowndes 1995: 175). Normatively speaking (and in rather exceptional agreement with recent 
post-modernist writings), political diversity is desirable to provide checks and balances of 
power — “power to take decisions, to assess standards of service, and to evaluate outcomes” 
(Hill 1994: 6).
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urban reality in these countries. Third World cities can therefore be 
considered a medium for both inclusion and marginalisation (Knauder 2000: 
28, Mabogunje 1994: 23).
Much like Rational Choice au Peterson, World Cityism suggests a 
predominance o f economic reasoning, but it embeds it in a trans-border 
setting. At the same time, the approach also has stoutly normative features 
when its conclusions on urban policies prescribe economic measures to 
safeguard supranational competitiveness, which includes the discourse o f the 
apparent inevitability o f economics-driven urban policy frameworks in order 
to survive the ostensibly all-encompassing competition within so-called ‘city- 
to-city networks’ (cf. Beall 2002). Redistributive policies, its proponents 
argue, could be effective in the short run but jeopardise the development 
agenda imposed by the dynamics o f economic networking across local 
political and economic space. In this sense, then, World Cityism is the 
watered-down and globalised version o f Peterson’s argument: a neoliberal 
index finger cautioning against local social entrepreneurialism in light o f an 
allegedly powerful economic superstructure — the ‘choice’ lies between 
positivist submission and fatal resistance. By positing that cities in 
developing world have to compete in a global system, the theory gives 
momentum to general prescriptions for Third World cities to somehow 
‘transform’ into world class cities. Yet this is a futile approach, as Beall et al. 
(2002) exemplify in the case o f urban development policies in South Africa. 
In light o f poor residents benefiting “disproportionately from the efficient 
and inclusive delivery o f services,” what is needed instead is to engage 
“critically with urban growth agendas and imagining opportunities for tying 
urban interventions for economic growth more closely to a politics of 
redistribution.” (Robinson 2006: 150, 165) In other words, engaging with 
local politics rather than subduing it to a globalist discourse holds the key to 
viable and liveable cities in the South.
Robinson’s (2006) notion o f ‘ordinary cities’ is therefore both a curious and 
intriguing theoretical contribution to the current debate. It is curious because 
of her normative agenda “to promote strategies for city improvements that 
build on their distinctive and individual creativities and resources” (ibid., 6,
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cf. 64, 167). At the same time, her proposition is intriguing in its implication 
for a comparative methodology which is not constrained by an 
understanding o f cities in developing countries as somehow distinct or 
‘special’ places (cf. Lauria and Wagner 2006) and instead highlights their 
“diversity and complexity” (Robinson 2006: 114). Resulting policy 
suggestions are equally captivating; Robinson is dissatisfied with the 
dominance o f inter-city literature and, instead, encourages refocusing urban 
studies towards cities themselves (ibid., 10), not to serve a purely 
developmentalist agenda—which eventually give way to “homogenizing 
tendencies flattening out the rich diversity o f what constitutes urban 
politics” (Yeoh 2001: 463)— but in order to analyse and understand the 
diversity that ‘keeps cities going’ in spite o f their supposed (yet possibly 
dubious) belonging to a “worldwide hierarchy o f urban centres” (ibid., 92), 
as well as to allow local realities to inform policymaking rather than trying to 
shape local realities in accordance to a pre-given policy framework (cf. 
Parnell and Pieterse 1998).
It is true that policies can be captured by special interests under the umbrella 
of a ‘participatory’ or ‘inclusive’ discourse, as Stokes (1998: 136) fears, but 
this serves much more as an argument in favour of enabling political 
opposition, rather than deliberately depoliticising the policy process. It is 
indeed the “political confrontation with social and political exclusion” that 
creates “the foundational moment o f citizenship” (Simone 2005: 14). Urban 
politics is thus concerned chiefly with the creation, re-creation, and 
destruction o f structures o f inclusion and exclusion that operate at and link 
the different levels o f governance impacting on urban dwellers— structures 
that lie at the very core o f the agenda to revitalise post-war cities, 
economically and socially.
At the same time, the normatively tinted tendency o f this emerging literature 
to posit, prescriptively, that cities can and should serve as “spaces of 
tolerance and sociability” (Ash and Thrift 2002: 137) is troubling in that it 
suggests a harmonious turnaround from more critical perspectives o f the city 
as a space o f “politics o f propinquity” (Copjec and Sorkin 1999). One o f the 
most innovating critiques o f apolitical interpretations o f urban space stems
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from Robins (1993) who criticises the “consensual belief in public space, the 
idea that the city should create some sort o f  communal vessel for shared 
activity” as an artificial facet o f postmodemity, a condition that, according to 
Robins, derives from a misread duality o f modernism and what supposedly 
follows it. Following Stoker (1989), Robins shows that the logic o f politico- 
economic domination continues to apply in spite o f an agenda o f post­
modernists to shift from the Fordist to the post-Fordist city, analogous to 
Harvey’s (1989) argument that the neo-capitalistic logic o f ‘flexible 
accumulation’ was the main driver o f the entrepreneurial approach to urban 
governance that had been developing during the 1980s. Urging acceptance 
of continuity and change, Robins warns against the “tendency to inflate 
economic, political and cultural spheres, and then to assume a 
straightforward logic o f development from Fordism/ managerialism/ 
modernism to post-Fordism/ entrepreneuriahsm/ postmodernism (ibid., 
309).” It follows that urban development cannot aim at (recreating cosy 
cohesion, but at creating new spaces for political participation to counter 
social segregation and the consolidation o f intra-city divisions along political 
and economic axes. Urban policies’ overarching goal must therefore be the 
creation o f a viable city ‘in the place’ and avoiding connecting the city 
globally without anchoring it locally (ibid., 320). Robins concludes, “The 
diverse and different populations o f cities must be seen as active political 
entities constituted through these encounters and confrontations, and 
urbanity must be a consequence o f the bargaining and negotiation this makes 
necessary. And for this we need ‘tougher’ notions o f public space” (1993: 
326)— notions that enable politics rather than silencing it, and empirical 
approaches capable o f questioning the “camouflage for what is really going 
on in the city” (Pieterse 2005: 146).
Still, even the most advanced thrusts in this direction are not free o f 
conceptual challenges. The claim that “cities are sites o f contestation” 
characterised by “deeply contested politics” that frame policy outcomes 
(Robinson 2006: 166) appears to sit somewhat uncomfortably with the 
parallel argument that “releasing cities from [...] colonialist assumptions 
about their modernity has the potential to enable city managers and residents 
to frame policies that address the distinctive needs o f their city” (ibid., 172).
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While the first contention seems to affirm both the centrality and ubiquity o f  
city politics, the latter suggests that there exist, in fact, a ‘way out’ o f political 
discourse via the reconstitution o f the epistemological framework in which 
policymaking takes place. Her threefold argument that cities o f the South 
must not fall off the map, must be able to write not only their own history 
but also determine how we understand urbanisation and cities globally, and 
must be tackled at the city level is critical, as is Robinson’s assertion that “[i]t 
is the politics o f city-development strategies [...] that are central to 
understanding their significance and potential.” (Robinson 2006: 131, 
emphasis added) Yet as much as the call to ‘post-colonise’ urban studies and 
to integrate analyses in developing countries into a heterogeneous body of 
‘one urban theory’ is theoretically fascinating and normatively 
comprehensible, it also runs the risk o f missing out on the distinctiveness o f  
urban histories, and particularly so in the case o f cities that have endured 
repeated and direct foreign intrusion, both administratively-militarily and 
structurally-economically. Freetown and Kabul have experienced such 
significant interventions by external forces. As a result, their internal 
structures and ‘external’ relations with the central state are markedly 
different from both pre-industrial cities in Europe and North America, and 
from many contemporary capitalist cities in developing countries. Clearly 
such cities are not travelling on an inevitable path to political and cultural 
convergence with the Metropolitan North, as proposed by modernists half a 
century ago (cf. Sjoberg 1960: 25-27). O f course this is also not what 
Robinson (2006) proposes, but it serves as a reminder that abolishing the 
legacy o f some cities as contingent places marked by unfinished projects of 
capitalism and their bellicose ‘inclusion’ into regional structures o f power 
may exclude factors that could be central to our comprehension of their 
contemporary political landscape if  they explain why opportunities for 
“shaping autonomous and inventive futures” (ibid., 7) in these cities is so 
markedly limited. In essence, then, a straightforward affirmation of 
Robinson’s stance on engaging with political reality on the ground is 
followed by a question mark behind the nature o f the two cities investigated 
in this study— also in light of their role as potential placeholders for other 
cities in similar settings— as ‘ordinary’. There is a possibility that Freetown 
and Kabul are rendered ‘extraordinary’, temporarily at least, as a result o f the
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magnitude o f intervention and the interplay o f these thrusts with phases of 
large-scale violent conflict. This proposition will be revisited in CHAPTERS 
SEVEN and EIGHT; this review must now turn to the final and arguably most 
pertinent interpretative framework to the concerns o f the study, urban 
regime analysis.
Urban regime analysis (URA) affirms the relevance o f historico-structural 
constraints but aims more explicidy at filling the analytical gap where power 
and politics act out at the local level. It thus takes a different view from RT 
in that it puts the coalitions o f actors— agency— into the centre on analysis. 
One o f the earliest mentions o f URA comes from Elkin (1985, cf. 1987) 
who, under conditions o f a stable electorate and reliable provision o f basic 
services, analysed the motivations and conditions under which local 
politicians cooperate with economic interests, finding that land use was the 
crucial issue around which coalitions developed. Stone (1987: 17, 291) then 
adopted this approach but argued against a rigid conceptual scheme to be 
imposed on cities, proposing instead a “regime paradigm [...] to ask how a 
governing coalition is held together and what difference that makes in the 
city’s development agenda” taking into account “the particulars o f time and 
place as well as general structural condition.” (cf. Stoker 1995: 59) Based on 
the contributions to his edited volume, he suggested that “no single group 
monopolises the resources that city officials need in order to put together 
and maintain a workable set o f governing arrangements” (ibid.. 283), and 
identified inductively three different types o f regimes: corporate, caretaker, 
and progressive coalitions, which are not necessarily responding to electoral 
power— power is regarded as an enabling, not a dominating force (cf. Stone 
1989: 229).8 Leadership control is therefore “not achieved through 
ideological indoctrination [...] but a result o f a group o f interests being able 
to solve substantial collective action problems. [...] This form o f power is 
intentional and active.” (Stoker 1995: 65)9 One crucial question against this 
background is whether there is a possibility o f conflicting regime preferences
8 Stone (1993) later modified his initial classification, subsequently denoting development 
regimes, maintenance regimes, and lower class opportunity expansion regimes.
9 By logical extension, one application o f regime theory that has received considerable 
resonance are approaches connecting it with negotiation theory, focusing on changes in 
bargaining power o f regime members as a function o f the relative weight o f their stakes 
(Kantor et al. 1997).
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among the players in the urban arena. For instance, political maintenance, i.e. 
the strengthening o f existing institutional frameworks, may be confronted 
with mounting pressure to bolster local development, exerted by both local 
businesses but, particularly relevant in post-war countries, international 
donors.
Given that it is economic motives that initiate the cooperation between 
different actors, an existing coalition is only considered a regime if it involves 
private sector actors and if it succeeds in inducing capital investment from private-sector 
markets to achieve economic development, thus producing economic growth (Kantor et al. 
1997: 349-350, cf. Stone 1993, Elkin 1987). Structural stability in itself is 
therefore not an objective o f a regime, but rather a result o f carefully 
accommodated economic interests. “Once established,” Stoker (1995: 65) 
explains, “a regime is a powerful force in urban politics. Opponents have to 
‘go along to get along’ or face the daunting task o f building an effective 
counter-regime.”
Note that this observation is similar to the notion o f structural rigidity in that 
it does not necessarily derive from targeted actions but can evolve as a result 
of everyday practices — that is, political practices. Painter (1997: 135-138) 
therefore suggests that Pierre Bourdieu’s notion o f habitus in his Theory of 
Practice (1990) is a more realistic concept to analyse urban politics than 
institutional determinism or rational choice: Within a field spanned by 
structures, these structures frame human agency “without being in any way 
the product o f obedience to rules” (ibid., 53). Applied to the urban context, 
this does not necessarily mean that one city equals one structure; on the 
contrary, cities are often a space o f overlapping structures, “virtual schemas” 
complementing “actual resources” (Sewell 1992: 13), with obvious 
consequences for the habitus and the stability o f the conglomerate of 
structures itself. Habitus also prevents actors from evaluating their own 
actions consistently and arriving at rationally defendable choices, instead 
including “a whole range o f other influences to be brought into an analysis 
of regime formation [such as] trust and mutuality, local chauvinism, political 
ideology (Painter 1997: 137) Indeed, such a widened spectrum o f
socialisations and ‘knowledges’ held by different political actors at the city
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level, such as local politicians, business owners, bureaucrats, civil society 
leaders, and security organisations, is a safe assumption even without 
examining the cognitive structure o f every single player. “Any policy, no 
matter how sincerely put forward as being in the public interest, is 
inescapably shaped by those who carry it out: it is shaped by their interests, 
their perceptions, their modes o f operation, and in a particular form of 
interdependence with one another.” (Stone 1987: 11) What is more, the 
notion o f habitus also includes conceptions o f development that influence 
city level actors within their specific structural framework(s) but that originate 
elsewhere. This, as will be shown, is an important feature o f explaining politics 
on the capital cities investigated here, as it transcends the accusation o f stasis 
made against allegedly reinforcing and self-preserving local structures (cf. 
Sewell 1992: 15).
At the same time, this reminder o f political interconnectedness also provides 
the entry point for a critique o f URA. Probably the most vulnerable aspect 
of urban regime theory is what Stoker (1995: 55, cf. Horan 1991) calls the 
‘localist trap’: its focus on the internal, i.e. local politics of coalition building 
(Stone 2005: 324, cf. Stone 1989: 178). Even the claim that this must be 
overcome by an opening o f the focus towards “the connections to external 
political economic relations” (Lauria 1997: 5) does not fully remedy this 
shortcoming, as it continues putting an undue emphasis on economic 
linkages. What is needed is “a recognition o f the impact o f shifts in exogenous 
conditions as well as developments in the internal dynamics o f coalition 
building [emphasis added], as Stoker (1995: 68) suggests.
Keating (1991) and Leo (1997) argue similarly. For them, the role o f the 
national state and city politics has historically been too large a factor to be 
ignored in the analysis o f political dynamics within a contained space, 
because it has determined the intensity o f grassroots participation and the 
autonomy o f different parties interested in urban development. In order to 
enable cross-national comparisons, Leo therefore suggests that “our unit o f  
analysis must become not just the local regime but all o f the forces that help 
to shape political decision making in and for the city, whether they originate 
at the local, regional, or national level (ibid., 97).” Pointing out that
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interrelationships between different levels o f society have for centuries been 
the subject o f enquiry o f various disciplines, Leeds (1973: 19, cf. Wolman 
1995: 135) criticises that only the forms o f interrelationships have been 
investigated, but neither their nature nor the potential o f ‘those dealt with.’ 
Leeds emphasises,
“localities can be considered loci o f  power in the society at large, varying according 
to their unique histories, and a geographical basis, their position in the locality 
hierarchy, and so on. As loci o f  power, they can, therefore, enter into various sorts 
o f  interrelationships with other loci o f  power, characterised by different 
conjunctures o f  power sources. These relationships can be quite dynamic and may 
be o f  various sorts, e.g. cooperative, hostile, competitive, autonomous, or several of 
these at once. [...] In general the evolution o f  society involves the continuous 
adjustment and readjustment between locality and supralocal power institutions.” 
(ibid., 26, 30; emphasis in the original)
Leeds’s emphasis here is clearly on the continuous adjustment o f power 
between different levels o f governance, which leads him to conclude that 
shifts, while carrying the potential to create temporary disequilibria, ultimately 
stabilise the polity (cf. Barth 1998 for a similar contention from the 
anthropological perspective). Leeds does not consider exogenous shocks in 
the form of political intervention through hitherto non-systemic actors, and 
hence does not analyse the case o f externally induced change and, possibly, 
disequilibria. In a post-war setting experiencing foreign intervention, the 
pace and direction o f these processes o f (readjustment could well be 
different as compared to more ‘contained’ environments.
A late follow-up to Leeds’ (1973) critique, Cox (1997) can be credited for not 
only looking at connections from the city to supraurban actors, but also at 
the relationships between levels. He argues that the city-based actors are in 
fact co-operating, competing or at least being influenced by institutions and 
organisations beyond the urban realm. The ‘place-dependency’ o f URA has 
so far constrained an appropriate analysis o f these relationships. Beauregard 
(1997) also supports this notion o f spatial interconnectedness and contends 
that “the regime’s performance is not solely a matter o f the internal 
distribution o f benefits, consensus around development projects, and 
relations with the governing coalition. Urban regimes are neither isolated nor 
closed arrangements.” (cf. Stoker and Mossberger 1994)
37
This is where Kantor et al. (1997) pick up the critique. In light o f the rather 
cursory treatment o f politico-economic environmental factors by regime 
analysts, they argue that this “agency bias actually hinders achieving the very 
thing that regime theorists set out to do — namely, to demonstrate the scope 
for political agency in urban politics, (ibid., 349)” Instead o f focusing on the 
dynamics o f internal decision-making to explain economic development 
policy, they present a conceptual framework to distinguish the type o f 
regimes that are likely to emerge in different structural constellations, which 
they then test empirically through a comparative case study framework 
covering eight cities “within the Western industrial system o f advanced 
democracies (ibid.).” They explain that ultimately, local democratic 
conditions, market position and intergovernmental environments “constrain 
the very composition o f governing coalitions (encouraging who does and 
who does not participate), the mode o f bringing about public-private 
cooperation, and dominant policy agendas (collective versus selective 
benefits, residential versus commercial development, downtown versus 
neighbourhood investments)” (ibid., 350).
In the context o f post-war capital cities in least developed countries, we can 
immediately see that their analytical framework is not applicable without 
significant modification. Democracy in such environments is usually induced 
externally or at least facilitated substantially, markets are commonly 
fragmented and often concentrated and controlled by a national elite, private 
investment is frequently tied to non-capitalist economic activity that takes 
place, at least partly, in the informal realm, and the competitiveness o f large 
urban centres emerging from full-blown war is seldom conducive to local 
economic development. Therefore, only the analytical column concerning 
the role o f the national government—which provides fiscal and political 
support for local development either in an integrated or diffuse manner, or 
withholds it altogether— can be transferred from the author’s contribution 
without overstretching the category.
Despite these modifications emanating from within the discipline and the 
conceptual advances that have resulted, little is known yet about the dynamics
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and means o f regime change throughout the process from being challenged 
or redefined to being replaced by the institutionalisation o f a new urban 
regime. Feldman (1997: 46) accuses regime theorists o f failing to explain why 
exacdy politics matters. He urges to move beyond descriptive accounts o f  
urban regimes, towards an analysis o f the politics o f policy-making (cf. 
Hibou 2004: 348). This is particularly true for cities in the less industrialised 
parts o f the world. Stoker (1995: 68-69) suggests that regime dynamics 
reflect “a considerable expression o f power,” but an obvious question 
remains as to where— both spatially and structurally— this power originates. 
Besides, few publications discussing URA actually make explicit what is one 
o f its central assumptions: that regimes govern under democratic conditions. 
As described above, Kantor et al. (1997: 350) are a noteworthy, exception, in, 
this regard, to the extent that they introduce variation by testing the impact 
o f democratic institutions that differ with regard to the effectiveness o f  
popular control on different types o f regimes. Still, their study is confined to 
democratic urban and national environments. Unless we understand the 
conditions for policy emergence and urban governance in non-democratic 
settings under stress, we cannot really gauge the applicability and value o f  
their and others’ analytical advances for this study.
Policy emergence and governance in settings of fragile statehood
We need to ask to what extent First World-centric conceptual frameworks of 
urban politics are actually relevant to cities in fragile and impoverished 
countries, especially as ‘the local’ is receiving growing recognition as a 
“creative and auto-dynamic [site] to ‘modernise’ or reconstitute order 
beyond the state” in contexts o f fragile statehood (von Trotha 2005: 37-38, 
cf. Graham 2004a, Unger 1987: 563-564, Hindess 1986: 115)? Ultimately, 
“autonomy is not so much a legal status as a real practice,” as Batley and 
Larbi (2004: 105) point out in a multi-country comparison, and while this 
mandates central government’s (un)preparedness to devolve decision­
making authority, it also crucially hinges on local capacity (and its creation, 
where necessary) to implement nominal changes in polity. Further 
constraints exist in the “wider institutional environment— centralised
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government systems, unclear policy frameworks, weak private actors, 
unstable economies and polities, and resistance to the competitive ethic of 
the ‘contract culture’.” (ibid., 179) For instance, decentralisation as a tool to 
increase local responsiveness and upward accountability is often constrained 
by central government’s commitment to political stability, including the 
preservation o f its own rule and externalising, i.e., localising, responsibility 
for poor performance, as well as an interest to prevent the creation of local 
political platforms that could potentially act as breeding grounds of 
oppositional politics (Rakodi 2002: 57, cf. Dahl 1967). Another example, 
whereas in democratic polities local institutions may facilitate residents’ 
claims through the provision o f formal channels o f participation into city 
halls (cf.. Berry et al. .1993: 288;. Rowlands. 2001: 147; Post and Baud 2002; 
Bollens 1997), legitimate channels for such pressure in post-war cities are 
commonly ruptured, and overbearing central state control can reduce the 
potential o f cities as instruments o f public policy, thereby diminishing 
participation in public decision making (Frug 1999: 8, cf. DFID 2001: 31).
Rather than in substance, i.e., control over resources, it is in the expression 
of as well as in the scope and scale o f participation in local-central 
competition where diversity (and possibly divergence) in cities in fragile and 
impoverished countries comes to the fore. Similar to Mollenkopfs (1989) 
concern discussed above and in response to Foucault’s (1991) warning that 
the production o f space is driven by those in power, not those at the 
receiving end of political deliberation, Simone (2002: 31, 43, cf. Hoffmann 
and Lubkemann 2005: 325, Cleaver 2004: 276, Strathem 1985: 65) has 
suggested that city-based collective action in developing countries needs to 
be made more visible to counter depoliticisation and subsumption under 
“specific development trajectories” as part o f a wider— yet presumably 
external— development agenda. Simone’s aforementioned critique dovetails 
with Horowitz’s (1989) late rejection o f Lucian W. Pye’s (1958, cf. Diamant 
1959) notion o f a “non-Westem political process.” Horowitz points out that 
not only in economically successful societies but also in impoverished 
countries, actors face constraints and have to make decisions under the 
condition o f bounded rationality. ‘Ripe moments’ (a concept that puts 
emphasis on a critical mass o f social factors that together possess the
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leverage to produce change10) catalyse outcomes, and initially unintended 
effects o f policies factor into strategies o f adaptation and adjustment. 
However, Horowitz then argues that under conditions o f political 
uncertainty and limited resources, as often found in fragile and impoverished 
countries, the scope o f alternative policies is greater than in democratic or 
democratising polities, where interests are already well organised (ibid., 203- 
205). It is therefore the context and not the substance of policies that 
explains difference.11
This raises the question o f local triggers. D o urban politics possess enough 
‘issue power’ to mobilise the local public? Peterson (1981: 109-130) has 
famously argued that, a significant, amount o f public policies, for 
industrialised cities are designed and implemented without public 
involvement, not necessarily because o f exclusion, but out o f disinterest. 
Except in the case of local crisis (which one could o f course argue is 
precisely the case in post-war cities), local issues— according to Peterson—  
do not carry enough weight to outweigh established preferences for national 
parties; non-partisan elections mediate this but, logically, do not have any 
impact on the national level and also complicate institutional accountability 
(cf. Jones 1995: 75). Even though political survival cannot be expected to 
hinge exclusively on the quality o f public policies, as Hirschman (1958: 64) 
has pointed out in his theory o f unbalanced economic growth, corrective 
action is often taken as a response to pressure on public authorities.
The view held by Peterson is congruent with predictions of constituency 
theory, which suggests that central government has a larger and more 
diversified stakeholder landscape representing more diffused interests 
allowing for mutual checking, which in turn increases the need to build 
coalitions to achieve mutually shared goals. On the other hand, local 
governments have a smaller constituency, which makes it is easier for 
dominant interests to control policy, leading to the exclusion o f less 
organised stakeholders. The problem associated with such a view in the
10 This builds on Althusser’s notion of contingency of social constellations; cf. Steinmetz 
(1994: 182).
11 More recently, Mitchell (2004) fielded a similar argument in the context o f international 
natural disaster relief; cf. Barakat and Chard 2004: 31, Holohan 2005: 167.
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context o f this study is that it assumes ‘the national’ to be somehow more 
diverse than ‘the urban’, where interests are organised insufficiendy. 
However, particularly in less urbanised developing countries under 
conditions o f urban primacy, capital cities embody the greatest diversity of 
political interests and the greatest proximity to decision-makers both directly 
and via the media, which is often absent outside the capital city. As a 
consequence, many urban governments in war-torn countries have to bear 
the brunt o f immediate public pressure, whereas politics at the national level 
is potentially more insulated, ‘detached’ and dominated by entrenched rent 
seeking interests. Hence if national policies favour certain locations in the 
process o f local development, this is not necessarily the result o f any 
cohesive, national development plan but can well be an effect o f political 
entrepreneurship in the context o f coalition building (cf. Mollenkopf 1983).
Much like in industrialised cities local interests in cities developing countries 
are not monolithic, resulting in an equally pressing need for negotiation and 
coalition-building. Clarke (1987: 112-114) has identified several distinct 
stakes in local public policy processes which— within given polity 
limitations— provide useful categories for this the analysis o f Freetown and 
Kabul and will be discussed in CHAPTER SEVEN on the basis o f our empirical 
investigation. Clarke distinguishes as follows. Groups that have territorial 
claims and organise around land use issues depend on community 
mobilisation in order to gain political clout and often experience 
organisational inertia and collective action constraints. Local elected officials 
have a latent interest in increasing the public’s voice, but their incentives are 
usually closely aligned with fostering urban growth. Local administrative 
officials underlie institutional norms and needs for power and control and 
will, collectively, aim at maximising budgetary allocation but also, 
individually, follow career aspirations and ideological beliefs. Based on this 
classification, she deduces three potential triggers for policy responses: 
electoral needs, ideological concerns, and institutional interests.12 The first 
response is triggered by a clearly delineated public desire, making opposition 
potentially costly due to a loss o f political support. A response to ideological
12 Note that this view once again mirrors the concept of the city as a closed circuit.
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concerns becomes more likely when the electorate is either undecided or 
stalemated. Finally, policy may kick in as a response to institutional interests, 
including the enhancement o f institutional capacity, when both electorate 
and ideological drivers are either absent or blocked (ibid., 114-117). Clarke 
concludes that institutional responses are necessary in order to maintain local 
legitimacy, authority and control, which may also require ignoring specific 
demands by social groups (ibid., 121).
Indeed, the competition between city and central governments observed in 
many developing countries— also in the course o f this study— can be 
considered not only an effect o f resource scarcity (e.g., Barrows 1971: 1) but 
also, a symptom o f competing legitimacies (cf. Appadurai 2003: 337) between 
real and ‘imagined’ communities (cf. Andersen 1991). In striking similarity to 
the case o f Kabul, which will be analysed in CHAPTER SIX, Nagel (2002: 722- 
723, cf. Makdisi 1997) illustrates in the case o f Lebanon “a nation-building 
agenda [that] has infused the country’s reconstruction” since the end o f the 
‘regio-civiT war (cf. Ozkan 2004) in the early 1990s designed to fill the 
“virtual power vacuum. [...] The new Beirut is designed to represent a 
national space where a decade earlier there had been only rubble and gutted- 
out structures [and] to signal the beginning o f legitimate, centralised 
authority where there had been political chaos and fragmentation.”13 In 
developing countries undergoing ‘peacebuilding’14 efforts, urban policies and 
polices for urban reconstruction are thus not exclusively bound to local 
needs and incentives; they are equally relevant to the national as well as the 
international political economy o f state (re)creation and resilience.
Equal attention is due to deliberate attempts o f reforming national as well as 
sub-national governance institutions and practices as part o f the 
peacebuilding agenda, as diverging views prevail with respect to approaching 
their reform. While certain analysts consider post-war settings “an 
opportunity for some o f these countries to rebuild their societies, economies
13 Kubursi (1999) has emphasised that the cost o f this physical exercise in nation-building 
was far exceeding any standards of financial prudence, eating up almost 90% o f annual 
government revenues.
14 Peacebuilding needs to be distinguished from peacemaking (military intervention to 
deescalate) and peacekeeping (enforced preservation of security status by an international 
third party; Mehler and Ribaux 2000: 33).
43
and polities and to start reforms and restructuring that may have previously 
proved unattainable [emphasis added]” (Green and Ahmed 1999: 189-190), 
others underline that the main task is to prevent connected zones o f  
lawlessness, a “fertile ground for the establishment o f drugs, crime, and 
terrorist syndicates from which no country may be immune” (Caplan 2005: 
256). Advocating external design, some go as far as prescribing the perfect 
state brought about through the workings o f an international body equipped 
with military and civilian personnel specialising in nation-building “flexibly, 
creatively and with sensitivity to local conditions” (Rondinelli and 
Montgomery 2005: 19) and urge that
“post-conflict nation building requires programmes to create a strong state quickly 
and in such fashion as to strengthen the capability o f  the governing regime not only 
to provide security, eliminate violent conflict and find ways to reconcile conflicting 
ethnic or religious factions, but also to protect human rights, generate economic 
opportunities, provide basic services, control corruption, respond effectively to emergencies and 
combat poverty and inequality.” (ibid., 22; emphasis added)
To achieve this, interventions and intermediate ‘de-sovereignisation’15 in the 
form o f ‘executive international authority’ (Caplan 2005: 179) are being 
suggested but have also been considered problematic, either in terms o f  
practical feasibility (ibid.) or more substantially with respect to political 
legitimacy (cf. Paris 2004: 231, Paris 2002, Young 2000).16 CHAPTERS FIVE 
and SEX illustrate that an important concern pertaining to post-intervention 
governance o f fragile polities is the question o f legitimacy, which is 
inseparably linked to the spatial levels at which governing and holding 
accountable is supposed to take place. Legitimacy and accountability 
relationships that cut through levels o f polity are more fragile and easily 
contested than those that are considered by both governors and governed as 
‘within reach.’ Still, in his comments on a study on regulatory developments
15 Some even urge ‘decertification’ o f such states rather then embarking on ineffective 
strategies to ‘rebuild’ them at all (Herbst 2003).
16 Not surprisingly, contemporary liberal-interventionist literature remains silent on the role 
o f international agencies in speeding up the disintegration o f some West African states 
through structural adjustment programmes during the 1980s. It focuses instead on the 
negative influence of regional governments in destabilising their neighbours, such as the 
provision of military training to insurgent movements (e.g., Iibya, Liberia, Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan) and the involvement of mostly Eastern European and Asian countries providing 
such anti-government movements with small arms— a position naturally welcomed by 
human rights activists— (cf. Fosu 2005: 237, Fosu 2002, Control Arms Campaign 2006: 12- 
17), but neglects the potential negative consequences o f political interference and foreign 
leadership in the context o f post-war reconstruction.
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in global governance (Messner 2003) Muller (2005: 10, cf. Call et al. 2003: 
237, 246) highlights that the potential for peacebuilding across levels of 
governance “appears obvious. [...] Multi-level networks o f diverse actors 
concerned with peace processes might provide an opportunity to establish 
effective monitoring capacity based on strong local participation and 
accountability.” Related hopes that international NGOs (INGOs) act as 
connectors between global bodies o f peace building and local arenas (von 
Trotha 2005: 38) are comprehensible, but may overlook an important 
politico-economic incentive that potentially diminishes the effectiveness o f  
such organisations. Indeed, an important incentive for decentralisation 
derives from practical effectiveness considerations by non-state actors active 
in. the reconstruction o f the. national economy and social structure. NGOs, 
highly dependent on short-term photogenic success to secure external funds, 
therefore tend to “reinforce the inclination o f rehabilitation programs to 
adopt the highly decentralised and integrated approaches o f relief rather than 
those o f development.” (Macrae 1997: 197, cf. Knapp 2006)
Insisting on involvement with legitimate government entities, Debiel (2005: 
13-14) suggests a distinction between input legitimacy, i.e., the scope o f  
participatory opportunities, and output legitimacy, i.e., the “developmental 
orientation” o f the government. In states with limited political legitimacy o f  
the government where donor agendas and governmental interests diverge, he 
recommends ‘systems alignment’ and a focus on projects rather than direct 
budget support. He also explicitly urges the support o f change agents. Where 
political legitimacy is stronger, donors should focus on policy alignment in 
order to substitute their lack o f effective institutions. Yet this strategy, while 
theoretically sound, overlooks the implicit perverse incentive it carries. 
International agencies will seek to legitimise their national counterparts as 
soon as possible after the termination o f large-scale violence— an approach 
taken in both Afghanistan and Sierra Leone— in order to get started with 
‘serious’ development programmes. Klemp and Poeschke (2005: 25) 
acknowledge this dilemma o f uncertainty with regard to legitimate country 
level partners and recommend “profound politico-economic analyses o f  
power relations and actors” prior to making large scale commitments in 
order to avoid symptom (rather than cause) based strategies. Similarly, Risse
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(2005) criticises the forging o f transnational/local alliances in “spaces o f  
limited statehood” against a background o f  the privatisation o f security 
services but does not raise any concerns about changing political structures.
Yet while Risse envisions democratic guidelines for a remote controlled 
polity, he does not outline how to deal with the ongoing politics in the 
temporary void. Besides, the notion o f ‘governance’ has also been criticised 
more generally for allegedly eclipsing an alternative discourse o f the 
necessary conditions for inclusive democracy through its “binary opposition 
[between] alien state intervention, which is associated with past development 
failures, and indigenous capitalism, which represents the basis for future 
development successes,” thus suggesting that-the cutting back o f the state 
automatically give rise to “a people friendly democratic venture, almost to 
the extent that state contraction or destatisation is presented as synonymous 
with democratisation.” (Abrahamsen 2001: 50-51, cf. Apthorpe 2005: 5) O f 
central concern against this background is thus the mode o f “establish[ing] a 
sovereign authority capable o f enforcing a hegemonic peace upon all the 
fearfully contending parties.” (Walter and Snyder 1999: 17, cf. Paris 2004: 
227, Klute and von Trotha 2004)
As we shall see in both cases studied for this investigation, competition for 
politico-economic control o f post-war assets was fierce, and often ran along 
the lines o f pre-war coalitions o f actors or groups. Simply superimposing a 
new system of governance was thus unlikely to be effective. Still, there has 
been little analysis investigating intervention impacts on sub-national 
institutions [other than studies on the role o f donor agencies in bringing 
about de jure decentralisation, one o f the “ephemeral aid trends” identified by 
Perin and Attaran (2003: 1218)]. Undeniably, it is plausible to assume— in 
theory at least— that the institutionalisation o f democracy is facilitated 
through routine, reciprocity and a subsequent increase in political 
predictability via a learning process among political leaders that increases the 
effectiveness o f ‘governance as conflict management’ (cf. Rothchild 1997: 
240-241, Zartman 1997: 10-12). However, the problem with such a 
proposition is that it presupposes the existence o f a political culture as a tool 
to achieve democratic political skills, hence failing to explain how
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governance as conflict management can be effective on the conditions o f  
political uncertainty and violence. The desire o f international actors in post­
war situations to hold immediate elections is often not shared by the 
population, who usually express a strong preference for physical security and 
a reliable justice system before a embarking on cementing well-known 
political constellations (cf. Green and Ahmed 1999: 203). Still, international 
calls for slowing the pace by laying out its intentions and strategies to 
devolve financial and governmental authority first “and only then focus on 
elections” remain the exception (ICG 2003b: 29, cf. Dijohn 2002: 5, 
Martinelli Quille 2000: 24, Green and Ahmed 1999: 200). Such an iterative 
approach to peacebuilding has been advocated by Paris (2004) who suggests 
that liberalisation and . public . voting be preceded, by . an effective 
institutionalisation o f the state (‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’). 
But this is a condition unmet in Sierra Leone, and even “partly reversed” in 
Afghanistan with its “quick and dirty approach to liberalisation” wrapped in 
a discourse o f leaving only a ‘light footprint’ from a curious mix o f technical 
advice and (arguably heavier-weighting) military missions to root out ‘anti­
government forces’ (Paris 2004: 223-227). Indeed, not only in Sierra Leone 
and Afghanistan the creation o f instutitions to fulfil the normative agenda 
that donor agencies are trying to promote has proven to be a tall order.
There is also some recognition o f a need for more careful peacebuilding 
processes ‘from below.’ The contributions by Bakonyi and Abdullahi (2005) 
on the central role o f local institutions to preserve local structures in an 
environment o f complete disorder highlight this, and Ahmed and Green 
(1999: 124) challenge the view that clan elders are unnecessarily 
unrepresentative based on their historical analysis o f civil war in Somalia. 
Similar to Omaar (1994: 234), the authors underline that local communities 
made great efforts to identify members who enjoyed trust in their ability to 
mediate and lead; eventually, communities were quite satisfied with the 
quality o f their local governance. On the contrary, what they considered the 
real problem was the disconnection between local politics and national politics through 
the lack of phjsical representation of local issues in the capital city and the insufficient 
support for rebuilding traditional structures o f local level conflict resolution 
(cf. Maynard 1997). As a consequence, several successes in peacemaking at
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the local level were not tied together nationally, which hampered the overall 
process (cf. Green and Ahmed 1999: 191).
How, then, can legitimacy be achieved? A growing number of scholars have 
come to emphasise the essential role o f tax collection in order to build, or 
rebuilt, a viable state structure that has the fiscal capacity to create an 
institutional framework in which growth-oriented economic policies can be 
implemented and take effect (e.g., Dijohn 2005, Addison et al. 2005). 
Resource mobilisation is thus considered to be at the heart o f post-conflict 
reconstruction, and policy measures that develop taxable economic activity 
and facilitate the shift from illegality to legality are central components of  
related strategies.. However,, this also entails the redistribution o f property 
rights. The cases o f Sierra Leone and Afghanistan demonstrate not only that 
this is an inherently political endeavour, but also that urban centres are key 
loci for such redistributive processes, prone to conflict.
Towards a revised interpretative framework
In essence, all theories considered in the previous section have their merits, 
but clearly none o f them is able, prima jade, to offer an individually 
compelling rationale for urban politics in post-war intervention capital cities. 
Elitism and pluralism do not pay sufficient attention to structural constraints 
and opportunities. RT as the more progressive expression o f Urban Marxism 
is limited mainly through its constitutive assumption of relative stability of 
the polity. Rational choice mischaracterises the economic environment and 
incentive structures embedding national-urban politics and policymaking. 
World Cityism is more receptive to inter-spatial relations but deterministic, 
and indeed reductionist, in its normative aspects by suggesting that 
streamlining local policies towards economic growth is the only feasible 
option at hand. Postmodernism tackles this and emphasises the scope o f  
local agency, but—in addition to frictions in its suppositions— risks being 
overwhelmed by local politics without considering the impact o f politic- 
economic supra-structures. In contract, while URA is equally tied to the 
local, its applicability, too, is limited due to its focus on economic coalitions.
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This, then, constitutes the preliminary answer to the first research question,17 
which will be taken up again in CHAPTER SEVEN to accommodate key 
empirical insights as well. In order to illustrate the remaining gaps in theory, 
the three-dimensional cube below visualises the foci of the aforementioned 
theories on a two-layer continuum of structure and agency, and of local, 
national, or international interaction (figure 1). For instance, a theory of 
urban politics that focuses on agency between predominantly local actors 
would be found in the lower left cube in front (e.g., pluralism). One that 
seeks to explain urban politics by national-local structures would be placed 
into the lower right cube in the back (e.g., the ‘local state’ hypothesis).
uri
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Figure 1: L ocating theories o f  urban politics
Noting the insights from the literature review on cities, development and 
war provided above, and from the subsequent discussion of theoretical 
coverage, and in line with hypothesis (C), we observe that box ‘X1’ (marked 
in green) is an unfilled yet presumably crucial area of theory in the context of
17 “Which existing theories of urban politics are suitable to explain political processes and 
their intended and unintended outcomes in impoverished post-war intervention cities?”
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post-war urban politics. Buffered by both authoritative and allocative 
recourses (Jabri 1994: 80-81), active cooperation between international and 
local actors in a structurally dynamic setting is expected to generate enough 
leverage to reconfigure local polity and practice in accordance with 
hypothesis (B) o f ‘accelerated structuration.’ This is visualised by the two 
green arrows showing the alteration o f both local and national spheres.
The concept o f accelerated structuration thus differs from regime theory in 
that it accounts for fundamental shifts at the macro, meso, and micro level 
(e.g., as a result o f the post-war economy, political fragmentation and 
segmentation o f social structures). At the same time, it is superseding RT by 
explaining external agency in environments o f weak rule o f law.
By way o f summing up, reconfigured urban theory in the specific settings 
looked at in this study would therefore have to incorporate the following 
features:
i. Conceptualise institutional multiplicity both within and 
across spatial levels o f polity and explain its relevance for 
political processes, including the politico-economic 
legacies and remnants from colonialism and incomplete 
capitalist transformation, and political activism around 
inclusion (‘street-level politics’) and service delivery at the 
micro-level that emerges within these structural 
constraints
ii. Shed light on different understandings and practices o f  
policymaking through different kinds o f formal and 
informal politics
iii. Address the challenges o f incomplete capitalism in the 
context o f externally assisted post-war recovery, first and 
foremost the tension between a lack o f taxable local 
resources and the ‘soft budget constraint’ introduced by 
external grants and programmes
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iv. Account for timeframes significantly shorter than those 
prevalent in democratically controlled cities, and for 
resulting political dynamics
This adds up to a tall order, but it is a feasible task if the analysis builds on a 
methodology that captures the different dynamics in need o f investigation in 
order to evaluate the merits o f my theoretical propositions. Based on an 
exploration o f different epistemologies, the following chapter explains the 
rationale for the methodology chosen and outlines its components.
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Chapter 3: Method
Places in context: the rationale for a comparative methodology
Comparative methodologies have gained significant theoretical and practical 
support by social scientists over the past decade. Dijohn (2002: 14), for 
instance, argues that the analysis o f party politics and political strategies and 
“their effects in generating more or less divisible parameters o f contestation” 
in a comparative case study research design can render important insights 
into the dynamics o f national conflict. Stoker (2006) has made a similar 
argument for the study o f local governance beyond national boundaries. Yet 
only recently Pierre (2005, cf. Mossberger and Stoker 2001) attested that 
urban researchers have been slow to harness the cognitive potential o f  
comparative studies, for several reasons. First, urbanists have a tendency to 
regard their research as somehow disconnected, or rather, emancipated from 
mainstream, mono-disciplinary political science. Second, comparative 
research would require a certain degree o f  reductionism that, at first sight, 
sits uncomfortably with the preference o f urban researchers for in-depth 
single case studies. And third, theoretical advances underpinning such 
comparative urban study has displayed a certain degree o f US-focused 
ethnocentrism that limits its transferability to other contexts.18 Inspired by 
such critique, this study addresses this gap and aims at reaping the 
aforementioned benefits o f comparative setups. In the course o f my analysis 
in CHAPTERS FOUR to SEVEN I am are using the comparative method to gain 
a deeper understanding o f each place and its political socio-economic 
historical trajectory and reality by analysing them in tandem. The key objective 
of this cross-national comparison is thus to distil explanations for similarities 
and differences, and to generalise from them to the extent possible.
Unlike settings enjoying democratic stability, the environments into which 
post-war cities are commonly embedded are usually highly dynamic. With 
the scope o f any agency defined by institutional frameworks, crisis situations 
thus become critical junctures at which decision-making by political actors is
18 The reverse is also true, as findings from non-US (but nonetheless developed) cities have 
fed into discussions of US-based urbanists only tangentially (cf. Vogel 2006).
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crucial (Bastian and Luckham 2003: 306-307, cf. Greif and Laitin 2004, 
Thelen 2003), and grounding this comparative study historically therefore 
proved indispensable. At the same time, given that my empirical analysis 
demonstrates a significant extent o f competition between newly conceived 
institutions with persisting established ones, attention to self-enforcing 
institutions based on belief systems (cf. Durkheim 1950) is equally 
warranted. This again necessitates a historical analysis in order to identify 
periods o f (re) structuration during different phases o f external involvement 
and also the bifurcation points that initiate processes o f reordering local- 
national government relations. In CHAPTER SEVEN of this study, I will 
employ counterfactual reasoning as a method to scrutinise the significance of 
the assumed causations.19. I - will, follow- Fearon’s - (1-991) approach to 
counterfactuals and distinguish accordingly between actual analysis and 
analytical tools: rather than seeking to incorporate cases with zero 
incidences, I ask, e.g., “Would xyz be the same under different 
circumstances?” Rather than writing “history backwards” (cf. Bastian and 
Luckham 2003: 306), a tendency particularly prevalent in the deterministic 
ontology o f ‘failing states’ criticised above, this requires the tracing o f  
bifurcation points from the past to the present, as “design is a rare and 
unlikely mode o f change o f institutions in general.” (ibid., 305).
Herein, sharp distinctions between ‘causes’ and ‘effects’ appear highly 
problematic. Building on a dynamic perspective put forward by McAdam et 
al. (2001), Sambanis (2004: 263) righdy points out that mechanisms “can also 
be outcomes: depending on the level of aggregation at which a theory is 
built, different outcomes become intervening variables, connecting a set o f  
variables to other outcomes.” The value o f proposing causal relationships, 
however, is not absolute; it hinges on the proximity o f the independent 
variable (s) to the explanandum (ibid., 263). This argument has again two 
important implications for the design o f this enquiry. First, Sambanis’
19 I am indebted to Ralf Leiteritz for guiding me to the key literature on counterfactuals, and 
to Professors Lehmann-Waffenschmidt and Demandt for providing me with an 
introduction to this method. Demandt (2003: 192) has concretised the contribution of this 
method in a historical context as follows: “Counterfactual History is necessary for the 
assessment o f causal factors that only show their weight once taken out of the larger 
context; [...] unrealised possibilities open up during first stages o f a development and crises, 
less so in the history of civilisation and culture but more often in the history o f wars and 
states [author’s translation].”
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contention can be interpreted as an argument in favour of multilayered 
investigation. Second, given these multiple levels of research, a focus on 
identifying the larger mechanisms appears crucial, thus confirming the need 
to integrate analysis of different spatial levels o f polity over time. The figure 
below visualises this analytical combination of longitudinal and multi-level 
approaches in CHAPTERS FOUR, FIVE and SIX.
CHAPTERS FIVE and SIXCHAFFER FOUR
M erging levels 
(polity space)
Freetown
KabulInternational
National Capturing
change
(history)
Urban Large-scale violence 
triggering international 
intervention and 
‘peacebuilding’
Processes of 
urban politics
Figure 2: Analytical approach
We should note that in comparative studies o f two cases there is a natural 
tendency to reduce, as much as possible, the variation among dependent 
variables. However, such a ‘most similar systems design’ may fall victim to 
the futile endeavour of trying to find empirical clarity in a world of 
complexity (cf. Przeworski 1987: 39-40), and the explanatory power of the 
overall argument should therefore not hinge on an expectation of absolute 
certainty of results (cf. Evans 1995: 20, Sekhon 2004: 281).
But careful extrapolation is possible, even when based on a small number of 
cases (‘small N-problem’). Mitchell (1983: 190-191), in his influential article 
on case studies and sociological research, points out that the potential for
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extrapolation does not exclusively derive from statistical inference, but is “in 
fact based on the validity of the analysis rather than the representativeness o f  
the events.” Hence if the analysis is sufficiently rigorous, a case study can 
serve “as material from which some theoretical principles are to be inferred.” 
Thus, even though comparative studies cannot be expected to produce 
strong inference if their theoretical foundations are still emerging— as in this 
study— , they can demonstrate that new models can perform as well as, or 
even better than, mainstream models (Leach and Sabatier 2005: 499).
The comparative method, even when comprising only a small number of 
cases, is equally suited to theory testing. Goldstone (2003) has shown that an 
empirical .investigation as.part o f a deductive theory testing exercise that rests on 
a small set o f case studies does not automatically provide less analytical 
insight than a large N-study. Inductive theory development would require a 
sufficiently large set o f cases (Sambanis 2004: 262) but deductive theory 
development can handle smaller sample sixes and benefits as well from 
variation in parameters to capture the greatest observational diversity 
possible (George and Bennett 2004: 19-22, cf. McKeown 1999, Ragin 1994, 
Patton 1990: 169). It also follows from Goldstone’s (2003) case that Turner’s 
(1953) ‘causal prime mover’ argument, which holds that prediction from the 
case studies tends to be theoretical rather than empirical, is not 
compromising the present study because the enquiry’s main aim is to 
advance the body o f theory, not to make accurate predictions based on any 
notion o f statistical inference. Case studies do not have to be ‘typical’ 
representations o f reality to ensure the practical applicability o f analytical 
conclusions. In other words, there is value in specificity; one case that 
contradicts strong priors can be highly instructive for theoretical refinement, 
which is precisely the intention o f this study.
In this endeavour, guidance can be drawn from Eckstein’s (1975) discussion 
of case study research. In ‘configurative-idiographic studies’, social reality is 
dealt with in a largely descriptive manner. On the contrary, ‘disciplined- 
configurative studies’ have a more focused theoretical component. Eckstein 
(1975: 100) explains that this type o f “case study is thus tied to theoretical 
enquiry— but only partially, where theories apply or can be envisioned.” The
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other two types o f case studies in Eckstein’s taxonomy fall squarely under 
the category o f ‘heuristic case studies.’ The first o f these two subgroups is 
what Eckstein calls ‘plausibility probes’. These are used to test specific 
arguments. Mitchell (1983: 196) points out, “Plausibility probes may be 
undertaken after heuristic case studies have been successfully concluded. 
[They] are used, then, as a preliminary test o f theoretical formulations 
previously established by some other procedures.” Consequentially, 
plausibility probes would appear very well suited to refine the conclusions o f 
this study, and will therefore be discussed in CHAPTER EIGHT.
The second subgroup is constituted by ‘crucial case studies,’ which are used 
to. illustrate outliers .with, enough explanatory, power to reject a commonly 
accepted theoretical proposition. The explanatory power o f this method can 
be charged further by embedding it into a ‘most conducive’ setting (cf. 
Hague and Harrop 2004). In order to test a new or revised theoretical 
proposition, such an approach is useful to examine its validity and 
applicability. If the proposition does not seem to carry sufficient explanatory 
power even in the context where its potential to clarify empirical 
observations can reasonably be expected to be greatest, then one can safely 
assume that it needs to be amended or even done away with completely. As 
the following section will outline, both Sierra Leone and Afghanistan could 
be considered ‘most conducive settings.’
In sum, three different approaches classified by Eckstein’s taxonomy are 
direcdy relevant to this study: heuristic cases, plausibility probes, and crucial 
case studies. Step one of deductive theory testing in this study is informed by 
references to general processes in post-war cities in order to demonstrate the 
theory gap. Facilitated by a ‘disciplined-configurative’ design and two 
arguably ‘most conducive’ settings, CHAPTERS FOUR to SEX then provide the 
analysis o f past and present politico-economic processes in and on Freetown 
and Kabul. Herein, despite obvious differences regarding geography, socio­
economic institutions and cultural norms, the contextual parameters in Sierra 
Leone and Afghanistan are not only comparable, but indeed similar with 
respect to a number o f essential aspects. While I am thus not comparing like 
with like, an ‘approximate equation’ o f the two study environments, to
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paraphrase what Mitchell (1987: 32) purports as the crucial pre-condition for 
meaningful case comparison, is given. The following section on case 
selection serves to substantiate this claim.
Case selection: distinct characteristics, similar contexts
In the text sections o f the latest World Development Report on ‘Equity and 
Development’ (World Bank 2005a), Sierra Leone and Afghanistan (see 
figures 3 and 4 on the following page; NB: different scales) are hardly 
mentioned. One finds only two references to the latter country, one focusing 
on the continuously appalling state o f health care, particularly in rural 
provinces (ibid., 144), and the other one briefly touching the issue o f  
reconstruction aid in 2004, the largest contribution (US$ 0.9 billion) coming 
from the United States o f America. Not surprisingly, after 22 years o f war, 
the data situation in Afghanistan is extremely patchy, leading to the country 
being classified as an “other economy.” The report only mentions one reliable 
figure— its gross national income, which is claimed to hover in the area o f  
5.5 billion US$ (ibid., 300). However, as this excludes illegal incomes from 
poppy cultivation and trade, estimated to constitute up to two thirds o f the 
overall Afghan economy (cf. Rubin et al. 2004), it is clearly a dubious 
indicator o f economic activity. In a complementary country data sheet 
updated in April 2006, the World Bank adds that 47.2% of the 2004 gross 
domestic product (GDP), estimated at 5.8 billion US$, was generated by 
merchandise trade, and that ODA had risen sharply between 2000 and 2004 
from 140.9 million US$ to 2.2 billion US$ (World Bank 2006b).
In the 2003 Human Development Index (HDI), Afghanistan was not listed 
in the main indicator tables either but was reported to have the second 
lowest life expectancy (43.1 years), by far the highest infant and under-five 
mortality rates (165/257 per 1,000 live births), and the second largest 
percentage o f under-nourished people (70%) among those countries not 
listed in the main ranking. The only country with an equally challenging 
record was Somalia, which remains a collapsed state (UNDP 2003a: 339), 
recent international incursions notwithstanding.
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Similar to per capita disbursements for Sierra Leone, calculatory payouts in 
Afghanistan were estimated at US$ 182 per head per year during the period 
o f 2004-2010 and are thus significantly lower than in Kosovo (US$ 814), 
East Timor (US$ 256), and Bosnia (US$ 249) during the aftermath o f these 
conflicts, and only marginally higher than per capita pledges for post­
genocide Rwanda (US$ 114; Rubin 2004 et al: 9). In August 2005, 
approximately 50% of indigenous national income was still generated 
through customs collection, but the government was planning to introduce a 
national scheme for income taxation with flat rates at 10% for above-average 
and 20% for high incomes, and was hoping that this scheme would 
constitute 50% o f national income by 2007. On the contrary, existing copper 
and iron mines .were, not expected to make a significandy higher contribution 
over the course o f the coming half-decade (A V T  2005).
With 98.5% o f its urban population living in slum-like conditions, 
Afghanistan is statistically second only to Ethiopia and Chad (both 99.4%) in 
the group o f countries with the highest percentage o f slum dwellers (GUO 
2003: 33-34). While post-war estimates o f Kabul’s population among local, 
national and international practitioners differed substantially— covering the 
extraordinarily wide range o f 2 to 4 million (cf. Mumtaz and Noschis 2004: 
7), the Central Statistics Office (CSO) set it at 2.707 million in March 2003. 
Including peri-urban areas, the figure added up to 3.314 million inhabitants. 
This compares to 1.3 million inhabitants counted in the Kabul City Census 
from 1986 (CSO 2003). The table below summarises these figures.
data sources: CSO 2003; Arez and Dittmann 2005, Yavari d'Hellencourt 2003 
1965 1978 1986 2001 2003 2005
Kabul city population 435,000 780,000 1,300,000 2,000,000 2,707,000
incl. peri-urban areas 3,314,000 4,000,000
Table 1: Population of Kabul
Sierra Leone is not mentioned anywhere in the 229 pages o f 2005 World 
Bank analysis, yet the statistics for this country, to the extent that reliable 
information is available, paint an equally bleak picture.20 The gross national
20 The following data has been extracted from World Bank sources (2005a: 279-299); cf. 
Schmidt (2006).
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income in 2004 was estimated at US$> 1.1 billion, roughly US$ 200 per capita. 
Given low commodity prices, local purchasing power o f the Leone is 
significantly higher, and PPP gross national income is therefore estimated at 
US$ 4 billion total and US$ 790 per capita in purchasing power parity terms. 
Nonetheless, in 2004, 70.2% of the national population was considered to 
live below the poverty line, with 56.4% o f city dwellers living below the 
threshold, and 79% of those dwelling in rural areas.
The annual GDP growth rate from 2003 to 2004 was estimated at 5.4%, 
mostly due to post-war recovery in legal regional trade activities. Data from 
2004 show that agriculture was the dominant sector with 53% value-added 
followed by industry with. 30%, Services only contributed 17%. Government 
spending was comparably low, accounting for 13% of overall expenditure. 
Private households accounted for 83%. With 20% of GDP, gross capital 
formation was relatively low in 2004, compare to other countries in the 
region. In 2004, the value o f imports was more than double the value o f  
exports, with US$ 285 million and US$ 140 million respectively. 
Manufactured exports only accounted for 7% o f total exported merchandise 
in 2003, with the largest export commodity being agricultural products.
Recorded net private capital flows were US$ 3 million in 2003, matching the 
US$ 3 million o f foreign direct investment in the same year. Official 
development assistance, on the contrary, was more than nine times the 
combined amount o f investment capital: US$ 56 million. In the same year, 
total external debt added up to US$ 1.612 billion, thus far outweighing gross 
national income. Domestic banks only provided approximately 30% of 
overall credit, with the rest stemming from international creditors.
Male life expectancy is still extremely low, averaging at 36 years. With 39 
years, female life expectancy is only marginally longer, and while male life 
expectancy can be expected to increase as an effect o f the cessation o f armed 
hostilities, the state o f maternal health, particularly outside provincial centres, 
remains dire. The literacy rate o f citizens o f 15 years and older is estimated at 
30% according to national census data. In 2000, education surveys revealed 
that 74% o f the population had no schooling, 4% had between one to six
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years, 19% had seven to 12 years o f schooling, and only 3% had more than 
that. In the period from 1995 until 2000, the country was witnessing 
substantial migration in the area o f 110,000 residents (World Bank 2005a: 
279-299).
Exceeding the regional trend, Sierra Leone is urbanising at a rapid pace. The 
UN Population Fund (2003: 75) calculates with an urban growth rate of  
6.3%; (regional average: 4.3%, cf. The Economist 2007a: 50). While only 21.4% 
of the population lived in cities in 1975, 38.8% were city-dwellers in 2003. In 
2015, the United Nations expect almost half o f Sierra Leone to be urbanised 
(46.7%; UNDESA 2004: 26, cf. Cramer and Schmitz 2004: 12). Freetown is 
by far the. largest urban agglomeration with a population, o f around 800,000 
people (of which more than half are estimated to live in poverty; UN Habitat 
2006b: 49), which is roughly a sixth o f the overall 4.97 million o f Sierra 
Leone.21 The table below illustrates population growth in Freetown over the 
course o f the past five decades.
(source: GoSL 2005a: 4) 1963 % 1974 % 1985 % 2004 %
Sierra Leone 
total population 2,180,355 - 2,735,159 - 3,515,812 - 4,963,298 -
Western Area 
Rural population 67,106 3.08 40,065 1.46 84,467 2.40 164,024 3.30
Western Area 
Urban population 127,917 5.87 276,247 10.10 469,776 13.36 786,900 15.85
Table 2: Population of the Western Area:22 rural, urban, and as o f total
This growth o f the capital city and the dire situation o f urban poverty in 
Freetown coincide with an oversupply o f skills in petty production and a 
dominance o f informal sector employment, estimated in 2003 to account for 
70% o f total employment (IDP Project 2003: 64-65).
As foreshadowed in the previous sub-section, the comparison o f Freetown 
and Kabul can build on similarities but also on differences. With their size 
both in terms o f absolute numbers and percentage o f their countries’
21 The total population estimate is taken from UNDESA (2004: 26) and the Government of 
Sierra Leone (2005a). The World Bank’s (2004b) population figure was slightly higher (5.2 
million in 2002).
22 The Western Area is the province embedding the dty o f Freetown.
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populations, both cities are metropoli. Moreover, Griinewald’s (2004: 16-18) 
provocative notion o f the ‘non-urbanised city’ seems to apply to both: city- 
based organisations have a coordinating function, groups identify themselves 
through and via the city, transactions are on the spot due to lack of trust, 
and public services are largely absent. Nor are the urban economies in 
Freetown and Kabul specialised on any particular value-creating industry, 
and urban space in both cities is not subdivided into quarters with specific 
functions such as production, services, administration, and living (ibid., note 
the parallels with the ‘urban functions’ production, service provision, equity, 
and security outlined in CHAPTER TWO). Finally, and vitally important, both 
cities and the countries in which they are embedded have undergone foreign 
military intervention and external rule, which-—following hypothesis (B)—  
renders them ‘most conducive’ settings that make structuring effects 
relatively more likely than in sovereign, self-contained post-war 
environments. Both Sierra Leone and Afghanistan have been hosting so- 
called ‘integrated missions’ o f the United Nations (Eide et al. 2005: 12, 34) 
that have combined an agenda for re-establishment of security and 
peacekeeping with transitional justice and relief systems, reconstruction and 
development objectives.23
Yet such parallels regarding contextual parameters must not gloss over 
substantial differences between Freetown in Kabul, which equally exist. First 
and foremost, any comparison o f Freetown and Kabul needs to consider the 
two fundamentally distinct historical paths o f these cities. It pits a city that 
owes both its existence and its structural importance to colonialism against a 
city that has grown in parallel with colonial attempts. Freetown, a “Christian 
colonial city” characterised by an intrusive elite, a place “created by Europeans 
for their own purposes o f administration and trade, playing a critical role in 
the process o f colonial political domination and in the extraction o f profit by 
colonial business enterprise,” (Harrell-Bond et al. 1978: 309) and an urban 
space planned from the very beginning (Fyfe 1968: 3) is being compared
23 This is in spite of the mission in Sierra Leone being credited to have had an ex post facto 
‘role model’ impact on the design of such hybrid constructs, whereas the mission in 
Afghanistan is significantly less holistic due to the crucial involvement of coalition forces in 
both military (e.g., anti-terrorism operations) and civilian matters (mainly the development 
function o f PRTs).
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with what O’Connor (1983: 32-40) has labelled a “dual city”, a space in 
which the traditional meets the ‘modem’ (cf. Enwezor et al. 2002). The latter 
occurs not necessarily through imposition, but through the emergence of 
alternative visions o f politics, culture, and public life.24
This difference is not to the detriment o f this study, on the contrary. The 
histories o f Freetown and Kabul carry important implications for the testing 
of the hypotheses formulated at the outset o f this study, in particular 
hypothesis (B). To recall, this hypothesis holds that structuration in and of post­
intervention cities is accelerated—that is, the process is happening significantly 
faster than in previous occurrences— through agency by international actors. 
If . colonialism, as . in. the case o f Sierra Leone, was . found to carry , a strong 
explanatory value with regard to explaining this disconnect, then this would 
weaken hypothesis (B). This would be so because colonial rule in the past 
may have had a very similar or even stronger effect on local and national 
institutions, thus rendering the relative leverage wielded by foreign 
intervention and post-war governance on altering institutions and structures 
diminished. Conversely, if  the historical analysis o f colonialism does not 
explain sufficiently the institutional landscape in Freetown in the present, 
then one can argue that alternative forces seem to play a role as well.
In addition to starkly different historical paths, contemporary national 
polities in the two countries are diametrically opposed as well. Consider 
Brinkerhoff s (2005: 11) submission who aptly calls Sierra Leone an example 
o f a polity “where high levels o f centralised control and political/ethnic 
domination” prevail whereas Afghanistan “illustrates the opposite situation, 
and national government too weak to function effectively outside the capital 
city.” But here again, this diversity is not hampering the analytical potential 
o f this study. As explained above, the shape o f a polity at a given point in 
time is not considered a contextual parameter embedding the enquiry but 
quite the opposite, the explanandum itself.
24 This notion of duality does not hinge on an absence o f socio-political relationships 
between different sections o f the urban society, nor does it condition a sharp distinction 
between the wealthy and the deprived— rather, the duality exists between the norms and 
practices that are exercised and replicated voluntarily by different groups o f residents. Cf. 
Grotzbach (1979) who labels Kabul an “Islamic oriental city” to essentially describe the 
same fusion of economic, socio-cultural and political spheres in space.
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This does not mean that no challenges have been encountered throughout 
the research process. The remaining two sections o f this chapter outline the 
approach to field research and explain unanticipated problems and resulting 
compromises in practice.
Field research: listening across levels of polity
Fieldwork was necessary not only to gain access to primary data on projects, 
programmes, and investment at different levels o f governance (for which 
research reports and newspaper articles have been included as well), but also 
in order to clarify the political agendas and resultant activities at these levels 
as they relate to the recovery, integration and development o f the two cities. 
During the preparation phase, the question had arisen whether a q-squared 
methodology, i.e., a combination o f qualitative and quantitative approaches 
was feasible. Both types o f inquiry have their specific strengths (cf. Sambanis 
2004), and combining them therefore appeared diligent. However, on the 
ground this intention faced not only epistemological but also operational 
obstacles.
Initially, the motivation for this study had been to study city level 
‘peacebuilding.’25 This was eventually abandoned for an analysis o f the city 
as a political arena. The reason for doing so was the degree o f politicisation 
observed right at the beginning o f the field research stints. During the early 
conceptualisation phase, I had been focusing on the potential o f grassroot 
collective action for more equitable service delivery and greater inclusion 
into local political processes. Yet after a more thorough engagement with the 
peacebuilding literature as well as scholarly analyses o f recent international 
interventions to fragile states, I began to question this focus. My scepticism 
was reinforced further after my first conversations with informants in Kabul 
in mid-2004 who redirected my attention to the influences on local politics 
exerted by international agencies and organisations. On my ‘modal map’, the 
task o f explaining conflict and ‘peace’ thus morphed from a mainly technical
25 An article by Bollens (2006) is, as far as I am aware, the first rigorous contribution on this 
aspect; previous work was exploratory in nature; e.g., Esser (2004a), Stanley (2003).
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issue to one that appeared to be both object and driver o f local politics. 
Consequentially, surveys of the populations o f Freetown and Kabul did not 
appear fully appropriate anymore to capture this new direction. I could have 
surveyed certain fractions o f the urban population to arrive at a 
comprehensive picture of their perceptions regarding their political and 
economic inclusion. However, exclusivity was so obvious in both cities that I 
felt that my main effort should focus on understanding the rationales and 
objectives o f different political players active in the urban realm. Moreover, 
the infrastructure and security situation especially in Kabul would have 
rendered large-scale surveys a rather complicated and unjustifiably hazardous 
approach. In Freetown, this would have been more feasible, also in light o f  
already, existing surveys conducted by. other academic researchers after, the 
war — to the extent that I had heard o f them or that they were ongoing 
during my presence in the country. Still, in order to ensure comparability and 
also in light o f the reflections outlined above, the decision was made to rely 
on a range o f qualitative tools.
The ensuing primary research aimed at accomplishing two objectives; first, 
to check the status quo o f political competition within and beyond the city 
order to allow, together with the data collected through desk research and 
presented joindy with primary accounts, for an evaluation o f recent 
dynamics; secondto provide leads for a comprehensive assessment o f the 
hypotheses formulated in CHAPTER ONE and the theoretical propositions 
deduced toward the end o f CHAPTER TWO. In order to cover this agenda, 
field research in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan was comprised o f non­
participant observation of multi-stakeholder gatherings, spontaneous as well 
as arranged focus groups, and semi-structured interviews with two most 
diverse sets o f respondents. The latter formed the empirical backbone o f this 
research project. However, data collected through this method had to be 
triangulated to ensure validity and reliability (Patton 2001: 247). In qualitative 
inquiries, validity and reliability are married to the concepts o f confirmation 
and completeness (Breitmayer et al. 1993). In the context o f this study, 
information gathered through primary research in Freetown and Kabul had 
to be verified because of certain adverse incentives o f respondents as well as 
methodological constraints (the following section elaborates on these issues).
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Triangulation was also sought to detect potential bias (Mathison 1988: 13). 
To this effect, direct interaction with research subjects was complemented 
through observation o f controlled (focus groups) and uncontrolled 
(meetings, sessions) interactions among informants as well as desk based 
research. At the same time, the methodological and operational limitations 
confronting the interview approach explained below necessitated alternative 
methodologies to collect the maximum possible amount o f data and to 
“search for convergence among multiple and different sources o f  
information” (Creswell and Miller 2000: 126) in order to eventually 
achieve— to the extent possible— generalisability o f the key findings 
(Johnson 1997: 283). Hence, triangulation was employed not only to verify 
the information, gathered but also, crucially, to generate broader 
understanding (as opposed to direcdy explaining) o f the study sites, 
according to Stenbacka (2001: 551) the main purpose o f good qualitative 
research.
To capture the urban political landscape and dynamics, the scope o f key 
informants includes municipal and ministerial officials, local and national 
politicians, tribal leaders, grassroot organisers, local as well as international 
staff o f NGOs, businesspeople, diplomats, and international aid workers. 
Interviewees were identified through initial contacts and subsequent 
snowballing, and interviews were conducted during four field trips: three to 
Kabul, the first one from June until early August 2004, then again in January 
2005, and in April/May o f  the same year. This was complemented by one 
extended stay in Freetown in November and December 2004. In total, 122 
in-country informants— 62 in Sierra Leone and 60 in Afghanistan— from a 
variety o f sectors informed the study through 74 individual interviews and 
twelve focus groups. This scope seems appropriate in light of similarly broad 
yet significandy smaller sample sizes for comparable studies, such as the one 
on governance by Hyden et al. (2004), which bases its conclusions on a 
minimum o f 35 interviewees in each o f the 16 developing countries included 
in the study. My study builds on roughly twice the number o f interviewees 
per country, which was the maximum that was feasible operationally. 
Nonetheless, 122 respondents still do not guarantee complete exploration 
and explanation, as different people would have told me different stories (cf.
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Keen 2005: 6). This is a methodological problem that is acknowledged and 
that can be mediated only by offering a diligent analysis o f the data that is 
available.
Regarding the ‘objects o f politics,’ the analytical framework focused on 
coalitions and conflicts pertaining to policy areas including local polity 
reform and its drivers and constraints, land tenure and related institutional 
reform, local economic development, the provision of municipal services 
with a spotlight on waste collection and water, and the assisted recovery of 
social cohesion in the context o f internal displacement and migration. In 
both cities, an apt starting point for the discovery and classification o f  
political alliances and coalitions emanating within and-beyond the-urban 
arena was the identification o f issues against which actors and groups were 
mobilising. In order to do justice to the complex nature o f urban politics, 
this methodological approach benefited from the ontological openness 
embraced by this study, with regard to both the space (different levels of 
political interaction) and time (dynamics) aspects explained above. At the 
local level, disagreement arose during different points in history between 
residents and strangers, between younger and older residents, between 
different ethnic groups, and most important perhaps, between different 
economic stakeholders. At the national level—which, in the case o f capital 
cities, can be overlapping with the local— , the practice and ideology o f party 
politics or its absence or even suppression was a field o f contestation, as 
were competing positions on preferences regarding the geography and 
content o f sub-national development activities and related actions of 
interference. At the international level, perceptible cleavages seemed to 
occur as results o f different strategic objectives and financial priorities, but 
also triggered by specific interventions, either unilaterally or indirectly, 
through supporting particular national and even local actors.
All conversations (except for two, which were transcribed manually 
following respondents’ preferences) were tape-recorded after seeking explicit 
consent o f those interviewed. Using Dragon Naturally Speaking 8.0 software 
these tapes were then dictated by the author into a word processing 
programme. Therefore, the accuracy o f the documentation can be assumed
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to get be to one hundred per cent. The structural outline for the interviews 
used in both countries is attached as annex I. An overview o f interviewees in 
both cities can be found in annex II.
Methodological and ethical challenges encountered
In light o f this study expressly intersecting different levels o f polity, the 
question o f where to ‘seal o ff  objects o f enquiry has been a challenging one. 
The need to do so in general has been explained above (e.g., Mitchell 1987), 
but its application to my case study settings seemed difficult during the 
conceptualisation phase. I realised that I had to position myself between the 
two extremes o f calling every issue or political activity ‘urban,’ or 
alternatively ascribing by default every issue political process to vertically or 
horizontally different levels o f polity. But once I had set foot on Sierra 
Leonean and Afghan soil and conducted my first interviews not only did I 
feel confirmed that the cross-spatial approach was appropriate, but drawing 
the boundaries also became less o f a daunting task. Clearly, seeing the socio­
political reality on the ground with my own eyes proved vital.
Conversely, a challenge whose exact magnitude I had failed to anticipate was 
the relative weight o f information gathered during interviews with key 
informants in my analysis o f political reality. My methodology proved highly 
effective in generating a rich dataset. Triangulation helped identify and—  
where necessary— exclude misrepresentations. But the question prevailed to 
what extent, for example, a statement by an international aid worker about 
the motivation o f international agencies to disregard the municipality in 
Kabul in favour o f the national ministry compared to a remark on the same 
topic uttered by a bureaucrat within that municipality. It should have come 
as no surprise that stark discrepancies existed among the diverse set o f  
interviewees in both cities with regard to leverage, education and self­
reflection. Still, I quickly noticed that I constantly had to remain alert in 
order to prevent statements made by more influential and informed 
respondents from automatically appearing more valid and instructive. As for 
validity, I have tried to address this challenge by probing whenever I had any
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doubts and by testing such data in subsequent conversations with other 
informants. Nonetheless, an error margin remained, which in my view was 
an inexorable by-product o f interviewing powerful and powerless 
stakeholders alike, protected as well as vulnerable ones, and also some who 
may have hoped to gain something from talking to me amid the hardship of 
urban life in Freetown and Kabul.
This general feature notwithstanding, the milieux o f the cities investigated in 
this study did indeed diverge, confirming Wood’s (2006: 384) observation 
that “conflict zones differ enormously in their [research] conditions.” An 
application o f Nye’s (1993) taxonomy to categorise bipolar politics o f the 
Cold War era to the two. cases investigated in this study characterises this 
distinction very well. His taxonomy renders Afghanistan— initially at least—  
more o f a USSR-type ‘black box’ (i.e., complicated data analysis because of 
information scarcity), whereas Sierra Leone was found to lean more towards 
the other end o f the spectrum, located in a previously USA-held ‘noise’ 
position (complicated data analysis because o f abundant and sometimes 
contradicting information). Apart from occasional language constraints in 
Afghanistan,26 which were overcome by employing local research assistants 
and debriefing interviews conducted in Dari (the predominant local dialect) 
immediately after they had been conducted to assure accuracy, a period of 
immersion was needed to develop a sufficient contact base, and 
ethnographic methods such as non-participant observation were used to 
overcome suspicion and create trust. Nonetheless, conducting qualitative 
research in urban Afghanistan proved to be challenging. Indeed very similar 
to the observation o f many NGOs working in rural areas o f the country, I 
regularly experienced the effects o f a curious combination o f compliance 
and secrecy. “Faced with agencies’ questions, villagers quickly work out what 
is going on,” as Johnson and Leslie (2004: 58) have observed, and the 
invention o f additional features or the dramatisation o f facts prove to be 
common reaction, brought to light in regular debriefings with the Afghan 
interpreters aimed at validating or problematising individual responses.
26 Most interviews in Afghanistan were conducted in English.
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But the caveat lies hidden precisely in this structure o f direct academic 
enquiry and its assumption, while false, that such intrusion will create factual 
information-loaded responses. Quite the contrary, respondents might have 
their own agendas, therefore appreciating the opportunity to share their 
interpretations and demands with the researcher. This was often the case in 
Sierra Leone. Despite lengthy explanations o f what the research was aimed 
at and the assurance o f anonymity, interviewees in Afghanistan would 
regularly remain suspicious, preferring to guard their knowledge rather than 
sharing it with an unknown foreigner, and responding by making friendly 
but general statements on the hardship o f urban life in a post-war context 
(residents), the need for more resources and the lack o f coordination among 
the donors (local urban officials) y and the constraints created by insufficient 
technical capacity and the ‘securitisation of development’ agendas 
(international aid workers; cf. HoC/IDC 2006: 9-10). Targeted follow-up 
questions sometimes missed their targets as well, and research ethics 
suggested moving on to a set o f related issues in such situations rather than 
putting undue pressure on interviewees (cf. Goodhand 2000: 14).
Sierra Leone then presented itself as an antipodal research setting, with 
limited language constraints and remarkable openness towards this project, 
which found its expression in interviewees being willing to be consulted on 
the spot and sharing a broad range o f information — sometimes to the point 
that the conversation was in need to be realigned gently in the interest o f  
maintaining a certain focus. At the same time, what had to be avoided in this 
context was a form o f “hegemonic spectatorship” that would sacrifice 
research subjects to a logic formulated a priori and adhered to during the field 
test (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 115) and instead engaging in seeking “lateral 
relationships” (ibid.) between researcher and interviewees. Apart from not 
pushing respondents into a specific direction, as experienced in Afghanistan, 
or unjustifiably forcing them *back on track’ as sometimes tempting in the 
case o f Sierra Leone, twice I also had to refuse paying small bribes to 
‘middlemen’ offering to facilitate access to government officials.
Several o f those interviewed in both cities requested that their statements be 
anonymous, which also in light o f the often political nature o f the subject
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and the remaining actuality o f the research at the time o f publication seemed 
to be the ethically most diligent mode o f data presentation (cf. Goodhand 
2000: 13-14). The list o f respondents has therefore been codified by offering 
descriptions o f the organisational, functional and hierarchical background o f 
every respondent. This code will also help appreciate the context of 
responses and statements as they appear in the written text, as abbreviations 
denote both the sector and location o f the interviewee. TBA-F5’, for 
instance, shows that the interviewee worked for an international or bilateral 
agency in Freetown. In this case, the respondent’s functional title was 
Decentralisation Advisor, and the interview was recorded on 22 November 
2004. Similar details o f all data events can be found in annex II.
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Chapter 4: 
The evolution of two capital cities and the paths to armed conflict
Freetown: from colony to capital city
“The town belonging to the colonised people [...] is a world without spaciousness; 
men live there on top o f  each other, and their huts are built one on top o f  the 
other. The native town as a hungry town, starved o f  bread, o f  meat, o f  shoes, o f  
coal, o f  light The native town is a crouching village, a town on its knees, a town 
wallowing in the mire.”
Fanon (1963: 39)
In her recollection o f her father’s role and life as a former government 
minister murdered under Siaka Stevens’s reign, Aminatta Foma (2003) 
provides a vivid illustration o f Freetown as a highly politicised arena that 
mattered as a space o f consolidation o f national politics. Freetown has been 
one o f the “crucibles o f experimentation with new patterns o f political life 
[through their] multiplicity o f political groupings and structures attempting 
to serve variegated occupational, economic, social, and ethnic 
constituencies,” (Skinner 1972: 1208) but has also remained a typical 
‘colonial city’ (cf. CHAPTER THREE) in terms o f space — a socio-geographical 
“promontory” and pivot of administrative and economic convergence 
including airlines, the telecommunications network, the country’s barely 
functioning postal service, and most television and radio stations; in sum, a 
“point o f dissemination [...] of imported goods and ideas” (Barrows 1971: 
6-7). Freetown yesterday and today has also been the place for garnering 
electoral and financial support in the struggle for national governance and 
political domination, including the vibrant and ever-growing landscape o f  
indigenous non-governmental organisations. Indeed, Sierra Leone is 
probably one o f the few least developed post-war countries where this 
diverse sector could appropriately be labelled ‘civil society.’
This ‘arena function’ has been fuelling intense and immediate exchanges o f  
national party politics ever since the creation o f political parties. The current 
political constellation in Sierra Leone is quite telling. The party in 
government until 2007 won a landslide victory in national elections in 2002, 
gathering approximately 80 per cent o f the national vote. However, in the
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first local elections o f the post-war period conducted in 2004, the opposition 
party— in power during the reign o f Siaka Stevens in the 1970s and 1980s—  
managed to win a landslide victory in Freetown proper.
Yet Freetown, and Sierra Leone embedding it, is also a poignant example of 
rural-urban divides. The Temne, one o f the two dominant tribes in Sierra 
Leone, refer to the city as “Salone,” the same word they use to denominate 
their country. For many, living in the country’s capital has been a promise of 
higher wages, a more vibrant social life, better healthcare, and a more 
immediate access to political decision-making structures.27 In spite o f the 
existence o f regional centres such as Koido, Kenema and Bo in the centre 
farther to the east, the. country remains governed in a dichotomic , manner: 
the ‘west’ (Freetown and the Western Area) and the ‘rest.’
Freetown itself spreads from east to west, its expansion limited by the coast 
in the North and steeply rising hills in the South. Residential patterns can be 
put into four categories: houses o f the more affluent residents and 
international staff in the West, often on larger lots with front- and backyards 
on the hillsides and towards Tower Hill, the seat o f the national government; 
crammed housing in the city centre (“Cotton Tree”), where buildings are 
used as shops on the ground floor and residences on the first and second 
floor, together with squatter settlements along the river bed; middle-class 
housing, in part still from the 19th century, and small shops, many of them 
run by Lebanese families, at Fourah Bay east o f the geographical centre; and 
finally, large-scale squatting in slums such as Kissy Town in the very east on 
the way to the interior provinces. The map on the following page shows the 
expanse o f the city in mid-2003 (courtesy o f UNOCHA).
27 Conversations with pedestrians in downtown Freetown; 2-6 December 2004.
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Figure 5: Freetown in 2003
The city’s founding was a spatial by-product o f the demise o f mercantilism 
and the rise o f early international capitalism. In the late 18th century, the 
slave trade was increasingly regarded as a waste o f human resources, and 
following economic rationality it was argued that Africans should be 
producers o f raw materials and consumers o f European products, and not a 
commodity themselves (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999: 24). Slaves 
were to be freed — and turned into ‘free’ producers.
Even though traces o f human inhabitation date back several centuries prior 
to the arrival o f outsiders, Freetown’s foundation as a formal setdement is 
commonly related to. the arrival o f 1,200 freed black slaves from Nova Scotia 
to Sierra Leone in January 1792. These newly arrived setders from North 
America soon developed a suspicious caution vis-a-vis the Sierra Leone 
Company established by the first group o f foreigners, a mistrust that was 
exacerbated by the introduction o f a land tax by the Company in 1794 in 
order to offset the cost o f physical reconstruction after a French attack on 
the harbour and town. Whereas the Company successfully retained political 
and economic control over the city, the freed North Americans setders hung 
on to their vision o f Freetown as a fully independent entity.
In 1796, the British leaders o f the Company ‘imported’ Africans from 
Jamaica (then called Maroons) to enforce taxation and governance structures, 
which safeguarded, at least temporarily, the functioning o f what was to 
become a vibrant trading community. In 1807, the Temne tribe, from which 
the land had been purchased, were prohibited from settling within an 11- 
mile radius from the city, and Native houses became subject to destruction 
(Doherty 1985: 150).28 In 1808, Freetown was chosen as the place o f  
liberation for Yoruba slaves who had been freed after the capture o f trader 
vessels transporting this human commodity along the African coast. Most of 
this group, which eventually numbered 50,000, were channelled into 
experimental farming activities or apprenticeships in or close to the city.
28 Trickling returns were tolerated; by 1823 an estimated 15% of the population was again of 
native origin.
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Partly a result o f the constant influx o f people and the slow pace of 
adaptation o f immigrant social institutions to the new urban environment 
(Banton 1957: xiii), the security situation in Freetown worsened significandy. 
There were also repeated arson attacks by hinterland tribes on the city 
(Harrell-Bond et al. 1978: 2), and by the mid-1820s most o f Freetown’s 
infrastructure was lying in decay (Nunley 1987: 4-10, Conteh-Morgan and 
Dixon-Fyle 1999: 25-26). Contemporary commentators mosdy blamed the 
lack o f effective public control through local governance and policing and 
the absence o f sufficient employment opportunities for the fast-growing 
urban population as preventing the emergence o f orderly community life.
.Yet even though , the attempts, by the. Sierra Leone Company to create a 
cohesive Christian city-state were largely considered a failure, Freetown 
survived as a setdement, influenced both in terms o f religious practice and 
local politics by local traditions and developing into a heterogeneous colony 
that was the site o f the emergence o f a new Creole class, which in spite o f  its 
own diversity and its many economic interactions with its hinterland, 
nurtured gradually “an attitude o f superiority” (ibid., 14) over the indigenous 
Africans living in what would later become Sierra Leone’s national ‘up- 
country,’ and the factions dwelling in the city proper (Spitzer 1974). This 
sentiment was reciprocated by the various tribes in the hinterland who 
feared the extinction o f their traditional way of life by the black intruders as 
much as they were hostile against the British colonisers.
During the second half o f the 19th century, paramount chiefs developed a 
vital interest in constraining large-scale economic entrepreneurship within 
their realm of power in order to prevent “alternative forms o f patronage” 
that would have diminished the leverage over their subjects, and preferred 
indigenous (and directly taxable) economic activity instead (Cartwright 1978: 
252-253). Even though missionaries and foreign scientists had regularly 
pointed to the developmental potential o f the Sierra Leonean hinterland (cf. 
Roberts 1982: 11), its eventual annexation under British rule was triggered by 
an economic event thousands o f miles up north— the Great Depression o f  
1873 in Britain, which, through a slump in demand, directly affected the 
colony’s economic prosperity. As a result, the small British community
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together with economic elites o f Creole origin under the leadership o f the 
Sierra Leone Association for the Improvement and Defence o f Commerce, 
Agriculture, and Industry (SLA) lobbied the Colonial Administration to 
annex the adjacent territories in order to ensure the advancement and 
protection o f trade routes and relationships, which dovetailed with the 
colonial desire to increase the colony’s tax base (Kilson 1966: 220). Abraham 
(1978: 54) explains that this was considered necessary “because duties levied 
on goods entering the Sierra Leone Colony could hardly produce much 
revenue so long as goods entering immediately adjacent areas paid no duties 
at all.” The chiefs had been right in their suspicion and concerns.
.Over the course of. the following twenty-three, years, discussions among 
representatives o f the Crown and city based traders about this move 
eventually led to regular excursions o f colonial authority into the 
neighbouring chiefdoms. Says Abraham (1978: 67),
“The [colonial] administration was careful not to get entangled in the politics of the 
interior. But slowly and imperceptibly, it was coming to find itself in a position 
from which it was unable to disentangle itself. As colonial influence spread, traders 
ventured further inland. Mostly Creoles who were British subjects, they expected to 
be protected.”
Thus mimicking the process o f state formation in Europe, the ‘state 
followed the trader.’ Even though it was declared policy to incentivise rural 
producers to bring their produce to the city rather than venturing out into 
the locations o f production, the protective measures that were required to 
uphold trading patterns eventually prompted the shift from fiscal jurisdiction 
of the hinterland to spatial annexation in 1896 — “a political act necessitated 
by economic considerations” (ibid., 68).
In 1898, Freetown was made the capital o f the hinterland. Until the country 
gained independence more than 60 years later, the colonial administration 
remained the largest national and urban employer through its railway system, 
ports, and the state bureaucracy. What is more, the lack o f economic 
progress beyond Freetown and Bonthe (a much smaller urban setdement 90 
miles south) after one hundred years o f colonisation was a common feature 
in contemporary comments on the state o f affairs in Sierra Leone. Indeed,
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the imposition o f a British Protectorate was claimed to have saved the 
colony from for ever remaining economically backward and “from that o f  
shocking terrorism [of tribal competition] which was the perpetual condition 
o f their existence until the creation o f the Protectorate” (Alldridge 1910: vii, 
357). This practice o f remote-ruling the Sierra Leonean hinterland from the 
capital city was anchored in the minds o f rural subjects via the defeat by 
British troops in the Hut Tax War in 1898, a rural rebellion against the 
perceived economic marginalisation through the dominance o f Creole 
economic activity, the abolition o f slave trade in the hinterland, and the 
introduction o f a hut tax in order to mobilise resources in the Protectorate 
upon its declaration two years earlier (cf. Kilson 1996: 221).
Only three years prior to Freetown rising to capital city status, the first 
mayor o f the city had been elected. First constituted in 1799 through a 
Charter to the Sierra Leone Company, Freetown Municipality had vanished 
soon after when the Colonial Administration cancelled its magisterial rights 
in 1821. It took over seventy years for it to re-emerge, owing to the ever- 
increasing importance of the city as an economic centre. The election o f Sir 
Samuel Lewis, a Creole lawyer, in 1895 followed the re-establishment o f the 
Freetown Municipal Council in 1892. Lewis was granted the authority to 
regulate trade, fire prevention, education, and planning. This marked the 
reconstitution o f Freetown as the city (cf. Banton 1957: 10). 15 councillors, 
twelve o f whom had also been elected, assisted him.29 Freetown had thus 
been given a local government typical o f Anglophone territories (cf. Stren 
1989: 25). A legal distinction between native and non-native was introduced 
in 1905, requiring that everyone seeking the status o f non-native had to 
prove to have made a ‘reasonable contribution towards some system of 
education’ and possess valuable property in the city (Harrell-Bond et al. 
1978: 7, 169). This separation was not only o f legal nature. It also manifested 
itself in space, and the following quote from the Creole-financed newspaper 
Sierra Leone Weekly News, published in 1900, is a telling illustration (quoted in: 
Harrell-Bond 1978: 8).
29 The British Governor appointed the three remaining councillors.
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“When we speak of ‘The City’, we mean, of course, the area enclosed by Little East 
and Garrison Streets, and Poultney and Water Streets with the Maroon Town 
flanking it on the West and South western sides, as a respectable compliment. The 
portions remaining [...] should be styled ‘Freetown’. The City is marked by good 
sober dignity [...], Freetown [...] by the confused noises of heathen [...] 
population.”
In 1907, the city’s second mayor of the Protectorate period, John Henry 
Thomas tried to canvass support for a moderate increase in water fees in 
order to offset the initial investment for which the city had approached the 
Colonial Government, which had granted a loan for which the Municipal 
Council assumed responsibility. This endeavour was frustrated repeatedly by 
the “customary indifference” displayed by Freetown citizens who showed no 
dedication to get involved in public affairs (cf. Peterson 1981)— including 
the mayor’s intention to nurture economic development through the 
extension o f the existing urban infrastructure and the desired effect of 
improving public health in light o f rampant waterborne diseases and the 
general perception o f uncleanliness among native urban settler communities 
(Harrell-Bond et al. 1978: 7)— and whose main interest was in keeping price 
levels stable.
Thomas decided to raise the rate with the backing o f the Municipal Council, 
which a contemporary commentator interpreted as an encouraging sign that 
citizenry in Freetown relying on “the present hereditary petty and most 
precarious system of trading” could eventually be transformed into “a more 
generally enlightened community”, which would require overcoming the 
“public ignorance and apathy” through the realisation o f the “benefits that 
such a representative assembly should bring to the citizens, socially, 
commercially, and intellectually— not the least o f these being the training o f  
the young citizens and public work.” (Alldridge 1910: 62-66) The mayor’s 
vision o f economic development in order to catch up with other colonial 
centres such as Lagos, which had already been equipped with electric lighting 
and a tram line, and his unshakable commitment to servicing the loan 
granted by the colonial administration were proofs of the desired 
institutionalisation o f ‘modem’, progressive urban mindsets, even leading a 
contemporary commentator to call him “an example o f what a citizen should 
be.” (ibid.) Freetown had thus ascended to the dual function that continues
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to dominate its politics until the present day. Not only was it a city to be 
governed; it also served as the politico-economic centre o f an entire country.
Kabul: from urban settlement to capital city
Pekharke ahlee wapa ghre keyaghi. (Pushtun proverb)
“Be tame in the city, rebellious in the mountains.”
Kabul’s genesis as an urban settlement preceded by millennia the era in 
which the leaders o f the country developed a language and policy o f  
nationalism and crowned Kabul as the capital o f the Afghan nation. Yet in 
striking temporal similarity to the case o f Freetown, at the beginning o f the 
20th century it endured the same tension between being ‘just’ an urban place 
and serving as a centre o f national politics, leading to ebbs and flows 
between centralisation and regional autonomy.
Centralisation was dominant during the reign o f Amir Abdur Rahman Khan 
(1880-1901), during the communist government (1979-1992) and the 
Taleban period (1996-2000), even though the latter were committed to an 
anti-urban agenda. Conversely, “the second model” o f national governance 
was characterised by the priority o f modernising the state apparatus in Kabul 
during the intermediate Habibullah and Amanullah governments (1901- 
1929), and to a lesser extent also during the royal government o f Zahir Shah 
(1933-1973). These regimes all displayed expenditure patterns substantiating 
an urban bias towards “building a modem state sector in Kabul that 
bypassed the rural power holders, leaving them with a large measure o f local 
autonomy” (Johnson and Leslie 2004: 139). This spatial imbalance went 
hand in hand with the beginning ‘tribalisation’ o f the state (Shahrani 1998, 
cf. Lake and Harrison 1990), namely the co-optation o f tribal leaders into 
central structures in order to lessen tribal pressures on the administrative 
apparatus and to gradually detribalise society. As early as in 1932 the fight o f  
the central powers with territorial powers was labelled the “red thread” o f  
Afghan history (Schwager 1932: 34). Thier and Chopra (2002: 895) have 
reiterated this observation seventy years later.
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As explained in the previous chapter, Kabul can be classified as an ‘Islamic 
oriental’ city connecting a bazaar (permanent market offering a variety of 
handicraft and traded goods) with one or more mosques, institutions o f 
higher leaning (e.g., schools or madrassas), and the political infrastructure o f  
an administrative centre. Together with Herat, Ghazni and Kandahar, Kabul 
was a distinct urban place in that its population, unlike in most other Afghan 
centres, fluctuated only marginally between winter and summer seasons due 
to its well established socio-economic strata (Grotzbach 1979: 6-7,18, 35).
The first accounts o f a town at Kabul’s geographical location are from 1,500 
B.C. about a settlement called Kubha. From the second century, records exist 
documenting the existence o f Kabura. Muslim, Arabs captured the place in 
the 7th century from the Hindus, but Islam was not established as the 
dominant religion until the 9th century. In the 13th century Genghis Khan’s 
hordes conquered the setdement, which had already become an important 
node for interregional trade before the discovery o f the seaways, yet without 
establishing any permanent rule. Kabul later became a provincial capital as 
part o f the Moghul Empire. In 1747 Ahmad Shah Abdali, later Durrani, was 
crowned King o f Afghans in Kandahar, marking the birth o f the country as 
a de jure unified nation (Schadl 2004: 114). In 1776 his son Timur Shah 
replaced Kandahar as the seat o f his kingdom with Kabul, which at that 
point only had 10,000 inhabitants, to insulate his regime from the dominant 
Pushtun tribes resident in the southern city (Rubin 2002: 46, 52). Ethno- 
spatially, Kabul lies on the border between Tajik, Pashtun, and Hazara 
regions, hence to exert political power ethnic strongmen had to leave their 
turf and venture into the blurred boundary. Thus anyone that could hold 
Kabul also proved that they had, to some extent, wider legitimacy outside 
their own regions.30 As Adamec (1996: 129) has put it, “To be recognized as 
a rule o f Afghanistan, one had to be in possession o f the town [Kabul].” 
Similarly, Giustozzi (2003: 6-7, cf. Rubin 1993: 189) remarks about the 
country’s more recent history o f national politics as a fight for the capital,
“While it may appear odd that the capital of a collapsed state could be the object of 
much desire, everybody has always been aware that whoever is in control of Kabul
30 I owe this insight to Ajman Maiwandi; personal communication in March 2007.
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will be better positioned to claim international recognition and receive a greater 
share of power in the event of a setdement.”
Timur Shah died in 1793; his death plunged Kabul into quarrels for his 
succession. This power vacuum rendered the country susceptible to foreign 
influence, and Russian and European envoys began visiting the capital city 
more frequendy.
By the 1820s the majority o f its residents considered themselves “Kabulis, 
detribalised inhabitants o f the city,” (Rubin 1992: 79) and in spite o f their 
ethnic diversity they shared a common identity based on a shared version o f  
Persian, Dari, and a common habitat, which was regarded by the 
surrounding tribes as “coward” in its rejection (or supersession, depending 
on the perspective) o f tribal origins (Kakar 1979: 137, Grotzbach 1979: 49).
Despite its religious diversity that included Hindus, Jews, Armenians, and 
Sikhs, Kabul was also a centre o f recruitment o f Muslim warriors recruited 
by the ruler o f the era, Dost Mohammed, for his military campaigns against 
Sikh tribes in the east, which were wrapped into a religious discourse yet 
motivated primarily by the political objective o f securing a cohesive sphere 
o f influence. Dost Mohammed had been holding the city since 1826 when it 
had approximately 80 mosques, fourteen karawanserais, several bazaars, and a 
steady income from taxing its population and subordinated tribes dwelling in 
its vicinity (Gregorian 1969: 77-79, Kakar 1979: 215).
Yet continuing ethnic factional fighting and futile attempts o f the central 
government to subjugate neighbouring tribes had stark consequences for the 
fiscal health o f the national cum municipal government, thus also impacting 
on the city’s development (Shahrani 1986: 35-36). As a result, much o f 
Kabul’s physical infrastructure was degenerating (Masson 1842: 264, 289). 
On top o f this decline and unlike other Afghan cities such as Kandahar and 
Herat, Kabul also became the target o f colonial forces, enduring two sieges 
and conquests by the British Hindu army, with the second attack causing 
widespread destruction and leaving the city under the knout o f urban gangs
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looting and pillaging what was left after the British forces had retreated 
(Canfield 1986: 76).
Lord Auckland had conquered the capital city on 7 August 1839 precisely 
with the objective to expel Mohammed Dost and to replace him with one of 
his fiercest rivals, Shah Shoujah. After enjoying a colonial lifestyle 
maintained through massive imports o f luxury goods— commentators noted 
that both officers and soldiers were “all looking uncommonly fat” (cited in 
Macrory 1966: 124)— , the urban population rose up and expelled the 
expedition force from Kabul, and legend has it that all but one soldier got 
massacred on their way across the Khyber Pass in January 1842. British 
troops stationed in colonial. India embarked on a bloody revenge, mission, 
taking Kabul in days, killing hundreds o f suspected insurgents, and 
destroying the bazaar and razing some o f the city’s most outstanding 
architectural heritage.
The occupation o f Kabul during the second Anglo-Afghan war was brief, 
but equally bloody. After the Indian Army had initially conquered Kabul in 
the twinkling o f an eye in May 1879, an armed uprising drove out the British 
invaders only four months later. The British-commanded troops regrouped 
outside the city and attacked the rioters, defeating them in a swift batde. The 
British then declared martial law and imposed heavy fines on the citizens. 
The death penalty was also used frequently, and those accused o f having led 
the riots were hung publicly. By December, the mob rose again and forced 
the British into the Sherpur bastion, from where they launched a successful 
counter attack, but from then on the army ‘governed’ from the bastion 
rather than from municipal buildings, with their forces having been 
diminished substantially and survivors branded with “a scare which has 
never been entirely shaken off,” having to watch quiescendy when urban 
gangs inflicted major plundering on the city and, in early 1880, beginning to 
ponder an organised retreat from Kabul (quoted in: Adamec 1996: 206, cf. 
Roberts 2002: 18-19). This temporary success notwithstanding, these events 
show that externally induced regime change to Afghan polity is as litde a
83
phenomenon o f the 20th century as is physical destruction as a result o f 
international power play.31
Abdur Rahman Khan, who had taken over power in 1880, emulated his 
predecessor’s stance towards establishing Kabul as the political and physical 
centre o f the nation— at the expense o f the economic and administrative 
development o f most of the other provincial centres, and the countryside at 
large— and combined his reconstruction o f the administrative apparatus with 
the concentration o f executive power in his own hands (Kakar 1979: 135, 
224; Gregorian 1969: 160, Ghobar 1967: 343-344).32 Khan also split up the 
provinces into smaller units so to weaken provincial tribal authorities and 
enlarged Kabul Province, which remained under his direct rule, to the extent 
that it also included remote areas such as Uruzgan and Kafiristan, thus 
making Kabul Province “virtually a kingdom in itself.” (Kakar 1979: 48-49).
Khan decreed that provincial expenses had to be covered with local 
revenues, but surpluses had to be forwarded annually to the centre, and 
newly appointed provincial officials had to report regularly to Kabul and 
wait for ordinances; their own initiative was explicidy discouraged and they 
were treated internally, receiving instructions on even the most trivial 
matters o f administrative concern or personnel appearance.33 Khan also 
reorganised local administration in the cities by introducing government 
appointed officials (kotwals) and elected representatives (/kalantars), which 
were then approved and appointed for life, and endowed the latter with far- 
reaching duties to guarantee civic order (Kakar 1979: 53-54).34
Khan seconded this political centralisation with a strong commitment to 
economic nationalism and widespread nationalisation o f larger firms. This
31 Revenge hit the city again in 1919 when the emerging British air force in response to an 
inroad by an Afghan general into British controlled territory, bombarded Kabul and 
Jalalabad, causing widespread destruction to both cities — but also triggering the Afghan 
declaration of independence.
32 Under Khan’s reign, Kabul’s population rose from 100,000 to 140,000 (Schadl 2004: 16).
33 Kakar (1979: 70) notes that the Amir instructed them in writing “to pause and to think 
first before they answered tricky question, especially those asked by foreigners.”
34 While he thus initiated a new period in Afghanistan's history o f urbanisation to the 
concentration of political power in the city, this consolidation was not translated into an 
active policy o f urban development, which was only adopted during the 1920s (Grotzbach 
1979: 14).
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had a detrimental effect not only on the country as a whole, whose borders 
became fully demarcated under Khan, but also on existing urban economies, 
including Kabul's. This rapid worsening o f the urban business environment 
was dovetailed by the falling purchasing power o f urban residents who were 
suffering under sharply increased government dues and fees, and the 
restriction o f foreign imports following Khan’s order, who was convinced 
that trade and involving foreign merchants both would only serve to 
impoverish the kingdom via monetary outflows and remittances (Kakar 
1979: 205-212).
Khan’s nationalist and monopolist policies were only abolished upon his 
death when his. son Habibullah Khan took over the crown, in. 1901, leaving 
behind a central bureaucracy that did not extend much beyond the capital 
city and that maintained social order mainly through the threat o f force, but 
that also formed the basis o f an emerging class o f urban intellectuals 
(Grevemeyer 1990: 167-168, Rubin 1988: 1195, Kakar 1979: 209).
Freetown: from boom to decline
Freetown’s rise to the nation’s capital brought with it the invigoration of  
administrative and economic activities across ethnic, tribal or religious lines. 
The city at that time has aptly been referred to as a “city o f  churches and 
mosques” (Fashole-Luke 1968: 127) in light o f its balance between its 
Muslim and Christian populations, and even though religious leaders 
occasionally played important roles in city politics, questions o f faith were 
uncommonly absent from urban politics. Yet this was altogether different 
with respect to the national economic dimension.
After the declaration o f a British Protectorate, a railway line to Makeni in the 
south-centre was constructed, and finished in 1914. But already in 1872 a 
colonial civil servant had suggested the construction o f a line towards the—  
mainly Muslim— northern region in order to facilitate the transport o f  
foodstuff to the capital city. When the colonial administration finally gave its 
support, it was only under the condition that the track enable the
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transportation o f exportable goods such as cocoa, coffee, and palm oil, all 
due to be shipped through and from Freetown (cf. Barrows 1971: 6). These 
plants were mainly cultivated in southern Mendeland, which was also already 
benefiting from Christian schools (Harrell-Bond et al. 1978: 163), and the 
decision to change the routing substantially contributed to the creation o f a 
structural advantage o f the southern part over the north (Sibanda 1979).
Apart from functioning as the most important trading point and port, 
Freetown thus also became a means for the economic empowerment o f the 
country’s south, with vital implications for the post-colonial politicisation 
process, as the following section on the city will demonstrate. Nonetheless, 
at the time not only the. hinterland still followed Freetown’s rhythm;, the vibe 
was also most seductive to people from farther away. Fulahs from Guinea 
had arrived in Freetown during the 19th century as liberated slaves. Having 
no rights over soil and being confronted with agricultural techniques 
different from those employed in their homeland, where stock-rearing and 
growing o f millet and com were predominant, most Fulah entrepreneurship 
began with non-trading activities in services, the income o f which was then 
invested in cattle and livestock or for setting up small shops (Banton 1957: 
95). During the first decades o f the past century, some o f most successful 
and wealthy merchant among the resident strangers living in Freetown were 
Fulahs (Harrell-Bond et al. 1978: 69).
However, even though individual members o f this community created 
considerable wealth, this did not prevent the stigmatisation of the group as a 
whole, with the post-colonial government using them as scapegoats for 
unrecorded alluvial diamond mining and threatening them with their 
deportation to Guinea on several occasions (Harrell-Bond et al. 1978: 312). 
In addition, their popular image— fuelled by the groups’ social history of 
impoverishment— that portrayed them as thieves and crooks proved 
remarkably resilient to change (Koroma and Proudfoot 1960: 43). 
Nonetheless, ever since their socio-economic conversion the Fulahs 
constituted a significant player in the urban economy.35
35 A study by Fowler (1981: 53) found that migrants from Guinea accounted for 26 per cent 
of a sample o f 967 enterprises in the informal sector in Freetown.
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European traders had become more active in Freetown as well. Their 
involvement up until the 1960s can be characterised in four phases. The first 
phase, from 1895 to the early 1920s, was a period o f expansion with several 
French and British companies engaging in commodity trade, with an 
increasing share o f retail sales and the establishment o f The Bank o f British 
West Africa in 1898 (Alldridge 1910: 71). Conditioned by a weak recovery o f  
the European post-war economy during the 1920s and as a result o f the 
global economic crisis by the end o f the decade, human and financial capital 
was withdrawn from the colonies, supported by a general conviction among 
merchants that the maximum level o f engagement had been reached. New  
investments, therefore, were predominantly in the area .of manufacturing and 
services, including after-sales service and maintenance.
During the Second World War, demand for unskilled labour increased for a 
short period o f time, with Freetown intermittendy acting as a strategic port 
for the British war effort (cf. Sesay and Mitchell 1968: 83), but the 
demobilisation in 1946 impacted heavily on the households o f poorer daily 
labourers. In the 1950s, a reinforced geographical withdrawal o f trading 
activities began from the villages of the periphery, again concentrating 
economic infrastructure in the capital city and the country’s main ports, yet 
without providing the employment opportunities for unskilled and low 
skilled workers.
Contrary to the first period of expansion, this third period was characterised 
by a desire to keep operating costs, including travel expenses for managerial 
staff, low and inspection times o f manufacturing equipment short, which 
necessitated and conditioned the concentration o f physical and human 
capital in Freetown. This trend o f economic withdrawal, however, was 
balanced subsequently by massive foreign investments in diamond mining 
infrastructure in the east o f the country. The preferred exit point for such 
diamonds was Freetown; this export geography changed only after the 
central administration increased controls between the east o f the country and 
the capital city, thus redirecting trade flows via the Liberian border (cf. Pugh 
and Cooper 2004: 101-102). Thus this fourth phase did not check the
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primacy o f Freetown as the main economic hub either but at least created an 
alternative pole o f economic activity (Harrell-Bond et al. 1978: 161-162, c f  
Riddell 1970).
As following sections and also CHAPTER FIVE will show, this economic 
structure continued to exist on to the late 1980s, albeit with decreasing 
margins as a result o f poor economic policies, which in turn triggered 
structural adjustment programs that proved largely ineffective. The outbreak 
o f the civil war in 1991 and the subsequent decline o f economic outputs in 
both trading and mining, marked the fifth and current phase o f foreign 
involvement in Sierra Leone’s economy; a clear turnaround o f this trend is 
still n o t in .s ig h t ........................................................................................................
The historical concentration o f foreign traders in Freetown was matched by 
a pattern o f indigenous economic activity, but with a significant time lag (cf. 
van der Laan 1975: 22). The creation o f businesses by tribesmen from the 
interior only gained momentum in the late 1950s, with the majority o f petty 
traders operating in Freetown in 1970 being in-migrants. By this time, larger 
enterprises focusing on exports were already firmly in the hands of either 
foreign or city based owners, and the commercial structure o f the capital city 
was divided between European and Lebanese companies, leading “one to 
wonder whether Freetown [was] in many ways two separate communities” 
(McKay 1968: 75). What is more, this contemporary commentator also 
added (ibid., emphasis added),
“The mal-distribution of incomes and spending power between the few lucky 
members of the community and the mass of the population is clearly shown up in 
shopping habits or necessities. It is often said that African countries are split into two 
distinct parts, the urban and rural dwellers, and that the gap in living standards between 
them shows no sign of diminishing. In some ways a similarly serious problem exists 
within the towns themselves
Adding to this division, Lebanese traders since their arrival in the late 19th 
century had continuously been enlarging their activities. They broadened 
their portfolios, which originally had focused on foodstuff, in the early 1930s 
to include gold mining and, in the early 1950s, diamond mining and related 
trade and also became heavyweights in urban services such as banking and
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transport, construction engineering, and materials (Van der Laan 1975: 30; 
Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999: 87). This economic success story 
(compared to European and African merchants in Sierra Leone) can be 
explained in part with the nature o f extended family networks providing 
mutual support and the “tenacity” o f these structures over time, as Van der 
Laan (1975: 233) concludes. Moreover, the Lebanese community enjoyed 
diplomatic protection first by Turkey, then by France, and finally, after the 
creation o f an independent Lebanese state in 1943, through the appointment 
of a Lebanese consul in 1954. The British colonial apparatus also followed a 
tacit policy o f gradual empowerment o f Lebanese traders in order to counter 
the predominance o f Creole businessmen (Gberie 2002:10).
Attracted by this heterogenous and indeed effective agency in economic 
development, young rural men increasingly aspired to become part o f the 
‘modem’ society by taking up white-collar jobs in Freetown and the 
provincial centres, and seeking mixed marriages with Creole woman (and, to 
a lesser extent, vice versa). Still, both culturally and politically the relationship 
between Creoles and ‘countrymen’, ‘citi2ens’ and ‘subjects’ in the ‘bifurcated 
state’ (Abdullah 2002: 203, cf. Mamdani 1996) remained the “bitterest and 
most long lasting ethnic conflict” in the country’s history (Cartwright 1978: 
170). This in-migration also caused the emergence o f a new urban group of 
stakeholders, which in spite o f its location was rooted in rural traditions. 
Conservative Creoles became increasingly concerned about the political and 
cultural power o f these native migrants as a different constituency. They 
repeatedly emphasised the superiority o f city-based Christianity over 
traditional rural practice, accusing in-migrants o f innate lawlessness and low 
morale and pointing to the alleged inability o f rural recruits to the police to 
maintain order in the city and to constrain widespread criminal activity by 
Creole youth gangs (Nunley 1987: 44-47, cf. Alldridge 1910: 267).
Another serious concern in the city was unemployment. Whereas Freetown 
had had 44,100 inhabitants in 1921, by 1953 its population had almost 
doubled. After the onset o f World War II, the migratory pattern from 
countryside to the capital city had been fuelled further by the availability of 
wartime jobs (Nunley 1987: 49-50), and the continuous inflow had created a
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sharp oversupply o f labour in the capital city (cf. Banton 1957: 60). In 1953, 
the colonial government reportedly employed 10,211 o f the city’s 85,000 
residents— most o f them in public works and the railway department— , 
compared to only 9,676 state employees in the entire Protectorate. 
Nonetheless, an estimated 5,000 urban dwellers were without jobs (Banton 
1957: 93-94). The urban elite was quick to link unemployment direcdy with a 
rise in youth delinquency in petty crime, which was indeed marked by an 
increasing share o f non-Creole offenders (Nunley 1987: 50, cf. Banton 1957: 
36, 213). The fear among Creole residents o f unemployed rural youths was 
paralleled by a general conviction that native tribes would aim to “drive the 
creoles [sit] out o f the city” by registering for municipal elections in great 
numbers to put pressure on the Colonial Administration (African Standard, 10 
August 1945, quoted in Banton 1957: 142).
This Creole political front crumbled— for the first time— over the 1947 
constitutional proposals, which aimed at institutionalising the political rule o f  
Protectorate politicians over all ethnic groups, including the Creole minority, 
who at this time accounted for 27% of the urban population (cf. Banton 
1957: 24). The Creole community was split in two, with a minority accepting 
their fate but the majority openly opposing the proposal, thus infuriating the 
British administrators and weakening their political clout in the decades to 
follow. While remaining dominant in the bureaucratic apparatus (Harrell- 
Bond et al. 1978: 315), the Creoles lost several subsequent political battles, 
including the one to be granted the right to acquire land upcountry in order 
to ease the pressure on the land market in the peninsula, created by the 
increasing demand for private land by foreign traders — first o f all the 
Lebanese community.36
It is important to note at this point that throughout Sierra Leone and 
including Mende country and Kono district where most o f the diamond 
mines are located, land belongs collectively to families and clans through 
customary ownership administered by tribal chiefs. Individuals can only gain 
access to this land if they become members o f these networks (cf. Roberts
36 In 1962 the national government decided that only Sierra Leoneans, i.e., Creoles, could 
buy land in and around Freetown.
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1982: 156). Those left out are therefore “neither ‘citizen’ nor ‘subject’” 
(Fanthorpe 2001: 385) as they are not cared for by tribal structures yet they 
also remain out o f reach o f the Freetown-governed ‘national’ state.
Political life in Freetown was thus already vibrant decades before the struggle 
for national independence set in, hence also prior to post-colonial 
redistributive agendas gaining momentum. Moreover, agency in political 
change in Freetown between the declaration o f the protectorate in 1896 and 
the wake o f decolonisation in the post-war context was neither confined to 
the bureaucracy o f the Colonial Administration nor to the established 
political channels such as the municipal council, but was framed as well by 
non-governmental actors...........................................................................................
Even though the leadership was held by the non-native elite, the political 
landscape increasingly included the other social strata even including native 
migrants, thus rendering elite approaches to urban political change 
incomplete (cf. Kilson 1966: 122). Still, the first move was made by well-to- 
do Creoles aiming at contesting elections o f the municipal council by 
capitalising on their political weight o f their monetary contributions to the 
Freetown City Council. In 1909, they founded several Ratepayers 
Associations, which by definition excluded non-Creole residents. 
Conversely, an urban lower-class counter elite that carried forward the 
political preferences o f the large native migrant community developed only a 
decade later, kickstarted through the foundation o f the Sierra Leone Railway 
Skilled Workmen Mutual Aid Union in 1920 as a response to two railway 
strikes in the previous year (Best 1949: 48, cited in: Abdullah 1994: 213). 
Abdullah (1994) views these incidents as the first substantial collaboration 
between workers dissatisfied with the rigidity o f their low wages and the 
urban poor, who were equally suffering from increased costs o f living (cf. 
Kilson 1966: 106). Yet in despite o f these uprisings, the formation o f a 
cohesive class was impaired by the prevailing tribal and ethnic identification, 
and by occasional opportunistic moves o f the African-American elite aimed 
at neutralising grievances. Even though the Creole elite was diametrically 
opposed to this street approach to politics, during the third strike in 1926 
some o f its more liberal factions tried to embrace the railway workers in
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order to subsume their movement into the existing structure o f urban 
African politics under Creole leadership. While this attempt clearly failed— it 
even prompted a colonial investigation o f the Freetown City Council which 
prompdy found it to be corrupt and inefficient, leading to the latter’s 
dissolution in 1927— , it served to weaken the organisational capacity o f the 
underclass.
In effect, apart from occasional rioting, which often coincided with strikes of 
skilled labourers, the urban poor participated in political processes not 
through clear-cut demands upon the colonial administration, but only 
occasionally and in an unorganised manner through the dozens of their 
.mutual aid associations that, had sprung up around the tum-of-the-century 
and to which, by 1925, roughly a third o f Freetown’s population belonged 
(Kilson 1966: 108). Their organisational pattern was diverse, building on 
tribal, religious, and occupational foundation, and it was in the mutual aid 
associations where traditional and progressive elements o f urban life were 
blended most effectively. Nonetheless, their political weight only 
materialised after the creation o f mass parties in the wake o f decolonisation.
It is important to recall at this point the fact that the vast majority o f city 
dwellers were unable to vote or nominate themselves as candidates because 
they did not possess the material wealth and property to register, as 
mandated by the municipal code. When this property qualification was 
eventually removed in 1957, it prompted doubts as to whether this 
“enlargement o f the franchise” (Pratt 1968: 157) was in fact beneficial to 
municipal administration given that it “proved to be one o f the avenues 
along which party politics has been introduced in the government o f the 
City” (ibid.), thus reversing through a “rude shock” (ibid., 164) a previous 
quasi-convention of non-partisan municipal politics, which was resting 
mainly on the influence of ratepayers’ associations. However, in spite o f 
criticising municipal party politics for limiting choices and compromising 
enlightened interests in urban development, party politics must also be 
credited with catalysing a keen interest among the public in the deliberations 
and activities o f the city council, the creation o f an organised opposition to
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highlight mistakes or lapses, and its function as a “training-ground for future 
politicians and statesmen.” (ibid., 165)37
The Freetown electorate in the 1950s and early 1960s consisted o f 70% 
Creole and northern Sierra Leoneans, mostly Temne. Many Creoles showed 
sympathy for the All Peoples Congress (APC), expecting the party to 
counterbalance what was at times perceived a too Protectorate-friendly 
national government o f the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP). The Creoles 
also shared a conviction that political pluralism was preferable to one- 
partyism both on ideological grounds in that it would be more effective in 
preventing political heavyweights from interfering in the Creole-dominated 
bureaucracy...................................................................................................................
The Temne had an altogether different motivation. They were primarily 
concerned about ways to curtail the influence o f the southern communities, 
first o f all the Mende, in the country in general and in the capital city in 
particular (Collier 1970: 33). The outcome o f the municipal elections in 
spring 1964 is therefore not surprising: 11 o f the 18 elective seats went to the 
APC, which prompted the election o f Siaka Stevens as the new APC mayor 
o f Freetown— only four years after the party, which had been created on 11 
September 1960, had first run for the November 1960 municipal elections, 
winning only two seats.38 A day later, the election result was mentioned in 
the evening news, but only in the context o f an announcement that the 
Minister o f Interior would take legal action against it. The court later ruled 
that it had in fact been illegal due to political pressure prior to the vote 
casting, but Stevens managed to cling to the position and ascend to the 
leadership o f Freetown Municipality.
In spite o f the SLPP’s defeat, the poll had by no means been a disastrous 
result for the party, which had garnered only 2% less votes than their
37 Particularly the latter turned out to be true when Siaka Stevens, a former mayor o f the 
city, was elected president. Pratt’s (op.dt.) following conclusion is therefore plausible, and 
its implications are as central today as they were almost 40 years ago: “The party system has 
come to stay in the municipality. The problem is not to curb it but to determine the degree 
to which it can be exercised in securing the good government o f the City o f Freetown.”
38 Note that Kilson (1966: 274) errs in his claim that the APC had already won the 1960 
municipal election.
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average over the previous four years and whose candidates had drawn 
consistent electoral support, nor a personal defeat o f Prime minister Albert 
Margai, who had simply misjudged the political preferences o f Freetown’s 
residents. Nonetheless, after the municipal defeat the Prime Minister felt 
confirmed in his “distrust of ‘Freetown people’”, subsequendy balancing his 
attempts to diminish the influence wielded by the APC in the capital city 
with setting up additional local party organisations and youth groups, and 
focusing his political efforts on the provinces where he urged the SLPP to 
forge even stronger politico-economic links with Southern Chiefs 
(Cartwright 1970: 191,200).39
A crucial institutional bifurcation point in the political history o f Freetown 
came later in the same year, when in September 1964 a member o f the APC 
challenged the legality o f the City Council arguing that the SLPP had 
nominated a successful candidate from a ward that was not the one where 
this candidate had been a resident. This challenge played into the hands o f  
some members within the SLPP national government, led by Margai, who 
were committed to display openness towards sub-national administration. 
The Supreme Court agreed and suggested that the council itself remedy the 
situation. Few days later however, Albert Margai dissolved the Council and 
announced the decision to reform its structure by increasing the number of  
elected members from twelve to 18, cutting those appointed from six to 
three, and decreeing that the council from now on be elected at once.
National politics had, for the first time, direcdy altered the structure o f urban 
government.
Albert Margai considered the ensuing political campaign an opportunity to 
test and demonstrate his political backing following his ascension to power 
after the death o f his knighted half-brother and predecessor Milton Margai, 
and decided to put it under his direct leadership. Politically however, the 
institutional change proved to be a grave mistake. Rather than emphasising 
the achievements o f  the SLPP-led Council over the past eight years, the
39 This approach set the precedent for the gradual abolition o f the SLPP under Siaka 
Stevens during the 1970s (Hayward 1984: 23-24, cf. Jackson 2004: 141-142).
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declared strategy was to promote the prospects o f Margai’s personal 
leadership skills. In fact, electoral publicity claimed that Freetown’s 
infrastructure was outright “inadequate” even though it was the SLPP that 
had been responsible for urban development. Furthermore, SLPP candidates 
also emphasised in their speeches the risk o f loosing public funding in the 
case o f an opposition-led municipal government (Cartwright 1970: 189-190).
National party politics thus played a crucial role in post-independence 
Freetown, but politics did not stop at party lines. They also included an 
institution whose purpose was even more direcdy that o f social control: 
tribal headmenship and its expressions in the city. Indeed, the creation of 
two parallel urban polities—Freetown City Council and.urban headmen—r 
had been an integral part o f colonial governance, which, following 
Mamdani’s (1996: 136) interpretative line o f ‘despotic decentralisation’, can 
be understood in the context o f creating an exclusionary capital city where 
tribal residents would be overseen by tribal authority, which in turn was 
answerable to a white administration and an alien black citizenry (cf. 
Abdullah 2002: 204).
Even though the establishment o f paramount chiefs by the British rulers had 
been initiated and concerted from Freetown, one o f the faultlines o f urban- 
rural tensions prior to Sierra Leone’s decolonisation were precisely the 
attempts by the central government to tackle chiefs’ permission to 
commission community labour and to hold court, as well as to close the 
loopholes in the administration o f local tax collection. The chiefs had been 
the direct beneficiaries o f the tax collection system between 1896 and the 
early 1930s, a period during which they had raised the liut tax’ and 
additional fees. Further income had been generated from obligatory annual 
gifts and entertainment allowances (Kilson 1966: 53-55). Legal institutions 
were then altered by the British to increase the amount o f revenue at the 
hands o f the central colonial government, but the magnitude o f atrophy 
remained a concern among both colonial and Creole administrators.
Tribal leaders working for the Tribal Administration in Freetown during the 
brief period from its creation in 1926 until its disempowerment in 1933 were
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largely obedient to the colonial administration (Banton 1957: 17). However, 
their relationship with the City Corporation, the predecessor o f the 
Freetown City Council, was less amicable as the latter saw the former as 
competitors in the urban polity. The Colonial Administration, however, 
decided to temporarily strengthen the role o f the Tribal Administration by 
further restricting the Corporation’s power, which prompted local protest 
from within the Creole-dominated institution.
The Tribal Administration persisted for six short years, eventually being 
dismanded under politically charged accusations o f corruption (ibid., 27-29) 
and informed by a commissioned report published in 1932 describing the 
various tribes dwelling .in. Freetown as ‘transitional, groups,’ and the .tribal 
administration therefore necessarily as a temporary system. The 
dismantlement constituted in shifting the right to appoint ‘urban headman’ 
to the colonial Governor, denying explicidy any civil or criminal jurisdiction 
o f headmen over their subjects, and granting the right to supervise the 
implementation o f these changes to the Governor’s office, practically 
rendering headmen merely a social institution.
During the following fifteen years, colonial inspectors forwarded several 
reports o f non-compliance by eleven o f the fourteen tribal headman in 
Freetown to the colonial administration and the municipal council. Neither 
of them intervened, mainly due to a lack o f personnel but also, after 1945, 
due to the increasing involvement o f tribal chiefs in the Freetown City 
Council.
However, this did not prevent a committee appointed to investigate the 
constitution o f the Creole-led City Council in 1944 from arguing that it 
would have been “wrong in principle to give any special representation to 
Protectorate natives as such. The idea to which we look forward is a 
Freetown o f intelligent and independent citizens, not an agglomeration, or a 
federation o f tribal detachments.” (quoted in: Harrell-Bond et al. 1978: 170)
Yet another review was ordered by the acting Governor in 1951, and the 
final report published in 1956 admitted that the headmen system possessed
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advantages with regard to social control and two-way communication, 
therefore recommending strengthening the welfare and judicial aspects o f  
headship through the creation o f an integrated tribal council (Harrell-Bond 
et al. 1978: 142-143, 150-156, 173).40 This was not only met with scepticism 
by the majority o f colonial officials who remained inclined to pay tribute to 
the idea o f Freetown as an Anglo-Christian city, but it also sparked 
resistance among members of the Freetown City Council, with the Creole- 
dominated ratepayers’ associations arguing that a tribal council would be 
“diametrically opposed to the Freetown Municipality Ordinance, derogatory 
to the dignity o f the mayor, aldermen, councillors, and citizens o f Freetown, 
and a complete retrograde step in the social order o f the city” (quoted in: 
ibid., 151). Not. surprisingly, this position triggered protest among headmen 
who accused the Creole community o f favouritism and maintained that the 
chieftaincy system was necessary in Freetown to address tribal affairs.
By the mid-1950s, both the British authority and the SLPP leadership still 
agreed that the chiefs were necessary to remote-rule the hinterland, but a 
decision had to be made on whether to take a hard line on the issue, or to 
accept the status quo o f largely independent chieftaincy. Even though some 
members o f the central government argued in favour o f a more tolerant 
approach, a coalition o f the British with younger educated members o f the 
SLPP managed to generate substantial pressure on Prime Minister Margai 
(who also acted as Minister o f Local Government) to end the “extortion” 
exerted by *big men’ on ‘ordinary men’ (Cartwright 1978: 138), a move that 
prompted northern chiefs to temporarily ponder the creation o f a new 
“Northern People’s Party”.
Even though this plan never saw operational light, the reaction o f the chiefs 
was clearly considered a potential political threat to the urban establishment 
given the size o f its rural electorate and the fact that the amount o f foreign 
investment and the central government’s control over it was insufficient to 
bypass the chiefs economically. On the other hand, doing nothing about the
40 The functions of headmen were in fact fourfold; they acted as legal and social patrons for 
newcomers, judges, spokesman of their communities, and government agents to 
communicate it implement municipal policies (Harrell-Bond et al. 1978: 16).
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rural power structure could have led to the creation o f an ‘anti-chief party, 
which could have challenged the SLPP through attracting younger voters 
both upcountry and in the provincial centres.
Milton Margai opted for the latter, a decision that was pardy motivated 
politically and partly a result o f his personal appreciation o f  certain tribal 
practices as a means to uphold the hierarchical structure o f Sierra Leonean 
society. The only major concession that Margai asked from the chiefs via the 
enforcement o f a 1932 ordinance was that forced communal labour not be 
used for personal benefit, but only for “public purposes.”
By, 1961, all but one chief that had initially been deposed , had again, been 
restored to office, and legislation introduced in 1963 ( Tocal Courts Act’) 
extended local courts’ jurisdiction over all persons living in a particular 
chieftaincy while centralising the right to appoint the president o f such 
courts— previously under the discretion o f the chiefs themselves— , a change 
that was indeed considered a noteworthy check on provincial patronage 
power but which also helped preserve customary laws as much as possible in 
light o f the pressure exerted by Freetown-based Creole elites.
The late Prime Minister’s half-brother Albert, who assumed leadership after 
the death o f his predecessor in April 1964, was more strongly committed to 
political centralisation and the creation o f a one-party state (a formal motion 
concerning this matter was only presented to the Parliament in January 1966, 
another 11 years before the APC-led one-party state was anchored in the 
constitution) and hence took a more delineated stance towards the chiefs, 
using his authority to appoint city-controlled court presidents while 
simultaneously making the chiefs an integral part o f the SLPP nomenclature 
and binding them though individual rewards and personal loyalty.41
Arguably, this strategy was only the ‘second best’ option in the eyes o f the 
party leadership, but the ‘first best’— total circumvention o f the rural
41 Indeed, party loyalty remained low throughout the 1960s and 1970s and was substituted 
by patron-client networks (Tangri 1978: 173) that soon after became the foundation of an 
autocratic polity under Siaka Stevens and his successor.
98
institutions and direct rule—was systemically and logisticaUy unfeasible. This 
double move produced an ambivalent effect: an institutional
instrumentalisation o f chieftaincy for exclusionary political purposes in line 
with SLPP objectives, but also an increasing lack o f popularity o f the 
government among rural communities, which helped tip the balance in 
favour o f the APC in the 1967 national election (Cartwright 1978:136-145).
In the meantime, many tribal leaders in the capital city had remained 
unofficial allies o f the colonial government, which was able to count on their 
support in dampening the aggressive mood o f the urban tribal population 
during the widespread riots in Freetown proper in February 1955, when 
native groups,, frustrated by. banks, favouring Lebanese. and. Indian 
businessmen and the colonial government systematically suppressing 
indigenous entrepreneurship, looted shops, destroyed middle-class houses, 
and attacked white-collar workers (Harrell-Bond et al. 1978: 162, Conteh- 
Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999: 64).42 In spite o f gradual attrition, the capacity 
for social control wielded by urban headman had largely been retained 
because o f the sheer size o f the native communities in Freetown by the time 
(Harrell-Bond et al. 1978: 315), and the widespread perception was that 
chiefs continued as the “sole legitimate representative o f  traditional values.” 
(Kilson 1966: 67)
In return, “the nationalistic new elite, in its attempts to secure mass political 
support beyond the urban centres o f its own origin, normally accommodated 
its political organization, methods, and policies to the strategic position held 
by Chiefs and local society” (ibid.) allowed some tribal leaders into the 
formal political system. This was exemplified by the dominance of tribal 
versus Creole politicians in the Freetown City Council after the council 
elections in 1957 and the cases o f Temne headman Kande Bureh and Mende 
headman Paila who became Minister o f Works and Housing in the same year 
and SLPP propaganda secretary in 1962, respectively (Harrell-Bond et al. 
1978:199-200, 249).
42 The riots spread to the north and south o f the country in November (Banton 1957: 160, 
Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999: 65).
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The embeddedness o f Native agents in dominant structural frameworks, 
typical o f post-colonial countries, and their dependent yet significant 
involvement in national affairs to safeguard local influence by simultaneously 
engaging in higher-level political spheres has aptly been labelled ‘double 
politics’ (Barrows 1971). But in spite o f political co-optation, the institution 
o f urban headmanship in Freetown also had a profound structuring effect itself, 
as Harrell-Bond et al. (1978: 308) have argued convincingly. It eventually 
succeeded in transforming Freetown from a Creole dominated political 
space to a multicultural city o f multi-actor political negotiation.
In the cultural arena constituted by the city, the presence o f residents from 
the hinterland led. to similar, diversity^—or competition, in the eyes o f the 
Creole citizenry— through traditional religious practices, including secret 
societies, and the rise o f alternative amusements such as public cinemas and 
theatre. By the late 1950s, masquerades and processions by mixed Yoruba- 
rural groups were a common feature o f Freetown city life — culturally at 
least, ‘up-country’ had conquered the capital. In ‘high politics’ however, 
youth societies continued being demonised for another decade, and only 
during the early 1960s the newly formed APC began capitalising on their 
organizational experience for political rallying, thus including politically what 
remained yet to be included socially and culturally into the urban 
establishment. (Nunley 1987: 55).
During the 1960s until 1971, youth societies and APC leaders kept 
developing mutually beneficial relations, and in 1971, when Siaka Stevens 
was elected President, youth societies finally acted as an established player in 
Sierra Leonean politics, able to voice their concerns and shared interests—  
such as the attempted unity o f various Ode-lay societies and their expansion 
from the city to surrounding provinces— directly to government officials 
who recognised the potential to align these claims with their own leaders’ 
aspirations for a one-party state.43
43 Even though the convergence between APC objectives and the interests o f urban youth 
societies was unique in its magnitude, links also existed between the latter and other parties, 
notably the SLPP. The Ambas Geda society succeeded in establishing one of its members as 
treasurer for the SLPP, which was governing the country since its independence in 1961 and 
until the aftermath o f the national election in 1967 when the governor-general asked Siaka
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In sum, the history o f party politics in Sierra Leone defies a categorisation 
into ‘mass’ and ‘elite’ parties common in post-colonial West Africa — not 
only because o f the power concentration under one-partyism and the 
personalised leaderships o f Albert Margai and Siaka Stevens (cf. Cammack et 
al. 1988: 85) but also because the real elite, the Creoles residing in the former 
Colony, had outmanoeuvred themselves, leaving political mobilisation to the 
urbanised landvolk (cf. Harrell-Bond et al. 1978: 200). The creation o f the 
SLPP in April 1951 by Protectorate leaders, most o f which stemmed from 
chiefly families,44 had been the first direct confrontation with conservative 
Creoles, who eight months earlier had founded the National Council o f the 
Colony o f Sierra Leone to defend their “long-standing [...] supremacy in the 
modem sector o f colonial life” by their eventually futile demand to grant 
independence o f the Freetown colony from the Protectorate (Kilson 1966: 
226-227).
This, in turn, triggered the emergence o f a political counterweight, which 
eventually converged in the APC, the main opposition party nine years later, 
which— in the absence o f the clear-cut class divisions typically found in 
capitalist Europe in the mid 19th century— formed similarly on ethnic lines 
(Temne, Sherbro45) and socio-economic grounds (the regional deprivation of 
the North), and even capitalised on an originally Creole discourse of 
(increasingly socialism-inspired) modernisation and the necessity of 
detribalisation to counter not only the concentration o f public benefits in the 
south, but also what was considered an essentially reactionist tribal position 
of the Mende-dominated SLPP in power (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 
1999: 69-71, Kilson 1966: 253).
Stevens to form a new government (ibid., 59, 203-204. The results o f the elections were 
never announced; Mwakikagile 2001: 183).
44 Barrows (1971: 10) characterises it as “a loosely-organized movement of hinterland 
peoples who mobilized politically not so much to oust the British as to assure that 
Independence would not bring rule by the Creole minority headquartered in Freetown.”
45 Due to the strong degree o f their community cohesion and their occasional collaboration 
with political subgroups opposing the SLPP, the Sherbro had repeatedly been denied an 
own urban headman by the native party, which at the time was controlling the Freetown 
City Council. (Harrell-Bond 1978: 254).
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Interestingly however, both parties— in spite o f their direct reliance on a 
large ethnic constituency in their respective province— were working to 
abolish the headman system in Freetown proper in order to ensure direct 
influence on the electorate, a position that was emulated by the military 
government that captured power in 1967. It was only in the mid-1970s that 
the institution o f urban headmen was reinstated, pardy because its abolition 
had merely pushed the structures into informality without reducing their 
effectiveness with regard to social and political obedience (Harrell-Bond et 
al. 1978: 18).
Before I proceed to the next sub-section, it appears helpful to provide an 
overview o f the key urban management challenges in Freetown throughout 
the period covered. This is vital because many o f them have persisted and 
are shaping politics in the post-intervention city, as CHAPTER FIVE shows. 
Moreover, these managerial challenges also illustrate— or have even 
furthered— the processes o f separation and structuration in the city.
Dubbed the “white man’s graveyard” (Doherty 1985: 150) due to widespread 
Malaria, Freetown had undergone a segregation o f residential quarters in 
1908, with European officials moving to the west o f the city centre where 
houses could be built on the hillsides, high above sea level. This labour 
dependent enclave was connected with the rest o f the city through a tram 
line (Zack-Williams 2002: 296). Banton (1957: 18) notes,
“The change o f  residence had a m ost beneficial effect on the health o f  the officials 
concerned but, by removing them from the town, it broke their ties with the 
populace. The better climate enabled officials to bring out their wives and to create 
a small social world o f  their own— a process o f  self-segregation which was resented 
by the Africans.”
Already in 1906 a municipal ordinance had stipulated that ethnic in-migrants 
to the city were expected to join neighbourhoods made up o f the same 
ethnicity, which did not only reinforce intra city segregation towards a ‘dual 
city’ (O’Connor 1983) but also served to increase the pressure on the urban 
land market, enriching further a small group o f Creole land owners (Harrell- 
Bond et al. 1978: 96).
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The quality o f sanitation in these areas did not improve at all over the course 
o f the following 50 years (Banton, 1957: 86). Soil erosion and deforestation 
during the post-war period worsened the condition for a steady water 
supply, with public demands during the dry season regularly outstripping 
availability (Jarrett 1956: 343-344). Struck by heavy rainfalls during three 
months and relative aridity (due to its geographical location) during the 
remainder o f the year, planning for the Guma Dam 20 miles east o f 
Freetown— whose completion took an almost incredible fifty years—was 
initiated in the 1950s (Jarrett 1956: 345). The mechanised provision o f water 
across regular neighbourhoods was only introduced in 1961. It succeeded in 
slightly reducing the occurrence o f intestinal and other waterborne infections 
(Roberts 1982: .43). This progress notwithstanding,, in the early . 1960s, the 
few non-native elite families that had remained in the city centre relocated to 
the far west o f the city as a response to the increasing deprivation o f the city 
and the continued absence o f any urban development scheme.
Housing in the city remained similarly problematic an issue. It had first 
emerged on the public agenda in 1900 when a ‘City Improvement Act’ 
sought to ameliorate public health and to impose a system o f planning and 
licensing. However, with the concentration o f European residents in the far 
west o f the city, this initiative immediately lost political clout and vanished. 
In 1939 and 1941, two slum clearance reports revived the issue by urging the 
demolition o f slums and making provisions for alternative accommodation 
schemes. However, their only tangible outcome was a low-cost housing 
estate inaugurated more than 20 years later, in 1963.
In the same year, a comprehensive redevelopment plan was commissioned 
to an international architecture bureau. The architects presented a 
comprehensive vision for the city centre, including high-rise buildings, 
supermarkets, and a central shopping mall. Soon after, its components were 
called into question mostly because the bureau had not paid much attention 
to financial aspects. The same applied to an attempt during the late 1960s to 
develop “an officially accepted, comprehensive [infrastructural] development 
plan” to curb “uncontrolled growth” (Harvey and Dewdney 1968: 195), 
which ultimately failed to muster critical political support from national
authorities. Two subsequent reports authored by UN consultants took a 
developmental position by encouraging the use o f self-help techniques and 
urging the acknowledgement o f unemployment and readily available labour 
as opportunities for urban development. Neither had any impact. In 1983 a 
state-owned company finished 120 housing units for low-income families, a 
project that had been downgraded from initially targeting 500 beneficiaries. 
This was to remain the only notable and mainly symbolic concrete 
government measure o f the decade.46 The central government was placing 
its faith in market mechanisms and the private sector to ‘right the spatial 
wrongs’ and chose to ignore the distinctiveness o f urban environments 
under conditions o f underdeveloped capitalism (Simon 1992: 114).
Should one therefore conclude that no money was to be made with 
Freetown? Quite the contrary. During the decade prior to the outbreak of  
violence in 1991, Freetown experienced impressive population growth. 
Newly arrived residents had to encroach on private lands, build temporary 
shelter on hilltops, and spread out towards peri-urban areas in order to find a 
place to stay. Some tried to acquire legal status through the Ministry of  
Lands, yet in the absence of a coordinated formalisation campaign they had 
to rely on paying bribes, usually without gaining any tangible protection. As a 
result, land grabbing and illegal occupation became rampant (Abdullah 2002: 
207; e.g. Standard Times 2006b).
As empirical data discussed in CHAPTER SIX proves, this is very similar to the 
challenge encountered in (post-intervention) Kabul. Rents in downtown 
Freetown increased fourfold between 1957 and 1976 even though the annual 
growth o f the country’s GDP during that period was below 2% (Doherty 
1985: 160), and it was not unusual for wealthier strata o f Freetown’s society, 
mosdy businessmen, lawyers and politicians, to invest in urban land and 
property. They would then rent out the villas to foreign firms or embassies 
with a good premium, thus using their control and preferential access to 
urban means o f reproduction to capitalise once again on the wealth- 
generating propinquity characteristic o f their initial place of accumulation
46 For a detailed description of report findings and resulting (ineffective) policies, see 
Doherty (1985:154-158).
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but also increasing further the value o f land and population density in the 
eastern part o f the city, deemed inappropriate for property investments (cf. 
O ’Connor 1983: 179, Simon 1992:112).
An identical replication o f this behaviour occurred with the arrival of 
international peacekeepers and reconstruction aid workers in the late 1990s 
when housing prices went up over night and landlords demanded foreign 
currency rents and a minimum two-year lease (Abdullah 2002: 210, cf. Keen 
2005: 170-171). This again constitutes a parallel pattern to the one found in 
Kabul after 2001. Together they exemplify drastically the exclusiveness o f  
the urban land economy in weakly institutionalised environments — a 
challenge that needs to be addressed by local policymakers and that carries 
clear normative implications, which shall be discussed toward the end o f this 
study in CHAPTER EIGHT.
In addition to this supply side distortion and as highlighted above, 
mechanisms for making effective demands for urban services (such as labour 
organisations) had remained structurally underdeveloped as an effect o f the 
largely non-capitalist economic history o f Sierra Leone. Doherty’s (1985: 
159) argument that the “perpetuation o f housing problems in Freetown 
[were operating] in the specific social and economic conditions of 
underdeveloped capitalism” is therefore compelling as it shifts the focus 
from supposedly ‘everyday’ concerns about management toward a historical 
analysis o f structures that link the urban housing market with the national 
political economy. Supra-national patterns o f economic governance thus 
manifested themselves locally, and did so to the detriment o f equitable urban 
development.
Kabul: from beacon to burden
In 1901 when Habibullah took over from his father Abdur Rahman Khan to 
continue his centralist legacy, Kabul already is not only an old town 
stretching along the Kabul River, where some structures have survived from 
the early previous century, but also numerous newer neighbourhoods
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making up the second and the third district. Habibullah favoured modem  
European architecture, and villas became the most frequent middle and 
upper class housing style (Schadl 2004: 16). His son Amanullah seized the 
throne in 1919 after Habibullah had been murdered during a hunting 
excursion. A brief diplomatic conflict with the British rulers in India and the 
aforementioned air raid on Kabul and Jalalabad rendered Afghanistan fully 
independent, and Amanullah was fully determined to, finally, make Kabul 
the capital worthy o f a proud nation.
Unlike his grandfather Abdur Rahman, Amanullah Khan had been “bom  
and raised in Kabul city and had virtually no contact with tribal Afghanistan” 
(Rubin 2002: . 57). His development agenda was radical. Aided financially by 
loans from European state banks he tried to tackle simultaneously a land 
reform, tax harmonisation, infrastructure investments, and the improvement 
of schooling ratios. All four culminated in the subsequent declaration o f the 
first Afghan Constitution in 1921 (Rubin 2002: 54, Johnson and Leslie 2004: 
138-139, Grevemeyer 1990: 103-104).
In 1921, when Kabul was already housing more than 600,000 inhabitants, 
Amanullah’s government initiated the institutional creation o f a municipal 
administration in Kabul (Baladieh, after 1964 Sharwali, cf. Viaro 2004: 154) 
based on existing staff working in a small office (Safaie) who had been 
supervising urban cleaning since its inauguration under Amir Shear Ali Khan 
(1859-1868).47 Unlike its direct involvement in public cleaning and 
sprinkling, the office had also been collecting municipal taxes through an 
indirect system of appointed wakil-e-go^ars (“neighbourhood advocates”) who 
were required to deliver their collections on a daily basis.
Three years later, a municipal law was passed that foresaw the establishment 
of 14 elected municipal councils across the country, mandating that elected 
members had to be literate, that the electorate had to register prior to 
elections, which were to take place in mosques, and prohibiting the
47 Yavari d’Hellencourt et al. (2003: 7) contend that the renaming took effect much later, 
namely under Zahir Shah in 1964, when it was mentioned in the new constitution. I have 
not been able to verify this.
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appointment o f more than one male family member per election period vote 
(Yavari d’Hellencourt et al. 2003: 7-8). However, facilitated by widespread 
ignorance among urban residents about these constitutional changes, 
ensuing political practice usually disregarded basic democratic principles and 
replaced electoral processes with central government-friendly local leaders.48
The subsidiarity principle was introduced as a tool o f local governance and 
cities were entitled to a share of provincial revenues (which previously had to 
be forwarded in their entirety to the central government, as explained 
above), even though unmet municipal expenses still depended on the 
approval by the Prime Minister, a situation that was a constant feature o f  
municipal .finance, in Kabul, where public expenses regularly outweighed 
public incomes, thus strengthening the politico-economic leverage o f  
national institutions over the capital city.
In spite o f these practical limitations, Afghan cities can thus at least 
conceptually be considered the first and only spaces o f experimental 
democracy in recent Afghan history (Grevemeyer 1990: 237-238, cf. 391 fn. 
74, Hondrich 1966: 226, Dupree 1963 cited in: Grevemeyer 1990: 241). 
Indeed, had the institutional framework been followed, the impact o f  
democratically governed cities could not be overestimated — both in light o f  
the growth o f urban centres since the 1920s and also the structural function 
that they played in transforming an exclusively agrarian society into a 
centrally administered polity (Grotzbach 1979: 31-33).
But democracy faltered, and tribal politics prevailed. Pushtuns were the 
dominant group in Kabul in local and national administration, while Tajiks 
as well as Uzbeks and Hazaras remained underrepresented. Similarly, in the 
evolving middle class o f officials, Pushtuns and Muhammadzais were by far 
the most dominant groups, constituting what Rubin (1992: 82) calls “a 
bureaucratic class that lived (or aspired to live) in Kabul. This city developed 
upper and middle classes with Westernized or semi-Westemized lifestyles.”
48 Grotzbach (ibid.) points out that the creation of Kabul Municipality preceded other 
comparable institutions in the country “roughly by a decade.” Here, a systematic 
introduction of municipal administration is credited to Amanullah’s successor Nadir Shah 
(1929-1933).
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At the same time however, the central government was maintained mainly 
through subsidies by other governments, and consequently failed to 
confront and “alter traditional patterns o f authority and economy in rural 
areas” (Goodhand 2004: 50). In order to service international loans, 
Amanullah committed himself to slashing remaining trade barriers in order 
to mobilise domestic resources and finance state-led accumulation. As a 
starting point, he sought to introduce the taxation o f agricultural 
production,49 which pitted him against provincial landowners who forcefully 
resisted the implementation o f his policy (Rubin 2002: 54-55).
Before departing on an extended tour.of Europe in. 1928, Amanullah 
reinforced his pressure on tax collectors, which increased the hardship 
particularly in the districts surrounding the capital city. This prompted a local 
social bandit known as Bacha-e Saqao to embark on a march towards Kabul. 
Upon his entering into the city in 1929 he had himself crowned as the new 
Amir Habibullah. Yet only few weeks later he was deposed, and in October 
a member o f the Pushtun Musahiban clan, Nadir Shah, seried the throne in 
Amanullah’s absence. However, Nadir Shah had to rely on a mercenary army 
consisting o f several tribes to capture the capital city, and when these 
realised that he had no financial resources to pay for their services, they 
unleashed widespread looting and pillaging on Kabul “leaving [Nadir Shah] 
at the head o f a state with neither army nor treasury.” Rubin (2002: 58) This 
dual ‘remote defeat’ gave momentum to the lingering conviction among 
Kabul’s urban intelligentsia that a social transformation o f Afghanistan was 
too ambitious an objective and that the only effective way forward would be 
a “nation-state enclave, insulated in as much as possible from the traditional 
society.” (Rubin 1988: 1196)
Under Nadir’s successor Zahir Shah (1933-1973), urban growth was picking 
up as a result o f the country’s first explicitly city-friendly development vision
49 Model and experimental farms to balance the relative neglect o f agricultural development 
as a result o f the urban elites’ commitment to large-scale industrialisation had been 
established under Habibullah and were then reopened under Nadir Shah’s brief leadership 
from 1929 until 1933. Most o f them were located in Kabul, displaying a similar geographical 
concentration as in the case o f the rising number o f middle schools for female pupils during 
the same epoch (Gregorian 1969: 318, 356; Arez and Dittmann 2005: 92).
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(cf. Newell 1972: 74, Grotzbach 1979: 22-23). A fourth district was added in 
1942, and seven additional districts followed roughly every four years up 
until 1976, including Wa^irAkbarKhan, the first largely homogenous upper- 
class neighbourhood (Arez and Dittmann 2005: 41, cf. Najimi 2004: 79). In 
1948, all processes o f urban management were subsumed under the 
supervision o f Kabul Municipality. During the following decade, the old city 
experienced large-scale destruction and subsequent bifurcation as a result of 
the construction o f Jade Maiwand (the Maiwand boulevard) and four-storey 
commercial and office buildings lining its sides.50 Prefabricated apartment 
blocks, often reserved for state officials and military officers and their 
families, were also erected in the old city, adding to its rapidly changing and 
increasingly disfigured image (Najimi 2 0 0 4 ) . ........................................................
The rising demand for electric power necessitated the simultaneous 
provision by three hydroelectric plants in the surrounding mountains 
(Adamec 1996: 130). Due to resource scarcity but also as an effect o f the 
focus required to ‘build the nation in Kabul,’ the government under Zahir 
Shah once again left more remote areas largely to their own control and 
adopted a more detached practice o f “co-optation o f autonomous local 
authorities through patronage” (ibid).
A simultaneous change in national and urban polity was then attempted 
through the 1964 Constitution, which provided an institutional framework 
for indirect participation through selected representatives in the National 
Assembly (Shura-I-Milh) and foresaw the division o f  legislative, executive, 
and judiciary functions o f the state. This included the city level, mandating 
that the mayor o f Kabul be elected in a direct and secret ballot for three 
years. Municipal elections were indeed held in several Afghan cities in 1966, 
which was considered a first step in creating a local structure below the 
national government. But ‘decentralisation’ was limited to a consultative role 
of provincial representatives and left legislative and executive functions 
untouched (Newell 1972: 181).51
50 I am indebted to Ajmal Maiwandi who brought this spatial division to my attention.
51 This practice was followed until shortly after the Russian withdrawal in 1991. A year later, 
all community-based organisations were banned, and the Mayor and his deputies were
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In a similarly state-led fashion, urban planning for Kabul had been driven by 
an assumption o f steady but moderate growth due to the city’s functions as a 
capital and the country’s centre o f higher education. Its industrial structure, 
too, contributed to rising population figures, as did its role in redistributing 
governmental incomes through formal and informal networks.52 The first 
master plan was completed in 1962 with a significant participation o f Afghan 
planning experts. It made provisions for a city o f 800,000 people, to be built 
over the course o f 25 years.
A first revision o f this initial plan appeared in 1971 in order to do justice to 
the growth o f the city that was much faster than anticipated. This revised 
plan accommodated a total urban population o f over 1.4 million expected by 
1995, but again it had little impact. Its provisions— aiming at increasing 
residential density through large scale construction o f housing units— were 
criticised for their ignorance o f local preferences for more secluded homes 
that allowed a sharp separation between private and public spaces. This 
criticism found its expression in no less than 6,000 applications for 
individual property to the municipality in 1975 alone. In addition, most of  
the apartment blocks remained unaffordable for lower strata, and in 
particular migrants from surrounding rural provinces. Finally, the large scale 
construction envisioned by this revision ignored the limited capacity o f both 
the construction industry and the financial capital available (Grotzbach 1979: 
55-56, cf. Viaro 2004: 155).
Writing in 1979, Grotzbach noted that alternative proposals had been 
rejected point-blank by the municipality’s city planners who already then 
adhered to a “virtually radical modernist” urban vision (ibid., translation by 
the author). Zoning as a measure o f city planning had only been introduced 
in the 1978 plan, a third attempt towards spatial governance initiated two 
years earlier and which was already strongly informed by Soviet style urban
appointed in accordance with the military raison d ’etat. Ever since, the Afghan President has 
appointed Kabul mayors without involvement o f the urban electorate (Yavari d’Hellencourt 
et al. 2003: 10).
52 This pattern of moderate growth was altered with the Russian occupation, when Kabul 
suddenly became a relatively safe haven “for those who were seeking freedom away from 
religion” (van der Tas 2004: 67).
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planning theory. This time, the planning horizon aimed at one million 
inhabitants but included a long-term projection o f two million, but the 
municipality soon got caught up in preventing the construction o f unplanned 
projects initiated by vested interests, and the planning steps laid out in the 
document became increasingly impossible to achieve in the context of the 
ensuing civil war.
Freetown: from independence to patrimonialism
Reinforced by the primacy o f Freetown as an urban centre when compared 
to other urban settlements in Sierra Leone, the capital city a decade after 
independence had remained the focus o f the political elites and the 
institutional machinery with which they attempted to govern (Barrows 1971: 
2, cf. Riddell 2005: 116-117). In the political arena, the turbulent first half o f  
the 1960s was followed by utilitarian alliances o f constandy mutating cliques 
o f military leaders in Freetown between 1966 and 1971 who were trying to 
alter national polity while preserving their clout within the internal structures 
o f command (Barrows 1971: 217, 225-226). APC politicians increasingly 
succeeded in patronising youth societies for their political purposes (most 
members o f the “red shirts”, the APC’s notorious youth canvass group, were 
also members o f secret societies) but also did not forget that Ode-lay societies 
remained an important constituency in Freetown and beyond, carrying “the 
potential o f exploiting an urban-based society that could establish branches 
and thereby enlist the support o f youth in the rural areas.” (Nunley 1987: 
215, cf. Keen 2005: 58-59)
In a strategic move to solidify one-party rule, local government institutions 
in the country were suspended in 1972 under President Stevens’ rule, 
followed by the abolition o f town councils. One key informant for this study 
explained this strategy as follows:
“The administrative hierarchy in Sierra [...] was Siaka Stevens’ playground all over. 
He cut and pasted that thing like there was no tomorrow. He amalgamated 
chiefdoms, he split them — he divided and ruled. If he had one person w ho wanted 
to be a paramount chief but wasn’t, he created a new chiefdom so he became one. 
If there was a paramount chief that was not aggressively pro APC enough, he cut
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his chiefdom to minimise the rule o f  that person. [...] The Western area is very 
different. Western Area rural, that is, the non-city part, is a rural district, which 
means that it has a district council, but it has only four wards. Nonetheless, the 
population in this district is big and it is a multimember constituency.” (IBA-F8)
In parallel, the Stevens administration also reinvented tribal administration 
through urban headmen to undermine further the legitimacy o f the City 
Council. The latter institutions, gradual decline was epitomised by its loss of  
control over investments for and revenues from municipal schools, markets, 
cemeteries, and public parks. In 1984, the President abolished the elected 
City Council and appointed a Freetown Management Committee by 
installing several o f his political allies as councillors — a central government 
move that marked the final chapter o f subsidiary polity in Sierra Leonean 
urban affairs.
During the remaining seven years until the beginning o f the civil war, the 
urban infrastructure declined and depilated further, and water and electric 
power became the exception rather than the rule. The continuing 
contraction o f social services and public revenues also led to an increased 
seclusion o f serviced ghettos in the western part o f the city and an 
intensification o f housing competition more generally, to the detriment o f  
the hundreds o f thousands o f poor residents (Abdullah 2002: 206, Zack- 
Williams 2002: 298).
Yet while funding for urban management was virtually absent, money was 
floating around. A modest recipient o f international assistance until the 
launch o f structural adjustment programs in the 1980s, Roberts (1982: 10-12) 
righdy points out that Sierra Leone had “always” (ibid.) been receiving 
foreign aid nonetheless, even prior to the establishment o f the British 
Protectorate in 1896, whether the population benefited from it or not.
After the Second World War, US American organisations had reinforced 
their presence aiming to “stimulate the latent potential o f the Negro,” 
“advance human welfare” through training in law, planning, and 
administrative capacity, develop contemporary tribal art and “creative 
expression,” and “strengthen national life” (ibid.). Additional resources were
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flowing to support students in the “Athens o f Africa,” as Freetown was 
known for hosting Fourah Bay College, to improve health and sanitation, 
and in contribution to general infrastructure development, particularly roads 
to the provincial centres. Socialist countries such as China and Cuba, 
previously quite unconcerned about Sierra Leone’s fate, joined this illustrious 
group led by British and US organisations shortly after the creation of the 
APC in 1960, thus contributing to a pattern o f vivid exchanges.53
By the mid-1970, Sierra Leone had received three standby agreement loans 
to cushion its budgetary crisis (van de Walle 1999: 121). President Stevens 
tried to increase the competitiveness o f the export sector by keeping the 
prices o f agricultural products. artificially. low-—on . average at 45% of its 
international market value— and introducing subsidies for imported food 
such as rice to ensure supply for the major urban centres (Riddell 2005: 119, 
cf. Keen 2005: 25-26). This indirect taxation o f domestic agriculture was not 
only ineffective with regard to improving the country’s competitive position 
in the region, but also helped aggravate uneven development through 
“distributional grievances emanating from rural isolation”, as Davies (2000: 
354) argues convincingly.
The shift from a capitalist-friendly pragmatic posture towards a socialist 
ideology and corresponding foreign policy— signalled by the recognition of  
Communist China and close links with neighbouring Guinea (Barrows 1971: 
237)— also brought with it the centralisation o f political power and a 
determination to extend state control to the private sphere (Roberts 1982: 
108), a remarkable continuation o f the colonial administrative legacy based 
in the capital city to the extent that “by design or accident, almost all major 
policy matters and decisions are taken in Freetown.” (Laggah et al. 1999: 
180) Foreign aid—including donors as diverse as China, the US, the Gulf 
States and the Soviet government— was thus used to create a clientilistic 
one-party state, and its total amount was rising steadily, as the following 
chart (Grant 2005: 5) shows.
53 During the politically tumultuous 1970s, Siaka Stevens was first protected by Guinean 
bodyguards, but following diplomatic disagreements both Cuba and China offered support 
to insure his personal security, which the President gladly accepted (Barrows 1971: 227).
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Figure 6: T otal aid to Sierra Leone, 1960-2002
When Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle’s (1999: 86) conclude that “economic 
necessity rather than any ideological or religious convictions [had become] 
the driving force behind the request for aid,” this is foreshadowing a parallel 
between the aid pattern observed in Sierra Leone during the 1970s and 
1980s, and the political manoeuvring of the Afghan government during the 
1950s and 1960s described in the following sub-section.
Kabul: utopia and its demise
In curious discontinuity to the previous decades, the faultlines and venues of 
direct confrontation in Afghanistan of the 1970s were shifting away from 
‘the centre versus the periphery’ or ‘the state against the tribes’, and toward a 
‘double localisation’ at the city level. Educated youth groups—which 
included rural folk who had benefited from increasing mobility during the 
1950s and identified themselves with the modernist agenda of Kabul’s 
rulers— assumed a leading role in challenging the technocratically modem 
yet culturally still traditional government elites on both ideological and inter- 
generational grounds. (Shahrani 1986: 61, cf. 1972: 198-199)
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This rising socio-political tension within the capital city dovetailed with 
tension at the village level. Villagers were pitted against local government 
officials deployed by the central government whose corrupt practices even 
outweighed the harsh rule o f local land owners (who demanded up to half o f  
the gross crop from their tenants but offered long-term perspectives through 
customarily institutionalised dependent relationships; Newell 1972: 31) and 
who “openly and ruthlessly squeezed the poor peasants, often in 
collaboration with village and community elders” (Kakar 1978: 205). This 
created a structure o f conflict that amplified the opposition against the 
central government both nationally, that is, across urban-rural faultlines, and 
in its own ‘backyard’ (the capital city) and provided the explosive mix o f  
secular discontent and religious mobilisation that culminated in the ousting 
o f King Zahir Shah through a military coup in mid-1973 and the 
proclamation o f an Afghan Republic.
In striking similarity to Sierra Leone, the commitment to financing o f its 
development programmes through direct foreign assistance in the form o f  
long-term loans and project credits also played a central role in this demise. 
The change from a tax-based economy towards an etatist agenda under 
Mohammed Daoud in 1953, coupled with the militarisation o f the central 
government, perforated further the links o f the administration in the capital 
city with their rural constituencies (cf. Rubin 2002: 279) and made the central 
government, which under Daoud’s leadership was remarkably successful in 
extracting aid monies from both power blocs (Westad 2005: 300), more 
dependent on external aid. Even though the administrative apparatus in 
Kabul had been enlarged with the objective to increase the control over the 
hinterland, relations became even more tenuous and villagers made extensive 
use o f local dispute resolution and allocation mechanisms in order to avoid 
“extensive and cosdy relations with the government whenever possible” 
(Shahrani 1986: 61, cf. Grevemeyer 1990: 235).
While the first five-year plan in 1956 put a strong emphasis on physical 
infrastructure, particularly road construction, to enable industrial growth by 
indirect means (Bossin 2004: 90)— an approach again taken up under US 
American leadership in 2002, this time however employing Turkish
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companies and using American equipment— , lurking agricultural 
productivity and only slowly increasing output by the industrial sector 
necessitated a downward adjustment o f envisaged economic progress in the 
third five-year plan in 1965. This plan focused on boosting productive 
capacity through direct intervention by Kabul-based agricultural and 
industrial development banks, and increasing revenue collection through 
improving public records o f land ownership and private incomes.
Even though productive capacity was thus enlarged, the output from state- 
owned heavy industry went into decline around 1967. The National 
Parliament, constituted after the declaration o f the National Constitution in 
.1964, also strongly resisted an increase in land revenue taxation in order not 
to jeopardise support relations with rural strongmen. Indeed, Rubin (1988: 
1189) pointed out succincdy that political representation o f the countryside 
in the capital city-based Afghan Parliament was limited to land owners 
travelling “to the capital to use their influence to reduce unwanted state 
intrusion while working to get foreign aid spent in their districts.” (ibid., 
1206) Illustrating a wholly negative long-term effect o f this geographical 
separation on state-building (cf. Giddens 1987), the aforementioned factors 
also prompted a sharp decrease o f national revenues, down to less than two 
per cent o f overall government incomes, which coincided with a slump in 
incomes from taxation o f individuals and businesses in the private sector 
(Newell 1972: 158-161).
Between 1950 and 1970, US$ 1 billion was paid out to Afghanistan, 50% of 
it as loans, and by the end o f the 1960s 2,200 foreign technical experts in 
military, technical and financial affairs from several European countries and 
the United States were operating in the country (Grevemeyer 1990: 104). 
Between 1956 and 1975, the World Bank alone poured US$ 230 million into 
the economy (Maiwandi 2002, Kazimee 1977). In the early 1970s, self­
generated government revenues only covered 24% of all national 
development projects and depended predominandy on indirect taxation 
from import duties and customs, property sales, fees for public services, and 
profits from state sector businesses, whereas revenues from direct taxation 
on corporate or individual income and private land holding was minimal.
116
The value created by agricultural production, which accounted for an 
estimated 75% of incomes in 1977, was not taxed at all (Newell 1972: 154- 
155, Grevemeyer 1990: 104, cf. Rubin 2002: 162-163). Furthermore, as a 
result o f the state-led model o f development introduced in the early 1950s, 
private entrepreneurship was confined to trading activities, whereas the 
government was the main player in urban development and construction 
(Rubin 2000: 1791). In sum therefore, Newell (1986: 106) was right to 
underline the
“massive impact o f  foreign influences that have been thrust upon [Afghanistan] 
within little more than the past generation [consisting of] pressures o f  assimilation 
o f  alien skills, ideas, institutions, products, and funding have let to  responses that 
suggest labelling o f  their political systems as derivative, not integral, states.”
Looking back at Daoud’s outreach towards external sources o f funding, an 
Afghan minister was quoted as saying that the acceptance o f “foreign 
morphine” in the guise o f development loans had been the greatest mistake 
o f Afghan economic and foreign policy; in 1971 the newly elected Prime 
Minister Abdulzaher named loan repayment as the crucial factor 
constraining Afghanistan’s development during his inaugural speech 
(Grevemeyer 1990: 104,115).
Against this background o f fiscal trends, a suspicion o f a city-centred 
development approach o f economically invasive forces during these decades 
of recent Afghan history seems justified. For instance, the failed strategic 
investment by the US American government into the Kandahar 
International airport in the early 1960s (designed to connect a secondary city 
to the regional network but ending up servicing only direct routes to the 
capital city) epitomises this priority as well as the largest Kabul-based bakery 
(financed and built by Soviet development aid) whose daily 64-ton 
production o f bread, using US American wheat imports, eventually crowded 
out 220 small private bakeries throughout the city.
Another urban development project worth US$ 11 million and financed by 
the USSR was the construction o f the Microrayan housing project comprising
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60 apartment blocks including a cinema, a mosque, a kindergarten, 
restaurants and shops (Viaro 2004: 155). An industrial park was established 
in 1965, hosting predominantly light industries such as it shoemaking, 
ceramics, garments, and electrical appliances. However, these goods were 
never meant to be exported, pardy because o f domestic demand and pardy 
because o f a relatively low quality.54
In the late 1970s, the budget o f Kabul Municipality was larger than the 
combined budget o f all the other Afghan cities (Wiebe 1978: 74), another 
exemplification o f the persisting allegiance to a centralist polity that backed 
up the national system o f central control with a sub-national concentration 
of resource allocation in the capital city. Unsurprisingly, many outside Kabul 
remained hostile towards the ‘promises’ o f urban life (cf. Hatch Dupree 
2002: 982, Tajbakhsh 2001). The pattern o f exclusion and rejection 
eventually nurtured its own opposition by creating a group o f educated 
minority leaders o f a wide political and religious spectrum, “ambitious men 
whose access to power was blocked. Through their participation in the state 
educational system and the time they all spent in the capital, they developed 
aspirations not only for themselves but for their nation.” Rubin (1992: 94) 
This argument is central indeed as it puts marginalised but educated and 
‘nationalised’ groups in the city itself into the foreground o f investigation. As 
we shall see in the following, agency for structural change was thus not only 
nurtured by rural insurgency against an alleged urban project o f modernity, 
but also by very concrete actions taken within the city.
As an effect o f the thaw in the Cold War during the 1970s, aid flows into the 
country from both the United States government and the Russian 
bureaucracy began to first stagnate and then increasingly ebb away (Sharani 
1986: 60). Increasingly vociferous youth movements, stimulated by the 
declaration o f the 1964 National Constitution— which in practice remained 
an exercise in “democracy from above” confined to urban centres (Boesen 
2004: 5, cf. Grevemeyer 1990, Newell 1972: 78)— entered as “a new force
54 Production continued until 1991 when outbreak o f hostilities focusing on the capital city 
cut off supplies (Arez and Dittmann 2005: 48). By mid-1970, Kabul’s economy consisted of 
approx. 55% commercial activities, 30% handicraft, and roughly 15% services (Grotzbach 
1979: table 7, cartographical annex).
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into the political processes o f the country” (Sharani 1986, cf. Dil 1977: 472) 
and demanded more political control and also specific policies to address 
widespread unemployment among urban university graduates.55 
Commenting on the political landscape in Afghanistan in the late 1960s, 
Newell (1972: 179-180) has remarked that the “failure to legalize political 
parties [had] prevented development o f political organisations outside the 
official institutions formally created by the constitution,” thus stifling 
electoral choice and political deliberation and fuelling instead a “potent and 
dangerous [...] polarisation o f the political process.”
Radical ideas both from the religious right (led by Professor Rabbani and 
including Gulbuddin. Hekmatyar who later emerged as a central figure, in 
mujahedin resistance and the post-mujahedin struggle over Kabul) and the 
political left (the communist Parcham, formed by urban Tajiks, and Khalq, 
which consisted mostly o f rural Pushtuns; ICG 2005c: 2) were cultivated 
among students. While the city was still characterised by a general air o f  
liberal thought and modernist visions, the government under King Zahir 
Shah banned political activity from the campus in 1968 and suppressed and 
imprisoned many leaders o f Muslim youth groups. In 1969 it even closed the 
university to prevent further demonstrations (Rubin 2002: 141).
Attempts within the progressive urban elite to address the persistent 
imbalance between poverty in the countryside (and the urban periphery) and 
the wealth o f urban traders and rural landowners had already been made 
under Amanullah. In 1966, the newly appointed Prime Minister Mohammed 
Hashem Maiwandwal had then delivered a starkly socialist tinted speech in 
which he urged to eradicate the remains o f feudalism through a land reform. 
This was met with instant public acclaim among the urban intelligentsia but 
again upset landed elites. Maiwandwal had to resign a year later, and the land 
reform was only implemented in 1976 under Daoud who three years earlier 
had successfully staged a coup against Zahir Shah.
55 Education to be obtained in Kabul city was not only a means to the end of emplyment; it 
was also the entry gate to a social network, which reduced transaction costs in dealings with 
all levels o f the administration. Being able to signal the belonging to a group o f alumni from 
a particularly prestigious school thus carried both social and economic value (Johnson and 
Leslie 2004: 37).
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Only a year later, in 1977, the Daoud government was in a gridlock situation, 
feeling the pressure from the technocratic and bureaucratic elite on one end 
and from traditionalists and religious power holders with a large constituency 
in rural areas on the other. However, the latter provided less o f an imminent 
political challenge compared to the increasingly popular urban-based 
communist and Islamist movements. This Communist movement was led by 
aspiring young politicians from both affluent urban (e.g., Babrak Karmal) 
and impoverished rural (e.g., Nur Mohammed Taraki) family backgrounds 
and also incorporated high ranking officials in the civilian administration and 
the military forces (Westad 2005: 299-300). In 1978, Daoud was overthrown 
by the communist .movement led by the Khalq-Parcham party, which carried 
forward with a socialist reform agenda — in spite o f the absence o f a working 
class. Here again— as in the case o f Sierra Leone— grand ideas o f the time 
were to be implemented in a setting o f grossly incomplete economic 
trans formation.
One o f the first major projects o f the Communists was yet another land 
reform, which they sought to push through in a decentralised fashion by 
sending out young members o f the student body and the party cadre in 
order to oversee its implementation at the local level. However, this strategy 
was met with fierce resistance not only by landlords but also by designated 
beneficiaries who simply did not believe that the central state would actually 
intervene on their behalf in case o f local retaliation, and who therefore saw 
the policy as a dangerous encroachment on their tiny livelihoods. The first 
Islamist uprisings soon followed. They reached Kabul in August 1979 and 
culminated in February 1980— two months after the invasion o f Russian 
forces on Christmas 1979— in the TSJight o f Allahu Akbar/ a “largely 
spontaneous rejection o f the regime and its Soviet sponsors” (Rubin 2002: 
135,186) involving students, shopkeepers, and workers.
The ensuing Russian occupation necessitated a greater degree o f  
coordination and mobility among resistance groups (Grevemeyer 1990: 112- 
130), and it was precisely the detachment of national governance from local 
constituents that proved to be one a major facilitating factors for the
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maintenance o f a successful insurgency movement. The mujahedin 
demonstrated enormous talent and political sensitivity in displaying the 
occupying force as “infidel foreign invaders” based in Kabul and driven by 
an agenda o f turning the country on its head (Westad 2005: 350, cf. Schetter 
2006). Moreover— and contrary to previous revolutionary movements in 
France, Russia, or China— the mujahedin did not have to rely on domestic 
discontent for support; they were able to mobilise once again massive 
financial resources from the international system, this time in explicit 
support o f a violent agenda.
In sum, no less than four different types o f politico-economic faultlines 
emerged in both Sierra Leone and Afghanistan during the one hundred years 
from 1890 until 1990, all o f which are characterised by an urban dimension — 
but not confined to it. First, the intra-urban divide between original 
Freetown setders and immigrated indigenous residents from the provinces, 
which compares to the tension between progressive Kabul elites and those 
who migrated to the city yet remained rooted in rural traditions; second,' there 
was the economic divide between urban Affo-Lebanese traders and rural 
paramount chiefs on the one hand and the indigenous population in both 
Freetown and the hinterland on the other, which was underpinned by the 
tension between Creole modernism and traditional chieftaincy in both urban 
centres and rural areas. A parallel can be drawn to well-connected Kabul 
traders and rural landowners in Afghanistan. Third, the ethnic division 
between the predominandy Temne north and the Mende south and south­
east in Sierra Leone was co-determining capital city politics during several 
periods, for instance during post-colonial independence in the 1960s and as 
the foundation o f Stevens’ patronage system in the 1970s and 1980s. Here 
again, Freetown emulated Kabul functionally as the local place o f national 
ethnic politics. And fourth and finally, both cities served as entry points and 
hubs for international aid monies, and much o f this money remained in the 
urban realm of power politics.56
56 This pattern was balanced (but not reversed) by US support for the mujahedin after the 
Russian invasion.
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In light o f these similar faultlines, much o f the driving factors for the 
emergence o f large-scale armed conflicts in both countries can be explained. 
Nonetheless, the following sections begin with analyses o f sometimes 
competing interpretations o f the causes o f conflict. Because the war in 
Afghanistan preceded the Sierra Leonean insurgency by roughly twelve 
years, the previous sequence is reversed. This final comparative element o f  
this chapter then feeds into the analysis o f post-war politics presented in 
CHAPTERS FIVE and SEX.
Kabul: the eclipse of the centre
Following the political turmoil during the late 1970s, Kabul for the next 
twenty years underwent a backwards transition “from a modem urban centre 
to a phantom city” (Magnaldi and Patera 2004: 69 [author’s translation]) — a 
politics-laden city slowly came undone. At the end o f this gruesome process 
was the “temporary eclipse o f the centre,” as Glatzer (2005: 11) put it. And 
novelist Yasmina Khadra (2005: 105) wrote: “Kabul, the old sorceress, [was] 
lying [...] in the grip o f  her torment, twisted, dishevelled, flat on her 
stomach, her jawbones cracked from eating dirt.” Yet this was not only an 
outcome o f the post-Russian internal factional war; it was equally due to the 
previous conflict, which was linked to international agendas. Glatzer (2005) 
has suggested that the fundamental mistake committed by the Kabul-based 
communists was to unsetde the inequitable yet stable rural balance and the 
desire o f the urban elite to create an effective central state with sufficient 
political and economic control over the countryside, culminating eventually 
in “the Kabul state losing its countryside in the course o f the 1980s” (ibid., 
12; author’s translation). This process was exacerbated by the activity o f  
Russian troops outside the capital city.
The Russians regarded Kabul and the provinces in the east (towards 
Pakistan) and the north as its “strategic Afghanistan” — and waged a war 
against the remaining vast rural areas (Roy 1986: 189-190, cf. Cramer and 
Goodhand 2002: 895). The result was a brutal suppression o f unruly villagers 
and also their recruitment into digging defensive system o f tunnels in Kabul
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(Hippier 2005: 26; Goodhand 2004: 51, Arez and Dittmann 2005: 102). In 
addition to this practice o f forced resettlement and the arrival o f war- 
induced internally displaced persons (IDPs) swelling the ranks o f Kabul 
residents, urban development fuelled a further influx o f rural migrants. 
Jointly these factors led to a doubling o f Kabul’s size to 1.5 million 
inhabitants within the decade o f occupation.
This rapid expansion exacerbated urban poverty in the city and contributed 
significantly to the tipping o f the balance between public appreciation o f  
versus hostility toward the communist ideology. The Russian administered 
municipality tried hard to reduce the vulnerability o f urban residents through 
a system of subsidies for basic foodstuff and fuel launched in early 1980, but 
inflation levels in the capital prompted Afghan middlemen to preferably 
serve markets in the nearby provinces. Even though this problem was 
recognised by the occupiers, it was unfeasible to seal o ff the city completely, 
as this would have had disastrous effects on food security. Together with the 
continuous outflow o f financial revenues from small-scale production 
operating in the capital city to province-based resistance groups, this 
dilemma showed that Kabul had remained economically dependent on its 
hinterland provinces. Besides, it made obvious what was a basic 
contradiction between two strategic goals o f the occupying force, namely “to 
isolate the countryside, and to normalise everyday life in the town,” as Roy 
(1989: 171, cf. Rubin 2002: 139-140) points out.
International countermeasures were no less ambivalent in their stances and 
effects. Goodhand (2004: 42) argues that the ideologically grounded anti- 
govemment position o f Western-sponsored INGOs during the first phase o f 
humanitarian aid for Afghanistan was equally aimed at driving a wedge 
between rural recipients and Kabul-based supporters o f the communist 
government, and that this aid policy did not only establish an aid pattern that 
“largely bypassed” urban residents but also helped legitimise military 
strongmen outside the capital city, thus weakening further the longer-term
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prospects o f constructing a viable state with sufficient leverage over its 
provincial constituencies.57
Yet even during the heights o f subsequent battles, first between the mujahedin 
insurgency and the Russian occupants and later between mujahedin factions, 
Kabul remained one o f the three constituting pillars o f the Islamabad-Kabul- 
Peshawar triangle from where some international aid organisations were 
operating (Magnaldi and Patera 2004: 81), even though the regularly 
changing fault lines o f conflict within the capital city made the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance extremely challenging (Atmar and Goodhand 2001: 
51, Marsden 1998). Indeed, after the Russian withdrawal the city had 
immediately become, the target of . several, competing factions, and the. 
subsequent fighting did not only kill an estimated 60,000 residents but also 
triggered dramatic out-migration.
That the city was thus a prime target in the ensuing battles is not surprising 
in light o f the various faultlines carved out by the pre-war political economy. 
Apart from very tangible incentives to control and plunder this seat of 
power in aftermath o f the Russian withdrawal in 1992, the symbolic value to 
the insurgency o f destroying Kabul was substantial. As a result, “by the end 
of 1993, Kabul probably exercised less control over the territory and 
population o f Afghanistan than at almost any time in the preceding century.” 
(Rubin 1994: 187). Based on the mujaheditf s expertise in maintaining mobile 
guerrilla armies to subvert the Russian occupation in Kabul, alliances were 
changing rapidly, and altered regularly (Rubin 2002: 241, 265). Kabul was 
factually divided into zones o f control by different factions and 
commanders, as the map on the following page (source: Arez and Dittmann 
2005, based on Dittmann 2003) illustrates.
57 Besides, the lack of communication with the central government and a poor transport 
infrastructure forced civil service remnants in the provinces to engage in a symbiotic 
relationship with local commanders. The former needed to survive and the latter needed a 
minimum of personnel with administration skills to keep things just about running.” (ACSF 
2004: 8, cf. Giustozzi 2003: 4)
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Figure 7: Z ones o f  control in the struggle for pre-Taleban Kabul
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Subsequent military offensives in March and August 1995 by a coalition o f  
commanders against the well-organised troops commanded by Massoud, a 
leading Panj’sheri mujahed who controlled the north o f the city, proved futile. 
Meanwhile on the international stage, agencies led by UN Habitat affirmed 
their commitment to “avoid quick fixes and the ‘dump and run’ syndrome” 
(Ward 1996) and to work towards “maximum use” (ibid.) o f local resources 
to strengthen local institutions and to overcome “their perceived 
inefficiency.” (ibid.) At the outset o f Taleban rule, UN Habitat then 
launched its Urban Rehabilitation Programme to “support the indigenous 
process o f recovery o f urban communities” (IoAAS 1996). The programme 
put an emphasis on participatory modes o f planning and implementation 
and on . the recovery o f . local institutions, and also acknowledged the 
dramatic need o f housing as a direct effect o f over three years o f heavy 
shelling by various mujahedin factions (ibid.).
The capture o f Kabul by the Taleban a year later was more the result o f  
political dynamics and instability between warring mujahedin factions and less 
one o f a coherent military or convincing political strategy by the intruders 
(Arez and Dittmann 2005: 115). Following an accord in May 1996, Massoud 
had to accept the appointment and entering o f Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who 
had been shelling Kabul from 1992 to 1995, into the capital city as Prime 
Minister (Rubin 2002: 272-273, Ward 1996). When the Taleban forces 
subsequently captured Hekmatyar’s military base south o f Kabul in August, 
Massoud was pressured to provide troop assistance from his urban 
strongholds, which weakened his defence lines in the capital city and tipped 
the balance in favour o f the advancing Taleban forces, who captured Kabul 
on 26 September 1996 against little resistance from Massoud’s withdrawing 
units (Davis 2001: 56-68, Cooley 2001: 143-145).
But why were the Taleban so keen on conquering Kabul, given that their 
ideology was very much geared to rural areas? Roy (2001: 21) explains that a 
dual interpretation o f the Taleban’s strategy towards ‘reconfiguring Kabul’ is 
possible. On the one hand, Kabul was a ‘Babylon’ ready for purification, to 
be pushed ‘back to the roots’ in order to finally fit into an ethos o f Afghan 
tribalism. On the other hand, a desire to anthromorphise Kabul as a political
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space and to somehow ‘punish’ it by way o f causing suffering to those 
inhabiting it links back direcdy to the experience o f Soviet occupation and 
the latter’s toleration by city based elites.
The resultant execution o f these stances was indeed a “forceful imposition 
upon the city o f distorted traditional, decentralized, rural values and 
lifestyles,” as Herold (2004: 313) has called the Taleban reign over Kabul. 
The city thus became the place where limitations to residents’ “right to the 
city” (Lefebvre 1996) were more widespread, more visible and more violent 
than probably anywhere else in the world. Urban cosmopolitanism was 
destroyed by a regime o f prohibitions that minimised freedom o f movement, 
to the extent that most women left the protective space o f the house only in 
circumstances o f immediate need for water or food. Urban Mohtasebin 
(“guardians”), an institution from Nadir Shah’s times, were reinstated; these 
were religious watchmen who had been one o f the three constituting pillars 
for the creation o f Kabul municipality, together with the police commander 
and the kalantars (Grevemeyer 1990: 236). But rather than helping maintain 
public order, they were now ensuring the strict adherence to the hardline 
interpretation o f the Q ur’an propagated by the new rulers o f Kabul.
Short-term dependence o f Kabul’s population from international aid 
agencies soon became a key feature o f the Taleban rule in the capital city (cf. 
Johnson and Leslie 2002: 68). Before leaving the country due to worsening 
security in the 1998, the World Food Programme had been feeding roughly a 
quarter o f the residents, and by December 1999 international staff were 
quoted estimating that o f two thirds o f  the population was relying on 
immediate humanitarian assistance (Goodson 2001: 122).
Owing to the Taleban’s explicitly anti-urban ideology (no urban 
reconstruction o f any significance was undertaken during their rule; Arez and 
Dittmann 2005: 148) and severe social control (Barakat 2002: 807), the 
balance between urban and rural also remained ruptured. The Taleban used 
forced migration from rural areas to the capital city, demonstrated by the 
case o f the displacement o f 200,000 mosdy Tajik residents o f the Shomali 
plain to Kabul in early 1997 “to create a dense Pushtun-settled ring north o f
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Kabul in order to make it clear once and for all that Kabul was a Pushtun 
city” (Schetter 2005: 69, cf. Marsden 1998).58 This initial measure o f forced 
resetdement soon developed into full-scale scorched earth tactics to ensure 
ethnic cleansing, when during the summer o f 1999 the destruction o f  
irrigation systems, farmland and shelter forced tens o f thousands to flee 
either north to the Panj’sher Valley -  or south to Kabul where approximately 
30,000 IDPs arrived before the winter set in (Johnson and Leslie 2004: 70- 
71, cf. Rubin 2003a: 569).
Yet the starkest experience o f physical vulnerability was still to come, two 
years later in the shape o f the US-led campaign to ‘liberate’ Afghanistan 
from Taleban rule and following the attacks on  New York and Washington, 
DC on 11 September 2001. In an attempt to avoid civilian casualties, carpet 
bombing was eschewed in favour o f numerous precision attacks on urban 
infrastructure (radar sites, airfields, command posts, etc.) that supported 
Taleban resistance. However, most o f these sites were surrounded by slums 
with large numbers o f people and fragile housing, with the result that most 
civilian deaths in the war occurred in high population density areas o f 
Afghan cities. Indeed, the very large number o f small death tolls meant that 
the US-led bombing campaign was the most lethal per 10,000 tons o f bombs 
dating back to the Vietnam era: between 2,214 and 2,571 civilians (Herold 
2004: 316-317).59
Immediately after the cessation o f fighting, intra-city politics revived around 
the issue o f ethnic dominance over either newly created or reinstated 
national ministries. Former allies o f Massoud, a Tajik ‘troika’ comprising the 
Foreign Minister, the Defence Minister and the subsequent Minister o f  
Education formed an “alliance o f convenience [...] to consolidate their 
power further in Kabul, [...] inevitably leading to tensions with [President] 
Karzai.” (Wimmer and Schetter 2003: 530) One respondent to the field 
interviews for this study explained such cooperation in the the capital city as
58 Giustozzi disagrees that this was a deliberate policy and argues that the displacement was 
mostly the result o f general insecurity; personal communication in August 2007.
59 This paragraph is adopted from Esser (2007a). The variance is due to competing casualty 
figures.
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“vying for credibility and power, which is not strange in the context o f  an evolving 
state. The central government is trying very hard to bring about change and new  
structures o f  government and at the same time correcting for initially giving too  
much power to the commanders. A  lot o f  the restructuring is about municipalities.” 
(IBA-K1)
Still, hands-on political competition also manifested itself, primarily in 
frequent demands by the Tajik leaders for timely withdrawal o f international 
security forces, a detrimental position to the one advocated for by the 
Pushtun President who enjoyed practically no military support in the country 
and who more than once has been referred to as “the mayor o f Kabul” 
(Hersh 2004: 2), simply because his factual power does not stretch much 
beyond the outskirts of the capital city. To illustrate this claim, one 
participant in a focus group said, [4:]
“Our president is only o f  Kabul. The major warlords have an enormous influence 
in the regions. [...] There might be a commander, even a small, minor commander, 
but his influence is huge. [...] In cities, there are forces — if  not local forces then the 
international forces. Some warlords have protested against the presence o f  ISAF 
[International Security Assistance Force]; they argue that they inflict cultural harm 
on the people, but the men in the streets definitely want them to stay. I cannot 
think o f  a situation without international security forces. There would be no  
security.” (CS-K3)
Kabul after the latest invasion is not the main distribution centre that it used 
to be in the past, with several provincial cities now rivalling its economic 
influence through their close locations to national borders and also the 
country’s economy disintegration and subsequent sub-regionalisation o f  
provinces in the north and west during the Taleban regime, which led to the 
emergence of sub-regional trade blocs (Pugh et al. 2004, Rubin 2000); the 
city is nonetheless “the main channel through which reconstruction funds 
flow, o f which, by definition, a substantial part spill over and stay in the city. 
N o city or province in Afghanistan can offer a comparable package o f  
incentives.” (van der Tas 2004: 68, cf. Lister and Wilder 2005) Hence it is 
not surprising that both local and national political agency in such a 
resource-laden setting is ubiquitous. However, before these agendas and 
actions in both Freetown and Kabul are laid out in CHAPTERS FIVE and SEX, 
we need to also consider Freetown’s fate during the armed conflict that 
dilapidated Sierra Leone during the past decade and look at both the 
intervening and immediate driving factors leading to its outbreak.
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Freetown: why did the leopard come to town?
LEPET DON KAM NA T6N. (Krio proverb)
The leopard has come to town. [Problems from the forest have entered the city]
In their multivariate investigation o f the drivers behind the adoption o f  
neoliberal, market-oriented reforms in infrastructure industries in 71 
countries and territories between 1977 and 1999, Henisz et al. (2005) find 
that Sierra Leone ranks among those experiencing the highest level o f  
‘international coercion,’ denoting the ratio o f  a given country’s level o f  
borrowing from the World Bank and the IMF to this country’s GDP.
This is particularly noteworthy because Sierra Leone actually lost its right to 
access loans from the IMF in 1990 due to previously poor repayment rates. 
Even though the authors provide no specific conclusion on the Sierra 
Leonean case, the statistical results for the other eleven countries in this 
group are robust, rendering a hypothesis linking the scope o f  
implementation o f the neo-liberalism to Sierra Leone’s rank in the 
debt/equity ratio. Even though Sierra Leone had been receiving structural 
adjustment loans from the early 1980s onward, the quality o f fiscal policy did 
not improve. A study by the World Bank published in 1994 admitted that by 
1991, Sierra Leone had still ranked among the countries with Very poor’ 
policies — in spite o f a decade o f Bank involvement. What is more, a follow- 
up study showed that the policies worsened further from 1991 to 1992 
(World Bank 1994a and Bouton et al. 1994, Killick et al. 1998: 37).
At the country level, the World Bank itself was aware o f the discrepancy 
regarding the perception o f effectiveness of structural adjustments between 
country managers on the one side, and economic reality on the other. In 
1995, a report cited an example where an adjustment credit for agricultural 
reform had been delayed by 240%, and its disbursements lagged 50% behind 
even though the task manager for the programme had indicated its 
satisfactory performance (World Bank 1995a, quoted in: ibid.: 29). Van de 
Walle (2005: 87) points out, “it seems clear that large amounts o f aid did not
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anticipate or prevent state collapse” in Sierra Leone, which had been 
receiving US$ 25 per year per capita prior to the outbreak o f the Civil War. 
How had this been possible?
Reno (1999) has shown that credits earmarked to increase economic 
efficiency through foreign direct investment (FDI)-driven privatisation and 
managed reductions in state-provided services were funnelled directly into 
high-level politicians’ pockets and then poured out to cronies and followers. 
Lacking his own political network and therefore desperately trying to create 
a loyal constituency, Siaka Stevens’ successor Joseph Momoh accelerated this 
process o f stripping the state o f its assets and used state-led and 
internationally financed privatisation as a deliberate process for personaL 
empowerment (Pugh and Cooper 2004: 112-113, Conteh-Morgan and 
Dixon-Fyle 1999: 86) amid disintegrating patronage networks as a result of 
steadily increasing political maintenance costs. However, a stark 
misinterpretation o f this process occurred at the international level as the 
IMF kept ignoring abuse o f international funding, including the maintenance 
of armed gangs o f loyal youths and illicit diamond miners, and interpreted it 
instead as a by-product o f a process o f increasing central state’s control over 
national resources, considered a key factor in boosting revenue generation 
(Reno 2002: 13). In November 1986, the IMF again authorised a standby 
credit over 40 million Special Drawing Rights (SDR). Shortly after, President 
Momoh declared the state o f economic emergency, mainly to crack down on 
a financial black market. In 1990, the IMF unilaterally withdrew from its 
credit scheme (Zack-Williams 2002: 299, cf. Keen 2005: 31).
Van de Walle (2001: 111-112, cf. Reno 1999: 133) has argued that while the 
principled demonisation o f fiscal engagement by international actors is 
misguided given their relevance for national cash flows and the steadiness o f  
monetary aid to West African countries, a bottom-line evaluation of this 
engagement on state strength and political stability is still negative. Unlike 
common critiques o f the amount o f flows, van de Walle ascribes this finding 
to the “process o f donor-assisted adjustment [emphasis in the original]. This 
process o f micromanaging elusive changes under conditions o f continuously
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worsening public infrastructures helped keep regimes in power irrespective 
of whether policy reforms were undertaken (cf. Killick 1998).
As already pointed out above, foreign aid monies thus kept flowing in and 
benefited the Freetown-based political elite, but this influx did litde to the 
worsening urban infrastructure. When the IMF stopped lending in 1990, the 
finally enforced austerity had dramatic effects on urban governance. The 
administrative apparatus in Freetown and most provincial centres was 
dismantled (Abrahamsen 2001: 89), which impacted directly on a significant 
share o f previously city-employed residents. At the same time, cities in Sierra 
Leone served as main loci o f public opposition against structural adjustment, 
with trade unions, student groups, and teachers, associations at the forefront 
o f organised protest (Francis 2001: 80).
Yet as much as this reading o f the Sierra Leonean conflict as a partly intra-city
driven phenomenon appears compelling, other interpretations do exist; they
focus first and foremost on the rural-urban divide, calling Sierra Leone “a
tragic case o f self-perpetuating agrarian conflict” (Pons-Vignon et al. 2004:
26, 36). Similarly, Adebajo (2002: 79, cf. Abdullah and Muana 1998)
underlines that this situation o f political misrule and economic crisis
“combined with worsening socio-econom ic inequalities between a corpulent urban 
elite and impoverished unemployed youths in the countryside who had limited 
access to education and employment and were thus denied the opportunity o f  social 
mobility.”
These authors are not alone in their assessments o f unemployed rural youths 
as a trigger factor o f the civil war. Oche (2003: 172) has also proposed two 
related, mutually reinforcing trends; first, the drifting o f young male groups 
either into a criminalized socio-structure in Freetown and other urban 
centres or into illegal mining in the diamond fields o f Kono in the east, and 
second, the rise in student militancy, a result o f both their exposure to new, 
mostly leftist ideologies and the political activism within their community as 
a response to steadily worsening local and national governance and the 
personalised rule o f Siaka Stevens and his loyal successor Momoh. Similarly, 
Abdullah’s (2002: 212) proposition o f a historical transformation from the 
urban divide between citizens and subjects toward a new urban “army o f
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subalterns” suggests that urbanised rural youth were a somewhat cohesive 
group.60
Yet as much as the scores o f native residents o f Freetown during the pre­
independence era had been (kept) fragmented internally and politically weak, 
so the contemporary migrants— whom Abdullah in a tremor o f normativity 
views as “threatening to remake the city in ways that would be 
accommodative o f their collective interests” (ibid.)— remained institutionally 
underrepresented. Therefore, rather than forging a new class o f ‘urban 
warriors,’ the marginalisation and fragmentation o f rural grievances were not 
limited spatially to the provinces', the pattern reproduced itself in the capital city as 
well. Rather than being subjugated by chiefs, rural-borne dissent in the city 
was prevented from surfacing politically by the ‘depoliticised’ (i.e., one-party) 
polity o f post-independence modernity (cf. Keen 2000).
The involvement o f youths in politics in Sierra Leone has a long history 
dating back to Siaka Stevens mobilising unemployed males from eastern 
Freetown to intimidate student groups inspired by Gaddhafi’s Green Book. 
However, the insurgency movement that in 1991 unleashed large-scale 
violence recruited its fighters not from Freetown but from rural areas, as 
Richards (2005) points out, thus rebutting the discourse o f state cum city- 
sponsored thugs. Urban youths joined the conflict only later on with the 
establishment o f the Civil Defence Force (Kamajors) following a successful 
act o f civic resistance against advancing RUF units in Bo on Christmas 1994 
(cf. Richards 1996: 153).
The view o f the conflict in Sierra Leone as a result o f pressures from the 
hinterland on the urban elite has been mediated further by Reno’s (1995) 
work on the role o f Sierra Leone’s diamond industry. Herein, Reno 
highlights legal and illegal trading activities by miners in the east o f the 
country who were linked to Freetown-based wealthy Lebanese. Indeed,
60 He also notes that the urban institution o f pote, a collective hangout by rarray men, a Krio 
term for marginalised, unemployed male youths living in cities (Hoffman 2005: 351)— often 
involving drug use— served to initiate and maintain alternative, and eventually violent, 
political discourses through a merger o f “town and gown” (Abdullah 2002: 208, cf. 
Abdullah 1998: 667).
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Lebanese businessmen thus profiting from rural extraction were a major 
source o f private loans to sustain the central government’s corrupt network 
(ibid., 135). But rather than emphasising rural suffering, Reno points to 
President Momoh’s attempts to regain control o f the informal diamond 
market to “manage the interelite accommodation processes” connecting 
urban and rural power holders (van de Walle 1999: 185, cf. Jackson 2004: 
141). His failure, Reno argues, led to a gradual disintegration o f the network 
o f patronage relationships, thus decreasing monetary incentives for 
compliance with the central power system and incentivising politico- 
economic entrepreneurship at the sub-state level, particularly in the remote 
parts o f Sierra Leone that were both resource-rich and abundant with those 
marginalised through the political structure o f the 1970s and 1980s. Hence it 
was the dissolution o f the neo-patrimonial state that gave momentum to a 
conflict acted out by marginalised citizens in rural and urban areas alike.
In April 1992, a group o f junior army officers staged a coup in Freetown and 
installed themselves as the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) led 
by Captain Valentine Strasser. Even though the international community 
tried to alienate the new military regime— partly as a reaction to the 
execution o f 26 alleged organisers o f a countercoup in November o f the 
same year, the junta initially enjoyed substantial domestic support particularly 
from urban constituencies, which also found its expression in a voluntary 
clean up and beautification campaign (“Cleaning Saturday”) in Freetown and 
other provincial centres (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999: 131).
The regime also managed to re-establish links with the IMF a year later. The 
latter demanded the implementation o f a stabilisation program in exchange 
for continued financial support. Yet in conjunction with a diamond 
smuggling scandal, the subsequent redundancy o f 30,000 mainly state- 
employed workers fuelled a reversal o f public approval. The reaction among 
donors was an increase o f diplomatic pressure on the NPRC with the aim of  
‘reconstituting democracy’ (Zack-Williams 2002: 303-305). This stance 
notwithstanding, between 1992 in 1995 the NPRC is reported to have 
received US$ 324 million from bilateral and multilateral donors (Keen 2005: 
160), letting Keen (2005: 165) conclude that “emergency aid seems to have
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served as a substitute for effective diplomatic action to address the 
humanitarian crisis.”
Similar to the challenge faced by INGOs in wartime Afghanistan, 
throughout the civil war in Sierra Leone their activity beyond the realm of 
the capital city depended on the security situation. At the same time, 
humanitarian action was a function o f the political constellation in the 
context o f the conflict, with political objectives consistently overruling 
humanitarian considerations. This was also reflected in frequent changes in 
the vitality and amicability o f the relationship between the humanitarian 
assistance community and the United Nations missions operating in the 
country (Porter 2003,. cf. Keen 2005: .40, Richards 2003:34). Everyday urban 
life had already deteriorated significantly during the rule o f the Strasser 
regime when looting became widespread and soldiers would simply pick 
young males from the street to ‘recruit’ them into the army (Keen 2005: 96- 
97). Corruption, too, had picked up, targeting already slim budgets and 
leaving lower ranks soldiers without payment. Both factors, i.e. the externally 
injected objective o f fiscal austerity and the plundering o f what was left, 
exacerbated the degree of insecurity in the capital city (ibid., 100). The 
availability of small arms and light weapons made things worse, as Ginifer 
(2005: 15) points out. While it had at first ‘only’ decreased human security in 
the provinces, particularly in the South and Southeast, it also fuelled the 
concentration o f IDPs in the capital, making crime the only resort to some 
of those starving.
By May 1993, over one million Sierra Leoneans had been displaced, and by 
March 1996 almost half o f the population o f then 4.47 million had been 
uprooted. Approximately 600,000 IDPs sought refuge in Freetown, inflating 
the city’s overall population from a pre-war level of 731,000 to roughly 1.3 
million (Conteh-Morgan and Dixon-Fyle 1999: 129). “When the Creoles 
came, they recreated Freetown,” one interviewee for this study recalled, “this 
was the first destruction of community, as you would think o f ‘community’ 
in Africa. And then, when the war happened, everyone fled to Freetown. 
This was the second destruction o f community.” (NG-F6) Only marginally 
countering this inflow in quantitiy but with important implications for the
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country’s functionality, an exodus o f the Freetown-based intelligentsia to 
Europe and North America fuelled the rapid disintegration o f social 
networks in the capital city, with “social solidarity [being] much weaker in 
Freetown than in many other parts o f the country.” (Ginifer 2005: 15)
The state o f the Freetown Municipality during the war years was dire. 
Already in 1990, ten out o f 17 leadership positions had been vacant (British 
Council 1990, cited in: Rosenbaum and Rojas 1997: 535). When in 1995 a 
new mayor was appointed, the administrative structures were so weak (the 
municipal management committee met once a month only), local polity so 
fragmented, and national support so negligible (the central government 
contributed a mere US$ 50,000. to. the municipal budget in 1996; ibid.) that 
the only significant income, US$ 2.5 million, derived from property taxes 
based on a 1952 property appraisal (ibid.). Even though national elections 
were held in 1996, a coup in May 1997 prompted the last member o f the 
democratically elected national government to flee to Guinea. Indeed, 
Rosenbaum and Rojas (1997: 530) argue that it
“was in many ways highly symbolic that the Minister for Local Government was the 
last cabinet minister [...] to leave the country, for at the heart o f  the political and 
military conflict that for several years has held sway in the Sierra Leonean 
countryside, and only recendy produced a convulsive violent outburst in the capital 
city, is a very strong current o f  centre-periphery conflict”
Shortly after ‘collaboration came to town’ [to paraphrase Keen 2005: 193], 
with the military rulers in the capital city inviting the leaders o f the RUF to 
form a joint government, thousands o f insurgency soldiers arrived within 
days, making Freetown the bizarre meeting point between hostile factions 
that, in reality, had been avoiding rather than confronting one another 
during most o f the war (ibid., 208-209).
But then, in January 1999 a sudden attack on and within the capital city by 
the rebel forces marked a turning point with regard to international attention 
paid to the conflict. “It was only after rebels breached the defences o f the 
capital that the world o f press took notice o f the horrors and widespread 
violation o f human rights by both sides in the civil war,” Zack-Williams 
(2002: 308) points out. Before that Freetown, despite random acts of
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extortion and looting, had remained a “bubble o f relative normality” (Keen 
2005: 168). Now, violence was everywhere. One resident, for instance, 
claimed to have made friends with the rebels that had settled in his 
neighbourhood after they had overrun half o f  the city on the January 6th, two 
weeks later, suddenly turned on him and cut off his forearm (cited in: 
Control Arms Campaign 2006: 9).61
In July 1999, the Lome Peace Accord— “imposed”, as Zack-Williams (2002: 
311) argues, on the Kabbah government by US chief negotiator Rev. Jesse 
Jackson in order to free the US and other western countries from having to 
commit troops to Sierra Leone— urged an immediate cessation o f armed 
hostilities and provided a. general amnesty, and even, made provisions to  
integrate some o f the RUF leaders in the new government. Three months 
later fighting erupted again, and in May 2000 the RUF took a battalion o f  
UN peacekeepers as hostages.
Approximately 30,000 people demonstrated in Freetown for the release o f  
the Kenyan and Zambian UN peacekeepers. When they approached the 
rebel leader’s house in Spur Road in the centre o f Freetown, Nigerian 
peacekeepers fired warning shots into the air but were eventually unable to 
prevent the RUF leader’s bodyguards to fire into the crowd. 17 
demonstrators were killed. This event, together with the massive influx of  
refugees, prompted the British government to agree to the deployment o f a 
military contingent to protect the capital city (Hirsch 2001: 88-89, Keen 
2005: 264). Soon after, a small contingent o f approximately 300 British 
solders secured Freetown within days and subsequently also confronted and 
dismantled the various rebel groups in the surrounding provinces, leading to 
a comprehensive ceasefire agreement in November. Two months later, in 
January 2002, the end o f the war was officially declared.
61 Small arms also leveraged the RUF assault on Freetown in early 1999, which inflicted 
massive killing among unarmed city dwellers and rural refugees. The RUF from 1994 
onwards had had “an eye on Freetown and political power” (Keen 2005: 40), and an 
advance towards the capital city was one of their main military objectives. Remarkably, the 
South African mercenary company Executive Outcomes had been hired by the military 
government in 1995 to secure the capital city following several RUF advances; only 
afterwards the mercenaries also confronted rebel groups beyond the Western Area in order 
to enable national elections a year later (ibid., 151-152). A detailed account of the attacks 
and defence of the capital city is provided by Ducasse-Rogier (2004).
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The physical destruction in Sierra Leone was significant, with approximately 
52% of dwelling houses destroyed countrywide. The highest level of 
destruction took place in the eastern provinces, especially in Kono (94%), 
Kailahun (80%) and Kenema (72%). Northern provinces suffered 
destruction o f around 50% of their housing stock, whereas destruction in 
southern provinces affected approximately one third o f dwellings. While 
thus moderate in comparison with other districts, the level o f physical 
destruction in Freetown proper—in addition to over 7,000 civilian casualties 
within two weeks during the attacks on the capital city in January 1999 
(Sesay and Hughes 2005: 56, Keen 2005: 228)— left 1,400 houses reduced to 
rubble, which, led to the displacement o f tens, o f thousands o f residents, with 
estimates reaching from 22,000 to 51,000 people (ACF 2001: 19, Zack- 
Williams 2002: 310, NRS 2003: 3, Keen 2005: 247). The UN Office for the 
Coordination o f Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA 2003a: 2-3) reported in 
mid-2003 that the Western Area district continued hosting “over 37,000 
formally registered IDPs and returnees in addition to many other non­
registered displaced who have sought refugee in Freetown over the past ten 
years.” In addition to the 20,000 estimated to have remained, INGOs 
expected another 10,000-20,000 ‘nonofficial’ IDPs to live mainly in 
Freetown and its outskirts (IDP Project 2003). “There is still at large number 
of people left in the city who have nowhere to go,” one respondent 
explained, “and who therefore stay in Freetown.” (NG-F10)
In the economic realm, a powerful indicator o f war impact on the Sierra 
Leonean economy is the US$ 100 million worth o f diamond exports that 
The Gambia accounted for annually between 1996 and 1999 even though 
the country does not actually have any diamond mines in its territory (Boge 
et al. 2006: 56, cf. Heupel 2006). Confirming Reno’s argument, the most 
effective alliance between the capital city and provincial centres o f resource 
extraction had been the collaboration between political notables in Freetown 
and paramount chiefs in diamond-rich districts who safeguarded personal 
patron-client relationships through the provision o f security forces for areas 
where ‘upstream’ illicit diamond mining (IDM; necessitating more
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sophisticated equipment) took place, thus creating stationary banditry with 
the active support o f government actors.
On the contrary, in areas where diamonds could be mined through simple 
sieving, government security forces repeatedly and successfully dispersed 
illegal mining activities (Boge 2004: 30). As a consequence the cohesion 
between paramount chiefs in the former areas and their subjects was 
ruptured, which made them more prone to rebel recruitment, whereas the 
local influence wielded by chiefs in the latter areas generally remained intact, 
shielded by a discourse and experience o f economic exclusion and 
stigmatisation by the central government in Freetown. Furthermore, the 
relative loss o f financial income was. counterbalanced in these, areas by the 
preservation o f local incomes as a product o f previous centre-periphery 
competition (Reno 2003: 55), which constitutes— schematically at least—  
another parallel to the war economy in Afghanistan where areas that lost 
incomes due to the demise o f Kabul aimed at compensating this loss 
through engaging in more local, sub-regional economic activity. In essence, 
warfare thus weakened the previous dominance o f both capital cities despite 
the different degrees o f direct involvement and destruction.
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Chapter 5: Recapturing Freetown
The dynamics of a post-war city: 
growth, contraction, and the politics of dispersal
Amid allegations o f the opposition party being hindered in several rural 
districts in the South and South East o f the country by paramount chiefs 
loyal to the SLPP (EC 2002: 8, 31) the 2002 presidential elections following 
the final cessation o f fighting saw the SLPP as the clear winner. The APC 
and the Peoples liberation Party (PLP) were the only opposition in national 
parliament, other political parties existed but had no significant political 
leverage. Once again demonstrating both the degree o f political organisation 
in the capital city and its strategic politico-economic value, the Western Area, 
consisting o f a rural district and Freetown proper, had been the most 
contested province in the elections. All parties had nominated candidates 
there, whereas only the SLPP, APC, and the Revolutionary United Front 
Party (RUFP) had consistently been present in all other districts in the 
country (EC 2002: 13). And at least in public discourse, Freetown at the time 
was even more o f a national centre than in the pre-war era, having grown 
substantially compared to pre-war figures, now covering the entire northern 
coastline o f the Freetown Peninsula.
Indeed, population growth o f Freetown proper was perceived as the central 
challenge by national ministries and international agencies alike. Consider the 
following statements by two interviewees for this study, both of them 
working for the national SLPP government.
“Fleeing the rebels brought them into the city [...] without any livelihood, so we 
have a social crisis at our hands in terms of crime and prostitution. All these 
developments are due to the chief influx of people. [...] The war is over. The 
greatest challenge of the government is how to reduce the population in this city. 
[...] The government is undertaking projects to re-enhance the people’s livelihoods 
in the areas, but there is this resistance of people to join their former localities. So 
they are overcrowding continuously the city. How do you get them out of the city? [...] A civilian 
government has to take into consideration the needs of the people, and at the back 
of their minds they have to remember that these are the same people that will have to vote 
for you, if you should be in power again. This is the sort of difficult situation that we 
find ourselves in.” (NPB-F7)
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“The reason why so many NGOs work on shelters is because they want to 
incentivise people to come back to the community. This is really what is so 
difficult, and this is where we need assistance. [ . . . ]  The city is overcrowded,(NPB-F6)
But despite these and many other similar statements made by respondents 
from the international community as well as central government officials in 
2004 regarding the size of Freetown having reached 1.5 million inhabitants 
(NPB-F1, NPB-F2, NPB-F7, cf. Elliott and Gilpin 2004: 2, McGoldrick 
2003: 32; one respondent [NPB-F3] even echoed Abdullah’s [2002: 211] 
claim of “close to 2 million people” in a “city bursting at the seams.”), the 
national census in late 2004 counted only 786,900 inhabitants in the Western 
Urban district. This was a startling finding. Yet while most o f the 
aforementioned commentators chose to simply ignore it, we cannot stop 
there; the serious misrepresentations require an explanation.
To begin with, the most convincing explanation for this drop is the ongoing 
resettlement from large IDP camps. But this managed deconcentration is 
offset at least partly by the ongoing in-migration into the city and 
surrounding wards (GoSL 2005a). The stated figure therefore also underlines 
a high degree o f voluntary post-war relocation o f IDPs. Mama (2003: 52) 
explains, “The dilemma lies in the complex movement and mingling o f real 
displaced population and homeless people searching for space in Freetown 
[who] are considered by the government o f Sierra Leone as non-IDPs while 
they consider themselves as left-out cases.”
At the same time, these statements could illustrate a reluctance to 
acknowledge the dynamics o f urban growth and re-contraction and a 
resulting dramatisation o f the perceived growth path, particularly among 
development practitioners. The chart on the following page provides an 
overview o f the previous expansions and recent contraction.
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Western Area Urban population 1921-2004 and as of total 
(data s o u r tE s :  GoSL 2<X>5a, Conteh-Motgan/Dixon-Fyle 1999, Banton 1957)
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Figure 8: Western Area population 1921-2004 and as o f total
If Freetown had indeed shrunk back so significandy from its size during the 
conflict, then official arguments suggesting the impossibility o f measures to 
refocus attention towards urban recovery— in light of a hopelessly 
“overcrowded” urban space— must be reassessed. The undeniable 
phenomenon o f urban growth may have been used and abused to promote 
certain development and reconstruction policies over others.
The national government, for instance, had a strong incentive to £de- 
urbanise,’ consisting first and foremost of a need for economic rehabilitation 
through rural agricultural production. This position was shared by many 
senior figures in the aid community. For instance, an international 
interviewee (IBA-F4) agreed in late 2004 that “the population has overgrown 
the town. [...] The challenge is to go back to the initial status quo, in which 
80% of the people live and work in the countryside. So the key question is, 
how can people be convinced to go back? [...] Agriculture has to be the 
basic skill.”
This submission was beefed up by statements about urban service 
overstretching and the government’s objective to allegedly recreate a state of 
national social cohesion. But following Lowry (1990: 158, cf. Lock 2005), it 
is worth pointing to “the political consequences of urbanisation: population 
clustered on a scale that facilitates mass demonstrations and mob violence
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against unpopular national policies or privileged groups.” That security was a 
factor in the political arena was confirmed by two interviewees. One o f them 
illustrated this concern:
“Freetown used to have 600,000 inhabitants in 1990 and now has 1.2 million 
inhabitants in 2004. This [...] is a huge increase, and it is creating some urban 
problems o f water and sanitation, housing, social problems in terms o f  safety nets 
and social relations. We know about this problem, and we know that it also has 
security implications. And we know that it will be more important in the city in the 
coming years. Rural insurgent is unlikely without facilitation and institutional support,.” 
(NG-F7, cf. NG-F6)
It is o f course easy to connect this and the previous statements to pre-war 
discourses in Sierra Leone, described in CHAPTER FOUR, on the ‘city 
suffering from rural in-migrants’ and the ‘rural insurgency versus urban 
enlightenment’ narrative. But whose agendas did they serve, what was the 
response, and at which levels o f polity had this response been conceived? 
One ministerial employee explained,
“How do we really get rid o f the excess population? Decentralisation is one o f the 
strategies that the government has adopted. Because o f overcentralisation, all 
aspects o f social life are being found in the city, so the rural people also moved 
throughout the past years to the city. Because o f this overcentralisation, we also had 
the influx of youth into the city, but with the assistance of donors and central government, the 
government will help the youths to go back to their respective villages or localities. 
I can tell you for free that over SO or 90% of the population in this town comes from the 
villages. From the provinces!” (NPB-F7)
Later in this section we will see how this joint govemment-donor ‘supply o f  
dispersal policies’ was also responding to a ‘demand for dispersal’ wielded by 
established urban dwellers (many o f whom o f Creole origin). Yet this 
apparent political response was o f an exclusive nature and, while clearly 
serving central government’s interests, left key citizens’ (or “subjects,” as 
Mamdani would have it) concerns aside. To illustrate this claim, let us 
consider what the aforecited senior ministerial staff went on to say.
“[The youth] are the able people who are expected to work on the farms — they are 
all in the city, but you cannot drive them by force; it has to be motivated. [...] This 
is why government got about this decentralisation. [...] Look at the Millennium 
Development Goals, which we are working on now: there are a lot o f prospects for 
rural development, [...] about food security, agro-industry at the local level, you talk 
about trade, electricity, hydro-electrical power, a lot o f  other areas, you know... that 
will make the youths to go back to the rural areas.” (NPB-F7)
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The declared objective o f the Sierra Leone government was thus to 
strengthen the agricultural sector. Yet a principled dichotomous view of 
urban growth and agricultural production would be unfounded (cf. Bates 
2001). What is more, the fact that legal ownership o f land was possible only 
in the Western Area intensified the reluctance against rural returns. This was 
exacerbated further by the death or forced replacement o f half o f the 
country’s paramount chiefs, making it difficult for returnees to claim 
customary ‘ownership.’ Indeed, one ministerial employee (NPB-F5) 
submitted that “the political instability, the lack o f institutions to 
accommodate managed investments, and the weak system of [land tenure are 
the] main three reasons , for the. lack o f development that we are. currently 
seeing in Sierra Leone.” This perception that land mattered in the post-war 
urban economy was reiterated by a participant in a focus group o f ministerial 
officials who said:
We made one attempt [...] o f  removing people from the slum areas into other parts 
o f the city. One o f the ministers, a lady, she went and identified a large area o f land 
in Allen Town [area toward the rural district], demarcated it with portions, came 
and addressed the people at several locations and told them to go over there so that 
slum area would not grow. Believe you me, these people went over, some o f them 
went — in less than a month they were all back in the slum! [...] The government 
provides a place for them to go, but they say, ‘Oh, this is too far out o f town.. .’ 
They cannot trade. This is the problem.’’(NPB-F7)
Still, many senior government officials interviewed for this study questioned 
the validity, or at least the severity, o f the land challenge. One senior central 
government official even made the following uncanny comment:
“It is not true that you cannot get land in the province. I am sure you are aware o f 
the mining districts. Mining land is not difficult to obtain. Why are you not asking 
me about mining land? Mining land is easy to obtain. We have talked to companies, 
and they have said it is not an issue. Land is becoming a big collateral. People want 
to believe that land is becoming a big issue, a big constraint o f  development. And 
then it is becoming a cloudy issue. [...] People are being given land for a hundred 
years, so why do you want to buy it? What are you going to do when you bought it? 
The whole land ownership thing has been overrated!” (NPB-F3)
Working with this institutional landscape— as opposed to against, as in the 
case o f simply transporting people back to the countryside— naturally
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proved extremely challenging. The project manager o f one o f the few 
INGOs that attempted to do so explained,
“We had to start negotiations with each paramount chief o f  all the districts. [...] 
But then we would have left our beneficiaries without any leverage. This is why we 
took the long process o f trying to legally acquiring the land for them. [...] There 
will be titling, which is, in a sense, a revolution in land ownership in Sierra Leone.” 
(NG-F12)
Yet partly because such schemes, as laudable as they were, were limited in 
their reach and partly because in a country in which most citizens are below 
the age o f 35 the economic “promise o f the city” remained a magnet, 
disincentives against a return to agricultural production were real. 
“Everybody wants to. come to Freetown thinking that Freetown is Sierra 
Leone,” a local bureaucrat lamented (LPB-F3).
Newly arrived women and men wanted to become mechanics, doctors, rap 
stars or bureaucrats— much like during the post-World War II period (cf. 
CHAPTER FOUR)— , at least those who somehow garnered faith in the 
unlikely resuscitation o f the Sierra Leonean pension system.62 Freetown thus 
continued being considered the place o f hope for most o f the country’s 
citizens who were ready to dare what Marchal (2000: 174) has referred to as 
“a blind jump into a dreamt modernity”.63
Those who tasted urban fife became addicted to it. “I really feel that at the 
moment, we have two peoples: people who live in Freetown, and people 
who do not live in Freetown,” one respondent pondered. “This is why we 
have so much migration into the city: its attractiveness comes from the 
desire to belong to the former group rather than the latter. [...] This even 
supersedes tribal structures.” (NG-F3) In addition, rural IDPs dwelling in 
camps close to urban centres realised, for the first time, the “extent to which 
they had been exploited by merchants. They were also exposed to better 
schools and urban amenities. This has fuelled a desire for substantial post­
war rural change.” (Richards et al. 2004: 37)
62 Casual conversations with youngsters in the Freetown harbour area, 4-8 December 2004.
63 Harvey (2000: 156-159) has called this public fixation on the primate city as a place of 
hope for a better life but also as the locus of temptation and evil “utopianism.”
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While the urban area had a comparably high ratio o f approximately 32,500 
persons per health care facility, private clinics located in the capital city were 
easing the pressure on public health infrastructure substantially, and the ratio 
o f patients per health practitioner was the lowest in the country, with 
approximately 80% of the country’s doctors practising in Freetown (ibid.). 
Television stations and newspapers were equally concentrated in the capital 
city. Radio programmes were also aired from provincial centres, but print 
media— even though its credibility among the population is low—was largely 
confined to Freetown at the end o f the war (EC 2002: 17).
Furthermore, the concentration o f aid agencies based and active, in the. 
Western Area was substantial. A government survey in 2003 counted 75 
major projects, managed by 22 different agencies, both multinational and 
non-governmental (NRS 2003). The map in the following page shows this 
density and also the locations o f local and international organisations in 
February 2003 (courtesy o f UNOCHA).
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Figure 9: Location of aid agencies in Freetown proper
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But this concentration did not mean that INGOs were focusing their relief 
programmes on the city and its inhabitants. One country director explained,
“Intervening as an INGO in the context o f direct support in urban communities at 
this stage would be a very political issue. Perhaps in the future, we might get criticised, 
because things were running in town if there had been the lot o f  assistance by 
INGOs: it has an impact on the national situation, much more with a programme in urban areas 
than with something in the rural areasP (NG-F7)
Another INGO programme manager admitted,
“I guess the real reason why we do not have any urban projects is because we have a 
need for prioritisation: there are a lot o f needs in the city, but there are even more 
needs in the countryside. [...] Actually, we do have something that is mainly 
focusing on the cities, which is social marketing of condoms.. .” (NG-F9)
Yet the scarcity o f targeted urban support discouraged few. “In Krio, Salone 
is the word for Sierra Leone, but it is also the word for Freetown,” one 
international aid worker explained:
“When you go upcountry, people will ask you, have you come from Salone? In their 
minds, Freetown is Sierra Leone. But when they do come here and think this is a 
world o f  opportunity, it is not reality on the ground. The NGOs are pulling out, 
there are less jobs than ever before, [the price of] rice is as high as it has ever been, 
[the price of] fuel is as high as it has ever been -  it is very, very difficult. It is much 
easier to live in the rural areas than before.” (NG-F6)
A widespread perception prevalent among rural youth in late 2004 was that 
the same circles that had been running the country prior to the war were 
again forming the elite in the post-war capital city, but that much like before 
and as an effect o f institutional competition with the tribal chiefs, their share 
in rural governance was hardly felt (Gberie 2005). Indeed, part o f the 
strategy to restore the legitimacy o f the Kabbah government— and indeed 
the latter’s stipulation (Hanlon 2004: 4)— had been the reinstallation o f  
paramount chiefs and customary courts outside major urban centres led by 
DFID, a key player in Sierra Leone’s ‘reconstruction’, which fed into a series 
of ‘community consultations’ across the country as the starting point for the 
national reconciliation process (Meijer 2000: 6, cf. Wierda 2006, Richards 
2006). One international advisor defended this approach saying, “The SLPP 
is doing its best to forge new leadership, and they are developing this 
together with the paramount chiefs. I think this is completely fair in partisan
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politics. The SLPP was very successful with this in the last elections: co-opting 
the existing structures” (IBA-F6)
Operationally, the Ministry o f Local Government and Community 
Development was instrumental in subsequent elections o f paramount chiefs 
in order to fill the gaps in their ranks, which as an effect o f natural mortality 
and the impact o f the civil war had left 63 o f the country’s 149 chiefdoms 
without a chief (NPB-F1). Reflecting on his ministry’s role in the process, 
the Minister o f Local Government and Community Development 
emphasised in mid-2003 his awareness o f the “vital role Paramount Chiefs 
play in the Maintenance o f Law and Order and in the socio-economic 
development o f their chiefdoms” but reminded that in the past, government 
interference in the appointment o f the chiefs had created a serious distortion 
o f its effectiveness (MoLGCD 2003: 3).
Jackson (2005: 57, cf. ICG 2003b: 17) notes that while this move made sense 
to guarantee local security, the process o f reinstatement also marked a 
foregone opportunity to make a reform o f the chiefdom system a central 
component of reconstituting local polity in Sierra Leone, and the subsequent 
2004 Local Government Act strengthened— rather than checked— the local 
power o f paramount chiefs, as long as they co-operated with local 
councillors. In an uncanny manner, this situation resembled the power 
arrangement in post-1973 one-party Sierra Leone (e.g., Tangri 1978: 169- 
171), leaving the boundaries between cooperation and co-optation once 
again blurred. In contrast, the establishment o f a District Council for the 
Freetown area was considered an equally urgent matter given that the 
district, unlike the rest o f the country, did not have a local polity based on 
paramount chiefs (ICG 2003b: 18). Nonetheless, an unpublished
“Handbook o f Local Council Wards in Sierra Leone” (Conteh 2003) 
explicidy juxtaposed a “Western/Modem component” o f local governance 
comprising o f elected councils with a “traditional component” (ibid., 2) 
denoting the system of chiefdom administrations. It also specified (added in 
handwriting) that the “role o f Tribal Headmen in the Western Area is limited 
to advising the central government in Freetown on matters relating to the 
traditions oftheir respective ethnic groups.” (ibid., 3; emphasis added)
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Another central area o f concern, the oversupply o f skills in petty production 
and the dominance o f informal employment known from pre-war times 
continued posing serious challenges. The most important facet o f this 
employment structure was the virtual absence o f employment opportunities 
for youth, a category that according to national statistics comprises of 
citizens up to 35 years. This dovetails with restricted de facto access to 
political decision-making and resulted in cultural and social alienation o f sub­
groups, particularly young men (e.g., Waddington and Mohan 2004: 230- 
231). Sierra Leone at the time o f field research was rampant with INGO- 
driven skill upgrading projects but this was either not targeted at agricultural 
skills or, where it was, young men found this skill set unattractive: “The 
young people are really embracing our offers,”, a programme manager said, 
“but basically they all want to open a disco, with the help o f micro-finance 
[laughs], or to become taxi drivers. They are dreaming o f urban life.” (NG- 
F4) Again mirroring the situation before the war, other areas o f economic 
activity offered equally limited opportunity and had remained under firm 
control by ethnic minorities. The Fulahs and the Lebanese have a lot of 
power,” one observer (IBA-F4) argued, and another respondents said,
“The Fulahs are now the suppliers to the Lebanese. When a Sierra Leonean is trying 
to import rice, they are powerful enough to prevent the ship from entering the 
harbour. Then they will go to the person and say, ‘If you want to sell this rice, you 
can only sell it to us. And here is the price that we pay’. . .” (CS-F5)
Contrary to the rigidity o f these economic structures however, adult-child 
relationships had been uprooted severely during the war, exacerbating the 
lack o f support available to youngsters. One international aid worker 
explained, “Children come back to their community and their parents may 
know that they have committed atrocities. Children themselves would have 
been under command from other children; their pecking order has changed. 
(NG-F11)” Still, “you always end up talking to non-youths,” another 
programme (NG-F4) director grumbled,
“younger people in the meetings are not allowed to talk. And when you ask the 
chairmen, What are you doing for youth?, they say, W e are building bridges for 
them.’ But then you ask them, Why does this benefit them?’, they say, Well, they 
are building them’ [sighs]. It is these experiences that are driving young people into
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the city. It’s a status issue: you don’t get land, you don’t get anything up country, so 
you go to the city. But that’s a dangerous development: they dream o f  the city, and 
then they see that is nothing here either. That makes them really angry, and they 
revolt against the obrigkeit [~higher authorities].”
Large parts o f the population had drawn their lessons from systematic abuse 
o f young fighters during the war; they regarded young countrymen gathering 
and hanging out in the main cities as a threat to security and therefore 
welcomed their dispersion — rather than recognising them as stakeholders 
and including them in the country’s transformation towards peace. Thus 
conditioned by the “image o f troublemakers” (CS-F10), the inclusion o f the 
country’s youth was informed mainly by a loose affinity o f national 
politicians to a short-term economic approach resting on agricultural 
production and not by translating the international non-governmental 
language o f rights and empowerment into legislature and policy (cf. Kemper 
2005, Olawale 2004: 5).
The power of aid: dreams and deeds of institutional modification
At the time o f field research for this study, there was quite some talk in 
Freetown among high-level bureaucrats and well-travelled national 
politicians about the need for foreign direct investment to upgrade 
infrastructure and productive assets, yet the poor state o f the economy, 
which had been stagnant for the previous two years, prevented any major 
successes.64 The focus on redeveloping the primary sector also created an 
impediment in that it diverted attention away from creating more upscale 
investment opportunities. What is more, the government’s objective o f food 
security was not a product o f political deliberation at the national level. Quite 
the contrary, the World Bank— through backroom dealings in 1991— had 
ordered a radical stop in rice imports in order to curtail high-level corruption 
and to jumpstart a domestic food industry from the scratch, thus conveying,
64 There have been exceptions. The three most sought after hotels in Freetown, Bintumani, 
Countiy Lodge and Mamba Point have all been renovated with foreign investment, but with the 
exception of the Chinese-financed Bintumani revenues flow directly into the accounts of 
foreign businessmen (cf. Buch 2004). The fourth relatively habitable hotel (Mammy Yoko) 
was hosting the UNAMSIL administration.
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at least indirectly, an ex-post adjustment o f national provision policy after the 
end o f the civil war (Griffiths 2003).
O f course, in light o f the dire poverty in the countryside, self-sufficiency and 
food security were legitimate objectives (and a focus on agricultural 
livelihood strategies their logical consequence). On the other hand, it is 
unclear how this could feed into a capital-driven growth path. The 
administrative capacity o f traditional authorities urgently needed to 
accompany a process o f local development was overshadowed by weak 
accountability. This also constituted a serious challenge regarding the 
taxation link that the government and the donors were trying to establish 
within, the traditional power system.
The creation o f a tax net covering at least the economic and political elites 
has been pointed to as one o f the crucial components of a post-structural 
adjustment policy agenda for Sub-Saharan Africa (Rakner and Gloppen 
2003: 94-96). Yet in Sierra Leone there was great reluctance on the part of  
city-based national and international administrators to admit that local 
capacity might ultimately be too low.
In 2000, the first World Bank Economic Rehabilitation and Recovery Credit 
had been paid out by the World Bank to the national government. In 2003, 
the third tranche o f this credit scheme was authorised, and the World Bank 
argued that the government had already begun moving “from the 
transitional phase o f peace building to the medium-term phase o f Sierra 
Leone’s strategy o f poverty reduction, founded on good governance and 
economic growth,” which would require critical resources to consolidate 
“progress made in governance,” including the decentralisation o f the polity, 
and “empowering local agencies to manage the delivery o f basic services 
throughout the country.” (World Bank 2004, cf. Berewa 2005) This sounded 
as if  the post-war challenge had already been overcome. But it hadn’t, and 
the Bank was supposedly quite aware o f this.
An Implementation Completion Report by the World Bank (2003) on a 
major credit scheme on urban water supply, authorised in April 1992 and
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launched in June 1993, had come to a devastating conclusion. It rated not 
only the outcome o f the scheme as unsatisfactory and its financial and 
technical sustainability as unlikely but also criticised both the Bank’s and the 
government’s performance. According to the authors, the project was 
constandy at risk, mainly due to the government’s failure, and urban 
consumers’ inability to pay for water consumption throughout the project 
cycle, but also due to a lack o f technical support by the government 
regarding the implementation o f cost recovery mechanisms such as 
metering. The authors also admitted that the scale o f water provision in 
Freetown, while unsustainable, might have created artificial hurdles for the 
resettlement o f urban IDPs dwelling temporarily in the capital city in light of  
. the even worse state o f water provision in other provincial towns (ibid., 16)-
Simultaneously, there was growing awareness among the public that post­
war development schemes led by the IMF and the World Bank such as the 
HIPC initiative were failing to address spatial axes o f the conflict, thus 
neglecting a key underlying structural cause (Riddell 2005: 126). Short­
sightedness o f financial relief was impacting on the country as a whole, 
partly a result o f a “belief [among the IFIs] in the separateness o f the 
economic and political spheres [which] means that their programmes do not 
address the fundamental inseparability o f these domains” (ibid., 127).
Equal neglect was portrayed by some national bureaucrats. In an interview 
with a senior government official, a curious understanding o f local 
development as an apolitical endeavour emerged. According to the 
respondent (NPB-F6), ownership in development would be achieved 
through joint planning and implementation, while local political processes 
that link up to national political dynamics were left unconsidered, and this in 
spite o f major donors such as the Bank considering ‘civil society’ a key pillar 
of the post-war development strategy (World Bank 2005c). Creating 
“community infrastructure” entailed primarily the construction o f health 
facilities and schools and not the creation o f fora through which people 
could exert voice, protest, and hold officials at all levels accountable. 
Similarly, in spite o f demonstrating extensive knowledge o f political
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structures, a respondent (LPB-F4) pointed to the crucial role o f improved 
organisational structures and data management supported by UNDP.
DFID had to eventually modify an initial request for proposals (RfP) for “a 
public awareness campaign designed to inform the general public about the 
objectives and benefits o f privatisation” in autumn 2005 and instructed the 
eight bidding companies that the “communication support” solicited 
through the contract should abstain from promoting privatisation on 
ideological grounds and should only disseminate factual information to 
increase awareness and facilitate consultation on the “options for any 
private-sector development in Sierra Leone’s public utilities.” (Pallister 2005) 
All told,, thorough analyses of. overarching problematiques o f institutional 
diversity and political struggle lost out more than once against visions o f  
improvement and ‘development’ that embraced technocratic and not 
political solutions.
Yet while Moore (2001: 909) is right in claiming that primitive accumulation, 
nation state formation, and democratisation remain “uncompleted tasks” 
across Africa, it was not ‘anti-statism’— of which he accuses the international 
aid community— that hampered economic and political development in 
Sierra Leone. Quite the contrary, aid agencies were heavily involved in 
reconstructing the state, particularly at the local level. Decentralisation was 
the joint donors’ recipe for all gusti. “In early 2003, that was when we launched 
the government's agenda, and when we realised the potential of decentralisation,” one 
staff member o f an international donor agency recalled (IBA-F6). And a 
bureaucrat working for a bilateral development agency explained,
“A lot o f communication here [in Freetown] is very informal: [name o f bilateral 
agency head] will call up [country representative o f multilateral agency], or so. It’s a 
bit o f  a microcosm. I think it’s too casual, too lax. What I want to do is to approach 
a couple o f key governance people and urge them to form a governance group, 
around functional areas. It’s actually quite bad that this isn’t happening. [...]
I mean, to justify to situation, there are so few donors. [...] Two years ago we and 
the [World] Bank went out on two different things: central reform and 
decentralisation. The deal was struck to work both on each. So when they left 
Freetown that was the deal, but then a presentation was made to the Bank’s board, 
and they decided to focus on decentralisation. So we were caught on the back foot. 
So we then said, ok, we are going to focus on government reform through direct
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budget support. And we also knew that the EU was coming along with their 8 
million € package for decentralisation reform support, and the Bank was really 
blasting away with all their work on local councils.” (IBA-F3)
Ultimately this was meant to benefit the capital city as well: “Freetown is 
supposed to be locally governed, and it was [prior to Stevens’ one-party 
state]. But during the war Freetown has become the object o f national 
forces. D o not forget, Freetown used to be free: free land.” (IBA-F4) Hence 
even though CHAPTER FOUR has shown that national capture had begun 
much earlier, some international agencies did indeed demonstrate awareness 
o f the constrained scope o f local decision-making power in the capital city. 
But this did not change the fact that institutional change toward the local 
level o f polity was conceived, formulated, and implemented not as a result or 
via a discourse o f local and national organisations, but as a grand project o f  
international agencies.
Following a Multi-Donor Governance Roundtable Meeting held in August 
2002, the national government in collaboration with UNDP and DFID had 
established a task force on Decentralisation and Local Government Reform 
in October o f the same year in order to cluster their efforts and, with the 
support o f the President, to increase the pressure on the national 
government’s ministries. The task force produced an internal policy paper 
(UNDP 2003) that is, according to one interviewee (IBA-F3), best 
understood as the foundation on which the donor agenda for the 
decentralisation process in the country was built in the following two years.
This document justified the urgency o f moving forward with decentralisation 
as the “cornerstone for stimulating economic growth and development in 
the rural areas, [emphasis added]” Even though the authors admit an 
“infrequent presence o f some important line ministries” during the drafting 
process, they conclude that the Government o f  Sierra Leone had been 
committed throughout “in order to forge a national consensus on local 
government matters.” (ibid., 8)
The paper argues further that “local government institutions are expected to 
play a leading role in all aspects o f post-conflict development and Sierra
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Leone” (ibid., 14) and recommends indirect elections o f mayors and 
chairpersons o f local councils (ibid., 29). The document also reiterates the 
“hereditary and highly honoured” institution o f chieftaincy (ibid., 32), 
concluding that “the system is an integral part o f the political system [of 
local governance] in Sierra Leone” (ibid., 33) and that it is in the central 
government’s interest to give chiefs the authority to manage local affairs 
without undue interference by the central bureaucracy (ibid., 34).
The subsequent Local Government Act from 2004, which overruled existing 
legislation on local polity including the Freetown Municipality Act from 
1973, mandates that local councils “shall be financed from their own 
revenue collections, from central government grants for devolved functions 
and from transfers for services delegated from Government Ministries.” It 
also urges local councils “to make adequate efforts to collect revenues from 
their own sources.” These sources include local taxes, property rates, 
licences, fees and charges, and shares o f mining revenues.
Until the end o f 2008, tied grants for each devolved service are to be 
appropriated on a monthly basis to local councils by the Parliament, based 
on a recommendation by the relevant line ministry, (the Ministry o f Local 
Government and Community Development in the case o f Freetown65), and 
“based on principles o f equity” and considering “expenditure needs, local 
revenue capacity, and the financial and administrative performance o f the 
councils.” During the transition period, the Act endows the Parliament with 
the tight to “specify the functions on which these tied grants must be spent, 
so as to ensure that national priorities and standards o f service are met.” The 
councils have the right to appeal to the relevant ministry in case o f 
dissatisfaction with the distribution. The final decision rests with the 
Minister who is required to make public the reasons o f his finding (GoSL 
2004, Part VII, paragraphs 45-51: 27-29).
65 Freetown is specified in the Act as the only city in the country, whereas Bo, Bonthe, 
Kenema, Koidu and Makeni are defined as towns, governed by town councils. Together 
with Bonthe, which historically has a similar colonial history as Freetown, the capital city is 
hence the only urban district for which the Act does not foresee the involvement of 
Paramount Chiefs as ex officio members of the councils (GoSL 2004, First Schedule, Local 
Councils, Part II: 62).
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But the Act also carries major political implications. One local administrator 
complained,
“The Freetown City Council is governed by an Act that was passed by [national] 
parliamentarians, and almost all o f these parliamentarians are SLPP. Given that they 
have passed this document, they should not stifle the operations o f  the council. 
Still, the climate is that those who are holding on to the past try not to release the 
past to those who have taken over the power.” (LPB-F3)
Another local bureaucrat argued,
“It says that the Minister may devolve such functions that deem suitable. In other 
words, if he doesn’t want to, he won’t. You can see from the devolution plan at its 
spans from 2005 until 2008. Some o f the real issues will not be devolved until 2008, 
and this council is only for four years. By the time that the real issues will be tackled 
this council will not be in place anymore and they will be left for the next council. 
When it comes to the next election, they will say, they haven’t done anything.” 
(LPB-F4)
The Government o f Sierra Leone also approved the creation of a 
Decentralisation Secretariat funded by the World Bank and DFID. Its main 
objectives were to develop a comprehensive decentralisation policy and 
program for the country, ensure the harmonisation o f this process with 
existing legal and regulatory frameworks, the coordination and monitoring of  
sector devolution plans, to push a joint local governance strategy with the 
Ministry o f Finance and the Ministry o f Local Government and Community 
Development, to support capacity development at the local and the central 
levels, and to report regularly to the central government on the progress in 
decentralisation (Decentralisation Secretariat 2004). Said one o f the 
Secretariat’s most senior officials,
“If we did not have money, then the government would do it their own way, but 
now that we have been given a large chunk o f money, the government works with 
us. [...] My blessing is, the President is interested. [...] We used to have local 
governments, but then everything was abolished through Siaka Stevens. So the 
president thinks, they took it away when I was at school, so I am going to bring it 
back. I’m going to be in the history books when they will be written. So I am riding 
on this opportunity.” (IBA-F7)
Jackson (2005: 51) points out that while the precise intra-organisational 
debates around the necessity and procedures o f decentralisation within the 
national government are extremely difficult to recollect, some o f  the
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goodwill by high-level officials can be explained first by the pressures that 
donors put on the bureaucracy in support o f President Kabbah’s proposal to 
disperse power from the capital city, and second by the resources that could 
be expected from primarily the World Bank and UNDP.
Similarly, Fanthorpe (2001: 381) has contended that the Ministry o f Local 
Government and Community Development constituted a direct response to 
the “‘good governance’ agenda favoured by the World Bank and other 
influential donors,” which had prompted its inauguration by the SLPP 
government in 1998. In sum, the historical trajectory o f administrative 
structures in Sierra Leone thus led from tribal fiefdoms to colonial 
centralisation, to. decolonised decentralisation, to dictatorial one-party state, 
to a remote rebellion eventually leading to factual statelessness, and from 
there, back to an externally designed decentralised polity (cf. Esser 2007b).
‘Peace parties’: depoliticising cross-spatial politics
The Local Government Elections in May 2004, a cornerstone in the donors’ 
decentralisation timetable, were heavily promoted and supported by the 
international community, including most INGOs. “N o one [in the 
international community] is going to give direct support to any one political 
player, given the country’s recent history with a one-party state. [...] But I 
don’t see party politics as a particularly destabilising factor here. This place 
has to vote,” one international advisor argued (IBA-F6).
Agencies embarked on sensitisation campaigns to educate voters about the 
procedure and duties o f elected councillors and to close the experience gap 
caused by the absence o f formal local government institutions in the country 
since their abolition under Siaka Stevens in 1972 (e.g., CARE International 
2004). A central bone o f contention in this context o f re-establishing 
decentralised polity in Sierra Leone was the question whether local elections 
should be held on a partisan basis. The 1991 constitution made provisions 
for presidential elections, parliamentary elections and local council elections 
to be conducted on the basis o f political parties, coming into force at a time
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o f one-party rule (NPB-F7). Arguments in favour included that it would be 
impossible to disentangle local candidates from their party affiliations and 
that it would harm the nascent democratic system to exclude parties. The 
APC was strongly supporting this view. Its chairman told me emphatically,
“The APC is not a new party; we are performers. The people know us; they know 
what we can do. We held the city in 1968. In 1964, the founder o f our party was the 
mayor o f Freetown: His Excellency Dr Siaka Stevens. The city knew that things 
were happening. He had been giving power through the ballot box, and within one 
year things were happening. [...] We are out to set an example. We are optimistic. 
We are committed to decentralisation. We are committed to devolution.” (NPB-F1)
The appointment form for new APC councillors did, in fact, include 
questions on prior engagement and previously held positions and urged 
applicants to testify as to whether or not they would be prepared to “truly 
and publicly defend the APC Party at all times.” It also asked them to 
provide a description o f their personal character, a police clearance, income- 
tax clearance, and three relevant references (APC 2004). Yet what it failed to 
ensure was a minimum understanding o f urban issues and administrative
Counterarguments against partisanship revolved around a potentially 
marginalised opposition and, in the words o f a high level UNDP  
representative, a “belief that Freetown would otherwise dictate candidates 
and policies coalition.” (ICG 2003b: 19) Both donor agencies and a loose 
coalition o f civic and non-governmental organisations operating from 
Freetown (the ‘National Election Watch’) supported this agenda based on 
internationally financed and coordinated consultations with communities (cf. 
NEW 2004). One o f the coordinators explained,
“The consultations that took place in March 2003 were about the question whether 
the local election should be partisan or non-partisan, about the procedure o f the 
elections, an about mini-consultations about how to do it. The idea was to have 
town hall meetings. We invited NG O s to present five representatives and all the 
local associations to do the same in order to get around, a bit at least, the 
paramount chiefs. [...] The discussion proceeded through different stages. 
Sometimes they spend half an hour talking about how the council should be named 
[laughs], but it was very instructive... it gave us an experiential dimension and an idea of 
the political structures.” (IBA-F6)
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Naturally, the SLPP-dominated national administration had its own stake in 
the process. One senior ministerial official argued,
“Let me first o f all say that at our ministry... really supervises these city councils. 
What we have done, we have been sensitising them that even though the elections 
for these councils have been on the basis o f political parties, their primary objective 
o f being in these councils is to bring about development in their localities. 
Therefore, when they go to deliberate on developmental issues for their localities, 
they should not retain the concept o f political parties.
Candidly, when you look at the political manifestoes o f  the two major parties, it is 
all the same. It is all a matter o f one having red, and the other having a green 
colour. But the overall objective is to bring about development to the nation. The 
incentive is reflected at the national and at the local level. You see, we do not want 
to incorporate in our people that when you contest on a political party basis, you go 
to a council, even if the opposition comes up with something sound, you will just 
say no. That would be negative politics. Politics should be positive for the 
development o f the people.
So we have to sensitise them. Initially, when these councils were sworn in, these 
kinds o f issues came up fast. But gradually, they are dying down. The realisation 
building up that they should work for the development o f their localities. Come 
2008, for the next round o f politics, then you can go and wave your colour, 
whatever colour you want, war that is the red sun [APC] or the country [SLPP]; it 
will be for the electorate to decide.” (NPB-F7)
The elections produced astounding results both nationally and at the local 
level. The APC lost in all but two districts o f the country, but it won 
Freetown proper by an impressive margin. The map on the following page 
illustrates this skewed outcome (own illustration based on UNAMSIL 2004b; 
districts governed by the APC are marked in light grey, black squares indicate 
major towns). Table 3 then summarises the resulting composition o f the 
Freetown City Council in the Western Area District (Urban).
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Party
Candidates
Winners
SLPP APC GAP 
32 32 1 
4 28
PDP
6
PLP
24
independent total 
69 164 
32
Table 3: Local Government Election results 2004: Freetown
This contrast appears astounding. Several explanations have been brought 
forward, including reactions to felt aspects of an “urban penalty” (UN 
Habitat 2006b) such as the urban cash economy, but also the argument by 
some, including opposition leaders, that Freetown’s residents were more 
“enlightened” than rural folk:66
66 In defiance o f  my own assumption prior to the field research in Sierra Leone, the 
influence o f  city-based secret societies and lodges on the election result was considered 
marginal by interviewees (cf. Nunley 1987). One informant noted, “Secret societies do not 
really directly influence the parties. They do not structure themselves around political 
parties; they have their constituency across the political spectrum. These societies have 
an influence over the people, but not directly on the parties.” (LPB-F6)
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‘Teople were being discouraged to go out on the street, so they expressed their 
protest in voting for the APC. Cost o f living has risen significandy recendy here in 
Freetown, so people really felt the burden.” (NG-F2)
“[1:] This was a protest vote. At the time o f the elections, the national government 
was not performing. The price o f  fuel went up twice, and costs o f  basic foodstuff 
also increased. So the people protested against the government and sent a message 
to them. [...] This was a Western Area phenomenon; because the bulk o f the 
population is literate they could exercise their right — as opposed to those in the 
provinces who are mainly voting on tribal lines.” (CS-F3)
“[2:] The people in Freetown [...] are the barometer o f  the country; they represent 
the true picture. The people in the hinterland do not have much education. Sometimes they 
do not even understand the interests o f their communities. [...] The chiefs are 
governing the provinces, but they are the manipulators o f the SLPP and the 
elections. [...] Here in Freetown, you have all the education. [...] All the 
newspapers are being published in Freetown; there are no provincial newspapers. 
People are more aware here in Freetown. So when it came to the Freetown City 
Council elections, there was very little the SLPP. could do.”. (N PB-F.l).....................
“The government is stealing more now than before,” one local interviewee 
lamented, “now that there is a lot o f donor money coming in. [...] Within six 
months you can see all over the city how houses are being built. [...] Where 
is all this money coming from? This is what the people ask.” (CS-F4) And 
yet another respondent said,
“The ministers, they are building houses for millions o f  Leones, on the hillsides. In 
Signal Hill, this is a new Freetown. They should set up factories for the youths, but 
for their self-interest they are just building a house, and then they go to Mecca and 
drive around in vehicles, while the rest is going to suffer. Even though our country 
has been experiencing war, our government has no interest in us.” (CS-F3)
At the same time, scepticism prevailed as to whether the local City Council 
would gamer enough political leverage, cin spite o f , as some respondents put 
it, the fact that Freetown is the capital city. To many in the international 
community, this did not appear problematic. One informant went even 
further by claiming that national politics had been sidelined across the 
country:
“The people in national parliament in Freetown have a vagrancy problem. They 
never go back to their constituency. But with the correction o f local government, 
this is no longer important. It was important six months ago, but it is not important 
anymore, because there is really no issue in this country today of import to local communities 
that is not covered Jy representatives in the local council. This problem is being solved. [...] 
There is a subsidiary now. [...] In terms of government, national parliament was never 
relevant to them before, and it is definitely not relevant now.” (IBA-F8)
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In a statement to the international media released immediately after the 
elections, the APC chairman emphasised that the victory in the capital city 
should be seen as a first step towards taking over the government at the 
national level (Africa Research Bulletin 2004). This position was also reflected 
in a pamphlet produced shordy after the announcement o f the party’s local 
victory: “We entreat our noble councillors to consider the choice o f these 
positions as a great responsibility, challenge and honour on behalf o f  our 
APC Party in the service o f our country. [...] Whatever decisions and 
conclusions our party takes should be in the national interest and must stand 
the test o f time.” (APC 2004) In an interview with him, he reiterated this 
stance: “We have the city council. [...] We’re going to choose this as a role 
model, case, for development.. [. ..] As a party,, we are ready to back our 
councillors. This is our support to Freetown, for the people o f Freetown. 
We are really backing the Mayor.” (NPB-F1)
It was also a vociferous call for partisan competition in and on the capital 
city, as one interviewee forecasted: “It is a chance for APC to sensitise the 
population on the lack o f changes, the lack o f improvement, and to show 
them in town that they confront the situation.” (NG-F7) Another one was 
more sceptical and argued,
“[2:] It is quite likely that the SLPP will withhold funding for the city council in 
order to prevent them from having a second chance. It is not certain, but it is a 
possibility. The APC in the City Council is poised to do a lot o f work, to make up 
for their past misdeeds, and because they want to try their level best.” (CS-F3)
Unsurprisingly, the national government was not pleased with losing political 
control over the capital city to the opposition party. A high-ranking SLPP 
member told me,
“The Freetown population are floating voters. [...] They change sides all the time. 
[...] It depends on how you are able to reach them. We keep saying to the donors, 
you have to be careful how far you are pushing the government. If you push us too 
far the people will protest. We are a reformist government.. .” (NPB-F3)
Soon after the local election, the political conflict over the capital city went 
into full bloom. In July 2004 a newspaper framed the conflict as follows.
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“The general hope o f the traders now is that since there is an All Peoples Congress 
mayor, they would be protected by his patronage. Their perception is that since 
most o f them voted APC, it should, as gesture o f a reciprocracy [sic\, to protect 
them from being persistently whisked off the streets by cops. [...] If traders on the 
other hand become stubborn and infest the streets again, then that would generate 
anger from the general public and incidentally all ills plaguing the city would be 
heaped on APC. O f course the ruling SLPP will say, W e told you. These are the 
people you were dancing for’. If [the Mayor] succeeds it will determine APC’s 
success in 2007 and if he fails, then APC would take the bottom part o f the ladder 
and SLPP will stay where it is.” (The Independent Freetown 2004)
The Mayor’s office recognised this dilemma early on:
“There’s the reluctance by the government because they do not control the councils 
and the Western Area. And because they do not control these councils, they think 
that there should be no support given to the local councils here. They say there 
should be no preferential treatment given to the municipal council; all councils 
should be the same. But when you look all the multinational corporations and all 
the business infrastructure, whatever exists in the capital city is bigger than what 
exists in the areas, because o f the capacity o f delivering services and the number o f 
the population, but the government is saying that Freetown and the rest o f  the 
country is the same. Is that possible? That is not possible. The reason why they say 
this is because they’re not in control.” (LPB-F5)
SLPP-led ministries defended themselves against such allegations, saying, 
“D o not forget that for the past 30 years the government was performing his 
functions. So it is difficult to just give them to the city council.” (NPB-F3) 
Another ministerial official joked, “The Freetown City Council has 
absolutely no capacity to conduct planning functions. What you would have 
to do is to transfer all [national] ministries to the local level.” (NPB-F5)
“You heard the mayor o f Freetown shouting, ‘government has not giving 
this, government has not been giving that’,” a national bureaucrat recalled,
“but now I think they are starting to understand, because come 2005, the actual 
devolution will start. We are going through the act. [...] In 2005, it will be worked 
out. [...] The instrument will be going to action, and copies will be made available 
to all councils, so they will see in 2005: These are the functions that will have to be 
devolved by the government ministries to the local councils, and it is not public 
functions, but the technical stuff, finance, logistics that is going to these functions. [...] This is 
why we have our development partners like the World Bank, like DfID, UNDP, 
the EU; they are teaching us to build the capacity of these councils for readiness fo r the absorption 
of these functions.” (NPB-F7)
O f course this power struggle between the local and national levels did not 
go unnoticed among international agencies and even triggered candid
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admissions such as that Freetown was “still largely planned and run by 
national ministries.” (CS-F5) Yet in spite o f their decentralisation agenda, 
some also seemed to view the capital city as a special case, to be held to 
different standards:
“The thing with Freetown is that because it is the capital, I don’t think it is ever 
going to be a representative model o f local government. [...] People up-country are 
going to look at the local councils for solutions to everything, agricultural and 
development, roads, everything, whereas in Freetown, the definition o f  what they’re 
going to hold the council accountable for will be much more limited to specific 
functions. [...] People say, ‘Oh, the Mayor o f Freetown has such a hard job.’ Well, 
actually, I would say it’s much easier to be Mayor o f Freetown than it is to be the 
chairman o f a local rural council, where holistic solutions are expected. [...] 
Different governments decided differently on the jurisdiction o f  Freetown City 
Council, an appointed body. You know, it is an instrument of national governance, in a 
sense.-1 would venture to say you should not consider Freetown City-Council-as-a 
local government. Maybe in the future, it will be.” (IBA-F6)
The fact that the Council was facing fierce opposition from national bodies 
was played down repeatedly:
“One o f the challenges o f urban governance is that they the Council can only 
deliver services that are ‘coloured’, that would help them get re-elected. [...] If I 
were mayor, I would be careful. I wouldn’t play the politics. I would try to get 
things done, not just say, Sve are APC’ or whatever.” (IBA-F5)
Another international observer also admitted implicitly his bias towards 
political homogeneity, saying, “In councils where there are SLPP and APC 
representatives there is more difficulty working together; corporation is 
easier for councils in more homogenous areas. [...] For example, the Bo 
Town council, which is purely SLPP, this one is doing a good job.” (IBA-F1)
Celebrating the first anniversary o f the Freetown City Council after its re­
establishment in 2004, the Special Representative o f the Secretary General of 
the United Nations for Sierra Leone called on the Mayor and members of 
the council to fight corruption, act transparently, and “serve as role models 
by imbibing the culture of accountability, tolerance, social justice and the 
rule o f law.” He did not go into any detail about the political constellation 
impeding the effectiveness o f the Council. However, the chairman o f the 
ceremony, a former national Minister o f Information, made a rather 
ambiguous remark about the need to embark on projects that would
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“safeguard” the relevance o f the Council for the next local elections in 2007 
(UNAMSIL 2005c).
After all, redistribution was not really the key driver o f the polity reform 
programme. In an interview conducted with senior officials in the Ministry 
o f Local Government (NPB-F7), there had neither been explicit nor implicit 
mention o f devolving power and resources or strengthening local structures. 
The sole thrust o f the decentralisation project appeared to be the 
deconcentration o f the population away the capital city.
This interest dovetailed with international agencies’ scepticism o f anything 
political, and in . particular. any political process connected, with partisan 
agency and domestic organisation outside the commonly donor-defined 
realm o f ‘civil society’. This stance against an “unorthodox” or even 
“unacceptable” traditional postcolonial African civil society shall be looked 
at more closely in the following section.
International institution-building live: 
forging the national through the local
The nature o f civil society in West Africa, as Jusu-Sheriff (2004: 269) points 
out, is much more intertwined than some multilateral organisations are ready 
to admit. The promotion o f non-state apolitical actors and ‘local partners’ 
with the aim of creating a depoliticised counterpart to a depoliticised polity 
therefore means matching a twisted perception o f political reality with 
wishful thinking.
Recent evidence from crisis states in Africa demonstrates that the voluntary 
sector grows faster in areas in which complementary activities and structures 
under direct state control receive priority funding from donor organisations 
(van de Walle 2003: 20). In other words, strengthening civil society does not 
necessarily depend on funnelling resources into the sector, but can be an 
effect o f a tangible commitment to rebuilding the state, thus calling into 
question the common proposition that direct monetary support to civil
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society actors was necessary to discipline the central state in order to bring 
about grass roots-driven accountability.
As already touched upon in previous sections, the history o f civil society in 
Sierra Leone had been one o f a sequence o f slowly increasing vibrancy in 
Freetown, forced contraction as a result o f national superimposition, 
indolence during the war, and eruptive post-war re-emergence. During the 
Siaka Stevens regime between 1968 and 1985, authoritarian rule had 
dismanded much o f what a highly politicised public arena after the country’s 
independence in 1961 had built. However, not even halfway through the 
armed conflict that began in 1991, several non-state groups began exerting 
pressure on. the government and the insurgency. Shordy after the cessation 
o f fighting, groups such as the Sierra Leone Labour Congress and the 
Association o f Journalists helped mobilise voters for the presidential election 
in 2002 (Jusu-Sheriff 2004). One respondent told me that they had a radio 
programme
“[1]: which is called “Let Di People Talk”. It is broadcasted live from the British 
High Commission. [...] Anybody can just walk into the hall, listen to what the 
ministry is doing, and ask critical questions. [...] The idea is to create space for 
political dialogue so that the people know what is going on and to encourage them 
to engage in interaction.” (CS-F3)
Similar activities initiated by local groups could be observed in the areas o f  
human rights, including for war wounded and amputees, and youth 
employment, which often served to transfer information from the periphery 
to the capital city. (Jusu-Sheriff 2004: 282) The Amputees’ Association 
(Image 2 in annex 3). a group o f war victims succeeding in occupying a plot 
o f private land in a high value neighbourhood, was a telling example o f local 
groups circumventing local polity and instead capitalising on their proximity 
to national authorities by using the urban infrastructure such as print media 
and the presence o f international correspondents (Esser 2005).
“[ i;] We have just been abandoned by the government,” their leaders 
proclaimed, “which is why I continue going to the newspapers, go to the 
radio, to tell them that we are here, we are still alive. [2:] We have been 
marketed. We are a zoo where you can find different types o f animals. D o
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you know, a 200?” (CS-F3) The association was articulating its demands very 
effectively, including a claim for immediate payouts o f US$ 3,000 per 
member (roughly 15 times the average annual GDP per capita) during a 
meeting with the Attorney General and the director o f a trust fund to 
mediate the suffering o f the amputees and war wounded (Fofana 2005b).
Such local pressure on national bodies may appear surprising; it was made 
possible mainly because o f the specificity o f the issue o f mutilation. Sierra 
Leoneans wanted “to turn the page and not put up with these people 
anymore,” one INGO worker explained,
“this is why the government would like the people to leave the camp. But you 
cannot come one day and throw them out, so the government is in a really difficult 
position. [...] There is still a big sign in front o f the camp come up reading 
“amputee camp”. Nobody can touch the sign. If you touch the sign, you ... 
[mimics throat cutting]. [...] Within a minute, you would have a lot o f  people 
around and they would kill you. You cannot touch it. So, this camp remains an 
amputee camp. [...] It is a very political issue. It is at the level o f  the President; 
Ministries cannot decide on this issue without involving the President” (NG-F10)
Asked what the role o f the Freetown City Council was in this, the response 
was muted. “I think they are formally involved in the evacuation and the 
closure procedure, but I haven’t seen them a lot.” (ibid.)
A peaceful general strike in January 2005 highlighted once again the vibrancy 
of civic actors in the capital city (cf. Donini 2005 et al. 2005: 48), and it is in 
this context that recent efforts to externally induce or ‘create’ civil society in 
Sierra Leone by way o f foreign grants and programmes have to be 
reassessed.
Certainly, the success o f the concept o f civil society as a framework o f aid 
delivery in Sierra Leone can only partly be explained with external 
imposition or conditionality. A domestic pull was equally prevalent and 
effective. Reflecting on her experience in West Africa in the early 1990s, 
Obadare (2004: 158, cf. Ferme 1999: 180) recalls:
“Everyone with one grievance or another against the state (also generally 
understood as the government) rallied in the name o f civil society. [...] Civil society 
also seemed to suggest something about civility, an element that was believed to be
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in short supply in the overall relations between the state and society across the sub- 
region.”
Furthermore, the emergence o f the civil society discourse and the 
momentum that it created opened up opportunities for private resource 
accumulation for those societal strata who had been suffering greatly from 
the contracting public sector under structural adjustment programmes. 
Obadare (ibid., 159) again: “[T]he idea was also a godsend for a cross-section 
of an economically wounded middle-class in search o f personal, not even 
group, salvation.”
N ot surprisingly then, the ‘NGOisation’ o f the country began in the capital 
city where resources were abundant and close enough to be captured, and 
employment in an NGO promised a stable income during the transition 
period (Ambrosetti 2003: 14-15). “We should very critically look at the work 
of NGOs,” a local bureaucrat urged, “some o f them are trying to take 
advantage o f the situation.” (LPB-F3) Against this background, Obadare 
(ibid., 157,) emphasises the persisting validity o f Mamdani’s distinction 
between “an urban ‘civil society’ and the subjetivisation o f the rural mass.” 
Did post-war civil society in Sierra Leone bridge this gap?
The accusation o f a persisting urban bias in non-monetary aid to Sierra 
Leone had first been made in the context o f the 2002 Presidential Elections 
when the international community focused its information and sensitisation 
campaigns on urban centres, leaving mobilisation o f rural voters to local 
NGOs (Sesay and Hughes 2005: 46, 136, cf. McKeown 2003: 10). By mid- 
2004, international observers had noted that human rights organisations 
were still active mostly in Freetown whereas “rural villagers [had] little access 
to their services”, urging the international community to provide more 
resources into the facilitation o f an independent domestic capacity (Douma 
and de Zeeuw 2004: 4, Sesay and Hughes 2006: 261). Yet building western- 
friendly civility was one task; building local leaders was another. A local civil 
society leader explained this ‘agency gap’ as follows.
“The international organisations, most o f all, have made sure that we are in this 
transition phase towards a state. A space was created for all these groups [of civil
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society], these coalitions, to form. [...] [Now] there is a need to move towards 
trying to create leadership. We have done all these things, but there is this gap. And 
this gap is leadership: not about having workshops, but engaging the right people. 
This is a huge gap. [...] This is the point where these coalitions have started to fade. 
[...] The whole process o f  democratisation and state building is questionable 
because o f the problem o f leadership. [...] The issue is not whether or not the 
space is provided. The space is provided now. But we need to provide a lot of opportunities for 
them to emerge. When I’m saying the space has been provided, I’m talking about the 
situation that contrasts the pre-war situation. Now, the government does not 
impinge so much, but we do not have people who want to take advantage o f this 
space.” (CS-F9)
Outright attempts by foreign organisations to hijack part o f civil society also 
occurred. One local informant recalled the following experience:
“W e told [name o f INGO] very clearly that they are not coordinating human rights 
activities here. They cannot coordinate, not facilitate, not supervise us. [...] We do 
not want [INGO] as a human rights organisation, even though we appreciate them 
as providers o f aid and relief. [...] We cannot allow [INGO] to come in and violate 
our own national standards in human rights, our own national pride. What it does is 
it undermines the relevance o f existing structures. They argue that they want to 
build the capacity o f  existing structures. Well, we already have a national movement 
for human rights, why don’t they support it?” (CS-F8)
In the meantime, most non-urban Sierra Leoneans continued thinking and 
arguing based on a ‘subjectivised’ discourse. For instance, a paramount chief 
in Grafton, a large former IDP camp fifteen miles east o f Freetown, 
connected the language o f citizenship to traditional relationships, saying that 
when talking to a minister, he would act “like a child going to the father. [...] 
We are looking up to the President and the Minister o f Land to assist us with 
land to develop ourselves.” (LPB-Fle) This illustrates that in spite of formally 
decentralised structures hierarchy remained a powerful perception of the practice 
o f governance and was seen as a promising channel to achieve something for 
local communities facing new threats in the shape o f post-war economic 
plans. “The [central] government cannot allow these people to just settle 
here,” a local official told me, “they have to move them out to allow the 
people to establish their business and to develop the country.” (LPB-F2e) 
This was also confirmed at the ministerial level: “Our position concerning 
Grafton is that we need their land, for any kind o f development.” (NPB-F5) 
“Concerning Grafton Camp,” another member o f the national 
administration explained, “one o f our strategies is to not encourage people
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to stay on this land. It is not the law, it is just a strategy. [...] Our main line 
is, ‘If you want to have land you have to go to the provinces.’” (NPB-F3)
Local development or national power? 
The politicisation of urban services
While this competition and conflict around institutional adjustments were 
taking place across polity levels, the state o f  affairs o f both urban 
government and urban services in Freetown remained dismal (cf. Arimah
2003). A proposal from April 2004 (Elliott and Gilpin 2004) commissioned 
by the City Council requested a budget of US$ 320,000 from international 
funding sources to upgrade the infrastructure o f the Council (computing 
hardware and software, electric power supply, photocopiers, furniture, and 
utility vehicles). This came at a time when the Municipality looked more like 
an abandoned primary school than the administrative centre o f a capital city 
(Image 3 in annex 3). Said one local official,
“It is a shell o f what it should be. When you look around you, this is not what you 
would expect. [...] If you can’t get any revenues in, there’s nothing that government 
you can do. And you cannot bring it in unless you have qualified staff and proper 
property evaluation, and then you can have the clout, financially, to affect the 
development. Other than that it is impossible, we would just be trying to survive.” 
(LPB-F6)
The Elliott and Gilpin proposal stated that the implementation o f the 
scheme should be expected to have “wider implications and cross cutting 
impact that would spill over to the country, as a whole, since Freetown is the 
Capital City” (ibid., 2). It also argued that the council’s current staffing level 
o f 210 core employees was insufficient to exercise effective governance, 
including local revenue collection, and that “serious inadequacies in terms of 
institutional capacity” existed, apparently using the term ‘institutional’ as a 
euphemism for human resource quality (ibid., 16).
The proposal failed to attract donors’ attention. International priorities at 
this time were on ‘promoting democracy’ and not strengthening local 
political bodies — even though one would expect the latter to be linked to the
171
former. Indeed, the manner by which I obtained the aforementioned 
proposal is a telling example o f this preference. Asking a staff member o f a 
bilateral development agency about its work on urban issues, he began 
searching several binders and stacks o f papers on his desk, mumbling:
“I am just thinking, is there actually anything that we are doing in urban areas? No, 
there is apparendy nothing. I mean, if anything we are going the other way by 
improving chiefdoms and the restoration o f traditional power, and how does this sit 
with the new local councils; what threats does this present in terms o f power and 
traditional law and so on?
[continues searching]
No, nothing. Whether it’s too big, you know, that’s the question. Maybe we should 
have a consortium on urban issues. [...]
Well, that’s really a very interesting question, why not the urban areas? Well, maybe 
most o f  the things we propose to do will eventually also benefit the urban areas, I 
mean, the whole capacity building we are involved in. M ost of this is based in Freetown 
anyway. [...]
After the war there have been a couple o f studies pointing out the need for 
infrastructure, also o f  local councils in Sierra Leone, and one o f the follow-up ones 
was on the City Council [pulls out a ragged copy o f  the Elliott and Gilpin study; 
laughs]. Oh, seems it has not really been used recently... You can have this copy.” 
(IBA-F3)
My observation o f a council meeting in early December 2004 brought to 
light not only some o f the most pressing issues in urban management in 
Freetown but illustrated as well the fundamental challenges that this 
reconstituted level o f government is facing in the capital city. Following the 
opening ceremony, several councillors complained that the administration 
had refused to authorise the payment o f rebuilt education facilities. The 
Mayor reminded the councillors that the municipality had never given its 
formal approval for these projects, which two councillors denied 
vociferously.
This debate fed into a discussion on land ownership. The position o f the 
council leadership was that some tenants would have to be removed from 
their current dwelling because their occupation was illegal. Immediately, 
three councillors jumped to their feet and provide lengthy explanations o f  
why they would oppose such a move in their ward. One comment by an
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observer in an earlier interview came to my mind; she had argued the 
councillors had in fact
“never focused on long-term issues that address development. The interest in 
projects has only been so far in that had allowed them getting a slice o f  the cake. 
This has been a force, a very strong determining force o f politics and governance at 
the local level. [...] The Mayor will need some support by the councillors, but many 
o f them want to continue the old way, and they cannot be checked. [...] Some o f  
them say that their predecessors just came to enjoy themselves, but quite a lot o f  
them still have the same view: that Freetown is a market where they don’t have to 
pay.” (LPB-F6)
One o f the most senior civil servants that I interviewed in Freetown had 
uttered the same frustration saying,
“As a civil servant I don’t like to be talking about politics. From my experience in 
the council, which I chair, politically they are all preaching, let us work together, let 
us work towards development in the city, but practically, it does not work that way. 
Whatever happens, if you belong to the party, you belong to the party. When it 
comes to implementation though, they look at the situation and say, if the 
opposition succeeds, then we will have problems in the next election.” (LPB-F4)
Later on in the same Council meeting, the Mayor urged the councillors to 
focus on the devolution plan, which at this point had already been delayed 
by two weeks. He explained, “Only if I have received such a plan from every 
ward, then I will be able to negotiate with the ministries.” While the 
councillors agreed and reacted with spontaneous applause to an 
announcement by the Mayor saying that he would be willing to enter into 
fierce negotiations with the central government, their subsequent questions 
reflected no knowledge o f the requirements to be met. The Mayor explained, 
“Look at all the functions that you are not yet performing and then try to 
think which ones you would be able to take over.” In an attempt to help 
refocus the discussion, the Chief Administrator o f the city then suggested 
that a mission statement be agreed on in order to define priorities and guide 
the policy process. Suddenly jumping up, one o f the councillors expressed 
his scepticism about the proposal arguing that the council should “not make 
new laws.” Here again, it became clear that the mission statement had little 
potential to guide any kind o f local policy-making process and was much 
more an application o f ‘donor language’ to the working o f a city council that
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was still struggling with the very fundamentals (cf. UNIOSIL 2006). One 
World Bank staff member complained,
“Look at the Freetown City Council: they could be making money on a daily basis; 
the problem is how to collect it. There is a revenue base, but there is no functioning 
system for collecting the revenue. What they will tell you is that they spend most o f  
this money for salaries. But our focus has to be on improving services. This said, 
the biggest problem is really building capacity. [...] Many o f the councils in the 
countryside have called for this. But the city council here in Freetown has not 
called for it at all.” (IBA-F7)
In a study commissioned subsequendy by the Bank (Mwesigye 2006) to 
examine the untapped revenue potential o f the City Council (mind again the 
earlier ignorance towards the local study produced by Elliott and Gilpin
2004), political willingness within the council itself was singled out as the 
most important factor to boost efficiency o f tax collection before outside 
funding should be supplied.
“While there is no doubt that a city such as Freetown does and will require transfers 
from government [and while] it is technically feasible to collect additional revenues 
with modest outside inputs, the most critical finding is that FCC will require 
exertion o f substantial and sustained political will at the highest level before it can 
even begin to do so.” (ibid., 2)
Indeed, the study concluded that “[n]o amount o f external funding and 
intervention is going to cause any meaningful change until the institution 
itself has decided it is time to change (ibid., 11; underlining and bold font 
removed).” Certainly the starkest shortfall in terms o f local resource 
mobilisation is apparent in the area o f local tax collection. In 2005, the City 
Council collected in a mere 11.55 million Leones in local taxes— less than 
1% o f the potential revenue estimated at 1.2 billion Leones (ibid.).
Revenue Source Actual 2005 Potential CollectionsCollections (Le) (Le)
Rates 719 million 1.20 billion
Markets 606 million 1.38 billion
Trading Licenses 66 million 430 million
Local Taxes 11.55 million 1.20 billion
Property Rents 7.9 million 244 million
Total Revenues approx 1.41 billion approx 4.45 billion
Table 4: Actual and potential revenue collection o f the Freetown City Council
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The author o f  the study points out that while “this does not appear real,” the 
situation can be explained by a tax base o f 2,309 contributors (as o f 2005) 
out o f an overall population o f almost 800,000, which is due to the virtual 
absence o f usable tax records at the ward level as a result o f both 
administrative neglect and the legacy o f a decade o f war (ibid., 9).
Following the urban riot in November 2004 that had made me reflect on the 
possibility o f an untimely death while writing e-mails in a downtown Internet 
cafe (cf. CHAPTER ONE), the Freetown City Council was eager to 
demonstrate compassion with the widespread discontent over the lack o f  
socio-economic prospects and basic services among the urban population in 
general, and. young. people, in particular and quickly condemned police 
brutality.67 Frustration was fuelled primarily by an unresolved battle between 
the City Council and several national ministries over the responsibility for 
urban garbage collection, but also by traffic congestion, worsened by 
Freetown’s shoreline location. Moreover, facing regular power shortages, the 
vast majority o f the population could not afford generators and goes without 
any electric power at all.
In January 2005, the World Bank and the IMF pressured the national 
government on the grounds o f its constitutional duty to take responsibility 
for public utility bills to make an advance payment o f 1.3 billion Leones to 
the National Power Authority (NPA) in order to ensure minimal level of 
provision for the first three months of the year (Standard Times 10 February, 
quoted in UNAMSIL 2005b). The situation worsened over the course o f the 
following months due to increasing prices for fuel, which reduced further 
the purchasing power o f Freetown residents reliant on generators (Fofana 
2005a). Facing a budgetary constraint, the NPA could only point toward 
capacity enlargement and argue that the situation would improve 
significantly upon the termination o f the Bumbuna hydroelectric plant close 
to the capital city, envisioned for 2007. However, in light o f fact that the 
plant has already been under planning and construction since the late 1960s,
67 Personal communication with a civil rights activist in Freetown, 9 March 2005.
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the scepticism among urban residents that corruption in the public apparatus 
would further delay its completion is comprehensible (cf. BBCNews 2005c).
A post-war rise in urban crime in Freetown also prompted the police to ban 
combat fatigues from the city (BBCNews 2005d), not only to foster an 
atmosphere o f civility, but also to address regular accusations o f residents 
that members o f the notoriously ineffective police force (Paris 2004: 223) 
had been acting as ‘piefs’ — police and thieves at the same time, 
incorporating an enhancement o f the war-time new ‘sobels’ (soldiers by day 
and rebels by night, a term coined by the Freetown Daily Mail' cf. Donini et 
al. 2005: 43, Keen 2002).
The “biggest challenge” in terms o f urban management (NPB-F3), however, 
was considered to be street cleaning and waste disposal. Historically a 
function o f the appointed Management Committee, in 1996 the national 
government had entrusted the Ministry o f Health and Sanitation with 
garbage collection and disposal in the capital city, helped by German GTZ 
engineers — arguing that the war-affected municipality would benefit from 
being relieved o f this duty (NPB-F2). During the war, garbage collection had 
become “a political tool,” one local civil society informant told me:
“UNDP and the World Bank wanted to put in some resources and to create some 
investments. [...] [A key] Minister asked us to pilot this process [...] [to] ensure that 
it would be a community garbage collection process. And that we would get all the 
support needed. [...] In the end [...] what they wanted was kickbacks. All the 
projects here are designed to give some kickbacks to the officials.” (CS-F6)
Bureaucrats in the Municipality were keen on assuming responsibility for this 
service: “You see mountains o f garbage in the city,” a city manager said,
“Once the Council has enough budget for garbage collection, it will have to think 
about dump sites, vehicles, and manpower. [...] It remains one o f the major areas 
to be devolved. Once it has been devolved, the council will be in the position to 
deliver that service. [...] Devolving this function to the council would also involve 
devolving resources, so council would very much been a position to perform it.” 
(LPB-F3)
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But political considerations at the national level had priority over achieving 
local effectiveness. A participant in a focus group o f civil rights activists 
explained:
“[3:] Garbage collection is clearly a crucial issue, because there is a public outcry. 
There is filth all over the country. People are looking at the issue with suspicion, 
and there is some politics going around that. Traditionally, it is the role o f the city 
council to take care o f  garbage collection. The government is looking at it from 
another perspective. If they allow the city council to handle the issue, and if they 
handle it effectively, people will say, this APC dominated city council is doing so 
well. The SLPP cannot see to let that happen.” (CS-F3)
In 2003, responsibility had been passed on from the Ministry o f Health and 
Sanitation to the Ministry o f Youth and Sports created in 2002, the national 
entity with the smallest budget (NPB-F2), partly on the grounds o f an 
assumed employment opportunity for potential young voters to be 
harnessed through the implementation o f large-scale manual cleaning 
schemes. “If any future planning can be undertaken in Freetown in terms o f 
rehabilitation o f economic activities,” an NGO worker explained, “we have 
to occupy the youth.” (NG-F7)
A senior official in the previous Ministry in charge said that he was crossed 
about this transfer o f power, arguing that he would have favoured 
‘devolution’ to the City Council:
“We were pushing that, because we attended conferences where people tell us that 
as long as this function is with national ministries, they will find it very difficult to 
support us. Whereas when this function is with the municipality, donors will come 
in and assist. [...] The World Bank sent us to Guinea, to a conference. There, we 
were told that all that the ministry was supposed to do is to advise and supervise. 
[...]
Look at the city o f  Freetown now. Garbage is littered almost everywhere. We had 
to come to the conclusion that the Ministry o f Youth and Sports must find it very 
difficult to deal with this problem. So it is not better than run than when the 
Ministry o f Health and Sanitation were collecting it. We gave them all the vehicles: 
five skip tracks, four dump trucks. But when you go to their parking lot, you will 
hardly find vehicles that are now working.
The government wanted us to supervise the process. Our role was to supervise. But 
they refused. They refused to be supervised. [...]. Apparently the youths, they do 
not want to be supervised by other people.” (NPB-F4)
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The move also sparked criticism from local human rights activists. One o f 
them warned,
“A good package for young people would include medical care and a guarantee that 
there would be paid regularly. It would also include proper tools to collect the 
garbage. Doing it with your bare hands is very unhealthy. There’s a lot o f  risk 
involved. They are misusing these people. You do not know what people have 
thrown to the garbage. Lots o f  people here have HIV.” (CS-F6)
Soon after, a report for the World Bank published in February 2004 had 
recommended the creation o f an independent institute, heavily subsidised by 
the Bank, to assume a coordinating function for waste management and 
garbage collection in the capital city (Sood 2004). The involvement o f private 
sector activity was urged as a central pillar o f a partnership strategy involving 
“local organizations such as area municipalities, citizenry, civil society 
groups, private firms and other actors including international donors.” The 
author o f the report concludes, “Experience in other countries has shown 
that the governments have also led effective partnerships.”
Yet as much as the study provided a detailed image o f the collapsed state of 
waste management in the city (Image 4 in annex 3). its conclusions 
demonstrated once again a wishful thinking approach to urban management 
by advocating cooperation based on theoretical assertions rather than on the 
political reality on the ground, which was marked by interorganisational 
competition and partisan hostility traversing different levels o f polity 
resulting in exactly the “limitations o f local discretion” caused by institutions 
o f local governance having become the “target o f central influence” that 
Page and Goldsmith (cf. CHAPTER TWO) envisioned.
In January 2005 the Mayor filed a written complaint with the Ministry o f  
Finance accusing several councillors o f illegally transforming garbage 
dumping sites into private areas for urban development projects and asking 
for forced eviction o f those settling on the sites, arguing that the 
“reconstituted council doesn’t have either the technical or human 
competencies to effectively address the present situation.” (quoted in Concord 
Times 2005a). Even though the willingness to hand over the responsibility to 
provide cleaning services from the Ministry o f Youth and Sports to the
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Freetown City Council had been restated by the former in early December
2004 (Concord Times 1 December, quoted in: UNAMSIL 2004a), in February
2005 the Council publicly declared that it was unable to execute this task due 
to the lack o f basic logistics and funding, for which no support had been 
received from the national government (For di People 10 February, quoted in: 
UNAMSIL 2005b).
This statement came less than two weeks after one o f the leading domestic 
civic rights NGOs had issued a public statement bemoaning that no priority 
had been given so far to waste disposal in Freetown compared to targeted 
proposals in this regard in other parts o f the country (A m ko  27 January, 
quoted, in: UNAMSIL. 2005a), Two weeks later, a grant from the World 
Bank for USf 2.8 million to the central government to support cleaning 
activities in the city was rejected by the City Council on the grounds that 
financial control would not be devolved to them, but would remain with the 
Ministry. On the same day, the Mayor complained in public about the 
practical inaccessibility o f an additional US$ 350,000, earmarked as an 
emergency waste fund, because o f retained central government control over 
it (Standard Times 2005b, Concord Times 2005b).
The purchase o f a sophisticated cleaning vehicle under dubious 
circumstances during the war years also continued fuelling public debate 
(Image 5 in annex 3). The Freetown City Council, without ever putting it to 
use, had handed it over to the Ministry o f Youth and Sports in 2004. Even 
though the Minister had made it clear that he would prefer reselling the 
vehicle to buy simple equipment, the buying agent company offered to 
provide training for two operators, which was never carried out. Following 
public inquiries about its whereabouts in May 2005, the vehicle was found in 
the backyard o f the Ministry, cannibalised and vandalized. Neither the 
Ministry nor the Council leadership felt responsible. In March 2006, the City 
Council eventually received a 3.2 million Pounds Sterling refund for the 
machine. A subsequent council session to discuss the use o f these funds 
ended in a stalemate, with half o f the councillors voting to utilise them to 
pay terminal benefits to deceased councillors (Concord Times 2006c). One 
commentator exemplified the political weight o f  the garbage collection
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quagmire when he asked, “with the politicisation o f garbage collection, 
people are already wondering if the APC town council could not clean the 
city, then what political guarantees could the citizenry repose in such a party 
to run the affairs o f the state for that matter?” (Bayratay 2005) Two months 
later, after an unsuccessful council session to determine the use o f the 
suddenly available funds, the National Traders Multi-Purpose Union Sierra 
Leone, a loose association of low income petty traders, decided to embark 
on an autonomous cleaning exercise in the Central District Market area of  
Freetown in an effort to, according to its leader, “ensure that business is 
conducted in a clean and healthy environment.” (quoted in Concord Times 
2006e). Business interests saw on-the-spot action as the only response to a 
.managerial . stalemate. caused . by . incompetence . as . much . as by 
interorganisational competition for political credit.
Remarkably, the only area o f agreement between the City Council leadership 
and national ministries appeared to be the question o f slum and squatter area 
clearance. Both parties emphasised that the problem consisted o f 27 
different dwelling sites that all shared poor sanitation and high levels of 
crime, eventually having to make way for urban development projects. Yet 
shortly after the appointment o f a new Acting Mayor, Rosaline Foarde, in 
April 2006, the eviction o f several dozens o f petty traders and the demolition 
o f their stands in the city centre caused a public outcry. The City Council 
leadership rejected accusations o f having ordered the move (Concord Times 
2006d) but soon after admitted that it did in fact play an indirect role in the 
incident in that it had received complaints by registered traders about illegal 
trading activity in the area. The traders had apparently offered to destroy the 
stands in an arbitrary move, but an unidentified member o f the Council 
seemed to have acted faster by ordering the demolition, which also affected 
some o f those who had filed complaints {Standard Times 2006a). During a 
subsequent gathering on National Housing Programs in May 2006, the 
Mayor o f Freetown argued that dwellers would need to be relocated as they 
were “not meant for the city.” Illustrating national instrumentalisation o f  
international policies, the Deputy Minister o f Works and Housing even 
made direct reference to the World Bank-commissioned Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSP) which, in her words, “oblige to undertake decisive
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action to reduce slum dwellings as a priority.” (as quoted in: Standard Times 
2006c). It thus became apparent once again that in the absence o f clearly 
defined areas o f cooperation, interests at different levels in Freetown align 
on-the-spot, but they are usually aimed against the weakest constituents o f  
the urban economy that possess no political weight or lobby.
Freetown after the storm: international ‘success’ and local reality
The last UNAMSIL troops left Sierra Leone in December 2005 (Doyle
2005) in what was widely considered one o f the most effective peacekeeping 
missions in the UN ’s history (Eide et al. 2005). Comparing the experience to 
the British involvement in the invasions o f iraq and Afghanistan, “Sierra 
Leone has been a success,” The Economist (2007b: 23) seconded.
After the departure, high-level international staff continued considering the 
rigidity o f the rural institution o f chieftaincy and its friction with rural district 
councils as the main drivers o f  potential conflict (IBA-F6, cf. Jones 2005). 
True, many newly elected rural representatives who had not also been 
headman were reportedly unable to exert power (due to a constant challenge 
by existing tribal institutions) while also finding themselves unable to gain 
leverage in the political centre, i.e., the capital city.
There however, a twofold challenge o f equal magnitude prevailed, but this one 
went largely unnoticed by the international community. First, the extreme 
scarcity o f self-generated resources made both local and national 
policymakers dependent on supra-national funding. Second, the function o f  
the capital city not only as the largest urban agglomeration in the country but 
also as the centre o f national politics through multi-level competition over 
policy-making supremacy (both via formal and informal channels) imposed 
tight limits on the scope o f effective policy deliberation for the city itself.
Based on her reading o f the single-party national elections in 1986, Ferme 
(1999: 184) had come to the conclusion that
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“the discourse o f  democratization and reform that has engulfed Sierra Leone and 
other African states seems to favor the concentration o f  electoral [national] politics 
in urban centers. [...] Future elections might restrict voters to a choice o f parties, 
not individuals, and this might shift competition for political patronage and office from the 
local constituenty to the party headquarters in Freetown.” [emphasis added]
Against the background the aforementioned dual function o f Freetown this 
comment foreshadows the claim o f an ‘overdetermined’ city, which will be 
discussed in detail in CHAPTER SEVEN. Certainly, political reality only a few 
years after the end o f the war (but almost twenty years after the publication 
o f her analysis) proved Ferme right. In January 2005, the press reported that 
the Mayor had fallen out with his deputy as the result o f general 
disagreement over their respective authorities, displaying first signs of severe 
-tension within the opposition party at the local level (Standard Times 2005a). 
The councillors had also made critical statements about the Mayor’s ‘know- 
it-all’ attitude and complained about his personal manners during council 
sessions. In one instance, Radio UNAMSIL, the UN-run local radio station 
reported that the Mayor had referred to the councillors as “dogs with their 
tails between their legs” and had refused to apologise, arguing that he was 
“saying the truth” (quoted in: Standard Times 2005c).
In a move to cover his own political back, the country’s SLPP President 
claimed in April 2005 that the conflict between the national government and 
the city administration had been resolved amicably and spoke out in support 
o f the City Council saying, “I would like to emphasize that government will 
provide the necessary support to the Council to ensure that Freetown could 
once again become a city we can all be proud of.” (quoted in: Concord Times 
2005c). But in October 2005, the SLPP’s Secretary-General publicly initiated 
the political battle for the 2007 presidential elections in the urban arena 
(Image 6 in annex 3) by launching a vocal attack on the opposition party by 
blaming them for being unable to clean the capital city and arguing that this 
shortcoming demonstrated “the ineptitude o f the APC to take care o f very 
basic problems.” The failure to deliver, he said, had resulted in a loss o f  
“moral authority to take care o f the country.” The Mayor quickly dismissed 
the accusation, calling it “rubbish” and “small boy kind o f talk” (as quoted in 
Concord Times 2005d).
182
Two weeks later, the leadership o f the City Council complained about the 
tax levy imposed by national customs on two vehicles that the council had 
purchased to alleviate the alarming environmental pollution in the city. The 
Mayor accused the government o f “sabotaging the efforts o f the Freetown 
City Council to keep the city clean.” His statement was sidelined by a high 
level APC representative arguing that the garbage removal discussion was 
merely a component o f a larger strategy by the SLPP to diminish the chances 
o f the opposition party in the 2007 presidential elections (Cocorioko 2005a). 
Another two weeks later, the mayor again spoke out in public, blaming poor 
and corrupt law enforcement for the insufficient mobilisation o f market dues 
and other potential sources o f income for the City Council. He added that 
the income from dues, which at the time was only paid by approximately .5% 
o f the traders, was insufficient to cover the expenses o f the Council in light 
o f the continuous reluctance of the central government to devolve financial 
assets.
In January 2006, the Chief Administrator o f the City Council admitted that 
public confidence had been lost as a result o f constant infighting between 
councillors. “The Council has been politicked and is plagued by personality 
conflicts. I have a difficult job. There are others who try to frustrate my 
efforts. There were no criteria set for selection o f councillors so this makes it 
difficult to work with them as part o f a management team.” Then she 
revealed that the Council’s Development Plan had been rejected by the 
Decentralisation Secretariat, denying the council access to one billion Leones 
from the central government. The head o f the Secretariat justified this 
rejection with the inertia o f the local institution, saying “City Council never 
participates in anything. Even their own development plan, they had not 
cooperated with any ministry” (quoted in: Christian Monitor 2006). Only one 
day later, the chairman o f the APC in January 2006 joined the ranks o f high- 
level national politicians publicly criticising the Mayor for his ineffective 
management of the City Council {Concord Times 2006a) in what constituted 
the first signal o f intra-party conflict cutting across political levels.
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Chapter 6: Regulating Kabul
The Afghan beehive: needs, profits, and the politics of aid
In his writing about the reconstruction o f Afghanistan Sultan Barakat (2002: 
814) has fielded the argument that one o f the most immediate dangers lay in 
an unequal distribution of project monies “between the poor rural majority 
and the competing claims o f the more vocal, visible and accessible urban 
minority.” It was therefore “vital that neither Kabul, nor the other strategic 
urban centres become the sole beneficiaries and every effort should be made 
to maximise the benefits and coverage o f all the different geographical 
regions,' with a view to reaching the majority o f the population that 
continues to be rurally based.” (ibid., cf. AACA 2002)
N o doubt, this concern was timely in 2002. Following the ousting o f the 
Taleban, the political centralisation project o f the occupation forces— led by 
the US Military and complemented by NATO troops—was paralleled by 
non-governmental organisations’ reinstated dichotomy between decision­
making in headquarters either far away from Afghanistan or concentrated in 
the country’s capital city and implementation “in the provinces”, the ‘site’ o f  
greatest need (cf. Stockton 2002: 29). This also comes to the fore in 
Rondinelli’s (2004: 13) recollection that “one o f the most difficult 
challenges” in the country’s reconstruction process was the channelling o f  
large amounts o f money without being able to rely on a central government 
with national authority. In their aim to support
“nation building lite, [...] assorted teams o f nation-builders are frenetically working 
on development frameworks, national plans, feasibility studies, aid-tracking systems, 
employment strategies, and the like. [...] The beehive feeling o f Kabul makes the 
contrast with the rest o f the country even more stark. [...] The further from Kabul, 
the thinner the aid presence becomes.” (Donini 2004: 137)
Yet this was only party true. After announcing its first operation in 
Afghanistan in April 2002, the World Bank made sure that a larger share of 
monetary assistance was funnelled into public works and housing projects to 
assist the reconstruction o f  rural villages than the amount spent on
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emergency infrastructure reconstruction Kabul and provincial centres 
(Rondinelli 2004: 24). N o question, Kabul seemed relatively better off. In 
mid-2003, about 45% of staff members o f the Ministry o f Health and almost 
half o f the country’s hospital beds were still located in the capital city 
(Khabir 2003: 623). Maternal mortality in Kabul, while still much higher than 
the averages o f most other countries, was only a tenth o f the rates 
experienced in the most remote provinces (Bartlett et al. 2005). Internet 
cafes were open in five urban centres, but main television stations were still 
based in Kabul and Herat (as o f March 2005). The only medium of 
communication available across the country was radio, whose legacy as a 
source o f information and propaganda had begun in 1940 with the creation 
o f Radio Kabul (later renamed Radio Afghanistan', Hatch Dupree 2002: 981, cf. 
Altai Consulting 2005, Kumar 2006).
At the same time however, Kabul underwent a process o f dramatic urban 
concentration (cf. Bertaud 2005). One interviewee urged, “You cannot see 
Kabul as Kabul only — Kabul is also the deprived areas everywhere in the 
country.” (NG-K8) The chart on the following page illustrates this 
acceleration o f capital city growth during the post-war years, a trend that is 
probably unprecedented in recent world history, even when compared with 
fast-growing cities such as Dhaka, Lagos, Karachi, Jakarta or Mumbai.68 The 
map on the next page then shows the expanse o f the city in December 2005 
(courtesy o f UN Habitat).
68 Growth rates in these cities vary between 6.17% and 3.13%; UNDESA (2004: 8).
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Resonating with demographic and financial trends presented in CHAPTER 
FOUR, one key informant explained,
“Kabul’s dominance has been the product o f post-1945, particularly 1955, the 
pattern o f  foreign aid. The urban budget in 1953 was about $17.5 million, it 
suddenly jumped up because o f the $100 million that the Soviet Union provided in 
1955, this brought with it a large expansion o f the bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy 
was predominantly central in Kabul. The trend o f the last years is just opposite. 
Other cities are all moving in terms o f  land prices, in Herat, Qandahar, or Jalalabad, 
or Mazar are all matching Kabul.” (CS-K1)
For sure, other cities were catching up. One interviewee commented,
“The trafficking routes come through Herat city. [...] It affects the city because 
most people involved in trafficking live in cities. Most people involved have built 
huge houses and have big cars on the roads so the living standard has come up as a 
result o f the income from the poppy trade. [...] Even the farmers have been able to 
buy tractors and have dug tube wells and have generators. So it has a significant 
effect on the standard o f living.” (IBA-K9e)
But Kabul remained by far the largest city. Migration into urban centres 
accelerated further between 2003 and 2005, constituting a “unidirectional 
flow”, according to one researcher (Opel 2005).69 Nearly half o f the 997 
respondents to a recent survey on labour migration in Kabul, Herat and 
Jalalabad had arrived less than a year prior to being interviewed, and the 
predominant motivation for relocation was the scarcity o f employment 
opportunities in rural areas and the perception o f cities as offering more 
promising livelihoods (Beall and Schiitte 2006, Schiitte 2004a, NPB-K1).
Amid such growth, Kabul was groaning under the increased demand for the 
most basic services. Reliable electricity has only recently found its way to the 
semi-peripheral neighbourhoods and some still remain without power. 
Sewerage systems remain overburdened, which is major source of 
preventable illnesses and hardship, particularly for more vulnerable residents 
such as children, widows and the elderly (Image 7 in annex 3). The UN had 
to issue a cholera alert in June 2005 (UNAMA 2005). Roads are in poor
69 Yet while overwhelmingly directed toward, urban centres, migratory patterns were not 
exclusively one-way streets. Some Afghans were in fact leaving the capital city after 
unsuccessfully trying to find a job in the allegedly booming urban economy and collapsing 
under the continuously soaring rents of up to US$ 200 for a three-room mud built house in 
an informal area (McDougall 2006, Salahuddin 2005).
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shape and are notoriously blocked for the better half o f the day. Yet at the 
centre of household concerns were rising rents and costs o f living, rampant 
unemployment, and lack o f sanitary services (Beall and Esser 2005b). As a 
humanitarian aid specialist put it: “In Afghanistan, disaster drives urban 
growth.” (IBA-K3, cf. UN Habitat 2002: 4) The ghost-writers o f urban 
policies for the Afghan government, UN Habitat has ever since been 
pushing the importance o f these matters (cf. TISA 2004a: 10).
Returnees had had a clear preference for relocating in urban areas in order to 
maintain a standard o f living known from eastern Iran, Peshawar and 
Islamabad in western Pakistan, or elsewhere. Female returnees, in addition to 
urban services and education. opportunities, also perceive cities a .more 
secure environment (Yavari d’Hellencourt et al. 2003: 4). While some 
improvements regarding the standing o f city dwelling women within their 
own family had been observed by Amnesty International after the cessation 
of armed fighting, this contrasted starkly with a largely unchanged situation 
in most rural areas, exacerbated by the slow re-establishment o f jAzhw-based 
justice systems outside urban centres (AI 2003b: 7, North 2005a). In some 
cases, women that had been victims o f forced marriages fled to provincial 
centres or even the capital city in order to seek assistance from international 
agencies (NRC 2004).
Analyses o f the discrepancies between urban centres and the Afghan 
countryside also pointed to increased opportunities for women’s 
participation in cities through their integration into the work environment, 
educational institutions, and civic interest groups (Thier and Chopra 2002: 
906). For those most vulnerable, such as widows, cities offered better 
physical protection in the absence o f family and easier access to aid schemes 
(Yavari d’Hellencourt et al. 2003: 5, cf. Kamal 2004).
An entirely different constituency, three years after the official end o f the 
war Kabul was also filled with expatriates. Indeed, the international aid scene 
dwelling in the city had repeatedly been accused o f living a peaceful and 
sometimes luxurious life in their “cosy offices” (Koelbl 2005) in Kabul. An
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Australian journalist (Beeston 2006, cf. Ladumer 2005) described this life in 
a ‘hardship duty station’ in poignant words:
“Dusk is falling, and around Kabul the cocktails are being shaken, the delicacies 
prepared and the city [...] is about to enjoy another night o f revelry. The four- 
wheel-drives o f  the international aid agencies prowl the backstreets o f the upmarket 
Wazir Akbar Khan district, crowding the entrances to the bars, restaurants and 
nightclubs that have sprung up there. Despite power cuts, terrorist attacks and the 
haphazard nature o f Afghan life, Kabul is booming. A typical evening for foreigners 
begins with a discussion about where to meet for drinks and then whether to eat 
Italian, Thai, Indian, French or Lebanese food. Afterwards there are bars and pool 
halls run by Russians from Tajikistan, and for those so inclined, brothels packed 
with Chinese prostitutes.”70
It took time until markers o f the magnitude o f urban poverty and urban 
vulnerability managed to find their way onto research and policy agendas. 
Only when practitioners realised that mere presence o f aid organisation in 
cities was often equated with urban development, the latter gradually gained 
momentum. And due to the lack o f arable land, dwindling water resources, 
and shrinking rural livelihood opportunities coupled with the return of  
refugees and shift o f internally displaced people to urban areas, urbanisation 
was likely to continue rising. Urban centres and their surrounding areas were 
thus experiencing “continuing widespread humanitarian needs,” as an 
international disaster specialist told me.
Kabul Province had also experienced one o f the sharpest rises in wage levels, 
together with Mazar-I-Sharif in the North (CSO 2006: 14). On the labour 
supply side, higher incomes from dependent agricultural activity closer the 
capital city were relativised by higher commodity prices. The cost o f basic 
foodstuff such as wheat grain in Kabul City and Kabul Province was among 
the highest in the country, but unlike other high price areas in which 
underlying factors were linked to insecurity and poor infrastructure, the price 
level in and around the capital was due to higher living expenses o f those 
involved in the supply chain, including commercial property rents (ibid., 4). 
At the bottom line, higher incomes did therefore not automatically translate 
into a higher standard o f living or more food security; on the contrary, the
70 A crackdown on prostitution in the capital city was eventually undertaken in February 
2006, when 46 Chinese prostitutes working in several ‘guesthouses’ were arrested by the 
police (AFP 2006).
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terms o f trade o f urban and peri-urban residents living close to the capital 
city were not necessarily better than those dwelling in more isolated areas 
(ibid., 18), an illustration o f what UN Habitat has now come to call the 
“urban penalty” (UN Habitat 2006b). “This disintegration o f relative prices 
conditions a disintegration o f the normative framework,” as one observer 
puts it (Gemer 2006).
The donor rhetoric o f Afghan cities as engines of growth, while conceptually 
appealing, thus missed the reality o f vulnerable urban populations. Earlier 
attempts, upon the victory against Taleban forces, to encourage rural returns 
can be considered an implicit admission that the importance o f a coherent 
policy to boost economic growth in urban centres had long been 
underestimated. Even four years after the termination o f major fighting “a 
very real confusion” (NG-K3) persisted over the responsibilities o f various 
local and national players with regard to urban management and 
development, “which effectively paralyses any serious urban development 
initiative.” (ibid.)
O f the 16,830 city hectares o f usable terrain encircled by steep mountains, 
only 1,000 ha had not already been used for construction as o f mid-2004. 
This extreme density in the Kabul River Valley, exacerbated by burgeoning 
informal setdements, was the background for a US-led envisaged 
construction o f a satellite setdement in the north o f the city centre, towards 
the Shomali plain. An aid worker explained,
“We have been directed by the US Congress to spend a lot o f money on urban 
IDPs’ housing, and we worked very hard to get MUDH [Ministry o f Urban 
Development and Housing] to donate some land for an urban upgrading approach. 
[...] For political and financial reasons the US government is wanting to spend the 
money, but it will be difficult to get the rest o f  the satellite city to develop around it, 
to provide the sustainability o f the place.”
This endeavour exemplifies the notion o f cross-level ‘axial governance’ 
fielded in this study (cf. CHAPTER SEVEN) as it found immediate support by 
high-level staff members in Kabul Municipality’s planning department, 
which got excited both about the approach to focus on planning new areas 
rather than engaging in the messy upgrading process pushed by UN Habitat
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with the support o f major INGOs, and about the obvious budgetary 
opportunity underlying this construction project.
Yet a staff member o f the bilateral donor organisation pushing the project 
also criticised this initiative, calling it an unviable “Le Corbusier’s dream” 
and a “real estate deal,” claiming that the cost per family would be ten times 
the average cost o f usual shelter solutions, and accusing influential Afghan 
investors o f buying cheap land in the designated area with the aim of  
reselling at profit to the government.
Lucrative deals with urban land were indeed to be made. Private capital, both 
from external accounts and generated through legal and illegal economic 
activity within the country, was driving the physical reconstruction of Kabul 
(Magnaldi and Patera 2004). The former Minister o f Finance, Ashraf Ghani 
claimed that “in Kabul alone, US$ 1.6 billion have gone into investments 
during the past four years. We need to have a strategy o f urban growth.” 
(Presentation at Chatham House, London: 26 September 2005) Claims made 
in unison by a number o f INGOs that resounded in early 2002 in the 
context o f the financial deprivation o f local institutions to support newly 
arrived urban dwellers in kind through the provision of building materials, 
while rightfully seeking to capitalise on the ingenuity o f war-tested Afghans, 
helped sustain the risky heterogeneity o f building quality (in the case o f  
earthquakes or heavy rains; cf. Magnaldi and Patera 2004: 100). What is 
more, it was also politically counter-productive in that it amplified the 
problem of informal construction, thus playing into the hands o f control- 
maniacs dominating Kabul Municipality and weakening the leverage o f both 
local and national interest groups advocating a more participatory urban 
planning process. Besides, in kind support also hampered the resurgence o f a 
competitive construction market, thus putting even more strain on small 
scale carpenter businesses. These had already come under pressure by calls 
by politically well connected construction companies to curb informal 
construction and to implement and enforce building regulations, arguably to
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slow down construction o f small scale informal settlements on high value 
land in favour o f more profitable large scale projects (cf. Basharat 2005).71
Widespread tenure insecurity was exacerbated by rising rents (Beall and 
Esser 2005a: 35, cf. World Bank 2006d). Afghan power brokers and 
organisations with international currency snapped up undamaged property, 
forcing poorer Afghans into informal settlements (Image 8 in annex 3). The 
economic losses o f such shifts are dramatic as long as the money and labour 
invested in these constructions does enter the formal economy through 
settlement formalisation (Schacher 2004: 74). Johnson and Leslie (2004: 164) 
have therefore aptly called the urban real estate market “one o f the starkest 
examples” o f post-war roving banditry by key government figures. “[FJrom 
the clerks in the municipality who deal with building permissions, to the 
ministers who quietly offer visiting donor missions and their house to rent 
(payable offshore, o f course),” all levels o f local and national government 
had a role to play in this bazaar. Incentivised by the readiness o f international 
development actors to pay New York-level rents, officials extricated both 
private and public lands by capitalising on the factual power bestowed on 
them by their official positions (Courtney et al. 2005: 22). A hundredfold 
leverage on initial ‘investments’ in pseudo-formal documentation from the 
municipality was the norm, and occasional investigations into cases o f  
corruption-backed land appropriation have regularly been outpaced by the 
speed o f construction on redistributed allotments.
Over the course o f the past one hundred years, a shift toward the northwest 
of the city has taken place with respect to the spatial concentration o f upper 
middle-class and upper-class residents. Whereas the old city used to be the 
preferred location, these income groups moved to Shar-i-Naw to live in the 
proximity o f the royal family during the 1940s. Paralleled in its standards 
only by the creation o f Wa^ir Akbar Khan, the neighbourhood remained the 
first choice until the late 1990s, when due to the widespread destruction of  
the city centre those who could afford it moved further northwest in an area
71 Micro credits aimed at incentivising local upgrading in Kabul also proved largely 
ineffective because in light of unclear tenure, funds were often used instead to mitigate 
against sudden survival needs arising in a post-war, deprived local economy (cf. Magnaldi 
and Patera 2004: 101-102).
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called Qala-i-Malik Tashoor. Not only has this area undergone a trend towards 
a gated community, with private security and exclusive supply o f water and 
generator electricity; the spatial shift is also coupled inseparably with the 
“invasion” o f international aid agencies that has driven into the two upscale 
areas. This concentration drove up prices within months, making subletting 
o f private houses one o f the most profitable sources o f income in the 
country (Arez and Dittmann 2005: 145, cf. Brynen 2005: 239, Magnaldi and 
Patera 2004: 105). “As in cities from Dili to Freetown,” Chesterman (2002: 
41-42) explained shortly after the capture o f Kabul by the US-backed 
Northern Alliance, the rental market “has exploded, accompanied by 
dubious evictions o f existing tenants to make way for more lucrative foreign 
occupants.”
One respondent (NG-K3) urged structural reform, saying, “We cannot 
continue to portray the ongoing theft and rendering o f government land, 
manipulation o f official distributions and uncontrolled— often illegal, under­
serviced and unproductive— speculative development by powerful 
commanders on as an inevitable consequence o f the war.” Still, another 
informant rejected the notion that more external aid was needed:
“My submission is that Kabul has an unbelievable amount o f  potential, but the type 
o f imagination that is necessary to harness this space... I can see making two billion 
dollars for the government from proper production o f space in Kabul without any 
problem. Kabul does not need foreign aid to put it together. Kabul needs 
imagination, management, and relendess dialogue to be able to do it.” (CS-K1)
Nonetheless, the majority o f buildings erected all over Kabul after 2002—  
where tens o f thousands o f mud houses that still remain to be connected to 
water and power circuits— circumvented the pressing public need for 
appropriate housing, addressing instead higher-level demands from the 
increasing number o f wealthy ‘businessmen’ and creating “pockets o f  
opulence” (Witte 2005),, wealthy neighbourhoods with glittering mansions, 
Iran-style (Image 9 in annex 3). Older neighbourhoods such as Wa%irA.kbar 
Khan, one o f the more sought after residential areas in Kabul, were 
increasingly rivalled by new construction projects in Sherpur, a former 
setdement razed and redeveloped in a strongman-backed case o f land-
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grabbing and redistribution (Suhrke et al. 2004: 45). One respondent 
explained this conversion o f physical capital into political capital as follows.
“There are two types o f markets [in Kabul]. One is that money, new money, is 
replacing old ownership, because o f the rise o f  prices and because o f the very large 
number o f immigrants who come and make a windfall profit. Ownership is radically 
changing. [...] Second is outright seizure, the conversion o f political office into 
control o f space. The land scandal in Sherpur is one example where people literally 
translate their positions in office into acquisition. There was a public outrage, the 
President was outraged, there was some inquiry and some remedial action, but the 
fact remained that those people really gained. [...] Political capital got converted into 
ownership, and this is long-term. And modalities to be found in this context are in the 
politics o f  construction o f space, and there, there has been radical shortage o f  
imagination.” (CS-K1)
Without doubt, the economic boom in Kabul is also financed by drug 
money (Rubin et al. 2004: 13). Asked about opponents o f settlement 
legalisation, one respondent cited drug lords, arguing that “opium is coming 
[to the city] with a vengeance” — crime had become an urban phenomenon: 
“it’s not just the bad guys in the hills.” (IBA-K3) The reinvestment of 
incomes from production and trade in narcotics has now even become 
public policy, with one provincial governor talking openly about an 
“informal amnesty” for drug lords willing to end their involvement in poppy 
cultivation and ‘leave their money at home’ in order to help kick-start 
construction companies and small industrial plants (Cooley 2006, cf. World 
Bank 2006b: 23). The statement o f a high level non-governmental official 
touched succinctly on this issue:
“Urban real estate prices cannot be separated from circulation o f money that I 
made in a criminalised economy. That demand is very high. The price o f an acre o f  
land in some parts o f Kabul now is US$ 1.2 million. Why shouldn't the public at 
large benefit from this? So I would like a model o f  production o f land that... a 
transparent auction o f land, and out o f that we make €2 billion, €3 billion. [...] The 
elite will provide the tax base for helping the poor. [...] A formalisation o f the 
illegal setdements [is necessary], because there is no way in the world that the state 
is able to handle that. The problem is the politics, or the mental models o f a place 
like [UN] Habitat: they take poverty for granted, and they take slums for granted. I 
don’t buy that model. I want to look at cities as radical centres o f growth and as 
places that are liveable, and as places where there is money. [...] This is not a zero 
sum game.” [...]
Urban growth actually in one way is a tax on the drug economy, and I really think we should 
go for a country strategy o f a model for the production o f  space that taxes the high 
demand for land as a way o f  funnelling gains that are derived from a criminalised 
economy, but that economy cannot be prosecuted. So, one way is to actually 
harnessing into a model o f urban production, spatial production. Kabul’s problem
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is not shortage o f money, it is shortage o f imagination. [...] What is lacking is a 
coherent model o f spatial production: definition o f the partners in that model, and 
ensuring that the current holders or owners o f land are treated as stakeholders and 
not deprived o f the benefits.” (CS-K1)
This would mean dealing with warlords as legitimate business partners. Not 
so far-fetched an idea, as some o f the most prominent human rights 
violators have already gained comfortable seats in the national parliament.
Historical evidence suggests that similar structures also played a role in state- 
building in other regions. Charles Tilly’s (1985) narrative o f state formation 
in Western Europe is that three major aspects o f statehood, namely physical 
force, capacity o f extraction and territorial control, have been at mediaeval 
warlords’ disposal. Yet the key difference with the situation in Afghanistan is 
that these mediaeval warlords did not have to contest permanently with a 
central government, while admittedly weak, which continues to be buffered 
substantially by international forces, both politically and militarily (cf. 
Mackinlay 2000, Giustozzi 2000). Furthermore, as Jung (2003: 20) points 
out, warlords o f the present day do not depend on local economies to 
market their extractions as they are well-connected regionally and, as in the 
case o f drug markets, even globally. “The crucial linkage between protection 
and extraction is therefore severed,” explains Jung (ibid.), “and [the] parallel 
markets o f violent expropriation and liberal accumulation coexist.” Some 
former commanders had been extremely successful in integrating themselves 
and their clans into the urban political economy o f the capital city, such as 
Marshall Fahim, a Vanjsheri, and Sayyaf, a former university lecturer and 
religious conservative leading the Sunni ltehat faction and exerting significant 
informal power over the Supreme Court (Johnson and Leslie 2004: 163). 
What, then, was the scope o f controlling such warlords?
A benevolent politics, strong private sector’ vision (e.g., Esman 2004: 163) 
on Afghan reconstruction has been the favourite approach of the key 
external actor, the US Government. Together with democratisation and 
security, this liberal stance serves as one o f the three key pillars o f the 
international strategy to prevent Afghanistan from plunging back into factual 
anarchy. This view was summarised rather stunningly in October 2002 by
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the former US Undersecretary o f Treasury for International Affairs, John 
Taylor (cited in: Heffron 2004: 58). Contemplating the implications o f 
“storefront after storefront [in Kabul] selling uncut logs, bricks, mortar, 
trials, shovels” in front o f a forum at the Council o f Foreign Relations he 
concluded: “I could only imagine the huge improvements in productivity 
and the better life that pre-cut lumber and cheap saws could bring; perhaps 
foreign investment by firms like Home Depot could some day be the agents 
o f such change.”
Some o f this desired private investor-driven construction is indeed 
happening, yet without the alleged trickle-down effects. In November 2005, 
Kabul saw the opening o f its first five-star hotel, the Kabul Serena. Rooms 
started at $250 a night, roughly five times the monthly salary o f an Afghan 
civil servant, and peaked at $1,200 for the presidential suite. During its 
inauguration ceremony, President Karzai branded the project a role model of 
urban development, suggesting that the hotel form the new centre o f the 
capital city (AFP 2005). Only a few days later at the inception o f the Kabul 
City Centre, developed by the non-Afghan Safi Group o f Companies (SCG) 
which purportedly enjoys the high level support o f an influential ex-minister, 
Karzai made a very similar remark, calling the centre a “quantum leap 
forward” in Afghanistan’s efforts to encourage private investment (GoA 
2005b). In the same month, the Afghan government was accepted as an 
adjoining member to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(GoA 2005c).
Additional post-war FDI into the capital city’s economy has so far been 
focusing on construction materials, telecommunications services, agricultural 
fertilisers, and solar technology (Heise 2005, Chuang 2006).72 Tourism has 
been suggested as one o f the more promising sectors for FDI, in spite o f the 
risk o f “McDonaldisation and Hiltonisation”, which would eventually eat up 
the competitive advantage o f Afghanistan as an adventure tourism 
destination. This would require targeted investments into marketing material 
and basic infrastructure, measures that so far had been hampered by both
72 In February 2006, Ariana Television—emitting from Kabul—went international by 
establishing permanent screen broadcast to the USA via satellite Q4TN 2006).
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the security situation and different priorities of international and national 
investors (Woznicki 2005). Yet large scale infrastructure reconstruction 
comes with a price tag attached, as demonstrated by the 2003 offer o f soft 
loans by a multilateral funding organisation to finance one o f the 
government’s top priority projects, a highway from Kabul to Kandahar, 
which according to one o f the most eminent analysts o f Afghan politics was 
capable o f “lur[ing] Afghanistan into the debt trap” (Rubin 2003b: 10) — 
once again, one is tempted to add (cf. CHAPTER FOUR).
Hefffon (2004: 65) is therefore making an important observation when he 
points out the irony o f coalitions between “local recidivist forces [...] with 
apolitical, neoliberal” ones acting on the country’s cities in the name of 
economic development to favour the restoration o f an exclusionary structure 
that promises higher yields for foreign investors, over more equitable 
reconstruction. Indeed, the absence of formalpolitical affiliations among high-level 
technocratic cadres installed by President Karzai has been singled out as a 
success factor for “extending the authority and capacity o f the Kabul 
government to the provinces.” (Thier 2004: 56)
Yet the influx o f foreign capital seeking non-governmental local agents for 
implementation has led to a creation o f  parallel institutions vis-a-vis a still 
embryonic state. Two INGO project supervisors explained, “[1] We are 
moving up in creating structures. [... ] It is at the beginning. We are telling 
them, ‘You need to strengthen your shura by supporting people whom you 
trust.’ [2:] In district six, the first talked all the different shuras, and then we 
gradually managed to convince them that they need a district level 
representation.” (NG-K5). In another organisation, respondents were 
similarly keen on pushing institutional change, but disagreed on whether this 
would be easier or more difficult in Kabul when compared to the “rest o f  
the country”:
“[1] We are currently thinking about federalising all the different kinds o f  
representative bodies that we’ve been helping to create. In the countryside, it will be 
easier; it is a relatively homogenous landscape at the local level. And when you 
consider the fact that the National Solidarity Program is operating there, which has 
only recendy begun to target peri-urban communities, then you can easily add two 
and two together. It will be easier to scale up. [...]”
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“[2] I think this is not true. The education level in the city is much higher [...]. Also, 
the community representation structures here are much closer physically to 
government ministries. [...] Here in the city everything is denser and direct.” (NG- 
K6)
And while institutions were altered, structures o f rent-seeking and 
distribution remained linked to local “potentates, tribal leaders and notables 
[who] are bringing together the families who are dependent on them into 
local user associations [...] and creating relations o f dependence and 
partnership with intermediaries in NGOs in the capital.” (Wimmer and 
Schetter 2003: 532) This linking o f the urban with the rural creates a new 
form o f non-state clientilism— “strengthened by the financial resources o f  
the international donor community, and obstructing the stabilisation o f the 
state authority and legitimacy.” (ibid.)
Seen against this background, it is no surprise that rural-based politicians, 
alias former commanders, have continued harnessing the frustration o f rural 
folk over the slow pace o f rural rehabilitation as a means to “political 
profiling” against the central government (Paasch 2005), most visible today 
in the East and South o f the country but prevalent in the relatively more 
stable North and West as well. Nonetheless, disgruntlement over the low 
percentage o f aid monies benefiting Afghan institutions rather than being 
channelled through international agencies and companies is also rife among 
the poor in urban areas, and the vigour o f widespread frustration among the 
population in general led to high-level politicians increasingly advocating 
direct budget support in order to strengthen the central government 
structure (McMahon 2005).
Responding to my question on whether donors had enough faith in the 
ability o f senior Afghans to make effective policies for Afghanistan, a project 
leader employed by the municipality answered,
“No. The policies are driven by donors. These are donor-oriented policies. [...] 
Many o f the people that have been living here during a long time have completely 
been ignored. [...] They do not speak English, but they are educated: they are 
engineers, doctors... They are not corrupt, but unfortunately they are totally 
ignored. It’s a discriminatory approach against the people who stayed in Kabul, 
whether they were members o f the [Communist] party or not.” (NPB-K1)
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Similarly frustrated by the imposition o f foreign schemes and personnel, a 
ministerial staff member suggested an innovative way out, arguing, “The 
problem with the donors is that they are pushing their own advisers. My 
proposal would be a tandem: for every international adviser, we should get 
five exile Afghans. It is better to have an Afghan expert and a translator than 
having an international expert and a babysitter.”
Land in a post-war city: myths of an institutional green field
One interviewee for this study struck me with his comment that Kabul was 
“not a green field on which one can plan as one wishes. The current status o f land 
distribution is unclear, but one has to distinguish between private and 
encroached public land. Private sub-selling means that this is, then, at least 
technically not informal anymore.” (IBA-K6)
In fact, two competing mandates and even more agendas (including those o f 
international agencies) for land administration in Kabul after the first Bonn 
peace conference existed. MUDH, replacing the previous Ministry o f  
Housing Building and Town Planning (Image 10 in annex 3). promoted a 
private sector model in relation to land and property development, even 
though the formal private sector is still relatively small, employing well below 
a quarter o f the labour force and run mosdy by returnees and local ex­
commanders (Mumtaz 2004: 143). Simultaneously however, Kabul
Municipality sold large tracts o f land to municipal and ministerial staff in 
hopes o f eventually generating future revenue sources.
The MUDH had been created immediately after the cessation o f large-scale 
fighting in early 2002 (Yavari d’Hellencourt et al. 2003: 7-8). One respondent 
explained, “The initial strong hesitation to invest in urban areas [by the 
government] was first addressed at the September 2002 conference. [...] 
This is changing right now, slowly, through World Bank and [UN] Habitat.” 
(IBA-K2) MUDH’s duties included the formulation and implementation o f 
the national urban development policy, the development o f  urban master
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plans across the country, and supervising adequate service provision and 
ensuring the adherence to quality and safety standards in the context o f  
larger construction projects. An institutional conflict with Kabul 
Municipality was thus engrained in its mandate, and ever since its creation it 
has been regarded as an institution o f relative potential and progress among 
the international community, and as a direct competitor by the senior 
municipal bureaucrats. The Municipality was tasked with the responsibility to 
implement the policies and plans o f line ministries, yet so too is MUDH— in 
its defining legislation, the ministry is charged with “formulation and 
implementation o f urban development policy. (GoA 2005a, emphasis added).
In early 2003, the Special Property Disputes Resolution Court was d iv id ed -  
through a presidential decree—  into two parts: one for Kabul, and one for 
the rest o f the country, the former renamed the “Central” and the latter the 
“Provincial” court. One informant explained, “The Supreme Court 
anticipated more cases in Kabul than in the rest o f the country, so this 
chamber got 10 judges and a director, whereas the provincial chamber only 
got six judges and a director.” (LPB-K5)
However, in practice informal residents in Kabul made little use o f it 
because o f its inefficiency and financial constraints. Instead they turned to 
international agencies for help. 49% of all land disputes to which one INGO  
provided legal assistance involved coercion at different levels o f government, 
13% o f them commanders, 16% government officials or people from 
political parties or powerful judges, 13% problems with the municipality, and 
7% of them were ‘pure corruption’, unresolved because o f bribes demanded 
by the municipality or court officials (NG-K2). The same respondent also 
illustrated the poor state o f the legal administration system: “Even when you 
get a court order or a municipal order it has to be enforced and that is not 
functioning. The police will not necessarily enforce it. There are other 
people telling them not to enforce it (ibid.).”
While this is one illustration o f the vibrancy o f informal channels, several 
others existed. Property and land transactions also took place through 
customary mechanisms such as the shura and jirga. While these historically
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grounded institutions were important given the absence o f effective courts 
and factual rule o f law (cf. Sharif 2004: 93), they were also problematic in 
that participation is restricted to men, they tended to exclude particular 
groups and interests, and they were susceptible to manipulation and 
corruption.
What was needed to accompany the process o f de facto “informal 
formalisation” (NG-K7) o f rapidly growing neighbourhoods in unplanned 
urban areas was “political support for a process o f selective, phased 
amnesties for those ‘squatters’ who have built adequate shelter for their 
families on government land, that is, the hillsides in Kabul, and who can 
prove continuous occupation for a given period — so that their status can be 
regularised.” (NG-K3) But this was a highly political matter. Said another 
respondent, “The problems do not come from a lack o f laws, as some say. It 
is the misuse o f the existing laws. People just grab the land, and then the 
laws are not applied.” (NPB-K3)
Together with ten bylaws and regulations on specific urban functions such as 
cities service taxes, rental rules, land acquisition, and settlements, and 
settlements, the Municipal Law of Afghanistan (IEoA 2000), decreed during 
the final months o f the Taleban regime and invalidating the previous 
Municipality Law No. 732 from 1990, was the central constitutional 
reference point for the organisation o f urban polity and finance in the 
country. In the following, some o f its key provisions will be discussed.
Article 5 defines that municipalities’ activities need to be based on the city 
master plan whose design and amendment is spearheaded by MUDH and its 
provincial offices. Municipalities’ role is confined to control and supervise 
implementation. Article 6 mandates that the Mayor o f Kabul is nominated 
by the ‘Emirate Authority’— a Dari term for the Taleban state— , thus 
rendering Kabul Municipality a part o f the central government. Article 11 
specifies an ordinary budget funded from 45% of fixed revenues o f the 
municipality. This share may be increased in order to cover basic services, a 
decision for which approval by the Ministry o f Finance must be sought. The 
remaining 55% o f local fixed revenues are to form the Development Budget
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o f the municipality. In exceptional cases, the central government will 
contribute to this fund out o f its national development budget Yet while the 
Law thus provides a rough framework for the financing o f urban affairs, it 
does not specify any particular conditions to be employed by the national 
government in order to assess the quality o f municipal proposals. 
Constitutionally however, Afghan municipalities are independent entities 
that can, but do not have to, rely on national financial support.
Responsibilities and authorities o f municipalities in the country are listed 
under Article 16 o f the Law. The total o f 44 positions include “taking 
measures to construct streets, playgrounds, public toilets, public baths 
(hamam), markets and civil and cultural centres through private investments 
in planned areas,” (5) “setting prices o f houses based on regulation,” (9) 
“taking measures for the distribution o f land for construction o f houses and 
commercial areas based on relevant regulation”, (10) “land acquisition based 
on land acquisition law,” (16) “seeking voluntarily assistance o f people for 
taking part in sanitation, greenery and other useful urban services,” (19) 
“collecting taxes for the city services according to the law,” (23) “inviting 
and convening meeting[s] on delivery o f city services,” (26) “making 
suggestions in regards to constructions o f traffic infrastructure in the city,” 
and (37) “prevention o f construction o f unauthorised buildings in 
collaboration with security forces in the region.”
In its concluding remarks, Article 19 specifies that the municipality “can give 
appreciation awards to business classes whose behaviour has been 
compatible with Islam and who have performed their duties to citizens well 
and properly.” Finally, Article 20 points out that the police, transport 
authorities, and water and energy supply agencies “are obliged to help [the] 
municipality in order to implement [the] city master plan and other public 
services.” In 2003— in accordance with Article 111 o f the 1964 national 
constitution— , an additional Electoral Law for Municipalities (TISA 2003) 
was passed, mandating that mayors o f all municipalities be elected indirectly 
by the members o f municipal councils every three years.
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In December 2004, one o f the two most senior international advisers to the 
MUDH circulated a discussion note criticising the insufficient scope and 
focus o f the Municipal Law in Afghanistan and urging substantial 
amendments (Anonymised 2004). Besides righdy pointing out unclear areas 
of jurisdiction between the urban and the national levels in the context of 
master plan implementation and the regulation o f development activities, the 
note advocated explicidy in favour of granting greater autonomy to the 
Municipality to manage urban land as a valuable asset. It also suggested the 
acquisition and implementation o f computerised Land Information Systems, 
the setting up o f “clear norms for sale o f land by municipality [...] through 
[an] transparent auction process,” regularising and tightening plots, naming 
of streets and numbering o f  properties as the basis o f valuation, and 
developing a strategy for emergency releases o f land to IDPs.
Its main critique, however, zeroed in on the lack o f specificity in the Law in 
terms o f private economic development. The note specified that 
“municipalities should not be involved in construction o f residential houses, 
as this can be much more effectively done by households and the private 
sector.” The note went on to urge that “by law municipalities should be 
obliged to develop policy and programs for poverty reduction” and exhibit a 
clear commitment to participatory governance and argued,
“a lot more needs to be stated in the Law to institutionalise citizen participation and 
to define the relationship between the civil society, community organisations and 
municipalities. [...] Similarly, a set o f  guidelines for private sector participation in 
urban development and management has to be developed and included in the 
Law.”
In its final part, the note provides for an “Expert Committee or a Task 
Force” to hold consultations and present its recommendations to the 
government in order to make the “Relevant Government authority take [...] 
up revision o f the Municipal Law.” International agencies were thus on an explicit 
mission to change institutions. This was nothing new in the global arena o f  
international development ‘assistance’; what made it special and noteworthy 
nonetheless was the fragile and highly dynamic environment o f structures
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and players in which these attempts took place. The following section will 
substantiate this point.
The city as frontline: 
institutional rigidity and interorganisational competition
The immediate post-war work focus o f Kabul Municipality had been set on 
the renovation o f office buildings and representative structures, 
predominandy with the financial support o f international agencies, 
rudimentary traffic management through the construction o f several 
roundabouts, and lobbying for large-scale housing construction schemes. 
Urban infrastructure renovation, including the rehabilitation o f urban roads, 
was usually done in conjunction with INGOs, with the Municipality taking 
what it liked to consider a ‘supervisory role’ (cf. Soave 2004). In 2002, it 
reportedly had 3,105 workers on its payroll, compared to a total o f 792 
central government employees charged with supervising and executing urban 
construction work across the country, with 306 o f them working outside the 
capital city (CSO 2003).
Rather encouraging, the Municipality displayed a basic understanding o f its 
role in the process o f urban economic development by trying to maintain the 
flow o f traffic and clearing up areas o f illegal or hazardous trading activity 
along the Kabul River and main intersections, albeit in autocratic and 
sometimes arbitrary moves. Two participants in a focus group (NG-K5) 
recalled, “[2:] The television showed a demonstration in front o f the 
municipality. There were a lot o f shopkeepers whose shops had been 
demolished by decree of the municipality in order to make way for road 
development. [1:] They demanded a solution from the mayor.” Another 
commentator added, “When the mayor took out these wholesalers away, 
there was a lot o f resistance from commanders, from people with money: 
they were offering him a lot o f money, but he did not accept it.” (NPB-K1)
Nonetheless, “weak urban management” was regularly brought forward as 
one o f the major post-conflict challenges, an area that had received relatively
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less direct support by international agencies. As outlined above, most 
regenerative efforts in the urban realm in Afghanistan had been either in 
physical reconstruction or indirect, through the concentration o f relief 
agencies, their administrations and the resulting demand for skilled and 
unskilled labour in cities (DjallaLzada 2004: 21).73 A local observer wrote in 
2002, “The third floor of the Kabul municipality office is a scene o f absolute 
chaos. There is hardly any room to move or breathe as hundreds o f  
desperate Afghans cram the corridors, all shuffling and jostling in their 
efforts to reach the property office and discover if—at long last— they have 
been allocated a precious piece o f land” (Saeed 2002). Three years later, one 
respondent still submitted, “The management in nearly all departments and 
municipalities is really a disaster. They do not know what each other are 
doing so they are really not informed. In addition from the ministries, which 
are involved in urban issues, there is no coordination. [...] You cannot 
blame them because they have to run so rapidly and change what they have 
learned 25 years ago. But there should be the possibility to overrule them” (IBA-K4)
A study by Beall and Esser (2005a) found respondents repeatedly positing 
that the ‘municipality people [such as workers, waste collectors or tax 
collectors] have never come to this neighbourhood.’ Furthermore, “whereas 
the majority o f male respondents said they trusted in their wakil-e-go^ar 
[neighbourhood representative appointed by the Municipality], female 
respondents regularly demanded more say in local decision-making 
processes. [...] Several respondents also complained about the self-interest 
and ineptitude o f their representatives.” (ibid., 29) For instance, while I was 
shadowing a meeting o f wakils with municipal staff one o f the ivakils stood 
up and said, “If you want me to work on behalf o f the community, you 
should pay me. If you have an imam in the mosque, and now one gives the 
money, then he will not pray. If you have a shopkeeper, but no one pays 
him anything, then the shopkeeper will stop selling things. So you will have 
to pay me for my job.” (NG-K5)
73 Small cash-for-work projects in Kabul usually peaked during the winter season. For 
instance in 2005, the municipality administered a scheme providing work for 30 days to 
2,000 people at a cost of around US$ 250,000 donated by bilateral agencies (HAAG 2005).
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Yet by and large, wakil-e-go^ars continued having a significant impact on the 
voicing or oppression o f citizens’ concerns. Some former representatives 
used their local political platform to become members o f the post-Bonn 
Ijoya Jirga through the endorsement by the municipality (Breshna 2004: 44). 
Nonetheless, frustration and confusion about roles and responsibilities 
among local representatives was widespread. Said one participant in a focus 
group, “[1] We are poor, the Municipality is only for the warlords. The 
warlords can force service provision, we can’t. We cannot tell the municipal 
employees that they do a bad job. We don’t dare. They all belong to the 
powerful ministries and factions that in charge o f Afghanistan.” (LPB-K9) 
Residents in Kabul also stated that they were expected to pay a premium for 
procedures such as registration for housing and neighbourhood upgrading, 
being received by an official, or obtaining public services. Public officials 
thus seek to support their admittedly meagre income (between US$ 35 and 
US$ 200 per month). However, this type o f  corruption is particularly 
worrisome, for three reasons. First, it undermines further the already weak 
confidence o f residents in the system o f urban management. Second, it 
reduces the prospects for establishing sound taxation systems, thus 
significandy depleting the municipal resource base. Last, and most 
significandy, it reduces the asset base o f already vulnerable people (Beall and 
Esser 2005: 31-32; Schiitte 2004b).
Though generally committed to working with local bodies, agencies 
implementing urban projects at the community level in Kabul were 
acknowledging the challenge that lied in addressing the priorities at different 
levels, including the sub-city (district) level, a “very time- and resource­
consuming [endeavour], often leading to the slowing down o f the 
programme” due to economic opportunities arising in the context o f project 
implementation and staff members “almost immediately [coming] under 
enormous pressure for favours from the city and district municipality 
officials.” (MercyCorps 2004) Service provision as a key function o f the state 
was “a relatively new concept” for Afghanistan, with the state until eady 20th 
century mainly administering tax collection and military order through its 
local representatives in the provinces. As described in CHAPTER FOUR, under 
communist rule a well-trained cadre o f bureaucrats at the provincial level
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reported regularly to the central government, but the transmission of 
information to the centre was arguably more important than the provision of 
local services (Thier 2004: 56).
UN Habitat had initiated a task force on urban development in mid-2003, 
comprising o f the Ministry o f Finance as the lead negotiator and high-level 
representatives from Kabul Municipality and the Ministry o f Urban 
Development and Housing. But regular meetings o f so-called ‘urban focal 
points’ produced litde more than incidental crisis management and failed to 
render an analysis o f the politico-economic situation and on this basis, derive 
strategies for cooperation and implementation (NG-K3). External finances 
made available by the donor community have even been suggested to 
constitute “an overpowering and dominating force in shaping urban 
development — with the main, decisive element very often being nothing 
other than the need to speed up the ‘flow o f funds’.” (Knapp 2004: 101).
My field interviews confirmed this allegation. One senior official o f a 
bilateral agency boasted: “We decide what messages are to get out, to whom, 
when and why and it is all coordinated with the media. [But] the central 
government does not have a well functioning political machine” (IBA-KlOe) 
This tension between donors and indigenous implementing organisations 
was wide-reaching, with the latter caught up between excessive ‘inclusion’ in 
the form of holding consecutive meetings and the constant pressure to 
produce reports, and exclusion as a result o f remaining distrust on the part 
of international donors regarding the loyalty and capacity of national and 
especially local actors (Brynen 2005: 242, cf. Stewart 2006).
At the end o f 2003, Kabul Municipality then underwent what Arez and 
Dittmann (2005: 151) call a “paradigm shift” in its personnel with the 
reappointment o f former Mayor Ghulam Sakhi Noorzad who, during his 
previous leadership in the late 1970s, had acquired a reputation o f not being 
corrupt and possessing technical understanding (NG-K5). His quest was to 
resume work on his “long-deferred dream” (Cloud 2005), the 
implementation o f the Soviet designed master plan from 1978, when Kabul 
had approximately 780,000 inhabitants — as a “means o f policy reduction”, as
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one respondent argued (IBA-K2). Noorzad’s vision was one o f wide main 
streets, shiny ministries based on Russian drafts (Image 11 in annex 3V and 
orderly neighbourhoods. “The level o f government-encouraged private 
sector development is insufficient,” an international agency staff member 
argued, “The municipality wants to re-acquire all the land and then develop 
it. This is completely unrealistic and would also be utterly unaffordable.” 
(IBA-K6) Another interviewee illuminated the functionalist role o f urban 
development saying, “The only sense o f accountability from the Mayor of 
Kabul is that he wants to do things and be seen to be doing things before the 
elections. He is a Karzai appointee and is under a lot o f pressure to do things, 
as is USAID to support him. [...] This is one o f the reasons we have a 
municipal assistance programme.” (IBA-K1)
Alarmed by the ongoing influx o f rural residents, temporarily in the context 
o f labour migration but also permanendy, and (then already outdated) survey 
by the Municipality conducted in 1999, which found 58,614 housing units—  
almost half o f the city’s housing stock— in ‘informal areas’, the Mayor 
acknowledged the lack o f housing as one o f the foremost challenges of 
urban management in the capital city, but considered forced resetdement of 
more than 3 million residents as a somehow more feasible policy option than 
amending the planning framework laid out by a 28-year old map. Trying to 
explain this position, one senior municipal bureaucrat argued that Kabul was 
“only for one million people. The recent growth o f the urban population is 
unnatural!” (LPB-K2)
Hence the municipality insisted on implementing the outdated master plan 
and concentrated its own development efforts in planned areas. One o f his 
senior staff explained, “We cannot and must not change or destroy the 
current master plan, but rather use it as our framework.” (LPB-K3) 
Municipal staff thus displayed a clear lack o f political will to address service 
provision in informal settlements (LPB-K9, cf. Schiitte 2005: 25) and did 
“not see with a keen eye intervention in these neighbourhoods as it conflicts 
with greater development plans and increases the risk o f newcomers settling 
in.” (ACF 2004: 13) Interference on national players into local matters was 
widespread: “[2:] The Mayor once told us not to work in district ten, because
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it does not belong to a planned area. He took his master plan and said, ‘If 
you work here, I will take action against you.’ But the previous Minister o f  
Planning, Younos Qanouni, wanted us to work there, so eventually we 
started working nonetheless. Qanouni is now one o f the major opposition 
leaders.” (NG-K5)
Informality also prevented the implementation o f a coordinated garbage 
collection procedure. The municipal official in charge complained, “The 
unplanned areas are my biggest headache. 4-5 families live in one house. It is 
very difficult to collect the litter there. So they take the rubbish down to the 
collection points in planned areas, and that only exacerbates the problem.” 
(LPB-K2) At the same time, national authorities were frustrated by the 
Municipality’s inactivity on the issue, as the following comment by a 
ministerial department head illustrates: “We tell all the families to put their 
garbage into the bins, but then there are no bins. My department is not 
responsible for putting bins everywhere. The Municipality should do that, 
but they have different priorities [...] The Ministry o f Interior helps us 
pushing environmental infringements, but there are no significant interfaces 
with the Municipality.” (NPB-K10)
Outright misunderstandings were also ripe. One senior municipal planner 
complained, “I am sceptical o f this ‘empowerment’ idea. [UN] Habitat 
claims to empower the Municipality. But we cannot destroy the illegal 
houses in this area because we now need the approval o f three different 
ministries, which we don’t get. We have requested police and military to 
protect the destruction process, but we don’t get any. So the Municipality 
cannot proceed as it has to, according to the Master Plan. This is not 
empowerment if Habitat does not give the Municipality the autonomy to 
act!” (LPB-K7)
In 2004, Kabul Municipality lost its authority to approve plans to the 
MUDH, which has caused a great deal o f frustration among municipal 
bureaucrats. One respondent argued, “Look, the Mayor has the same 
position as a minister, and Kabul is the national capital. The power the city 
has needs to be balanced with good services. [...] MUDH should really
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focus on provincial centres and decrease its involvement in Kabul affairs.” 
(LPB-K4a) Another one complained, “The MUDH makes the plans, the 
Municipality executes. In the current situation, this division o f work is not 
acceptable. We need planning authority in the municipality as well. [...] It’s 
strange: cities like Jalalabad, Herat and Kandahar want more input and 
guidance from MUDH but don’t get any. We want to get less and obtain 
more freedom instead, but they keep telling us what to do.” (LPB-K3) 
Municipal staff argued that they themselves should be in charge o f the city 
and demand a massive increase in funding in order to develop 
neighbourhood by neighbourhood, guided by the old master plan or, as they 
argue, a new plan still to be drawn (NPB-K1).
Apart from planning authority, financial resources were a key issue. “The 
main problem is that the Ministry o f Finance does not give us money. In the 
past, we simply needed an approval from the Ministry of Planning, but now 
we need to have our activities approved by the Ministry o f Rehabilitation 
and Reconstruction, the Ministry o f Planning and the Ministry o f Finance, 
and this leads nowhere.” (LPB-K4b) Yet what the respondent did not touch 
on was the reason why the situation had been changed, namely as a result o f  
the Municipality’s approach and reputation.
Even among senior ministerial staff, there were signs that a linear, apolitical 
vision o f urban development was prevailing — sometimes coupled with 
activities for private gain. One department head interviewed for this study 
handed me a colourful business card on which a company selling cars and 
property was advertised, after which he proposed visiting one o f “his” 
construction sites. (NPB-K7) With striking similarity to comments heard in 
Freetown, he also admitted that urban development could also be a means to 
another end: “What I’m really hoping for is decongestion or 
deconcentration, with which I mean that people are going back to the 
province.” (ibid.) While showing me a map o f a Kabul district, an 
international informant reported saying to the Minister o f Urban 
Development and Housing,
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‘“Look, I brought this to you last week, if this is not urban planning, then what is? 
This is a planning document, and there are many more down there.’ [...] We need 
to be constructive. We have to rely on them as counterparts. It is frustrating 
sometimes, but you have to get past this wall o f  [four names o f highest level staff], 
and then you have [names o f department level staff], and many o f them are deeply 
good people: surveyors, planners. N ot all o f  them straight, some o f them got 
mysteriously wealthy, but sole to the earth people who have technical skills. [At the 
MUDH] you have a lot o f  kids with PowerPoint skills who can zip-2ap around and 
place nice icons, but we have to look behind and underneath it and say, ‘Have you 
done your homework, what is your growth rate, what is your agricultural land 
projection, and so on.’ So you have these presentation skills together with the old 
guard planning convictions, so you put two and two together.” (NG-K3)
A senior figure in MUDH stated, “Based on the Master plan we can study, 
survey, plan, design — this is a clear mandate for us. We don’t need the 
communities for information.” (NPB-K8) According to another source at 
this level, urban development would progress from initial surveys and 
updating maps to liaising with NGOs and other authorities, developing laws 
and building codes, to then developing an implementation program in 
consultation with communities and private investors (NPB-K2). One 
international aid worker joked, “There is a wonderful congruence between 
the Russian trained and the Islamic rote learning about ‘this is how it is 
because it says it in the book’. Questioning it is hopeless. And then there is 
the hierarchical stuff layered on top o f this about if the minister says this 
then it must be so.” (IBA-K5) Nonetheless, some space for planning 
surprises apparendy remained. One head o f a ministerial department said in 
the midst o f dramatic gaps in public housing, “We are currently working on 
a trading centre with 18 flats in the first district o f Kabul. This will also 
include a conference hall. We are also building a mosque in the Parwan 
province. We see ourselves as designers.” (NPB-K7)
Shortages o f housing and service delivery attracted greater attention among 
international donors and agencies from mid-2004 onward (cf. Mohammad 
2004). A national urban policy began to take shape through the development 
o f the National Urban Programme (NUP; cf. TISA 2004a, 2004b). The NUP 
attempted to provide a framework for informing ongoing urban activities at 
the community level. With six sub-programmes focused on a wide range o f  
topics, the NUP is ambitious in scope and not without problems. Yet the
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process o f policy deliberation was far less participatory than the provisions 
made by the policy itself:
“Let’s face it: they never had to sell the NUP to the people. [...] There is always 
going to be this kind o f sealing for the time being where people’s feelings are being 
locked out. [...] It is a very imposing process, pushing it down on people. If the 
donors are dumping huge amounts o f money, then what is the government going to 
do, and what is in for the people? [...] The whole NUP consultative process was 
very patronising. ‘How we going to approach land...?’ This idea that you can draw 
a policy in two weeks is completely out o f context This whole workshop process: 
completely inattentive and culturally insensitive [...]. And then, where was the lead 
after the workshops? The Ministry o f Finance? I told the minister, ‘there is nothing 
that is not in the NUP!’ [...] Some parts are really contradictory: they are talking 
about an enabling environment, and then they talk about provision o f  housing...” 
(NG-K3)
What is more, the pressure exerted on the programme by the President’s 
office and ISAF was massive. One interviewee explained, “It is very difficult 
for donors to push capacity building. It is very frustrating to do development 
in a highly political environment.” (IBA-K1) Another one was more explicit:
“The president says ‘the only thing that matters is getting projects going on the 
ground’ and this is because the peace and the political project depends on this. So 
this is behind the NPPs [National Priority Programmes]. We were advised by 
planners from ISAF who told us about ‘means and ends’ [...] They said lwe are not 
interested in how you get there, the means and mechanics, ju st where you end up.’ [...] There is 
no end state in the urban sector, it is all process and the end state constandy 
changes. In some o f the other national priority programmes people had similar 
doubts though but the young ones did not feel confident to challenge them. [...] 
We set up a planning team to define the five projects and what to do over the ten 
years as instructed by the military. We came up with the six sub-programmes o f the 
NUP. We had to expect that they would go ahead with or without us anyway and 
there was a big time concern as they were going so quickly.” (IBA-K5)
“It is an evolving process for the municipality and ministry as well and it is 
‘make it up as you go along’ and hope you can deal with the future 
unanticipated needs later,” another international advisor explained. “In some 
cases it is easier to do development here than elsewhere because there are no 
rules, but they can come back to shoot us. We can get Kar^ai to issue decrees 
about this land or that project and those benejiciaries, but it is not a guideline or a rule 
book in the end. ” (IBA-K1)
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Tty again, fail better: reinventing urban reality, the second74
In April 2005, the US Agency for International Development issued a draft 
Statement o f Work (SOW) in which it outlined large scale urban 
development projects in the area of water and sanitation to be implemented 
over the course o f several years (USAID 2005). While its general premise 
regarding the need to invest in Afghan urban infrastructure was certainly 
justified, every single section suffered from virtual ignorance o f any kind o f  
in-depth research undertaken on the capital city and major urban centres 
during the period o f 2001 until 2005. Throughout, the statement was 
misinformed in its empirical basis and hesitant in its conclusions, making 
assuinptions where sufficient data had already been gathered. For instance, it 
did not mention corruption in land distribution, nor did it specify the 
political actors in the urban arena, it misinterpreted the legacy o f the master 
plan (whose existence it denied), it failed to raise political competition over 
planning supremacy as a major constraint to urban management, instead 
singling out “cultural attitudes” as the critical factor, and it presented no 
feasible concept for reconstituting urban polities in order to achieve what it 
calls a “harmonious reconstruction o f municipalities”.
Programme experts from several INGOs working in the area o f  urban 
management submitted detailed comments on the paper, and a month later 
the SOW was withdrawn (NG-K6). But not only this specific proposal drew 
substantial criticism; the general approach o f weaving development into 
external military control went down badly with some, as the following 
statement shows:
“I went to an opening o f a mosque renovated by the US Embassy. [...] They were 
occupying the mosque, because it was raining outside, and they put the American 
flag right in the middle o f the mosque, with a big sign saying ‘The United States 
gave you this...’ I walked in and was frisked by the dogs and people who looked 
like robots but probably were humans behind dark sunglasses and their protective 
stuff, greeted a guy that I had been working with, and walked out again. [...] It is 
just propaganda that comes with a whole ‘neighbourhood lock down’: ‘D on’t go 
out on the roads, don’t go out on the roofs. . (NG-K3)
74 I have taken the liberty to emulate the title o f Cramer’s and Goodhand’s (2002) 
publication.
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Yet the largest post-Taleban urban development scheme for the capital city 
was submitted for bidding in July 2005. The Kabul Urban Reconstruction 
Project (KURP), developed by a World Bank consultant and issued by the 
Ministry o f Economy, was the first holistic endeavour comprising o f area 
upgrading (including ‘unplanned’ neighbourhoods), land tenure 
regularisation, engineering and management support, beefing up the financial 
management capacity o f Kabul Municipality, upgrading structural planning 
skills and providing a more fruitful investment climate for urban projects, 
the rehabilitation o f main roads, and the implementation o f a traffic 
management system.
One respondent commented, “The World Bank is sensibly putting land 
management in with the upgrading process. It may not be a legal paper according 
to Afghan law but it is a start towards tenure security and you harmonise it all laterP 
(IBA-K5) However, the project background information made no mention 
of the diversity o f existing players in the urban political arena, stating instead 
“Afghanistan’s urban vision [...] for well functioning cities with inclusive, 
inefficient, and self-sustaining management systems” (GoA 2005a: 44), 
basically a reiteration o f the formulation by the local UN Habitat office 
developed during a high level workshop on “securing tenure” in June 2004. 
The project was heavy on (foreign-facilitated) training, but light on political 
analysis, emphasising the need to strengthen technical and financial 
management capacity in order to empower local administrative structures. 
Community mobilisation was mentioned in several occasions as “the most 
important principle” (ibid., 69), but was regarded as an input factor for 
delivering needs based upgrading, not as a political resource to build a 
legitimate counterweight to the remaining grave lack o f accountability o f the 
local polity.
In spite o f such efforts by the Bank and bilateral agencies, UN Habitat 
remained the key ghost writer of Afghan urban policy, explaining strategies, 
outlining processes, initiating technical projects, and organising and hosting 
conferences. The text for the second phase o f the NUP, covering 2006- 
2009, exemplified this when it outlined that the programme would
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“seek to strengthen the institutional and legal framework to create an enabling 
environment for good urban governance and management. It will pay particular 
attention to the ‘urbanisation’ o f  poverty, to urban policy generation and to devising 
instruments that supports poverty alleviation. This support will be provided within 
the scope o f a co-operation agreement that has been signed between the Ministry o f  
Urban Development & Housing on behalf o f  the Government o f Afghanistan, and 
UN-HABITAT. UN-HABITAT is also working in close partnership with the 
Ministry o f  Justice, the Ministry o f Interior, Kabul Municipality and other provincial 
municipalities” (UN Habitat 2006a).
Once again, donor language had been applied to post-war reality. As one 
informant recalled, during a meeting with a multilateral organisation a high- 
ranking government official suddenly got up and proclaimed, “listening and 
understanding are the preconditions for ownership. I do not understand 
what you are talking about. You need to explain things better if  you want us 
to have ownership.” (IBA-K5) His conclusion was drastic:
“[UN] Habitat is good at the preambles but not the realities. [...] Their proposals 
are all about mobilising people. They are not ‘at the coal face’ and they are pissing 
in the wind. M y main interest is seeing projects happen. I t is the only way to get things done. I  do 
not agonise about the politics and compromises we have to m ake” (IBA-K5)
In 2006, the World Bank office in Kabul began to buy into the logic o f  
leveraging urban land as a state asset. It embarked on an agenda for land 
registration, scheduled to be piloted in late 2006 and rolled out in 2007 and 
2008, and included the sale o f public land in major cities in the poverty 
reduction strategy for the country, based on a governmental survey “of all 
urban and peri-urban land that it owns.” (World Bank 2006b: 14-18) O f  
course the Bank did not break its commitment to market-driven recovery 
and mandated that the government “use the revenue from the sale or lease 
o f public land [...] to provide the infrastructure and incentives for the 
private sector to build low-cost housing to be sold or leased to middle and 
low-income families.” (ibid., 18)
Mirroring the international agenda in Sierra Leone in a remarkable manner, 
these were considered a vital steps to “reduce migration to cities” (ibid.) and 
to ensure that “urban development happens rationally [sic\ and sustainably 
(ibid., 42).” The Bank’s strategy concluded by letting the national 
government argue,
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We should not achieve our goal o f reducing poverty through raising agricultural 
productivity at the cost o f driving unemployed rural people into cities where there 
is little employment, housing, or sanitation. Hence our efforts at promoting 
agricultural development will be balanced by support for the development o f rural 
industries and productive activities in small towns and regional cities, away from 
Kabul. Even if  we succeed in slowing urbanization, however, it will continue, which 
requires us to find resources to improve the infrastructure in our cities and provide 
improved housing and urban amenities on a very limited budget, (ibid., 19)
Unlike the situation in Freetown where growth was assumed to serve political 
agendas, the fact that Afghan cities were growing and would continue doing 
so was thus acknowledged. What continued being absent was an 
acknowledgement o f the conditioning impact the highly politicised ‘urban 
arena Kabul’ would have on the strategy to accommodate this growth. 
Instead,, the . Bank clung, to a debatable mix o f ‘technical governance’ 
measures arguably constrained by financial resources. This budgetary 
constraint was certainly real with respect to the national income; it 
subsequendy became somewhat less acute at the supra-national level, 
following the most recent donor conference for Afghanistan in London. 
There, the ‘pro-urban’ shift in priorities by international financial institutions 
also another expression in a rising share o f direct support measures to build 
government effectiveness, using existing channels like the national budget 
(World Bank 2005b, 2006a). In this vain, a major bilateral agency announced 
that would invest US$ 500 million [500,000,000] into urban development in 
Afghanistan. Yet what might have appeared to give reason for optimism was 
once again driven by a vision o f “urban development in Kabul to look like a 
tabula rasa type o f planning situation. It is basically the same approach that 
the Russians took... Here we go again.” (NG-K3) In sum, neither the Bank 
nor bilateral donor agencies— and not even UN Habitat despite its openness 
to local processes—was ready to engage, actively, with the politics that cut 
through the different levels and layers o f polity, all o f them present in the 
capital city.
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Centralism and the pillars of peace:
appeasing war by imagining democracy
With reconstruction thus misconceived, the second leg o f the international 
effort to ‘develop’ the country should be given equal consideration. This 
second pillar was the creation o f a nation state and its ‘democratisation,’ and 
it again had a crucial urban dimension as Kabul for over two centuries has 
been the declared centre o f this— to borrow from Anderson (1991)—  
“imagined [Afghan] community.”
As outlined in CHAPTER FOUR, only two main societal institutions had 
historically been binding the city and the countryside. First, the bazaar 
connected rural producers with urban clients. Second, unlike educational 
institutions, whose graduates have rarely returned to their rural origins, 
religious establishments such as mosques and Qur’an schools (madrassas) 
were attracting rural students (Yavari d’Hellencourt et al. 2003: 3). Hence if 
at all, the current nation-building exercise finds a historical precedent in the 
post-Amanullah reign of the Shah clan during which the first Constitution 
was written, national holidays were introduced, and contacts between rural 
areas and foreign areas were encouraged, facilitated by the Afghan Tourist 
Bureau established in 1958 (Hatch Dupree 2002: 981).
In 2005, the central government announced its plan to renovate the 
Darulaman Parliamentary Palace constructed during Amanullah’s reign as a 
symbol o f nation and democracy, more than 75 years after the former King’s 
modernisation campaign had crumbled under fierce traditionalist pressure 
(Synovitz 2005). The adoption of a nationalist discourse in Afghanistan by 
parts o f the population is linked to the individual experience o f displacement 
by approximately every second Afghan at one point during the Russian 
occupation, the following civil war, and the international military campaign 
against the Taleban, which was instrumental in creating a popular spatial- 
national consciousness, with both internally displaced Afghans and 
international refugees coming to perceive nationhood as the new smallest 
common denominator (Schetter 2005: 60, cf. Saeed and Nasrat 2005). At the
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same time expectations generated by the concept o f nationhood in 
Afghanistan varied gready between different educational levels, a 
phenomenon that coincides with spatial location. Whereas the idea receives 
emotive acclaim from many younger educated city dwellers, ‘nation’ for 
rural, usually uneducated residents mainly denotes their weak embeddedness 
in a state bureaucracy. (Johnson and Leslie 2004: 137) “Since many ‘new 
ideas’ emerged from Kabul and tried to make inroads into provincial and 
rural areas, anything coming from beyond the known confines o f the 
community is treated with suspicion.” (ACSF 2004: 29)
Additional resistance against the nation project conceived by international 
agencies and a Kabul-based intelligentsia— aided by pan-Islamic forces under 
Pakistani leadership— came from the southeast o f the country inhabited by 
Pushtun tribes among whom the idea o f a unified Pushtunistan, which 
would include areas beyond the Afghan-Pakistan border, has since lost little 
o f its popularity, in particular in light o f the recent alienation o f Pushtuns 
from key functions in central government, which has been suggested as one 
of the key threats to long-term stability (ICG 2003a, Goodson 2001: 179, 
Banuazizi and Weiner 1986: 8, cf. Schetter 2005: 63-65).75
The evolution (or resurgence, as proponents would argue if they ignore the 
conflicts around nation-building already outlined in CHAPTER FOUR) of 
national citizenship in Afghanistan was hampered further by the ethnic and 
tribal fragmentation o f the population. A process o f an incremental 
emergence o f a feeling o f state-bound togetherness envisioned by authors 
such as Mouffe (1993: 84-85, 1992: 235-26) as an alternative to forging 
citizenship through the ballot box was therefore out o f reach, for the time 
being. This is so despite the need to ‘be present’ in Kabul, for both political 
and economic reasons. As one respondent put it, “[2] Kabul is considered a 
win-or-lose place — either a peaceful political battlefield, or a violent political 
batdefield. [...] Think o f our civil war, when Kabul was divided into 
zones.. .” (CS-K3) Another interviewee supported this view and illustrated it 
as follows.
75 Admittedly, the current president is a Pushtun, but is widely regarded part of the expat 
community, not representing the old school of Pushtun tribal values and social norms.
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“I think that we are still in the process o f  centralisation. You have to centralise 
before you decentralise. The problem is, once you centralise, will you really 
decentralise, because the people in Kabul will have all the power. So far, they don’t, 
because they are still people controlling the provinces. [...] The problem is that this 
decentralisation process is creating a lot o f tension. If, as a rural community, you 
cannot partake in the system in Kabul, then you are seen as a complete loser.” 
(NG-K1)
At the time (and still very much so at the time o f finishing this study, given 
the worsening security situation outlined further below in this chapter) there 
was no reason to believe that the state would be able to assume any kind o f  
developmental role by acting through its local representations (cf. Cramer 
and Goodhand 2002). But it would do even less so in a possible federation 
of smaller entities. In fact, the evolution o f a unified nation could arguably 
be justified most compellingly, if at all, by the structure o f economic 
resources on which Afghanistan could build a viable economy on. Trading 
activity in water, hydropower, and some agricultural goods such as grapes 
(Afghanistan used to provide 40% o f the world’s raisin market in the 1960s 
and 1970s) all point to the necessity o f institutional facilitation o f economies 
of scale (cf. Naby and Frye 2004: 215). Politically, granting provincial leaders 
more de jure autonomy on top o f their already far-reaching de facto autonomy 
would have had disastrous consequences at the time (Lister 2007: 10).
In light of these reflections, it appears fair indeed to posit that 
decentralisation in the Afghan context would indeed exacerbate further the 
“centrifugal” tendencies (Goodhand 2004: 52) present both prior and after 
the recent wars, precisely by weakening central ministries and inhibiting 
national strategic planning (Brynen 2005: 243). An additional disjunction also 
existed between the centralisation o f decision-making in Kabul and the 
simultaneous creation o f local institutions buffered by massive international 
financial aid, such as through the National Solidarity Programme (NSP, cf. 
UNOCHA 2003b). Its main purpose was to weaken the link between local 
citizens and local traditional institutions o f power in order to facilitate the 
connection between local communities and the central state. The NSP 
concept was certainly not unique to the case o f Afghanistan. If one leaves 
aside the local names, acronyms and abbreviations, the similarity to Hohe’s
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(2005: 62-68) description o f the community empowerment and community 
council establishment process in East Timor is striking. Yet Johnson and 
Leslie (2004: 189-191) have also argued that the National Solidarity 
Programme ultimately served to weaken the central state because o f its 
failure to incentivise and institutionalise accountability, while at the same 
time falling short o f bolstering sub-national decision-making due to its 
circumvention o f provincial or district-level power holders — in fact the two 
key objectives it had been set out to achieve.
There are, o f course, exceptions. For instance, in one district o f Kabul 
Province, tailoring shops were be built and equipped, to the benefit o f the 
communities (LPB-K9). But Boesen (2004: 58) also found that local 
hierarchies remained intact in spite o f the NSP, with elders, landowners and 
mullahs getting elected to local NSP councils. The NSP thus suffered from an 
inbuilt “risk that they may reproduce existing structures o f politics, power 
and dependency.” (ibid.) Scepticism concerning the sustainability o f the 
programme once the massive foreign budget is spent (e.g., Suhrke 2006: 19) 
is therefore diligent.
In sum, at the time o f research there was “really nothing that can be decided 
in the provinces,” one academic observer pointed out, “the supply o f posts 
and positions is concentrated here in Kabul; everyone who wants to 
participate in this fight has to come to Kabul, physically.”76 And indeed, in 
line with traditional patterns o f holding court it is still common for rural 
Afghans to travel long distances to Kabul with the expectation o f being able 
to meet a minister or even the President to complain about local 
circumstances and, regularly, demand the replacement o f specific senior 
bureaucrats (e.g., Giustozzi 2004: 2). Following a popular criticism of 
inaccessibility, Hamid Karzai once had to explain in a radio interview to 
calm down enraged citizens that their patience was needed, but he did not 
discourage them from embarking on such journeys, arguably because it is in 
the interest o f the national government to demonstrate its willingness to deal 
with provincial conflicts at the centre (Radio Afghanistan 2005).
76 Antonio Giustozzi, presentation at the American Institute of Afghanistan Studies, Kabul, 
4 May 2005.
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Suhrke et al. (2004: 16) conclude, “With much international attention 
focused on Kabul, [...] the different realities in most the provinces continue 
to challenge the centrist approach.” What is more, leading intellectuals argue 
that it is precisely the connection between the provinces and the centre that 
needs to be strengthened — but this is to capacitate policymaking in Kabul, 
not to empower the periphery: “The space of governance has to be 
reinvented in Afghanistan, and at the heart o f this is reporting. Every 
province, every district, has to report to the centre on a regular basis. [...] 
We have to develop matrices o f governance where a mechanism of binding 
the provinces to the centre takes place.77
Pressure by the US-led coalition to hold immediate national elections after 
the liberation o f the country was resisted by the United Nations and the 
endeavour eventually postponed until 2004, which was considered evidence 
for a learning process within the organisation that arguably manifested itself 
as well in the reversed sequence approach taken in Kosovo, where elections 
were conducted from the municipal level upwards (Reilly 2004: 11, Wimmer 
and Schetter 2003: 535). In spite o f repeated delays, “[p] res sing forward with 
elections without having first begun the process o f building these 
institutional foundations— including a central government with authority 
beyond Kabul [...]— is a recipe for continued instability in the country that 
has no experience with democracy and a long history o f violent, zero-sum 
competition among regional warlords,” as Paris (2004: 127) argues. And 
Johnson and Leslie (2004: 158-159) indict,
“If the international community imagined a peace agreement, so too it imagined a state; 
both with what it was (a terra nullis on which they could set to work from scratch) and what 
it should become (a liberal democracy), [thus ignoring] a territory staked out by powerful 
players who have their feet in the past and their eyes on the future.”
The subsequent parliamentary elections for an Afghan Parliament (1Volesi 
Jirga) in September 2005 were welcomed by most international actors as the 
“conclusion o f the Bonn agreement political transition plan.” (US State 
Department 2005) The Afghan President found more emotional words
77 Ashraf Ghani, presentation at Chatham House, London, 26 September 2005.
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during the inaugural session in December 2005, saying “Let me tell the 
world that Afghanistan is rising from the ashes of invasion and will live forever, 
[emphasis added]” Many others were less convinced. A youth movement 
leader submitted the following response:
[2:] “Sometimes, democratic structures simply legalise the illegal efforts o f  some 
people, like... let’s be straightforward: Rashid Dostum. He is a warlord. [...] What 
this system [democracy] did was giving him legitimacy. [...] We have a saying in 
Pushtu: “The donkey is still the same donkey, only the carry bag has changed...” 
Only his name has changed, from Warlord to Parliamentarian. ” (CS-K3)
The seat distribution in the lower house had been determined by population 
estimates, with Kabul Province occupying the largest share, 33 seats, and the 
three smallest provinces Nuristan, Nimroz and Panjsher each getting two: 
The political landscape in Kabul and the country as a whole at that time was 
highly fragmented. Over 100 political parties were active, and another 40 had 
applied for registration. “Many o f these parties are quite fractionalised,” one 
respondent explained, “they do have programs, but these are very general. 
You cannot differentiate between their programs. It is mostly intellectuals 
within Kabul City that run them, but they don’t have any constituency.” 
(NPB-K1) Still, some parties had a focus on mobilising urban voters, such as 
the Republican Party o f Afghanistan (Hi^b-e Jumhuri-i Khihanyi Afghanistan), 
the National Solidarity Movement (Na^hat-e Hambastagi Milli), and Afghan 
Nation (Afghan MillaP, ICG 2005c: 7). The same interviewee explained,
“As political parties develop, they are agenda will also include urban development. 
[...] This is the beginning o f  a general trend: the nascence o f political movements 
out o f  city based shuras. [...] Within the Parliament, we can do very little with 
regard to urban development direcdy, but hopefully with the coordination with the 
municipal council that will be elected, we will be able to achieve something. 
Through the Parliament, we can impose on the government changes in municipal 
polity. We are going to have to have a coalition with them; without a coalition, it is 
impossible to work with the municipality. The mayor o f Kabul is not cooperating 
with the Parliament, he won’t be. [...]
We have to work very closely with the Ministry o f Urban Development [and 
Housing]. They are allies. We can bring them closer to the Parliament; we can 
develop programmes for them. [...] This will probably look like a political bloc, 
rather than a formalised institution. It will be around issues. If some think that we 
should remove all the blockades o f the coalition forces in Kabul to clean up the 
streets, or even to remove all the military bases from within the city boundary... 
For this, I could get the support o f other parliamentarians!” (NPB-K1)
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Partisan candidacies were possible, but political parties had been discredited 
so substantially as a result o f the failed attempt to establish communism in 
the country two decades earlier that in the end, almost all candidates 
preferred running individually, backed by ethnic or tribal loyalties. Two 
members o f  a focus group explained, “[2]: In the history o f Afghanistan, 
with all the parties that had power, we have made a terrible experience with 
parties. We are not happy to choose candidates who try to run on a party 
ticket.” [3]: “It could be a disadvantage to be a member o f a party. People 
want good government.” (CS-K2, cf. Witte 2005b). O f course, there were 
exceptions: “Among older Kabulis, political parties have a strong
constituency — among the returnees probably not. The refugee vote is a 
mystery to all analysts, what is clear is only the importance o f this 
constituency. [...] It is much easier to target the old Kabuli constituency, 
because it is much more established.” (NG-K1)
Yet with only 36% of registered voters, the turnout in Kabul was 
significantly lower than the national average, which was 53%, and even more 
sluggish in comparison with the 75% turnout for the presidential elections in 
the previous year (BBCNews 2005a). The most commonly cited reasons for 
this reluctance was the oversupply o f candidates (cf. Birsel 2006), including 
suspected war criminals, and the undersupply o f information on priorities o f  
programs (where they existed) and the general frustration among the urban 
population— “a palpable air o f disillusionment”, as the ICG (2006: 4) puts 
it— generated by the immediate proximity to the riches that the 
reconstruction process has generated for a small minority (cf. Biswas 2005). 
What is more, pro-urban coalitions were an option, but not guaranteed:
“I would like to think that some o f the 33 members o f  the newly elected parliament 
have leverage on deciding how urban development in Kabul is being approached 
[...] but I think there is a bit o f a danger o f going back to the shape o f government 
that the country had in the 1950s and before, when people use their representative, 
tribal representatives or whatever, to put pressure on the government to get 
something for your local place, jobs and clinics and all that. Politics had multiple 
entry points, particularly vertically.” (NG-K3)
Provincial councils had been elected simultaneously, but their responsibilities 
would remain confined to “participating in development” and “advising
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administrators”, as the national constitution specifies opaquely in its article 
138, leaving a question mark particularly behind their relationship with the 
Kabul-appointed provincial governors and thus bearing the “risk that a 
potentially effective mechanism for local government might be forever 
marginalized” (Tarzi 2005). One commentator even argued that candidates 
had “no idea o f their role, responsibility o f powers once they are elected.” 
(Rashid 2005) N ot surprisingly then, during the first meeting o f provincial 
council members in March 2006, the protest against this institutionalised 
powerlessness was vociferous. The Speaker o f the congregation and head o f  
the provincial council o f Kabul Province explained that apart from 
appropriate meeting facilities— two rooms for up to 30 delegates in the case 
of Kabul Province are currently the norm—-, members wanted genuine 
oversight over provincial policies, the right to remove or appoint district 
level personnel, and effective control o f budgets (IWPR 2006a).
The enlightenment argument that has been fielded to explain the capital city 
based opposition movement in Sierra Leone certainly falls short in the case 
of Kabul, where one o f the most powerful warlords and leader o f the Sunni 
Itehat, Abdurrab Rasul Sayyaf, finished the political race for parliament on 
fifth place, gaining himself a comfortable seat in the new system. Even more, 
during the first session o f the house, Sayyaf, who thanks to his continuing 
political proximity to the current president has multiplied his war-won 
wealth by reinvesting it into housing development projects in unplanned 
areas acquired direcdy from the central government under obscure 
circumstances, missed the additional honour o f being elected Speaker o f the 
House only through a razor-thin defeat, losing 117 to 122 votes in favour o f  
the leader o f the ethnic opposition, the Tajik mujahed Younos Qanouni 
(Witte 2005c). In spite o f this denial o f ultimate triumph, Sayyaf nonetheless 
is a picture book example o f the fusion o f the economic and the political 
sphere in a highly fluid polity. In Herat— the second most important city 
economically— , the absolute power wielded for decades by Ismail Khan, 
one o f the earliest mujahedin and authoritarian ruler o f the border city and its 
surrounding districts, was challenged successfully— surprisingly even to 
informed observers— by a female aerobics instructor sporting a “beguiling 
campaign poster”, as The Economist (2005) put it smirkingly, suggesting that
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“perhaps politics in Afghanistan can become more ordinary than people 
imagine.” In essence however, more in-depth knowledge o f political agendas 
was reflected neither in the comparatively low turnout in cities nor— while 
anecdotal— by such ambiguous results.
This mixed bag notwithstanding, the theme o f Kabul as the locus o f frictions 
between modernist and traditionalist forces had lost nothing o f its 
significance (cf. Poya 2005, Sands 2006). Kabul’s radio stations were being 
controlled meticulously by city-based religious authorities, including the 
Ministry o f Religious Affairs, but nonetheless scored occasional successes. 
For instance, Radio Qarabagh once cited letters from listeners complaining 
about the city’s mayor using a teachers’ day ceremony to make political 
statements praising the mujahedin. The mayor was quick to deny the 
allegation and asked a local shura [religious council comprising o f mullahs and 
elders] to intervene. The shura, however, eventually ruled in favour o f the 
radio station (Kumar 2006: 266, cf. Mojumdar 2005). In light o f these 
frictions, an image that characterises the competition over public values as a 
fight between ‘the urban’ and ‘the rural’ would be a starkly simplified 
representation o f social reality in Afghanistan. Quite the contrary, these 
standoffs were taking place within the capital city. In such a diverse 
environment, apolitical and secular notions o f a ‘city-based Afghan civil 
society’ that would effectively balance and check the power o f the state and 
its enemies at various levels are evidently unrealistic.
Such hopes ignore the social prestige that religious scholars continue to 
enjoy among both rural and urban populations, and while particularly urban 
residents are often dissatisfied with the remaining social hierarchy, advice by 
religious shuras is not easily ignored (Johnson and Leslie 2004: 40). 
Furthermore, is not unusual that shuras become vocal against government 
decisions or even individual officials. The three circles o f power— clans, 
government, and religion— are not eclipsing one another; there is 
overlapping but also redefinition and repositioning. An assumption that 
religious structures and their priorities are somehow identical with state 
structures, both united against the citi2enry, would therefore be misguided 
both conceptually and empirically. In fact, assistance by international actors
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to city-based secular organisations have regularly turned out as indirect 
business development, supporting ‘suitcase NG O s’ and refusing to 
acknowledge the opportunities that lies in a little-understood religion-based 
civil society.
In sum, a depoliticised approach to civic revitalisation in Afghanistan such as 
through the equation o f farmer organisations— which are motivated 
economically— as civil society (Rondinelli and Montgomery 2004: 233) 
appears ahistorical. The concept’s transferability is rendered limited in a 
social environment o f networks that are oriented around extended family ties 
and ethnicity rather than clustering dynamically around specifically defined 
public interests. What it more, if the social capabilities embedded in tribal 
and traditional structures were to be excluded ex ante (Schmeidl 2004), then 
efforts to ‘build a civil society’ in Afghanistan are even doubly misguided.
When failure is bad: the Afghan leopard is getting hungry again
In addition to these conceptual flaws— and indeed common to conflict 
environments in general— civic activity in Kabul and beyond was also 
hindered substantially by a fragile and subsequendy worsening security 
situation. The choice o f Kabul as the seat o f ISAF headquarters contributed 
to the creation o f a “protected enclave”, a manifestation o f the international 
community’s priority to “[protecting and promoting fledgling institutions of 
the [central] state [...] rather than security for the population.” (Goodhand 
2004: 76, ICG 2005b: 7, cf. Rubin et al. 2005: 36). One informant in Herat 
argued, “Herat is well off, but in Kabul it is more like 50-50. And those well 
off in Kabul are well o ff pardy because ISAF is there protecting everyone, 
and from the per diems o f international agencies.” (IBA-KlOe) ISAF tried 
hard indeed to win the city residents’ goodwill by supporting physical 
reconstruction and even publishing a newspaper in Dari (and English!) to 
publicise their work (Image 12 in annex 3). Still, the allocation o f a 
disproportionate amount o f resources and attention to maintaining security 
in the political centre also created opportunities for insurgency in the 
periphery and fragmented the process o f increasing countrywide security
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“along a rural-urban axis” (Sedra and Middlebrook 2004: 8, cf. Rubin et al. 
2005: 70).
This does not imply that the city was a safe space. Criminal activity made it 
unwise to roam around after nightfall. During the day, security was 
maintained through the presence o f several dozens o f ISAF peacekeepers in 
military vehicles speeding through the city. Even though reported homicide 
rates were lower in 2002 than in many large Western cities (ISAF 2004), the 
dark figure was estimated to be a multiple o f the official number (cf. Esser 
2004b). As one journalist put it, “Kabul is not really a city, but a wilderness 
in urban decoration.” (Zekri 2003, author’s translation)
In 2004, the situation in Kabul worsened significandy for Afghans as well as 
foreigners. Most o f the city’s districts were considered unsafe for 
international staff. The ‘Kabul City risk map’ depicted on the following page 
and published by UNAMA in November 2004 illustrates this. The small blue 
areas were the only ones considered at low  risk’, yellow areas were assessed 
to be medium risk, and red zones were out o f bounds.
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SECURITY RISK MAPPING FOR KABUL CITY
Since then, the numbers o f robberies, abductions for ransom, and bomb 
attacks have been on the increase (cf. ANSO 2005a). Suicide bombings—  
previously unusual in Afghanistan— have targeted urban centres. Kabul, 
Kandahar, Herat and Jalalabad had the highest incidence rates (BBCNem 
2006, Evans 2006, Paasch 2005, North 2005b, 2005c, 2005e). Occasionally 
very rural ‘tools’ would be used to create havoc, such as in the case o f a 
donkey-bome bomb exploding in Faizabad City in December 2005, aimed at 
the military target but damaging an off-road vehicle used by an INGO  
without causing human casualties (ANSO 2005b).78
The Afghan President also saw himself confronted with public complaints 
about the quality o f police in the capital city that remained under national 
authorities such as the National Security Department and the Ministry of 
Interior. He responded by pointing to the difficulty o f the task but avoided 
to discuss the dissolution o f policing authority to the city level, or 
heterogenising the police force (Radio Afghanistan 2005). The ethnic 
division o f public service organisations is probably most visible in the case of 
the police and security apparatus, in which approximately 80% of officials 
are Tajiks (Khabir 2003: 622; Esser 2004b). Police forces based in the capital 
city and in particular their senior officers had remained disconnected from 
the rest o f the country due both to a lack o f technical equipment and unclear 
governance structures, with local commanders often also claiming the 
function o f local policing (AI 2003a: 28).
Amnesty International documented that a former military leader, General 
Salangi, operated as the quasi head o f Kabul police, commanding a ten 
thousand strong force and wielding “much actual power”. At the same time, 
General Jurat, the ‘Head o f Security and Public Controls’, was controlling his 
own force o f 4,000 policemen that focused on controlling main public 
infrastructure and regularly erected checkpoints within the city (ibid., 8). In 
addition, several former military commanders managed to maintain policing 
powers in their neighbourhoods. The reputation o f urban police forces 
continued to be poor, partly an effect o f the recruitment practices prevalent
78 No further information was available about the donkey. Its demise must be assumed.
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during the first two years after the victory against the Taleban. “Many armed 
men have been systematically drafted into the local police force, both 
because o f an acute shortage o f security personnel and in order to control 
them and prevent further criminal acts. However, Afghan policemen, many 
of whom are paid irregularly [US$ 17 per month in mid-2004], commit a 
significant number o f the criminal acts in Kabul.” (Esser 2004b: 34)
The public in lead nations in the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan 
became increasingly worried amid the ineffectiveness of current strategies, 
exemplified in The Independents full front-page accusation that the recipient 
government continued to be “trapped in its own fortified compound in the 
capital” (The Independent 2006: 1). In February 2006, Kabul witnessed its first 
full-blown bank robbery in the post-Taleban era when six robbers escaped 
with US$ 320,000 killing one policeman and injuring a guard and a child (The 
Daily Outlook 2006). Political violence reached a new peak in March 2006 
with the assassination attempt o f the newly elected Speaker o f the upper 
house in the middle o f Kabul city centre, killing four bystanders. According 
to high-level Afghan government officials, the attack had been organised by 
the Pakistani intelligence service ISI in order to destabilise the new political 
system (Bokhari and Morarjee 2006).
Embedded in an upsurge o f fighting between government troops, coalition 
forces and insurgent groups in the south o f  the country, in May 2006 Kabul 
experienced the most serious rioting since the fall o f the Taleban. Following 
a road accident involving a US American truck, approximately 2,000 
protesters chanted anti-govemment slogans, burned vehicles, and marched 
towards the upscale neighbourhoods o f Shar-i-Naw and Wavpr A.kbar Khan 
where they threatened international staff and ransacked offices o f several 
INGOs. 16 protesters were shot dead by local police and, allegedly, also by 
hastily retreating American troops. One police officer was killed as well. 
Over a hundred demonstrators were injured (Gall 2006, IWPR 2006b).
The President himself was quick in blaming the incident on the insurgency 
movement, calling the incident a tragic accident taken advantage o f by the 
“enemies o f Afghanistan” (quoted in: C N N  2006), and the Senate Speaker
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claimed to have seen “red flags” and concluded, “It appears that the 
communists also played a role in this.” (quoted in: Pahjwok 2006) Events in 
the aftermath suggested that political power play had indeed fed into the 
outbreak o f the riot. A commander from the Shomali plain with a blotchy 
human rights record, Amanullah Gozar was appointed police chief for 
Kabul as a demand by the representatives o f the rioters. Soon after President 
Karzai was criticised publicly by the German Government, who is training 
the police, for this appointment. At the same time, both scale and vigour o f  
the riot have also been linked convincingly to the “excruciatingly slow pace 
o f change” (ibid.) regarding the (non-)progress o f development in the capital 
city, giving rise to a common feeling o f neglect by and mismanagement o f  
international aid expenditure among its residents (Leithead 2006). This 
perception constitutes a readily exploitable and growing basis for political 
agency, and Jamiat-e-Islami, a prominent traditionalist faction in the national 
parliament was singled out by several analysts as a “likely culprit” o f sending 
groups o f agitators and instigating the masses, thus creating several 
epicentres o f protest in the city (IWPR 2006c).
By the time of completion o f  this study, the situation had worsened. In June 
2007, a suicide bomber drove his dynamite-packed car into a bus carrying 
three dozen policemen, all o f whom were killed (BBCNews 2007a). This was 
the most devastating attack that struck Kabul since the ousting o f the 
Taleban six years earlier. It also marked a strategic shift by the insurgency 
whose fighters were moving away from all-out assaults in open terrain, 
intensifying instead their suicide attacks within the capital city as a crucial 
means to weaken the central government and also as an expression o f their 
renewed desire “to surround Kabul and eventually capture it.” (Simpson 
2007, cf. BBCNews 2007b). Predating this most recent escalation, an already 
known charge (ch. Hersh and CS-K3 in CHAPTER FOUR) o f President Karzai 
as “a type of Mayor of Kabul [...] insofar as control o f territory is concerned” 
was revived by former US Secretary o f State Albright (Albright 2006; 
author’s translation). Soon after, Pakistan’s leader Pervez Musharraf 
invigorated this image by claiming that Karzai was “the best man for Kabul 
[...] but he doesn’t understand Afghanistan.” (cited in: The Economist 2006b: 
36) While these comments were uttered under the impression o f resurfacing
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countrywide unrest, they epitomise the political arena that was, and is, Kabul 
(cf. Gotsch 2004: 130). Tragically, the crucial question o f how to make 
Kabul work for its inhabitants amid worsening security and facing the 
dominance o f a private sector-driven, apolitical narrative has remained 
unanswered.
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Chapter 7: 
Trial, error, and the reconceptionalisation o f urban analysis
The politics of polity and policies: what do the empirical data tell us?
A comparison o f constitutive factors o f society that remained attached to the 
post-war urban sphere shall serve as the entry point to our empirical and 
theoretical synthesis. While not benefiting urban economic development in 
Freetown directly, political power (at the national level), social attractiveness, 
military might, and— to some extent— economic resources proved ‘spatially 
sticky’. Even after the conflict, decision-making power was retained in the 
urban arena as a result o f propinquity as well as fragmented constituencies in 
the provinces. Socially, the predominantly young population o f Sierra Leone 
still regarded the capital city as the place where opportunities were ‘lying on 
the street’. And with regard to military control, the national government 
went unchallenged. Indeed, only economic power remained divided between 
urban non-Sierra Leoneans, a handful o f  political entrepreneurs, and 
international mining companies.
By contrast, only two o f these factors were predominant in Kabul. One has 
been the politic-economic power to coordinate reconstruction— the capital 
city as the centre o f the nation-building project, locus o f cooperation, 
collusion and coercion between international and national policymakers, and 
hub for aid distribution— , yet not the power to control the process country­
wide. The other factor lies in the social dimension, exemplified by a 
significantly greater degree o f civil liberties and relatively broader service 
coverage. Conversely, an overwhelming amount o f indigenous resources is 
dispersed and non-taxable by the centre (e.g., drugs, contraband, provincial 
commanders controlling border trade), and military power is wielded by 
international forces and applied to provinces hosting resistance forces and 
illegal production, particularly in the East and the Southeast o f the country 
where insurgency and the drug trade are often linked. Even security in the 
Kabul depends largely on international forces.
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N ot surprising then, in light o f these differences in post-war polities in Sierra 
Leone and Afghanistan contemporary governance reform agendas for the 
two countries were diametrical. As CHAPTER FIVE has illustrated, the 
declared appeasement strategy for Sierra Leone was a quest for 
decentralisation through the creation o f ‘better’ institutions at the local level, 
whereas political and physical reconstruction in Afghanistan, outlined in 
CHAPTER SIX, had been informed by the proverbial allegation that the 
national government’s leverage hardly extends beyond the capital city’s 
borders.79 Here, international measures have focused on countering the 
economic de-facto decentralisation o f Afghanistan deriving mostly from rural 
poppy incomes and illegal customs. This has been sidelined with neo- 
nationalistic moves, including the repatriation o f the late king to Kabul and 
the proclamation o f the late Shah Massoud as the father o f the nation 
(suggesting a state o f mind that he hardly displayed when defending the 
Tajik-held Panfsher Valley against invaders, including other Afghan tribes). It 
has also manifested itself in the NSP, which sought to empower local 
communities vis-a-vis provincial power holders and seeks binding them, 
through direct local budget support, more closely to the national centre and 
its ministries.
These differences also found expression at the city level. When we apply 
Clarke’s (1987: 112-114, cf. CHAPTER TWO) policy response framework to 
Freetown and Kabul, we see how institutional dynamics regarding incentive 
structures for responsiveness by the municipalities in Freetown and Kabul 
differed. In Freetown during the past three decades, the historically rigid 
majority for the APC, in conjunction with the central state-imposed period 
of an appointed urban management board, created a lack o f civic leverage. 
After the recent polity reform however, the constitutional framework in 
Sierra Leone regulates, at least de jure, both the tasks and the financial 
discretion of the municipality, and city politicians and municipal officials are 
struggling to preserve a minimal degree o f political leverage vis-a-vis the 
national state. In Kabul, democratic structures at the municipal level have yet
79 The degree of physical destruction in the course o f violent conflict differed starkly as well. 
Kabul was mostly reduced to rubble, whereas in Freetown only a few neighbourhoods were 
affected severely.
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to be implemented, and until recendy a highly autonomous municipality 
continued operating under planning norms o f the Soviet regime. However, 
change has been happening here as well. While still insulated from electorate 
pressure, the Municipality has been incentivised— and partly forced— to 
stabilise its budget and compromise on its initial degree o f  autonomy as a 
consequence o f its devotion to outdated strategies o f urban development. 
How can these parameters be interpreted?
Even though I have outlined in the sub-section on Urban Regime Analysis 
(URA) in CHAPTER TWO why Kantor et al.’s (1997: 349-350) framework to 
analyse different types o f regimes in industrialised cities can only to a very 
limited extent be applied to non-democratic, non-capitalist environments—  
the authors themselves conclude that their “framework suggests caution in 
attempting to transfer policies to cities with very different structural soils 
(ibid., 371)”— , some key parallels o f this present study with their analysis are 
striking and appear to reinvigorate Robinson’s (2006) argument. When 
Kantor et al. argue that Detroit be characterised as a ‘dependant private, vendor 
regime’ city where popular participation is low, coalitions are confined to 
“government and a few businesses” (as opposed to being open to parties, 
unions, and residents at large), the “mode o f public-private cooperation” is 
“business-led” (i.e., not party or social movement-driven), and the “policy 
agenda for collective benefits” is “selective, including side payments”, it 
would be ignorant to deny a conspicuous similarity with post-war reality in 
Kabul. A similarly arresting observation can be made in the case of 
Freetown. Following the taxonomy by Kantor et al., Naples is classified as a 
‘dependent public, clientilist regime’ city based on the observation that (effective) 
popular participation is (again) low, coalitions are limited to “party elites” 
organised around “patron-client relationships”, public-private cooperation is 
party-led, and selective benefits and side payments are embedded in 
“manifest corruption” (ibid., 369) -  isn’t this rather analogous to the 
situation found to prevail in the capital city o f Sierra Leone?
Yet I argue that acknowledging these admittedly surprising parallels without 
seeking to elucidate further the underlying drivers o f such constellations 
would fall into precisely the same Tocalist trap’ o f URA that I have already
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pointed to in CHAPTER TWO. It is obvious that in the two cities investigated, 
the degrees o f political and socio-economic dynamics over the course o f the 
past two decades would render a potential hypothesis o f ‘stable urban 
regimes’ with litde explanatory power. Particularly in the extremely fragile 
polities in regional zones o f conflict looked at in this study, the role of  
international agents in strengthening or weakening the state and its 
organisation and institutions at various levels has been essential, and this 
limits the ordinariness o f post-war politics in Freetown and Kabul.
Moreover, despite these justifiably different classifications responsive 
measures by international actors in both settings were remarkably similar, 
thus confirming suspicions o f—at least in part— a. blue-print approach. 
During the first years o f ‘peace’, urban development had not been a priority 
in either o f the countries. Resources had been channelled into the creation 
o f rural livelihoods, even though the scale and scope o f urban management 
challenges was alarming in both cities. Moreover, while colonially induced 
physical segregation between foreigners, Creoles, and native hinterland 
migrants has indeed been a factor in the formation and spatial development 
o f Freetown— and as much as this legacy lives on until the present day 
through the built environment— this does resemble the trajectory o f spatial 
patterns in Kabul, characterised by the rise o f several distinguishable 
neighbourhoods which, also because o f rising rents driven by the ‘need for 
space’ among international organisations, constitute de facto exclusive urban 
quarters, both in the past and even more forcefully so in the present, as an 
outcome o f the post-war urban economy.
In addition, the crucial “regional dimension” (Pugh and Cooper 2004) of 
both conflicts exemplifies two similar geographies o f power. Both central 
governments are located in taxable voids, with diamonds in Sierra Leone 
either mined illicitly and exported through circumvention o f the capital city 
(both financially and physically) or by benefiting foreign stakeholders in 
international supply chains, and opium in Afghanistan crowding out 
potential ‘cash crops’ for the rural population and the central administration 
and, because o f its illegality, being shipped out o f the country via the nearest 
border crossing (cf. Rubin et al. 2004: 7).
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At the same time— in Freetown and in Kabul— , patronage networks 
financed by international aid were orchestrated from (but not concentrated in) 
the cities. Political links to the rural constituency provided traditional 
participants in the political arena located in the capital city with crucial 
leverage to compensate for their lack o f policy support by donor agencies 
(cf. Rubin 2002: 66-69). With massive flows o f aid money being channelled 
through the two cities, urban rent-seeking by non-urban actors— be it at the 
micro level through continuing in-migration, through existing patronage 
networks or through ‘high politics’ in the form o f national institutions’ 
capture o f financial flows, appears to constitute another parallel.
Migdal’s (1988: 33) contention that state leaders are not only constrained by 
state structures, but also by actors in the political economy that do not 
necessarily operate within the realm of the state (he cites chiefs, landlords, 
bosses, rich peasants, clan leaders, etc) thus resonates forcefully with the 
findings o f this study even though the latter had been set up to focus 
primarily on urban, not national, politics. But as the empirical investigation has 
shown, separating lines between these two spheres in capital cities in fragile 
states are fuzzy.
Important against the background o f this argument and also the 
aforementioned debate on whether Freetown and Kabul are rather 
‘extraordinary’ cities is the recognition that deliberate attempts by national 
authorities to hinder or capture local politics is not a unique phenomenon. 
Both for budgetary reasons and in order to control potential or actual 
political opponents, the dissolution o f local government on accusations of 
mismanagement or ineffectiveness has been a strategy pursued by many 
other national governments in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond, and Stren 
(1989: 32-35) exemplifies this through the case o f the suspension o f the 
Nairobi City Council in 1983. Stren concludes that these manoeuvres 
visualised the “contours of the central-local struggle that is endemic within 
political systems in which substantial institutional resources have been 
developed at the local level, [emphasis added]” While in a different context, 
it appears intriguing that Stren focuses on institutional resources (as opposed
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to economic resources), which appears to make his conclusion even more 
poignant for the case o f post-war cities where economic recovery is only just 
beginning but where institutional legacies from pre-war times exist and 
persist, as demonstrated in the previous chapters. Likewise, the call for 
physical deconcentration in order to deconcentrate poverty and political 
opposition away from capital cities— as described here in the case study o f  
Freetown— is not unprecedented; it resembles the gentrification agenda for 
North American and Western European cities during the 1980s and 1990s.
Yet a key question in the context o f this study’s comparative perspective is 
whether the political potential that is inherent in the thorny process o f  
implementing such a policy can be harnessed by local agents in a post-war 
context to the same extent as it has been observed in some cases in 
economically and politically more institutionalised settings (cf. Goetz 2000). 
In light o f population dynamics and dire poverty, this appears unlikely in 
general; in the cases o f Sierra Leone and Afghanistan it has certainly not 
happened. Despite the diametrical direction o f politico-spatial planning in 
Freetown and Kabul, my research has unearthed significant cleavages between 
city-based groups that can be traced to pre-war times, as well as structures 
that favour a small group o f the countries’ elites. These, too, have strong 
pre-war precedents. In sum, ‘the city’ and ‘the hinterland’ cannot be 
characterised as a sharp dichotomy. In both Sierra Leone and Afghanistan 
there have been manifold connections between the two spheres, and 
important power struggles have taken place within the capital city.
O f course it would be foolhardy to deny that basic infrastructure and service 
provision in urban centres is better. Even so, the basic point here is that 
there was no “poor c o u n tr y s id e -c i ty ” pattern. This is also partly true 
because o f forced migration and internal displacement during the various 
eras o f large-scale violence, which greatly increased the pressure on urban 
systems. One key informant in Kabul argued,
“Kabul now has a new group o f  residents who have com e from other cities or from  
the surrounding areas, and they are undergoing a rapid process o f  urbanisation, but 
the question o f  whether they are really urban yet in terms o f  the old definition o f  
Kabul— and I’m not defending the old definition, I am saying this is an analytic
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problem— and what is the social capital that was found around neighbourhoods 
and networks, and how  that can be redone is an empirical question in need o f  
investigation.” (CS-K1)
We can thus infer how Smith’s (1996) ‘post-Liptonist’ argument o f an intra­
urban division informs our journey to reformulate urban analysis for post-war 
cities. But as CHAPTERS FIVE and SEX have shown, donors’ priorities were 
clearly focused at other issues and, certainly with regard to sequence, also at 
other levels o f polity. In Afghanistan, both national and provincial elections 
were a non-partisan endeavour, with agencies fielding the argument that the 
concept o f parties had a negative connotation after the negative experience 
under imposed communism, and that the appeal o f political parties was low 
anyhow. This .was endorsed immediately by the .country’s President who had. 
made previous remarks on party politics as a cause o f war and instability, 
officially on the grounds o f operational ease (i.e., vote counting and the 
communication o f results to the mostly illiterate electorate) and protection 
against ‘warlords’— potential contenders— exerting influence through 
bribery and coercion (ICG 2005c: 6). In Sierra Leone, the reinstatement o f  
President Kabbah in 2002— including his cabinet o f “discredited (recycled) 
SLPP politicians” (Zack-Williams 2002: 309) thus essentially putting “the 
same old men [...] back in power” (Hanlon 2004: 11)— after his ousting in 
1997 was almost as safe an assumption as the US-concerted installation of 
President Karzai in Kabul, as were high level appointments o f SLPP 
dignitaries in Sierra Leone and leading commanders in Afghanistan, thus 
frustrating the emergence o f a “loyal opposition” in both countries (Paris 
2004: 224). Through local elections in May 2004, UNAMSIL then aimed at 
decentralising political decision-making while, indirectly at least, helping the 
national government de-concentrate the population away from the capital 
city. Local structures o f representation were being established and, 
presumably, strengthened, but even though inter-institutional competition in 
rural areas was recognised by international agencies as a key challenge, the 
fact that local polity had remained tied to the national level was neglected 
(Fanthorpe 2006). Winning the City o f Freetown as the final puzzle piece 
had been a central electoral objective of the SLPP. As CHAPTER FIVE has 
explicated, the international community had been fighting to achieve non- 
partisanship but failed eventually. The outcome o f this election, a landslide
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victory o f the SLPP everywhere but in the capital city and one rural district, 
sparked the revival o f local politics as much as it complicated it. Newly 
elected rural representatives remained largely powerless locally due to 
existing structures while simultaneously finding themselves unable to gain 
leverage in Freetown, the centre o f power and the hub o f external resources. 
The same happened to most urban representatives, including the Mayor, 
who were blocked by a national political structure operating not only in and 
from, but also on the city (cf. Sharp 1997, Lupsha 1987). These constellations 
seemingly problematise donor driven fast paced ‘re-democratisation’ across 
layers o f polity in post-war recovery settings. It is paramount to point out in 
this context that the success o f those in Sierra Leone who supported 
partisanship cannot be blamed for the politically charged situation that 
emerged from it. Quite the contrary, the underlying cause was the 
presidential election— partisan, o f course— against which donor and UN  
agencies had had no objections, and the subsequent support given to the 
national government o f SLPP President Kabbah, whose victory had been 
predictable. Arguing in favour o f non-partisan local elections two years later 
was then not only a conceptual inconsistency on the part o f the international 
organisations (in collaboration with actors from the donor-sponsored ‘civil 
society’) but also misled in analytical terms: Why would citizens— politically 
weakened already and unhappy with the slow progress o f reform and 
recovery— accept the depoliticisation o f their ‘life world’ with its many wants 
and institutional deficiencies (cf. Ottersbach 2003: 33-34)?
Quintessentially, it was this situation o f immediate socio-economic crisis and 
the function o f Freetown as the place o f aid disbursal and national 
policymaking that renders Peterson’s (1981: 109-130, cf. CHAPTER TWO) 
rationale, which explained low citizens’ involvement and interest in local 
politics by “political parties [...] not structuring] conflict, issues [...] not 
hav[ing] as burning an importance, and candidates [...] not ambitiously 
competing] for office (ibid.)”, pointless in the context o f urban governance in 
fragile states. This specific context constituted two environments marked by 
distinctive incentive structures, shorter time horizons, and a greater number 
of players not only at the local (urban) and national levels but involving a 
multitude o f international interests as well. Arguably, this nexus o f agency
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and resources in times o f political crisis also seems to justify attaching the 
label o f peculiarity to the characterisation o f Freetown and Kabul. Both 
cities thus appear ‘extraordinary’ to some degree. But neither is everything is 
‘out o f order’, as the counterfactual questions to be asked and answered in 
the following sub-section reveal.80
Counterfactuals: 
what if there had been no recent international interventions?
We can begin by asking whether the Freetown City Council would have had 
the same configuration without the post-war involvement o f international 
agencies in Sierra Leone’s different layers o f polity? Clearly this appears 
unlikely. There would have been no local elections at the point when they 
were held, and it is also doubtful that the President alone would have been 
able to push the decentralisation agenda forward through the jungle o f 
political resistance within the national line ministries. Furthermore, the 
elections were framed by a new municipal law that was entirely the product 
o f collaboration between two major development agencies.
Would Kabul Municipality have had the same relative leverage within the 
national political landscape and with regard to accessing national funds? 
Even though financial means for decentralisation programmes were stepped 
up after 2005, the agenda had initially been a smokescreen; the real challenge 
was to appease the periphery and to bind provinces to the centre — local 
empowerment-related interventions (e.g., the NSP) changed little in political 
practice. In the capital city, international donors clearly voted with their feet 
and wallets (as a result o f the insistence by the municipal leadership on what 
has been perceived outdated planning methods and the poor reputation of 
mid-level the bureaucrats). Therefore the relative autonomy o f the 
Municipality vis-a-vis other actors in the urban arena would arguably be
80 Note that this hypothetical reasoning presented below does not serve to validate the three 
working hypotheses derived in CHAPTER ONE. To them we will turn afterwards, in the 
subsequent section of this chapter in which the extent to which these hypotheses can be 
confirmed or require modification, or even rejection, is reviewed.
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greater; at the same time, this would have probably changed little, given the 
lower amount o f short-term funding.
Would the structure o f city-based non-governmental agency in Freetown 
and Kabul have been the same without the involvement o f international 
agencies and INGOs? The structure o f civil society in both cities would 
arguably be more dominated by ethnic (Afghan) and ethno-regional (Sierra 
Leonean) features, and it would likely be concerned about issues closer to 
political agency, rather than mainly becoming externally funded non-state 
service providers.
Finally, would the scale and scope o f urban infrastructure have been 
different without the involvement o f international agencies in both cities? In 
Freetown, water provision would arguably be even more unreliable; 
however, in other areas o f urban services such as electricity and waste 
collection, no significant changes could be expected. Furthermore, given the 
absence o f large-scale physical reconstruction schemes driven by 
international agencies and funded with outside money, the physical 
landscape in Freetown can be assumed to have appeared largely the same. In 
Kabul, initial funding focused mosdy on rebuilding a national institutional 
infrastructure o f local governance and on satisfying short-term needs 
through the provision o f emergency housing, cash for work schemes, and 
food aid. Donors were later on moving towards rehabilitating physical 
infrastructure and preserving Kabul’s physical heritage as well. However, in 
the area of urban construction, the vast majority o f funding for small-scale 
rehabilitation was coming from private pockets, including reinvestment of 
profits from illegal activities outside the city, and the relatively low 
commitment o f non-Afghan funders suggests that a significant part o f  
housing and small-scale business infrastructure would not have looked much 
different. Here again donors have had a visible yet not dominant impact on 
urban physical reconstruction.
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Theorising cross-level agency: paths, paces, and overdetermination
There is no way o f denying that the historical review in CHAPTER FOUR 
challenges the suggestion o f an exclusively war-induced reversion o f urban 
fates in Sierra Leone and Afghanistan, as fielded by hypothesis (A).81 Both 
countries had been recipients o f substantial foreign aid prior to the most 
recent armed conflicts at the end o f the past century, which I have argued in 
the same chapter even served as a considerable trigger factor for the 
outbreak o f fighting. At the same time, attempts to restore urban 
functionality in Freetown and Kabul after the conflicts have indeed been 
overshadowed by resuscitated agendas o f nation-building and national 
democratisation, which limited the scope o f stimulating taxable urban 
production and sustainable urban development.
In Sierra Leone, even though per capita financial assistance was lower than 
in most other recent interventions (cf. CHAPTER THREE), from an in-country 
perspective these flows reached new heights after the defeat o f the RUF and 
the ousting— temporary at least, at the time of editing this study— of the 
Taleban. The resulting decrease in relative political leverage o f local players 
in urban affairs resonates strongly with Giddens’ (1981: 170-171) claim that 
“[t]he notion o f resources can be applied to connect the structural study o f  
domination with the analysis o f the power relations involved in social systems.” 
Thus, time— together with space and ageny one o f the three key components 
o f my analytical framework (cf. CHAPTER ONE)— does appear to play an 
important role for this analysis. Yet a war-induced change in a direction as 
sketched in hypothesis (A) cannot be confirmed. Political landscapes marked 
by agendas and actions cutting through layers o f polity have indeed limited 
the scope and the effectiveness of local governance in Freetown and Kabul, 
but this had been the case for a long time prior and war as an ‘event’ 
therefore did not constitute a watershed as attributed to it by hypothesis (A), 
and also as implied by figure 2 in CHAPTER THREE.
81 “The political leverage o f capital city-based actors has been correlated positively with the 
historical emergence of the nation-state project, but as an effect o f war, urban pro­
development politics are overshadowed and paralysed by national recovery agendas and 
supranational strategies to (re)create the nation-state. The initial correlation has been 
reverted.”
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This feeds into the structural aspects o f this enquiry, which have been 
addressed by hypotheses (B) and (C). The empirical evidence presented in 
CHAPTERS FIVE and SEX (and in conjunction with the hypothetical scenarios 
discussed in the previous section o f this chapter) suggests that hypothesis 
(B)82 pointed into the right direction, yet the politico-economic histories of 
both cities fail to confirm it in its entirety. To explain this contention, let us 
revisit the argument presented in the section on case selection in CHAPTER 
THREE. There, it was proposed that if ‘accelerated structuration’ in Freetown 
was found to have occurred during colonial times as well, “then this would 
weaken hypothesis (B) [...] because colonial rule in the past may have had a 
very similar (if not stronger) effect on local and national institutions, thus 
rendering the relative leverage wielded by foreign intervention and post-war 
governance on altering institutions and structures diminished.” This was 
exactly the case, as CHAPTER FOUR showed, and it was epitomised in Sierra 
Leone by the colonial practice o f ‘divide and rule,’ both with respect to space 
(north versus south at the country level plus the physical separation in 
Freetown) and regarding urban agency (non-natives versus natives). But does 
this render colonialism as a strong explanatory variable? In CHAPTER THREE 
I went on to argue that “[cjonversely, if the historical analysis o f  colonialism 
does not explain sufficiently the institutional landscape in Freetown in the 
present, then one can argue that alternative forces seem to play a role as 
well.” (ibid.) And indeed, the investigation o f Kabul’s history demonstrated 
that the structuration o f a capital city—by local, national, and supra-national 
players— had begun over a century ago via a foreign-inspired, elite-led 
process o f modernisation and increasing indebtedness — but without any 
colonial rule.
This observation needs to be digested thoroughly. What it implies is that 
while caution is warranted in order not to overestimate the structuring 
effects o f post-intervention processes in light o f similar periods prior to the 
most recent armed conflicts, explaining such periods o f accelerated
82 “The political leverage of local actors and institutions in post-war, post intervention cities 
is limited sufficiently through interorganisational competition with other institutions at other 
levels o f polity that agency by coalitions with sufficient financial means gains enough 
leverage to alter local institutions and policies in a process o f ‘accelerated structuration.””
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structuration with a colonial legacy would equally miss the point. Much as 
my prediction made in CHAPTER ONE that “[i]f space matters [...], it might 
do so differently in different politico-economic contexts,” we can conclude 
that structures have indeed mattered for agemy in both settings, but that the 
sources o f these structures and institutions were not identical. In other words, 
colonialism was only one way o f structuring urban governance over time; there 
were other ways, too.
The aspects o f this finding that pertain to the impact o f colonial rule are 
backed up very well by existing knowledge. Theorists o f  governance have 
argued that the brevity o f penetration o f ‘modem’ polities into traditional 
societies was sufficient to upset the latter, but too short and shallow to replace 
them (Clapham 2001: 85-88). This claim is illustrated neatly by the case of 
Freetown. As much as during the early years, the urban colony itself had 
been structuring and thus conditioning the economic and social 
(under)development o f the hinterland, the failed economic integration o f the 
country (after the formal annexation o f the hinterland and subsequent 
independence) into the international division o f labour and, later on, during 
the institutionalisation o f neo-patrimonial structures did not only parallel 
“the demise o f Freetown as an important commercial and intellectual 
center”, as Zack-Williams (2002: 314) has argued, but have also conditioned 
the persistent powerlessness o f local governance in Freetown. Twenty years 
after independence the process of decolonisation had in fact worked to the 
detriment o f the city’s inhabitants— certainly with respect to the Creoles— , 
and the “gap between those who manage national affairs from the urban 
centres— in ministerial buildings, parliamentary chambers, and executive 
mansions— and those who remain in the many rural communities, [had] 
become wider.” (Roberts 1982: 124).
Here again, we can see how little the initial hypothesis o f ‘war as a 
watershed’ captures social reality in historical perspective, and hence has to 
be refuted. The pattern clearly ‘survived’ the war.83 As a result, exploitation
83 Arguments suggesting that post-war states be conducive environments to the 
establishment of “modem statehood” due to the “lower level o f frictions” or even a “polity
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o f both rural and urban residents— i.e., practically the entire population o f the 
country— continues despite a history o f spatial politics in Sierra Leone that 
has led from a hinterland-dominating urban colony to a neo-patrimonial 
nation imposing itself on its capital city through an uneasy coalition between 
a politics-embracing governing party and an international community 
obsessed with achieving non-partisanship. Indeed, “the situation now 
resembles the situation before the war,” one interviewee stressed. Thus 
emphasising structural continuity rather than rupture, he noted,
“One o f our consultants recently said, ‘This is not a post-conflict situation, this is a 
conflict situation.’ Post-conflict, development, appeasement — whatever you call 
these phases, in the end it doesn’t matter. It only matters to donors. All this is a 
donor driven structure: .‘Let’s just add another layer o f  administration.’. [...] But if 
you write something critical in your own reports to alert them, they just delete it. 
Just delete it! Gone.” (NG-F4)
CHAPTERS FIVE and SIX have also shown that the leverage that international 
agencies have had recently over urban institutions cannot be neglected. For 
instance, the wars in both countries proved to be catalysts for the 
institutionalisation— i.e., the process o f ‘instantiation’ o f rules and resources 
in social systems— of a private sector, ‘anti-politics’ driven approach to 
urban management, orchestrated by international agencies. The same is true 
for legal frameworks regulating urban affairs. Furthermore, both amounts 
and relative distribution o f resources—defined by Giddens (1981: 171) as “the 
‘capabilities o f making things happen’, or bringing about particular states o f  
affairs”— changed as a result o f foreign post-war involvement. But to a 
significant extent, structuration o f both urban polities had been an element 
o f Sierra Leonean and Afghan politics for the past one hundred years and 
beyond. The weight o f these observations thus inflicts severe scratches on 
hypothesis (B); while it remains correct in its general thrust, it has clearly 
underestimated the impacts o f pre-war interactions between political actors 
across different levels o f polity.
What we must turn to now is an explanation o f the nature o f agency framed 
by structural and institutional settings in both countries, captured initially by
vacuum” (Rudner 2005: 19 [author’s translation]), can only be explained with an insufficient 
understanding of political realities (cf. Bastian and Luckham 2003).
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hypothesis (C). Space and agency— the second and third components o f the 
analytical framework o f this study— have been shown to matter given the 
manifold cross-scalar processes in the two post- intervention cities. But 
rather than agency and resultant alteration o f structures taking place as an 
outcome o f international agencies’ use o f “authoritative and allocative 
resources” (Jabri 1994, cf. CHAPTER TWO) in interaction with genuinely 
urban, i.e., local actors— as predicted by hypothesis (C)84— , the 
restructuration o f Freetown and Kabul has been happening ‘remotely’ 
through cooperation, collusion, and coercion between international and 
national actors.
Before I move on to visualise this astonishing discovery in figure 14 a/b and 
to analyse its implications for the reconfiguration o f urban analysis in fragile 
state contexts, I shall dwell a little longer on substantiating this claim o f the 
‘international-national’ determining the ‘local/urban.’ Recalling the urban 
functions outlined in the section on urban policies and politics in CHAPTER 
TWO (i.e., production, service provision, equity, and security), I am going to 
analyse in the following the ‘locations’ o f policymaking for five concrete 
issues o f urban planning and management. The investigation o f local 
economic development (LED) covers the first function outlined; 
housing/residential planning and urban services (here: water/wastewater and 
garbage collection) cover the second and third function. Social cohesion—  
exemplified here by the issue o f IDP re-integration— arguably intersects with 
the equity function o f cities but also has a security component. This 
component will be taken up as well by a brief comparison o f policing 
authorities in both cities.
We should note at this point that the fulfilment o f two o f these five areas of 
governance and management (urban services and residential planning) are 
impacting primarily on the city and its inhabitants themselves— positively as 
well as negatively, the latter through increasing the appeal o f the city and 
thus incentivising additional in-migration (a dynamic quite different from the 
situation in developed countries)— whereas the other three (LED, policies to
84 “Urban policies and politics in the two cities are determined mainly by the interaction of 
international and local actors.”
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address the displacement challenge, and security) commonly also create 
positive externalities at the provincial or even national level. Herein, the case 
o f urban security and its implications for the country is probably the most 
debatable one. The rationale for attributing greater spatial leverage to it here 
is that while in Afghanistan the main and acute security threat insurgency is 
rooted in the provinces, it would be difficult to dismiss the likelihood o f all- 
out war if Kabul wasn’t secured by ISAF. In Sierra Leone the line (if any) 
between ‘urban security’ and ‘security in the rest o f the country’ has been 
even more blurred throughout history (e.g., urban gangs, political thugs, and 
the 1999 attack on Freetown launched practically from ‘within,’ as described 
in CHAPTER FOUR). When adding evidence o f urban insecurity in other 
regions destabilising entire countries (Davis 2007, Koenig 2007) or—  
conversely— helping defuse tensions beyond the urban realm (Beall 2007a, 
Bollens 2007), and also accounting for the fact that warfare is urbanising and 
‘new’ forms o f war are both targeting and benefitting from urban density (cf. 
CHAPTER TWO and in particular Beall 2006), the aforementioned 
classification o f the security function appears justified.
Figure 14 a/b on the following page visualises the loci o f both policymaking 
and policy impact in practice, i.e., as observed during the field research for this 
study and as described in CHAPTERS FIVE and SEX. The location o f each 
hexagon in the grid thus depends on the ‘impact level’ on the horizontal axis 
and the spatial ‘location o f policymaking’ on the vertical axis. In line with a 
decentralisation cum subsidiarity rationale, the green area in the figure 
visualises the 0-hypothesis denoting that urban policies that benefit mainly the 
city and its inhabitants should be formulated at the same scale, namely the 
local/urban level. By contrast, if  an urban policy can reasonably be expected 
to also produce externalities, then the policymaking level should be higher, 
involving provincial or even national decision-makers. Given the focus on 
post-intervention cities, we also need to include an additional level in order 
to account for international actors.
Figure 14a (following page on the left) locates the levels o f policy 
deliberation and the impact levels o f resulting policies in Freetown and 
Kabul. Whereas impact levels differ relatively little (small differences are due
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to the simple fact that Freetown and Kabul are different cities embedded in 
different countries), policymaking locations do vary in some areas. For 
example, if we recall the case of garbage collection in Freetown (cf. CHAPTER 
FIVE) where the issue is subject to fierce interorganisational competition, we 
see the difference between this situation and the one in in Kabul where 
garbage as a task is tackled by the Municipality — yet only in those 
neighbourhoods that are recognised as ‘formal.’ At the same time, we may 
recall from CHAPTERS FIVE and SIX— and therefore also see in 14a— that 
LED policies for both cities were forged beyond the urban level.
Figure 14b (on the right) allows for a direct comparison of the two cities. 
Because all hexagons— obviously— remain in their positions, figure 14b can 
tell us that while some functions in Kabul were being dealt with locally (e.g., 
garbage collection and also IDP integration, to the extent that it actually 
existed), not only were policies that produce ‘higher level’ externalities but 
also policies that have an impact primarily on the city itself, by and large, 
conceived outside the green area, i.e. not where one would— normatively 
speaking— expect related deliberations to be located.
Residential Planning
Urban Services I 
(water and sewerage)
Urban Services II 
(garbage collection)
□  Freetown 
|  Kabul
U  IDP (Resettlement 
□  Policing
Policymaking level Policymaking level
1 International 1 International
National National
Prov/National Prov/National
Local/Prov Local/Prov
Local urban Local urban
Impact Level Impact Level
Figure 14: Locating policymaking -  (a) functional comparison and (b) inter-city comparison
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The two illustrations visualise the concentration o f urban policymaking 
‘above the heads’ o f stakeholders with a primary interest, as residents, in 
seeing the functions o f Freetown and Kabul— as cities— fulfilled. Again, this 
is true also for those policies whose impact is felt almost exclusively in the 
urban realm. These ‘sovereign conflicts’ (Beall 2007b) over the two cities are 
crucial findings in that they provide substantial momentum to the 
proposition o f ‘overdetermination’ introduced in CHAPTER ONE. However, 
in defiance o f hypothesis (C), figures 14a and 14b also show what has 
already been described in detail in the empirical CHAPTERS FIVE and SIX, 
namely that urban governance in the two post-intervention cities has been 
determined to an overwhelming extent through the interaction o f  
international with national—not local—actors. As CHAPTERS FIVE and SIX have 
demonstrated, this was certainly due to different incentives. In Kabul the 
underlying reason was municipal staff lacking technical capacity and 
suffering from a dubious reputation o f corruption. On the contrary, in 
Freetown donors felt committed to supporting the national government run 
by the SLPP, thus staying away from engaging with the APC-led city council. 
Here, post-war politics around national matters remained spatially 
concentrated in the capital, but the task of governing the city itself was 
suffering from the reluctance to hand over resources to a City Council that 
would potentially destabilise the new national ‘democracy’ — at the expense 
o f enabling more effective local governance in Freetown.
Moreover, a second dimension o f overdetermination comes to the fore 
when we focus on the comparative perspective that figure 14 a/b  offers. The 
three functions for which the policymaking location differs substantially 
between Freetown and Kabul are garbage collection, IDP (re) settlement, and 
policing. These are precisely the functions which, in CHAPTER FIVE on post­
war Freetown, we have found to be highly politicised. Partisan politics across 
spatial layers o f local vs. national constituencies thus contributed to the state 
o f overdetermination in Freetown, which— as figure 14b shows— is even 
more pronounced than in Kabul, thus problematising and indeed refuting 
contrary perceptions that characterise Kabul as an even more ‘remote 
controlled’ setting.
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I visualise these insights in a synthetic manner in figure 15 below. Its general 
composition already known from CHAPTER TWO, it enables a dynamic view 
on the proposed impact of such cross-level agency on urban structures. In 
essence, what figure 15 demonstrates is that interorganisational interaction in 
post-intervention cities in fragile states that serves to catalyse changes in 
urban institutions or alters urban actors’ autonomy vis-a-vis the national 
government does so from ‘above’ — either indirectly (light green arrows, via 
X3) or directly (yellow arrows from X2). We should recall at this point that 
we are using ‘autonomy’ in a positive conceptualisation, in accordance with 
the definition by Wolman and Goldsmith (1992: 45) provided in CHAPTER 
TWO. For instance, simply blocking policies conceived by international 
agencies is not synonymous with autonomy as it is applied in this study as 
long as this resistance does not also result in an independent and positive 
impact on the well-being of urban residents (ibid.).
Structure
Agency
Local National
Theory
Location
Spatial 
impact o f  
multi-level 
cooperation
Figure 15: Learning from trial and error: revisiting hypothesis (C)
What becomes visible as well when studying this figure is the emptiness of 
cubes X2 and X3— much like cube Xj as focused on in CHAPTER TWO— as no 
existing theory of urban politics ‘fills’ them. In the context of the theoretical 
development agenda embraced by this study, this is highly intriguing. Let us
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recall that at the outset o f this investigation I hypothesised (C) that the 
theoretical void to be filled would be located in X l5 i.e., in the area o f  
international-/?^/ interaction, and not in X2 or X3. However, my empirical 
analysis o f post-intervention politics in Freetown and Kabul shows the need 
to reconfigure urban political theory for these and comparable settings 
elsewhere, namely in the area o f international-national interaction. This, then, is 
the task to be tackled in the final section o f this chapter.
Reconfiguring urban analysis: 
the concept of ‘tri-axial urban governance’
Given the insufficient applicability o f existing theories o f urban politics to 
post-war intervention contexts substantiated by the empirical analysis 
provided in this study, and also in light o f the emptiness o f boxes X2 and X3, 
how can this theoretical gap be overcome? Let us recall how I have explained 
the rise o f the concept o f ‘urban governance’ in CHAPTER TWO. Against the 
background o f urban-national competition, I have argued that the “relevance 
o f urban governance is not self-contained, but a distillate o f the perception 
or observation o f ineffective and inefficient resource allocation at the 
national level and its negative impact on urban life.” This rationale also seems 
to fit trimly into a post-war intervention context.
A governance-driven analysis that cuts through levels o f polity eases the 
pressure to identify— at any price— urban regimes, elites, or potential fata 
morganas o f signs o f residual capitalist structures in the city. Instead, it 
redirects the focus on investigating the relations between institutions and 
agency at different levels on how these affect the quality o f life and the 
political leverage o f urban residents, thus freeing up intellectual resources for 
an analytical accommodation o f cross-spatial political processes. An 
emphasis on cross-spatial governance (rather than intra-regimes, elites and 
the like) also jives with recent propositions to reconsider urban regimes as only 
one possible ‘mode o f governance’ (Mossberger and Stoker 2001: 818). 
Governance is thus the overarching category including, but not limited to, 
the structures examined by existing theoretical literature.
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Now, if we chose to adopt urban governance as an alternative framework for 
the analysis o f city politics in fragile states, it would appear crucial to 
distinguish between different meanings o f the concept as a normative model, 
empirical object, and theoretical concept. As Pierre (2005, cf. Bache and 
Flinders 2004: 195-196) explains, governance can denote a prescriptive 
approach to social relations— Welch and Kennedy-Pipe (2004: 130) argue 
almost sarcastically that “the very idea o f ‘policy arenas’ begs a question that 
it would be better to leave open, namely: whose policy?”— expressed most 
prominently by the cry for ‘good governance’ (e.g., UNESCAP et al. 2007) 
but can also be understood as the result o f an enquiry, thus constituting a 
finding and not a framework. Third however,
“[a] governance perspective on urban politics directs the observer to look beyond the 
institutions of the local state to search for processes and mechanisms through which 
significant and resourceful actors coordinate their actions and resources in the 
pursuit o f  collectively defined objectives. [...] Urban governance makes no 
prejudgment about the cast of actors involved in shaping the urban political agenda, nor 
does that make any assumptions about the normative direction and objectives o f  
the governing coalition.” (ibid., 452; emphasis added)
This fulfils exactly the characteristics that are necessary—given the empirical 
data presented— to reconceptualise urban political theory in order to allow it 
to capture the political reality in the settings looked at in this study. Against 
this constitutive background and the discussion o f  the data provided earlier 
in this chapter, one would want to posit emphatically that a revised analytical 
framework needs to retain its politico-economic thrust while being more 
explicitly spatial. Such a revised framework would need to account for 
institutional multiplicity and interorganisational competition not only within, 
but beyond the city level. This is so because political axes that transcend the 
urban and even national politico-economic spheres have served as powerful 
determinants o f urban structures and institutions (the local ‘wheels’, 
following this logic) in Freetown and Kabul. First, there is an axis linking 
formal and information urban institutions; second, another axis is 
connecting— again predominantly through competition— the agendas of  
city-based actors to national government agendas, and third, an axis evolved 
that renders vital urban functions being governed ‘remotely’ through
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collusion between national and supra-national interests and organisations. 
This study therefore suggests speaking o f ‘tri-axial urban governance.’85
In the realm of theory, the notion o f ‘tri-axial urban governance’ also 
captures the observation o f cooperation, collusion and coercion across levels 
o f polity, thus superseding ‘localist’ concepts from the pluralist, elitist, or 
post-modernist comers as well as approaches focusing on the determining 
influence o f national structures like the ones put forward by Marxist and 
post-Marxist theorists. At the same time and unlike the concept o f ‘multi­
level governance’ dicsussed in CHAPTER TWO, it is explicit in its 
acknowledgement o f the intersecting and traversing nature o f urban 
governance through axes that combine local, national, and international 
levels o f agency and structure. O f course, a comparative study o f two 
cases— even when looking at six concrete policy areas and their impacts on 
both cities and thus generating twelve distinct ‘events’— cannot thwart the 
small iV-problem (cf. CHAPTER THREE). However, the conceptual rigidity o f  
‘tri-axial urban governance’ for the two cases investigated here appears solid, 
and this alone should serve as an encouragement for testing it in other 
settings o f fragile statehood. While concrete propositions for such tests will 
be outlined in the final part o f this study, CHAPTER EIGHT, the general 
question guiding these enquiries could therefore read as follows:
—> At which levels (local, national, through direct international 
intervention or, in its most extreme form, ‘remote control’) 
do political agendas for post-intervention cities (a) originate,
(b) at which levels do they play out and how, and (c) how are 
these agendas linked to the production and allocation o f both 
indigenous and supra-national resources?
85 The only analytical uses of the concept o f “governance axes” that I have been able to find 
are related to mapping options for environmental governance, e.g., in a forecast of  
environmental challenges (Office o f Science and Technology 1999) and in a publication on 
scenario planning for climate impact assessments (Berkhout et al. 1999).
We should note as well that the central assumption of hypothesis (B), namely an axis linking 
local with international agency, has not been substantiated. In Kabul there has been some 
political interaction between these two levels of polity, but the policy outputs or institutional 
changes that these interactions have produced are neither comparable in magnitude nor in 
leverage to the three axes drawn above.
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Chapter 8: Critique and ways forward
Making cities work by embracing local politics
In the analysis provided I have tried to address Soja’s (Soja 1989: 155, cf. 
CHAPTER ONE) critique o f Giddens “dip [ping] into empirical analysis at will 
and without commitment to any but his own framework o f interpretation.” I 
have done so by working towards an amalgamation o f empirical analysis 
with different interpretative frameworks in order to understand the ‘not-so- 
light footprints’ (cf. Paris 2004) that external actors of ‘reconstruction’ are 
leaving on city politics and urban governance while trying to bring about 
“development and prosperity for all,” as Abrahamsen (2001: 14) rags, 
through enthusiastic agendas o f ‘decentralisation’ and ‘empowerment’.
In review, my analysis o f secondary and primary data reveals a significant 
explanatory value o f space while also confirming the importance o f time as 
analytical categories. Unlike the colonial rulers o f Freetown and the 
indigenous reformers o f Kabul, today’s key players are equally central to the 
institutionalisation of governance, but are not stationed permanently at the 
loci o f their interaction, and hence are not subjects to the norms and codes 
that they have devised, implemented, and reinforced. Thus, contrary to the 
attempts o f British colonialists to detach themselves completely from ‘the 
natives’ and their failure to absorb what was then an ‘Afghan void’ and to 
remote-control it from Kabul or, better even, from India, intervention by 
international actors today is feasible in principle without making potentially 
painful long-term commitments ‘on the ground.’ Remote control is possible 
(cf. Risse 2005). Under this impression, it seems fair to speak with some 
confidence o f a ‘second spatial turn’ as already suggested at the beginning of  
this thesis. Unlike Cockbum’s (1977) ‘local state,’ cities in fragile states do 
not reflect the structures o f national and international capitalism but bear the 
structural outcomes o f cooperation, collusion, and coercion between central 
government and international actors in the name o f ‘reconstruction.’
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My proposition o f externally driven structuration should not be equated with 
conspiracy theory. International organisations do not aim at ‘taking over’ 
post-war countries, and the ongoing debate among academics and 
practitioners about how to leave the lightest footprint possible and also work 
toward a politically responsible withdrawal is not a facade o f a hidden agenda. 
Yet this absence o f intention does not contradict the evidence o f tri-axial 
urban governance and its impacts on the city. Arguably, the key to 
understanding the processes o f tri-axial urban governance in fragile states 
lies in analysing the conceptual flaws, and not the intentions, o f international 
actors’ agendas. These entail the prevailing obsession with presumably 
apolitical strategies, the distrust in local capacity, the lack o f  clarity with 
respect to committing to a long-term process, and the apparent conceptual 
dearth between the two positions o f ‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’ 
on one end (cf. Paris 2004), and liberalism cum nationalism on the other. In 
the absence o f alternative approaches, it is no surprise that initially optimistic 
predictions regarding the extent o f achieving ‘local ownership’ (Chesterman 
2002: 41)— not only o f development, but also of governance structures—  
have been frustrated in both countries.
At the same time, while Pierre’s (2005: 459, cf. CHAPTER SEVEN) definition 
o f urban governance as an analytical tool is opportune, one may nonetheless 
also want to reflect on how the findings o f this study can inform 
policymaking in and for post-war intervention cities— and potentially others 
as well— on the normative plane. Urban regime analysis, for instance, has 
equally been pushed recently towards more normative grounds (Stone 2005: 
328, 334-335). While substantive multi-sectoral foreign involvement in 
conflict contexts does seem to render ‘target’ cities ‘extraordinary’ with 
respect to resources at stake and ensuing political pressures as well as priority 
policy areas, this does not negate the insights from ‘ordinary’ cities; rather, 
the resultant reduction of local political space and pre-determined policy 
options serves to amplify Robinson’s (2006) call to take urban politics 
seriously. This will be necessary to widen the straightjacket o f de facto 
economic structures and discourses beyond the city level and to harness, to 
the extent possible, ‘the pragmatism of developmentalist approaches’ (ibid.). 
But rather than being guided by a private sector driven ‘equality of
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opportunity,’ the compromise sought must include measures to achieve 
greater “equality o f agency” across levels o f polity (cf. Rao and Walton 2004: 
359, 367, cf. Satterthwaite 2005, Mollenkopf 1989, Moe 2005), even more so 
because contributions on the options for dealing with fragile states continue 
maintaining an outside fixation, exercised either through fiducial 
management or by exerting direct influence and supervision o f policy­
making in all areas o f social and economic significance. Andreas son (2005, 
cf. Krasner 2005) explains,
“Even in instances o f emphasising (internal) agency over structure as do Bates 
[1981, 1999] and van de Walle [2001], the process o f  privileging external solutions 
remains firmly rooted at the ideational and discursive levels, whether or not it is the 
objects o f development themselves who are to adapt to and implement these 
solutions.”
Conversely, political mobilisation is not an objective; political monitoring is 
suggested instead to act as an early warning mechanism to cushion the 
operational autonomy enjoyed by international organisations (Klingebiel 
2005). Such ‘external views’ that also purport the inevitability o f remote- 
controlled governance without properly investigating ex ante the political 
diversity on the ground and potentially resulting opportunities for local 
leadership is rendered highly dubious in light o f the findings o f this study. 
Exceptions from this pattern exist. Where ineffectiveness o f international aid 
for post-war reconstruction has not been explained with ‘technical problems’ 
during the implementation phase, focusing instead on the reliability and 
visibility o f political will, analyses have indeed demonstrated shortcomings 
by international agencies rather than local partners or institutions (e.g., 
Goodhand 2004: 50-51). Yet with respect to the political processes across 
different levels o f polity that are taking place around concrete policies for 
the city, much remains to be explored. This thesis has tried to narrow this 
gap. Certainly, there is no need anymore to search for a rationale. In his 
discussion of urban reinvention in Africa, Bouillon (2002: 86) puts this 
candidly: “[T]he local town in its physical and administrative reality is the 
first locality/local-city, as it occupies the bottom levels o f [...] political 
communities.” This serves as yet another reminder o f Bollens’ (2006) 
characterisation o f urban places’ potential for peacebuilding with which this 
study has been introduced. But their implications are translatable into
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practice only if “‘tougher’ notions o f public space” (Robins 1993, cf. 
McCann 2002: 78, Holston and Appadurai 1996, Holston 1995) are 
embraced — not only in theory, but also in practice. The channels for co­
determining the creation o f workable cities from below thus remain an area 
o f trial and error. Harvey (2000: 184) has recalled Foucault’s notion o f the 
urban heterotopia, introduced in his Order of Things (1970) and later also applied 
to political spaces (1986), as an alternative space o f “choice, diversity, and 
difference.” Yet the vital question is how this heterotopia could be made to 
fulfil the functions that make a city viable and economically sustainable, in 
particular with respect to a robust local tax base. ‘Classic’ answers to this 
would be straightforward indeed: no urban bourgeoisie, no democracy (Moore 
1966). Still, a developmental role o f municipalities would have to be balanced 
by furthering political inclusion and demonstrating a commitment to service 
provision even under the most deprived conditions due to the simple fact 
that the poor tend to benefit less from sudden increases in urban economic 
outputs but overproportionally from increased efficiency and coverage in 
service delivery (Amis 2002: 109).
O f course, reconstructing the city while neglecting rural areas would not only 
be unsustainable but also potentially sow the seeds for new outbreaks of  
violence (Magnus and Naby 2002: 196). However, in light o f the prevalent 
focus on rural areas in the two cases investigated, one is reminded o f  
Mamdani’s (1996) proposition to bridge the rural and the urban by 
transforming the nature o f power in both spheres, and in a democratic and 
non-coercive manner. Similarly, Johnson and Leslie (2002a: 871) have 
pleaded for an approach to reconstruction that recognises both rural and 
urban needs. It is clear that income opportunities in rural areas in the 
countries discussed here are worse than in the two capital cities. Nonetheless 
and in light of the strong urban appeal, Richards (2005: 586) suggestion that 
development policy should concentrate on creating agrarian incomes for 
youngsters is rendered questionable,86 and options that lie in the urban 
rather than the rural economy need to be taken much more seriously.
86 Rather odd, this is also echoed by the same author’s (1996: 163) conclusion that 
“[cjitizens of weak but modem state in Africa need and deserve room for creative 
manoeuvre if they are successfully to build islands of security and archipelagos of peace with 
the limited material resources at their disposal.”
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Implications for policymaking
The significant degree o f political friction in Freetown and Kabul coupled 
with the importance o f the two cities for national politics and development 
renders any sustainable progress towards ‘peace’ unlikely if the novercal 
treatment o f urban governance observed in 2004 and 2005 remained the 
modus operandi o f  both national and international actors (cf. Homer-Dixon 
1999). Yet we would fool ourselves if  we ignored that the latter’s focus on 
strengthening structures, exemplified by calls to “redouble their efforts to 
build effective state institutions” (Paris 2004: 224), is very much in line with 
the expectation o f  global organisations.
A recent UN report (UN ECOSOC 2006: 8) declares, “Promoting effective 
decentralization continues to be a core element o f the UN-Habitat strategy 
to strengthen the capacities o f  local authorities as first-tier providers o f basic 
services, to improve local governance and to deepen democracy at the local 
level.” Still, this study suggests that any such efforts will only be effective if  
political agendas and agency at all levels is acknowledged. This would require 
a determined turn in donor policy. The key factor constraining this seems to 
be the fear o f ‘the political’ and the resulting argument that ‘stability’ is 
needed instead.
Such a preference among bilateral and multilateral donor agencies after the 
cessation o f violent turmoil is understandable, and it mirrors the hopes o f  
the millions living in these countries. But its translation into anti-political 
practice is highly questionable. For instance, the international community’s 
goal o f “restoring” local polity in Sierra Leone (e.g., UNDAF 2003: 10) 
accepted the danger that the structural violence emanating from the large- 
scale exclusion prior to the outbreak o f hostilities in 1991 be replicated. 
Resembling the findings o f this study, Jackson (2005: 56) therefore rightly 
felt “alarmed” (ibid.) by conversations
“with government officials who see the pre-war period as some kind o f perfect 
system that needs to be rebuilt and to see this reflected in some donor reports. It is 
closely linked to the denial o f the war itself within Freetown [...] in that there is a 
belief that during the war the bureaucracy somehow heroically kept the country 
going in the face o f barbarism.”
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This laudable critique by a senior international civil servant notwithstanding, 
the same normative agenda also governed reconstruction in Afghanistan. 
Schetter (2006) argues,
“Without doubt, Afghanistan nowadays resembles a large ‘re-education’ camp in 
which numerous [international] organisations are trying laboriously to spread and 
institutionalise modern values and norms, even though this is effort is proceeding in 
parallel with a devaluation o f Afghan self-esteem, [author’s translation]”
How such approaches can possibly create viable countries and cities remains 
dubious. Still, the concept o f ‘tri-axial urban governance’ helps us 
understand where and why city politics in post-war intervention settings 
originate and how it plays out. There is some evidence o f development 
agencies acknowledging a need for national governments to “let cities go” 
(ADB 2006: 2). Yet they remain reluctant to translate this claim into the 
sphere o f political agency. It is one o f the “truisms o f political economy” 
that aid is a “source o f power and enrichment,” as Brynen (2005: 244) points 
out. But the challenge is really that the political consequences o f this 
characteristic feature o f aid is not always understood by agency personnel on 
the ground “whose analyses may be shaped by either the universalist, non- 
discriminatory, need-oriented ethos o f humanitarian relief work, or by the 
technical parameters o f their particular sectoral speciali2ations.” (ibid.)
Likewise, in his article on designing democratic institutions in ethnically and 
politically divided societies, Horowite (1993: 36) has described the risk that 
existing incentive structures o f politicians are not being taken into account 
when devising modifications (one could call this an ex-ante deficiency). As 
this thesis has shown, international actors were relatively more worried 
about newly designed institutions that might, later on, fail to take effect 
(which could be called an ex-post deficiency). Brynen’s (2005: 246) warning 
that it would “be ludicrous, however, if Afghanistan were held to a level o f  
apolitical economic planning that would be alien to most donor countries or 
UN member states” therefore touches on a fundamental challenge o f post­
war urban recovery, and it is indeed vital “to find ways o f doing things that 
contribute to sustainable social and economic development as m il as political
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consolidation, to patronage and institution building, to both peace and 
prosperity, (ibid.)” While ideal type solutions would require interventions at 
all levels, scarcity dictates their scope and scale, and requires prioritisation. In 
a context o f resource constraints and high political stakes at the national 
level (both ‘at home’ and in the intervention country), decision-making 
matrices o f international actors are facing a set o f awkward questions: 
Should services be massively stepped up to increase public well being? 
Should public policy focus on achieving inclusion and work towards equity? 
Or, should investment be facilitated to boost productive capacity? Moreover, 
does urban policy need to focus on all urban functions, or is prioritisation 
more effective? Is it necessary to accept that asking these questions imply 
possible trade-offs with national stability?
Kabul’s development potential can be maximised only if  residents’ concerns 
and priorities are taken seriously. If Kabul is to fulfil key urban functions as 
a city, namely to serve as a centre o f  economic recovery, to generate 
sustainable livelihoods for residents and in-migrants, but also to develop into 
a place where residents possess and use “political capital” (Beall 2005b) by 
shaping debates and participating in representative decision-making, then 
“new modes o f flexible planning need to be developed. [...] While 
infrastructure-based development projects are important, so too are 
approaches to urban development that build the capacity o f modem urban 
governance by encouraging citizen consultation and participation.” (Beall 
and Esser 2005b: 1) All actors involved in shaping governance therefore 
need to recognise the political nature o f the process and try to work towards 
coalitions that do not only give consideration to their own priorities, but also 
improve the prospects for flourishing urban centres without restricting 
residents’ freedom to revert to both voice and public control. As this study 
has shown, the experience o f disinterest or exploitation by the central state 
served as triggers that fuelled uprisings among the rural population. A dual 
strategy is therefore necessary to anchor productive assets within the urban 
realm but also to generate additional value for the national economy with the 
help o f capital city-based institutions that coordinate a countrywide process 
of economic recovery.
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The general thrust o f this conclusion also applies to Sierra Leone. A reform 
o f local property laws, particularly in the context o f the illegal occupation 
and investment restrictions, would not only have implications for rural 
livelihoods (cf. van der Veen 2003: 102-103), but also for the urban economy 
(cf. Roberts 1982: 301). This suggests that controversial agency by local 
actors in the context o f scarce resources, while vital, is unlikely to produce 
only ‘winners’ (cf. Khan 2002, Skinner 1972). As for managing urban 
growth, Stren’s (1989: 307-308) conclusion that municipalities will have to 
accept and address constructively the “likelihood o f continuing inflow” is an 
important insight for managing growth in Freetown. Rather than adopting 
anti-urban approaches and considering human resource flows as a target o f  
antagonistic policymaking, in-migration needs to be understood as a spatial 
manifestation o f the dominant capitalist discourse and the resulting 
perceptions o f economic opportunities in the urban realm (cf. O’Connor 
1983: 57, 142). The task is thus to accommodate and capitalise on growth, 
and not to send citizens back into rural underdevelopment.
Implications for further research
In light o f the critique brought forward in this study against the trajectories 
of decentralisation and recentralisation strategies in Sierra Leone and 
Afghanistan, respectively, the need to ‘re-empower’ city-level politics, and 
the conceptual step toward cross-level analysis, Young’s (2000: 230-235) 
extension o f Fmg’s (1993, 1999) notion o f ‘decentred decentralisation’ is 
intriguing. Young advocates inter-city coordination at the regional level in 
order to address the imbalance between wealthier and poorer 
neighbourhoods within cities, and to thus overcome the limited responsibility 
o f decentralised units beyond their narrowly drawn ‘legal borders’ through a 
practice o f ‘relational autonomy.’ This concept takes into account virtues o f  
kinship, history, and proximity by altering the local institutional framework 
through the integration of inter-level negotiation rather than an exclusive 
reliance on legal hierarchies between the centre and local. In regional war 
zones, such ‘horizontalisation’ o f development may appear unfeasible at first 
glance. Yet this renders the concept even more tempting in post-war
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intervention contexts. With donors often linking active citizenship to the 
challenge o f service provision— presumably because o f an assumption that 
increased ‘community cohesion’ and ‘social capital’ would somehow ‘jump 
in’ for a lack o f publicly provided services— Young’s perspective on rights 
and citizenship raises an interesting entry point for further research by asking 
to what extent there could be a conflict between the focus on nation 
building on one hand, which inherently emphasises individual rights in the 
context o f an imagined collective, and the collective task o f rebuilding 
communities on the other (cf. Lowndes 1995: 171-174).
Furthermore, if in spite o f related critical observations made over the course 
o f this study all cities could nonetheless be “considered within the same field 
o f analysis” (Robinson 2006: 170) and if policy interventions in any city 
could therefore inform meaningfully policymaking elsewhere, then it would 
make sense to test the proposition o f ‘tri-axial urban governance’ in settings 
comparable to the ones chosen for this study. A windfall gain o f such efforts 
would be that the small TV-problem that the present study has encountered 
could thus be addressed. Two alternative approaches come to mind. The 
first approach would be a rather intrepid endeavour, namely to translate 
lessons learned in Freetown and Kabul to a city in which the political, 
economic, and social institutions are substantially more efficient and equitable 
(e.g., in an industrialised country). Conversely, conceptual transfer appears 
more likely through a second approach. This tactic would test the conceptual 
validity o f ‘tri-axial urban governance’ in other cities in fragile states. As a 
starting point, it may focus on cities on which in-depth research is already 
available, including for instance Kigali (cf. Mamdani 2001), Kinshasa (cf. 
Trefon 2004), Grozny (cf. Gall and de Waal 1998), Colombo (cf. van Horen 
2002) or, tragically, once again Beirut (cf. Hanf 1993, Khalaf 1994). By thus 
applying ‘plausibility probes’ (cf. CHAPTER THREE), this second approach 
would open up expedient opportunities for reflection and refinement o f the 
arguments developed in this thesis.
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Appendices
Annex 1: Guideline fot semi-structured interviews
Guideline for semi-structured interviews 
with municipal and ministerial staff, local and national politicians, urban residents, 
IDPs, grassroot organisers, businesspeople, and international aid workers in
Freetown and Kabul
(1) The city in flux  or stasis:
S  Has this city changed over the course o f the past twenty years? If yes, how?
S  What have the main issues and conflicts been before, during and after the 
war, and which roles did you/other city-based actors play in their contexts?
(2) Priority assessments:
S  What are the political, economic, and social development issues and 
challenges that affect urban recovery, e.g.
—> Polity: system of governance, political activism and freedom o f expression
—> Employment opportunities and income generation
—> Security o f land tenure, access to land and housing; role o f planning
regimes
—» Basic services: water, sewerage, electricity, security, public transport,
education
—» Social inclusion, support networks, reintegration o f perpetrators and
victims
—> Other factors or developments
(3) Current state and history o f politics and coalitions: diversity o f links and leverage 
between local, national and international governmental and non-governmental 
institutions:
S  Source o f and leverage in agenda-setting by different actors
S  Accuracy of needs assessments and impact of aid delivered
S  Formal and informal structures and institutions o f responsibility and 
representation:
—» Who deals (or doesn’t deal) with which issues?
—» On which behalf do these parties claim to act?
—> Which interests do they represent?
S  Effectiveness o f formal and informal accountability relationships
S  Which actions and sacrifices have actors made to achieve their goals, and 
why?
S  Quality o f communication and cooperation in concrete reconstruction 
efforts
S  Has cooperation, where happening, mainly been facilitated/constrained by 
financial, organisational, ethnic, political or interpersonal factors?
(4) Additional issues that the respondent would like to point out or comment on
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Annex 2: Overview of interviewees and data coding
Sierra Leone - #  of informants: 62 Afgh. - #  of informants: 60 total #  of informants: 122
Sierra Leone - #  of data events: 43 Afgh. - #  of data events: 43 total data events: 86
Sierra Leone - #  of interviews: 37 Afgh. - #  of interviews: 37 - of which interviews: 74 (86%)
Sierra Leone - #  of focus groups: 6 Afgh. - #  of focus groups: 6 - of which focus groups: 12 (14%)
Freetown Kabul
code type function
I - semi-structured interview 
FG - focus group
location 
and date
(F= Freetown)
code type function
I - semi-structured interview 
FG - focus group
location 
and date
(K=Kabul)
NPB-F1 FG national opposition 
chairman
national opposition 
secretary general 
national opposition 
regional chairman
F: 1 Dec 04 
F: 1 Dec 04 
F: 1 Dec 04
NPB-K1
NPB-K2
NPB-K3
I
I
I
M P for Kabul City (1X'olesi
Jii&)
nat. ministry, urban 
advisor
nat. ministry, advisor, land 
tenure
k :  3 May 05 
K: 3 July 04 
K: 20 June 04
NPB-F2 I national minister F: 8 Dec 04 NPB-K4 I nat. ministry, senior 
advisor, policing
K: 21 June 04
NPB-F3 I national ministry' 
secretary
F: 30 Nov 04 NPB-K5 I deputy national minister K: 26 June 04
National P olitics/
NPB-F4 I national ministry, dept, 
manager
F: 6 Dec 04 NPB-K6 I nat. ministry, urban 
advisor
K: 24 June 04
Bureaucracy NPB-F5 I national ministry, dept, 
director
F: 30 Nov 04 NPB-K7 I nat. ministry, dept, 
director, housing
K: 14 July 04
NPB-F6 I national coordinator F: 30 Nov 04 NPB-K8 I nat. ministry, dept, 
director, w ater
K: 3 N ov 04
NPB-F7 FG national ministry, 
permanent secretary 
national ministry, dept, 
director
national ministry, 
deputy dept, director 
national ministry, senior 
asst, secretary
F: 26 Nov 04 
F: 26 Nov 04 
F: 26 Nov 04 
F: 26 Nov 04
NPB-K9 
NPB-K10 
NPB-Klie *!
I
I
I
nat. ministry, dept, 
director, public health 
nat. ministry, dept, 
director, environment 
nat. ministry, provincial 
representative (Ghazni)
K: 3 N ov 04 
K: 3 N ov 04 
2 May 05
Local P olitics/
LPB-Fle ! FG param ount chief 
(supports opposition) 
local council member
local council m ember
local council m ember
local council secretary
param ount ch ief s 
scribe
W. Ar.: 23 Nov 04 
W. Ar.: 23 N ov 04 
W. Ar.: 23 N ov 04 
W. .Ar.: 23 N ov 04 
W. .Ar.: 23 N ov 04 
W. Ar.: 23 N ov 04
LPB-Kle ;
LPB-K2 *
LPB-K3
LPB-K4a
LPB-K4b
LPB-K5
I
I
I
I
I
I
municipality, senior 
management (Herat) 
municipality, dept, 
director, sanitation 
municipality, dept, 
director, construction 
municipality, dept, 
director, policy 
municipality, dept, 
director, policy 
provincial court chairman
27 July 04 
K: 3 N ov 04 
K: 22June 04 
K: 22June 04 
K: 3 N ov 04 
K: 10 July 04
Bueraucracy " LPB-F2e" I district doctor, 
appointed by ministry
W. .Ar.: 23 Nov 04 LPB-K6 I district repres., partly 
unplanned area 1
K- 28 O ct 04
LPB-F3 I city council, middle 
m anagement
F: 1 Dec 04 LPB-K7 1 district repres., partly 
unplanned area 2
K: 31 O ct 04
LPB-F4
LPB-F5
I
I
city council, senior 
management 
city council, leader
F: 8 Dec 04 
F: 8 Dec 04
LPB-K8 FG district shura rep., planned 
area 2
district wakil-e-gospr, 
planned area 2
K: 31 O ct 04 
K: 31 O c t 04
LPB-F6 I city council, senior 
m anagement
F: 1 Dec 04 LPB-K9 FG district shura rep., 
unplanned area 2 
district shura rep. (female), 
unp). area 2
K: 31 O ct 04 
K: 31 O c t 04
IBA-F1 I W orld Bank 
decentralisation analyst
F: 22 Nov 04 IBA-K1 I bilateral agency, urban 
advisor
K: 8 Aug 04
IBA-F2 I UN specialised agency, 
head, statistics
F: 17 Nov 04 IBA-K2 I UN specialised agency, 
urban progr. mgr.
K: 22 June 04
IBA-F3 I bilateral agency, 
governance advisor
F: 26 Nov 04 IBA-K3 I bilateral urban 
emergencies advisor
DC: 23 Mar 04
IBA-F4 I UN specialised agency, 
country rep., IDPs
F: 23 Nov 04 IBA-K4 I in tem at contractor for 
bilat. agency
K: 8 Aug 04
Intemat. /  Bilat. 
Gov. Agencies
IBA-F5 I bilateral agency, 
decentralisation advisor
F: 22 Nov 04 IBA-K5 I intemat. advisor 1 to  n a t  
ministry
K: 6 Aug 04
IBA-F6 I U N D P senior advisor F: 29 Nov 04 IBA-K6 I intem at. advisor 2 to nat. 
ministry
K: 4 Jul 04
IBA-F7 I W orld Bank 
decentralisation advisor
F: 6 Dec 04 IBA-K7 I UN specialised agency, 
chief techn. adv.
K 19June 04
IBA-F8 I UNAMSIL advisor F: 19 Nov 04 IBA-K8e
1BA-K9e ;
"IBA-Kib'e":1
IBA-Klle I 
•
I
I
I
I
UN specialised agency, 
provincial mgr. (Herat)
UN specialised agency, 
regional coord. (Herat) 
bilateral agency, regional 
representative (Herat)
UN specialised agency, 
head o f  reg. Office (Herat)
27 July 04 
26 July 04 
25 July 04 
25 July 04
Non-Gov. Sector 
(service delivery)
NG-F1
NG-F2
NG-F3
I
I
I
IN G O  advocacy coord, 
multi-sector 
IN G O  programme 
asst., peacebuilding 
local N G O  director, 
multi-sector
F: 29 Nov 04 
F: 26 Nov 04 
F: 3 Dec 04
NG-K1
NG-K2
NG-K3
I
I
I
intemat. consultant (for 
research IN G O )
IN G O , legal advisor, 
refugees and ID Ps 
IN G O , programme mgr., 
urban architecture
Kj  6 May 05 
K: 5 Aug 04 
K: 3 May 05
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NG-F4 FG bilateral aid agency; 
country rep. F: 30 N ov 04
NG-K4 I UN spec, agency, country 
rep., refugees
IO 2 Aug 04
bilateral aid agency; NG-K5 FG IN G O  senior programme 10 27 A pr 05
progr. coordinator F: 30 Nov 04 mgr., multi-sector
bilateral aid agency: IN G O  project supervisor, K: 27 Apr 05
project manager F: 30 N ov 04 local governance
NG-F5 I IN G O  country 
director, multi-sector F: 3 Dec 04
IN G O  project supervisor, 
infrastructure
10 27 A pr 05
NG-F6 I IN G O  country 
director, rehabilitation F: 29 N ov 04
IN G O  project supervisor, 
cash-for-work
K: 27 A pr 05
NG-F7 I IN G O  country 
director, food aid F: 6 Dec 04
NG-K6 FG IN G O  program m e 
manager, cash-for-work
K: 11 May 05
NG-F8 I IN G O  country 
director, multi-sector F; 26 N ov 04
IN G O  project manager, 
education
hi: 11 May 05
NG-F9 I IN G O  progr. manager, 
governance F: 22 N ov  04
NG-K7 I IN G O  a ss t country 
director, multi-sector
K: 2 3 June 04
NG-F10 I IN G O  country 
director, disability F: 29 N ov 04
NG-K8 I IN G O  country director, 
m icro-finance
10 17 June 04
NG-F11 1 IN G O  country 
director, children F: 2 Dec 04
NG-F12 I IN G O  advisor, 
refugees and IDPa F: 7 Dec 04
CS-F1 1 civil rights organisation, 
former chairman F; 3 /5  Dec 04
CS-K1 I senior academic, former 
nat. m inister
K: 15 May 05
CS-F2 FG self-help group, 
chairman 
self-help group, 
chairlady 
self-help group, 
secretary general 
self-help group, 
financial secretary 
self-help group, public 
relations officer 
self-help group, 
member
F: 5 Dec 04 
F: 5 Dec 04 
F: 5 D ec 04 
F: 5 Dec 04 
F: 5 Dec 04 
F: 5 Dec 04
CS-K2 FG local (urban) shura 
representative (male) 
local (urban) shura 
m em ber (male) 
local (urban) shura 
m em ber (male) 
local (urban) shura 
m em ber (male) 
local (urban) shura 
m em ber (male) 
local (urban) shura 
m em ber (male)
10 30 Apr 05 
K: 30 A pr 05 
10 30 A pr 05 
K: 30 A pr 05 
K: 30 A pr 05 
10 30 Apr 05
CS-F3 FG civil rights organisation. local (urban) shura 10 30 Apr 05
Civil Society (civic/ progr. officer F: 26 N ov 04 m em ber (female)civil rights organis., local (urban) shura 10 30 Apr 05
political focus) asst, progr. officer F: 26 N ov 04 m em ber (female)
civil rights organisation. CS-K3 FG youth m ovem ent leader I 10 14 May 05
project officer F; 26 N ov 04
CS-F4 I civil rights organisation, 
director F: 7 Dec 04
youth m ovem ent leader 2 10 14 May 05
CS-F5 I lawyer, former 
committee chairman F; 19 N ov 04
youth m ovem ent leader 3 10 14 May 05
CS-F6 I youth m ovement leader F; 6 Dec 04 youth m ovem ent leader 4 IO 14 May 05
CS-F7 I religious body, national 
gen. secretary F; 7 Dec 04
CS-K4 I civil rights organisation, 
chairman
lO 16 June 04
CS-F8 I human rights 
movement, nat. leader F: 7 Dec 04
CS-F9 I academic researcher, 
local university F: 6 Dec 04
CS-F10 I youth movement 
coordinator F: 6 Dec 04
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Annex 3: Images
All photos have been taken by the author.
SIAM STEVENS STREET
1) Youth riot in Freetown, November 2004
& i
2) Freetown Municipality in December 2004
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3) The Amputees’ Association in Aberdeen Camp, Freetown, December 2004
269
4) Going shopping in Freetown, December 2004
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MAYOR WANTS PROBK ON I 1500 Mi l .LION SXMTIMR
rUpkmmt moulderi at Him knxHtd g a mttgc
Fodav Mannah - trapped in house lie
was it a bank loan  -  or money lie saved?
The M »\or o f  Cm Council pension funds 
Freetown. WiMUmley held in (he U K and whs 
Htnkole-Johnson hat both ihc Local Gmcrmtxnl 
refuted to accept the minister Siddiquc Bnnia 
non-function* I ureci V,ce President Solomon  
iwocper which former Bcrcwa g«\c ihcir apprmal 
Crty Council chairman, m ihu scheme 
Horn Ferpmon chums illegal
to tars* houghi frr dose k former Cit> Council 
to 200.000 pmmdt uNiator told our paper thai
tachrucalh 11 u n  "wrong 
According in \ t r \  and lh.faf for government 
mhahte amrcna ihenew to K j,k a guarantee 
City fo u n c i l  t% now Aikmiag torwmun 10 raid 
demanding • ft»H tm I L fund
unman* m p n r  atto A p en s .o r fund i t  
Mm H vp an en  raided «uhftshcd 10. mn ft* jet,
The general manager of the National Power Authority 
lodny Mannah. hat g i\cn  two conflicting accounts o f  
how he obtained the inonet to build two houses ,u Godcnch 
simultaneously
In «ir las* issue (no -7 *  hrnjav AfcnvmVr IX we 
exposed the fad that Mr Mannah. who look m et run 
nwgol'NPA in 2*W»2 on Slate House directive*. {A r  \/M  
Hoant ibt! m u i f •/tom him at hi* /itsI Mfc’n v u f  was 
building two nun&Kirw near VIMCET in Godcneh 
When wc vontxicd Mr Mamuh to probe him over how 
he got the iikw o. he claimed to hat*. u \o d  $5.tilU ~fntm 
the time / u%t* \*orlp9g in Anon* o 
However he alv> told our x v  reporter Huiarr Koroma 
that he had taken out a hank kvin to purehavc the Goderich 
land and begin construction
Meanwhile neighbours have exposed Mr Mamah's cc- 
ccnov housebuilding sMc
"Whenever he ncmms fivnt j  t^p ihrvad Ik changer the 
architectural design o f  ihe i-aiiAfV' Vrp^cntb he worm 
hit houses took tike Oh west mode.* ui South Africa 
Lib* a or wherever he fw-* a teighbour »4d us 
Mr Mannah m»J he * changed the structure <*wc
iiorn Any other use o f  the 
monc> is illegal
The C m  Council’s former 
Icgol adv ise r, N ich o las  
B ro w n -M ark c . w a s n ’t 
consulted before the pen­
sion fund was raided 
M eanw hile  the w h ile  
e lep h an t o f  a s tre e t 
sweeper is parked at the
Blackwood Hodge garage in 
Kiw> Dockyard
A BnUsh expert, who works 
for U N A M S IL . sa id  the 
machine was not suitable for 
Sierra Leone
"W lw escr bought it failed to 
take  co g n isan ce  o f  the 
specifics o f Sierra Leone s 
rubbish problem
S) The “w hite elephant’ (PEEPIMagazine, 1 December 2004, page 2)
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OSE CO SntY O iE  PEOPLE
6) Opposition billboard in the capital city, Freetown, Novem ber 2004
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7) Sewerage crisis in Kabul, July 2004
273
8) Hillside settlement in Kabul, January 2005
274
9) A new style for Kabul, May 2005
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10) What became of the ministry? Kabul, June 2004
11) What is wrong with a 16 year-old plan for a Ministry o f Nationaliti [s/c] and Tribes? 
Kabul, July 2004
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German CIMIC Rebuilds 
Police Station
The newly reconstructed police Marion 1,1 
PuUct Dim net H offuaall) reopened »»n “ 
April 2005. The German < IMH »c*n>.In ’’ 
ongoing project to refurbish the |» l i“  
station* in Kabul, spent t'SS2H*VMi **id *<> 
month* rccnmn u<nng the 5^ rooms of the 
two «tory headquarters. Ministry o f the 
Interior representatives Chief of IVilice 
General Haoxm Asifi. security *>M*tant 
General Shatiq. Commander of ISM * 
Kabul Multi National Unmade (KMNU) 
Brigadier General Berk, x German cmhasst 
delegate, and Kabul C hief of Police 
( tcncral Mohammed Alt ram K hakrc/ual 
.«ft ended the opening ceremony.
11
French Soldiers Provide 
Medical Care in Shamali
Throe doctors and five nurses of the French 
ban»li»n ..f ISAf- ironed.m ore than 150 
p40 tn:> < ner a four hour period on 26 .March 
Jtlii' tn the Shamali area north nt Kabul. 
I lie  doenrnt trcaiol men. uom cn. and 
children at three aid p»»r^ Medicines tavre 
provided for people suffering from heart 
disease, age related diseases, leishmaniasis, 
malnutrition, and m one case polity One 70 
year old man was evacuated m a hospital in 
Kabul with a badly infected hand in tun 
sustained as the result o f a truck accident.
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UK CIMIC Supplies 
Khaja Rawash School
O n 27 March 2<K)S. tbe ISA! t mtcd 
Kingdom (I'K ) CIMIC team provided three 
canvas classrooms to K hau Rawash Middle 
Schcxd in Kabul T he new classnxima 
provide a venue to assist m educating some 
o f  the 2.000 student* al the school. 
Members o f  the Regiment o f  Ghurkha* 
and local contractors completed erection o f 
the tent* in only two hours. The company 
licolog funded the project. The ISAF l-K  
CIMIC team is hoping to provide desks fo* 
the school in the near future.
S panish  Troops Help 
D isp lac ed  P eo p le
Sp»mth Mikiicn made the U« o f ranc 
tlclivrnci o f humaniLuun aid coniMiinji o f 
1.5 tonnct of d n fh n , ih o o , and hlan lns to 
seven camps housing more than 4.500 
displaced people on 11 March 2(105. The 
Spanoh contingent of ISAI provided 
aauatancc to r»-o central Kabul orphanti){e» 
and an admission centre for horn cleat 
* « n e n  and children as sss-11 „  medio ncs to 
the Indira fihandi. and Malana and 
Lmhmanaasiv Hospitals. The camp, arc 
located in Dtnrictr 15. 14. 11, t ■ aiut Ptd-i ChaAhl. ana * V » * *JJAJ
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12) ISAF does urban development as w ell... (ISAF News 79, 20 April 2005, page 11)
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